Not exactly, I am just saying that rational thought processes may be going on that we are not aware of. There doesn't seem to be any logical contradiction or impossibility in that conjecture. — Janus

I see no reason to believe that rational thought processes must be executed consciously. If the brain/mind can do strict logic or any other form of associating ideas consciously,why could it not carry on with such processes in the absence of conscious awareness. I mean, maybe it can't do that; but if that were so we would need evidence and an argument to establish it. — Janus

Well, now we've raised the question of whether rational thought processes have to be conscious. I vote yes, but I don't have a definitive argument to back that up.

I agree that intuition probably works by associating images, impressions and concepts. Alchemy, astrology, acupuncture, hermeticism and homeopathy are some examples of ways of intuitively associating qualities of elements, things and processes via perceived similarities or affinities. There is a logic to this, which is not empirically based in our modern scientific understanding, but I would call it rational nonetheless, — Janus

You start out associating intuition with discredited ways of knowing - alchemy, astrology, etc. I don't understand that. Intuition is not something esoteric or mysterious. It's an everyday process our minds use all the time. Then you describe those intuitive processes as a kind of rationality. It seems like you are identifying rationality as anything the mind does to collect information or solve problems.

You start out associating intuition with discredited ways of knowing - alchemy, astrology, etc. I don't understand that. Intuition is not something esoteric or mysterious. It's an everyday process our minds use all the time. Then you describe those intuitive processes as a kind of rationality. It seems like you are identifying rationality as anything the mind does to collect information or solve problems. — T Clark

I'm not trying to diminish intuition. I think it is an imaginative faculty. Those "discredited" (by some) ways of understanding I believe are based on imaginative associations that are intuitively thought to "make sense" or "feel right". I also think there is always an implicit logic in what ties the associations that are made together. For example Mars is the planet associates with the God of war, (and hence we get the word 'martial') because it appears red and red is the colour of blood, which it seems obvious to associate with war.

So I am not claiming that these processes of reasoning are deductively valid or empirically based, but they are different ways of balancing, measuring and associating things which have their own kinds of logic.

The medieval and ancients minds reasoned in these kinds of different ways than modern empirical and deductive minds do. That said, there are still plenty, perhaps even a good majority, of people alive today who think in those 'old' ways.

The other point is that whatever kinds of reasoning a human being consciously deploys to deliberate and arrive at reasoned conclusions, whether they be ancient or modern, in cases where a conclusion is reached "instantly", as we understand it, "via intuition", I still see no reason to deny that these processes of reasoning might go on without conscious awareness. I am not affirming that such reasoning does or can go on unconsciously either; I don't actually have an opinion on the matter.

So I am not claiming that these processes of reasoning are deductively valid or empirically based, but they are different ways of balancing, measuring and associating things which have their own kinds of logic. — Janus

Seems like you are changing the meaning of the word "logic" in mid-discussion. We can leave it at that. If we go on we'll get into more and more nitpicking which I don't think will lead to a satisfactory resolution for either of us. This has been a really good discussion.

Seems like you are changing the meaning of the word "logic" in mid-discussion. — T Clark

Just a final question to consider. In cultures existing prior to, or unaffected by, our current conception of empiric and propositional logic-based reasoning, would you say there was no distinction between rational and irrational thinking, or reasonableness and unreasonableness?

Answer if you wish, or not. In any case I agree it's been a very good discussion. :smile:

In cultures existing prior to, or unaffected by, our current conception of empiric and propositional logic-based reasoning, would you say there was no distinction between rational and irrational thinking, or reasonableness and unreasonableness? — Janus

That's a great question and I know it's directed at @T Clark. If rationality is using knowledge to achieve goals, then probably. But there is always a foundational set of values by which a culture measures itself. Many people believe that reason is synonymous with The Age of Reason - what we call knowledge and the practices this engenders must be arrived at without superstition and with no logical fallacies. At one end of the continuum this is probably scientism.

That's a great question and I know it's directed at T Clark. If rationality is using knowledge to achieve goals, then probably. But there is always a foundational set of values by which a culture measures itself. Many people believe that reason is synonymous with The Age of Reason - what we call knowledge and the practices this engenders must be arrived at without superstition and with no logical fallacies. At one end of the continuum this is probably scientism. — Tom Storm

"If rationality is using knowledge to achieve goals"; that sounds right, and I would include reasoning from existing knowledge/ understanding to enable the drawing of novel conclusions in that.

I agree there are always basic sets of values that cultures understand themselves in terms of. I am not so fond of a narrow conception of reason that understands it as being only that which accords with our Enlightenment and subsequent conceptions of rationality. I think "no logical fallacies" is right, although I think it pays to remember that inductive and abductive ways of reasoning are not bound by deductive criteria of validity. Previous cultures may have held what we would call superstitions as foundational premises upon which to reason and arrive at the "inferences to the best explanations" they were able to derive.

Sociopaths can be highly strategic and able to make complex plans, but they are not rational — L'éléphant

This is pretty much where I was heading. Do you think that is just a congenital or organic deficiency? Or did they lose or renounce the ability to be rational?

Just a final question to consider. In cultures existing prior to, or unaffected by, our current conception of empiric and propositional logic-based reasoning, would you say there was no distinction between rational and irrational thinking, or reasonableness and unreasonableness? — Janus

Great question. A history of reason would make an interesting read. :chin:

Previous cultures may have held what we would call superstitions as foundational premises upon which to reason and arrive at the "inferences to the best explanations" they were able to derive. — Janus

And this makes it interesting to me. How is a standard of reasonableness determined if superstition and magic are your compass points? I remember sitting with a staunch, right-wing Catholic in a cafe one afternoon. In walked an Islamic family. The Catholic gentleman clucked, shook his head and uttered 'Primitives!' Here's the question - is the secular humanist who regards both my Catholic fella and the Islamic family and their worldviews with dismay any more 'entitled' to his values driven reasoning here?

Just a final question to consider. In cultures existing prior to, or unaffected by, our current conception of empiric and propositional logic-based reasoning, would you say there was no distinction between rational and irrational thinking, or reasonableness and unreasonableness? — Janus

I don't mind trying to answer, but I don't have much insight to offer. To start, I'll say again - irrational and non-rational are not the same thing. Intuition is not irrational, it's non-rational. I don't know what happened in ancient cultures. Julien Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" claimed that consciousness did not develop in humans until about 4,000 years ago. I've always been skeptical of that, but I don't know for sure. As I noted before, I think rational thought is probably not possible without self-awareness. If Jaynes and I are both right, I guess that would mean that there was no rational thought until about 4,000 years ago.

Julien Jaynes in "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" claimed that consciousness did not develop in humans until about 4,000 years ago. — T Clark

Is he talking consciousness or metacognition?

If rationality is using knowledge to achieve goals, then probably. — Tom Storm

If all it takes to be rational is using knowledge to achieve goals, then animals are rational. Any mental process that may lead to action is rational. That takes all the meaning out of the word. It's certainly not how we've been using the word up till now in this discussion.

Is he talking consciousness or metacognition? — Tom Storm

Jaynes defines consciousness as "the human ability to introspect." I interpret that to mean that consciousness is self-awareness - the capacity to think abstractly about ourselves. Does that answer your question?

The definition is Steven Pinker's -

HAVARD GAZETTE: Can you define rationality in a sentence?

PINKER: I define it as the use of knowledge to attain a goal, where “knowledge,” according to the standard philosopher’s definition, is “justified true belief.”

Perhaps this latter bit I left out precludes the animal kingdom.

Lots to take issue with, like JTB.

Does that answer your question? — T Clark

Bingo. Thanks.

I define it as the use of knowledge to attain a goal, where “knowledge,” according to the standard philosopher’s definition, is “justified true belief.” — Tom Storm

Well, I think justified true belief as an explanation of knowledge is wrong-headed, so that doesn't resolve anything for me. No, I don't want to talk about JTB.

I think @joshs would see Pinker as part of an old problem in his fairly traditional notion of and advocacy of reason.

I am happy with Pinker's definition but I recognize its problems. Is not part of the issue that some of us see reason as a superior pathway to truth (small 't') - and let's not get onto that one either.

I am happy with Pinker's definition but I recognize its problems. Is not part of the issue that some of us see reason as superior pathway to truth (small 't') - and let's not get onto that one either. — Tom Storm

I think we're coming up against the problem that we never did define what "rational" means back at the beginning. For me, it means a systematic search for knowledge and understanding following a formal system such as logic, the rules of which are specified in advance. It's probably too late to go into that now.

[...] we never did define what "rational" means back at the beginning. For me, it means a systematic search for knowledge and understanding following a formal system such as logic, the rules of which are specified in advance. — T Clark

To be forthright: First off, as a matter of opinion, we disagree on what the term rational ought to refer to. I for one believe it should be roughly described as “the ability to discern and apply reasons (like causes and motives) and comparisons (with ratios as one example among humans) for the sake of optimally fulfilling goals, be these needs (like physical sustenance so as to maintain physical health) or desires (with improved eudemonia as one example sometimes spoken of by philosophers)”. But, I grant, my definition does not need to be strictly applicable to only humans, and I get that many don’t want to ascribe rationality to any lesser life form. Be this as it may.

An observation based on the quoted definition of “rational”:

So called primitive people that lack rationality as just defined (and which have not been intruded nor in any other significant way influenced by westerners: certain people in the Amazonian forests and Inuit people as two examples) have lived in mutual benefit with their natural environment for as long as they’ve been known to be, resulting in the preservation of a healthy ecology in which they subsist.

We westerners, who as a grouping arguably represent the apex of this rationality as defined, are deteriorating our natural environment to the point of causing the sixth mass extinction, environmental collapse, and our own demise as a people - and this, for the most part, without giving a hoot.

I know there’s bound to be (this from at least some person somewhere), but in assuming no indignantly emotive attempts to rationalize these two just stated facts:

If the cultures in which (your sense of) rationality prevails happen to callously and obliviously bring about the steady obliteration of the inhabitable planet - and, via rational inference, of themselves as a peoples in the process - while those cultures devoid of rationality (as you've defined it) do no such thing, what’s one to make of rationality’s value?

I don’t know, your present definition leaves me with a topsy-turvy feel in this context.

Was René Descartes "questioning rationality"?

First off, as a matter of opinion, we disagree on what the term rational ought to refer to. I for one believe it should be roughly described as “the ability to discern and apply reasons (like causes and motives) and comparisons (with ratios as one example among humans) for the sake of optimally fulfilling goals, be these needs (like physical sustenance so as to maintain physical health) or desires (with improved eudemonia as one example sometimes spoken of by philosophers)”./quote]

It's not a question of what "rational" ought to refer to, it's what it actually does refer to. It doesn't mean just good, effective thinking, at least not in a philosophical context. It has a specific meaning and it's not the one you've given above. It's closer to the one that I've given, although we could argue the specifics.
— javra

If the cultures in which (your sense of) rationality prevails happen to callously and obliviously bring about the steady obliteration of the inhabitable planet - and, via rational inference, of themselves as a peoples in the process - while those cultures devoid of rationality (as you've defined it) do no such thing, what’s one to make of rationality’s value? — javra

Again, it's not my sense of what it means, it's what it actually does mean. You propose a more holistic approach to knowledge and understanding, which I endorse. Rationality is reductionist. Logic only applies to propositions, statements of fact. Question - How many true propositions does it take to paint an accurate picture of reality. Answer - Trick question. Reality can't be described effectively with any number of propositions.

I think we're coming up against the problem that we never did define what "rational" means back at the beginning. — T Clark

Probably right. It might even be instructive to identify that which is irrational. If belief in god is rational (and not everyone agrees) is belief that you are going to burn in hell because you are a sinner irrational?

I don't think it is easy to have a discussion like this without recognising that reason belongs to a web of interrelated ideas and values and any substantive discussion will lead us irrevocably to matters of truth and reality.

I don't think it is easy to have a discussion like this without recognising that reason belongs to a web of interrelated ideas and values and any deep discussion will lead us irrevocably to matters of truth and reality. — Tom Storm

As I noted in my response to @javra, above, I don't think rationality is really capable of dealing with "a web of interrelated ideas and values."

As I noted in my response to javra, above, I don't think rationality is really capable of dealing with "a web of interrelated ideas and values." — T Clark

I struggle to see how it wouldn't if we're exploring reason as a practice to guide human behaviour and choices. I'm not sure how we understand the rational/irrational in isolation without locating this within a set of values and situational exigencies? Maybe I'm missing something.

Again, it's not my sense of what it means, [the description of "rationality" which T Clark previously posted is] what it actually does mean. — T Clark

For the record: Best I could do in finding a good reference for what “rationality” means is this. The SEP section of this article lists seven possible meanings of rationality (without claiming them to be exhaustive), none of which appear to me to coincide with what you claim the official, or formal, meaning of “rationality” is. Particularly, your claim that it be "a systematic search for knowledge and understanding following a formal system such as logic, the rules of which are specified in advance".

If you could provide some reference for the meaning of rationality as you've specified it, I could then learn something new and be more in the know, so to speak.

----------

ps. If interested, a different SEP article on rationality that touches on the topic of this thread. From the first paragraph of the article:

"This thesis appears to threaten the “rational authority” of morality. It seems possible that acting morally on some occasion might not be a suitable means to an agent’s ends. If so, then according to this thesis, it would not be irrational for her to refuse to act morally on such an occasion."

Quite by accident I came across this bit in Dewey (Reconstruction in Philosophy) that nicely contrasts reason in its practical versus its rationalistic guises. It seems to fit with some of the themes that have been emerging. I think I may reread this next. (bolded by me)

"Reason" as a faculty separate from experience, introducing us to a superior region of universal truths begins now to strike us as remote, uninteresting and unimportant. Reason, as a Kantian faculty that introduces generality and regularity into experience, strikes us more and more as superfluous—the unnecessary creation of men addicted to traditional formalism and to elaborate terminology....

...reason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the pattern of science, and used in the creation of social arts; it has something to do. It liberates man from the bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened into custom. It projects a better future and assists man in its realization. And its operation is always subject to test in experience. The plans which are formed, the principles which man projects as guides of reconstructive action, are not dogmas. They are hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires....

In contrast with this experimental and re-adjusting intelligence, it must be said that Reason as employed by historic rationalism has tended to carelessness, conceit, irresponsibility, and rigidity—in short absolutism.

edit: the notion of the bridging of the nomothetic-scientific and the social-hermeutic (which is how Dewey characterizes reason here) is central to Understanding and Explanation by Apel, which I'm currently reading.

I think you're right. Your definition of "rational" is a valid one.

Wait a second. My take so far is that, as of yet, there isn't a settled philosophical definition of what "rational" means. Mine fully included.

Thanks, though, for the tentative approbation.

My take so far is that, as of yet, there isn't a settled philosophical definition of what "rational" means. Mine fully included. — javra

Agreed. As I noted, it's best if definitions are agreed on, or at least discussed, early in a thread.

:up:

They are hypotheses to be worked out in practice, and to be rejected, corrected and expanded as they fail or succeed in giving our present experience the guidance it requires.... — Pantagruel

I guess he's describing a fallibilistic approach.

"Reason" as a faculty separate from experience, introducing us to a superior region of universal truths begins now to strike us as remote, uninteresting and unimportant. — Pantagruel

Possibly what I was getting at when I said that reason can be better understood in the context of situational exigencies.