the causal connection may not always be sufficient for knowledge. Consider the fake barn scenario. — Andrew M
This is more or less a typical Gettier case because the conclusion is an existential claim that is true in virtue of the existence of some particular: it is true that there is a cow in the field because this particular cow, let's call her Alice, is in the field. — Srap Tasmaner
My way of putting this raises some issues though: in what sense is the farmer's belief about Alice? This doesn't look good at all. Since Alice played no role in the farmer's belief formation, it's pretty clear Alice is no part of the content of the farmer's belief. Alice does play a part in the existential claim; Alice is what makes that claim true. — Srap Tasmaner
...he might have seen Alice and mistaken Alice for a bit of cloth flapping in the breeze — so not seen that Alice is a cow — and formed the mistaken belief that there's a bit of cloth in the field, which might also be Gettierly true. — Srap Tasmaner
...I don't think there is a remaining problem with the existential generalization after all because we can just enumerate it: if Alice, Bobbie, Clarabelle, and Dixie are the cows in the field, then the truth of such an existential claim as we're concerned with is a truth about at least one of those: one of those four ought to play a causal role in the farmer's belief, expressed as an existential generality...
...Suppose the farmer thinks the cow he's seeing is Clarabelle, when it's Alice, even though Clarabelle is out there in the dark. — Srap Tasmaner
@creativesoul, I think some of your concerns are addressed above. — Srap Tasmaner
My point is that if one wants to deduce conclusions from premises based on formal logic, then the meaning of the terms is irrelevant — neomac
The meaning of terms used to construct premises and deduce conclusions is irrelavent? I don't think I agree. — Benj96
I already highlighted precisely what I meant by H, A and W — Benj96
Some people think that there is no knowledge in Gettier cases, but that there is justified true belief. Hence they conclude that the JTB definition is inadequate. Others, like me, think that the JTB is correct, (subject to some caveats). They think that if there is no knowledge, there cannot be justified true belief. The question comes down to whether the main character's belief is justified or not; the stories create situations in which it isn't possible to give a straight answer. Or that's my view. — Ludwig V
Well if a valid deduction is enough to be deductively justified — neomac
If the cow that he doesn’t know about is the one that establishes the truth, then he didn’t know there was a cow in the field. — Ludwig V
There certainly seems to be a problem about the farmer’s belief that a piece of cloth is a cow. You seem to be assuming that in reporting the farmer’s beliefs, you need to use words that he would have done, and he certainly wouldn’t have said that a piece of cloth was in the field. — Ludwig V
I would just add, though, that the causal connection may not always be sufficient for knowledge. Consider the fake barn scenario. In that case, the traveler in fake barn country does see an actual barn, so the appropriate causal connection is present. But he doesn't know it because he was lucky. The false lemma in this case is that he implicitly assumes that this region is like any other where fake barns are a rarity. — Andrew M
I'm arguing against using words that the farmer would have used at the time, for he did not know that he believed a piece of cloth was a cow... pace Moore's paradox. Nevertheless, the farmer most certainly believed that a piece of cloth was a cow. — creativesoul
The farmer certainly did not believe that a piece of cloth was a cow; how could he, since he didn't know it was a piece of cloth, and if he had known it was a piece of cloth, then how could he believe it to be a cow? He believed (erroneously) that he was looking at a cow, when he was actually looking at a piece of cloth. — Janus
There is no puzzle there of the kind that you seem to be attempting to nurture by virtue (or vice) of ambiguous usage of language (that is by substituting what we might say about the farmer's belief for how he would put his belief into words, to arrive at an absurd paradox, "believing that a piece of cloth is a cow", that might engender the illusion that it is of some significance, when it really is not). — Janus
valid deduction is often expected to conserve justification and to conserve knowledge, just as it conserves truth. — Srap Tasmaner
The awkward bit in the Gettier cases is the possibility of partial justification. — Ludwig V
If the farmer saw a cow, there is a specific cow that he saw. If the cow that he doesn’t know about is the one that establishes the truth, then he didn’t know there was a cow in the field. — Ludwig V
I’m not happy with the causal theory of perception (though I’m not up to date with more recent ideas about it.) because what we see is so heavily dependent on interpretation, which doesn’t fit happily with causality. — Ludwig V
Which, again, is why the farmer won't feel nearly such a fool if it turns out to be Clarabelle, even if he's very surprised, because he will still have gotten a lot right.
(I was going to head in a completely different direction, so I'll wait to see what people think of this before trotting out alternative analyses.) — Srap Tasmaner
If I see something in field that I think is a sheep, am I justified in believing it is a sheep if I don't take the trouble to move closer and examine it to see if it really is a sheep, or shout to make it move or whatever? It might not be what people ordinarily do, but is that any justification for failing to investigate, and for forming an insipid conception of justification itself? — Janus
However it seems to me that even if seeing the cloth is accepted as justification for believing there is a sheep in the field, it could only be justification for believing that the apparent "sheep" (the cloth) was in the field, not some other unseen sheep that just happened to be there unbeknownst to me. — Janus
As I say above I would go further and say it is an unjustified false belief due to lack of proper investigation, because I have no business believing a cloth is a sheep, if I'm not close enough to it to be sure, or if I haven't seen it moving around and grazing like a sheep. — Janus
That particular farmer sees that particular piece of cloth in that particular field at that particular time, and mistakenly believes at that particular moment in time that that particular piece of cloth in that particular field is a cow or a sheep(which one does not matter).
Are you denying this? — creativesoul
He believed (erroneously) that he was looking at a cow, when he was actually looking at a piece of cloth. — Janus
OK. But more thorough investigations can involve mistakes. For example, suppose the farmer thought he saw a sheep moving and grazing, but it was a goat (or a robot). — Andrew M
That particular farmer sees that particular piece of cloth in that particular field at that particular time, and mistakenly believes at that particular moment in time that that particular piece of cloth in that particular field is a cow or a sheep(which one does not matter).
Are you denying this?
— creativesoul
Read what has already been written and ye shall be enlightened:
He believed (erroneously) that he was looking at a cow, when he was actually looking at a piece of cloth.
— Janus — Janus
I believe he was. He does seem to have developed that sense of mischief that some logicians have. But there is some fun to be had, as well as the irritation. — Ludwig V
It is tempting to think that when a flaw has been found in a bad argument, it is not necessary to pursue the matter further. But there is more than one problem with Gettier cases, and the expectation that they either meet the definition criteria or they do not is another one; the target proposition is always partly right and partly wrong. — Ludwig V
P1: If doctor X diagnoses a cancer, then there is a cancer
P2: doctor X diagnoses a cancer
C: there is a cancer
One could believe P1 to be true (P1 being the case) and yet not know it to be true.
But in this case again, the term justification wouldn't apply to just valid deductions, they would still need to be sound deductions. — neomac
assess whether JTB is an acceptable definition for the notion of “knowledge — neomac
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