Bye

That's better: some manners.

“It's also understandable that identity is seen to persist when someone 'loses consciousness', because from everybody else's point of view, the living body remain”

The living body isn’t consciousness. And it’s not identity. When you sleep you are literally unconscious, and lose your identity…. unless you have a lucid dream. Nothing to do with your body, clothes, legal rights, or how other people see you. This seems pretty obvious.

“Why do they have to end up in the materialistic sphere to be considered valid?”

What do you mean by “they?” I’m saying in the case of consciousness (it should be obvious by now) that if an immaterial thing (consciousness) causes a material thing (body) to move, what is the pathway between them? This is honestly pretty basic stuff.

“No biology, no thoughts!”

Thank you.

:up:

It’s funny how panpsychists always want proof for a materialist view of consciousness when there’s zero for panpsychism

More importantly NO Scientist would claim there’s proof that the mind is part of a material brain. It’s all speculation. It’s a …what’s the word….”theory” being explored, just as panpsychism - ex. that a rock has some level of consciousness - is a theory.

Sorry if I’m getting a little snippy. Too many coffees

It’s funny how panpsychists always want proof for a materialist view of consciousness when there’s zero for panpsychism — GLEN willows

There's no proof for any theory of consciousness afaik. It's more a process of figuring out the least problematic one.

Is that what convinces you so strongly? — bert1

It is simple Bert1, I experience my consciousness waking up every morning and fading out every night. Anything else is not consciousness, it is something else.My interest is in understanding this thing that wakes up and goes to sleep, this thing that correlates with the global neural space of your and my brain (see Dehaene), this thing that grows in my brain as we grow and stops as we die, tis thing that Tononi measures using his PHI methodology. This is what is interesting, and I call this "CONSCIOUSNESS" and I'm even more interested in how the SELF comes to mind (as Damasio would call it). All the rest is not interesting for understanding what we're (panpsychism, spiritualism, metaphysics, etc...).

The Self, you, me, is a process that is confined to a synchronous integrated information exchange activity between the cortex pre-frontal ventro-median area and the temporal and parietal (praecuneus) lobes. This is known, it is proof and all the rest is speculation.

There's no proof for any theory of consciousness afaik — bert1

There is, it is you that don't want to see it. Read my post if you're really interested in knowing about consciousness and the self.

Consciousness is a state. — Bartricks

CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT A STATE.
"state" is not the right word to define consciousness, it doesn't help, it is too simplistic. Consciousness has certain characteristics that differentiate it from the state of matter or the state of a system. Consciousness is the result of a dynamic and synchronous exchange of information with a very special function.
Consciousness is more an ability, a funcition that has arise from biological evolution because it has been a competitive advantage for those living beings that developed it but you cannot say that it is just a "state". The word "state" is used differently in current or professional language and it has different connotations that do not help understanding the complexity of consciousness.

But the most important thing why you should not use word "state" for consciousness is that consciousness is not an "ON/OFF" thing while the word "state" suggest it. Consciousness is, let's say, analogical, it grows as you grow and it fades in a gradual way as we get old. And to be more generic, a system could be more or less conscious depending on the grade of functional synchronisation and complexity (see Tononi's PHI)

It is simple Bert1, I experience my consciousness waking up every morning and fading out every night. — Raul

If you're saying that your consciousness depends on you, or that the consciousness of a brain depends on that brain, then I agree. But what justifies the generalisation that only you, or only brains, are conscious?

The thing that wakes up and goes to sleep, is you, I suggest, not consciousness. That is consistent with the view that consciousness, in the sense of the capacity to experience, does not fade in and out.

this thing that grows in my brain as we grow and stops as we die, tis thing that Tononi measures using his PHI methodology. — Raul

Tononi measures the quantity of integrated information. And then he goes on to suggest that consciousness just is integrated information. At best he has a correlation, although I believe that has been challenged (need to look that up). My question for Tononi, and other kinds of functionalists, is "Why can't a system integrate information (or whatever function you want to specify) without being conscious?" To put it another way, what is it about what a system does that demonstrably necessitates it's capacity to experience?

Consciousness is, let's say, analogical, it grows as you grow and it fades in a gradual way as we get old. — Raul

I think I know what you mean, and if so, I think it is based on a confusion between consciousness and the content of consciousness. The content of consciousness changes all the time (what we are experiencing) whereas the fact that we are experiencing something-or-other changes not at all.

But the most important thing why you should not use word "state" for consciousness is that consciousness is not an "ON/OFF" thing while the word "state" suggest it. — Raul

I agree with you that characterising consciousness as a 'state' is wrong, but not for the reason you give. The difference between experiencing something and experiencing nothing can only be a binary difference, no? There's no intermediate state between something and nothing, don't you think?

Why can't a system integrate information (or whatever function you want to specify) without being conscious? — bert1

This is a good question Bert1, the answer is in physics and how complex systems auto-organise. I suggest you read Alberto Felice de Toni for example on how complex systems auto-organise. Do you know Conway's "Game of Life"? It will help you as well understand and get rid of naif intuitions.

Nice easy quiz from Bartricks!

So, to be clear, you think your consciousness is the state of what - an atom? — Bartricks

No, not my consciousness, because I'm not an atom.

You think you're an atom, do you? — Bartricks

I don't. No sir! Not me.

And presumably you think that your body contains billions upon billions of other persons? — Bartricks

Possibly, depending on definitions.

And that everything around you is teeming with billions of persons..? — Bartricks

Maybe, again depending on what a person is.

And to be clear some more: you think the way to solve the problem of how consciousness - which is clearly not a property of matter - could be a property of matter, is to make all matter have it? — Bartricks

It makes it easier, yes.

How does that work? — Bartricks

You stop thinking that only some things are conscious, and you start thinking everything is.

How does that explain anything? — Bartricks

It avoids the problem of explaining why only some things are conscious and not others. If you say there are two types of thing, conscious and non-conscious, it raises the question of why (or perhaps 'how' is a better question) some things are conscious and others are not. This is really really hard. So hard it's called the 'hard problem'. So panpsychism is one theoretical way to avoid the hard problem. The other way is eliminativism, which is to say that nothing is conscious. All three options: panpsychism, emergentism and eliminativism are problematic. Dualism is a bit like emergentism in the problems that it faces, it seems to me.

You think if you multiply the problem enough times, it goes away? — Bartricks

In a way, yes. If we have so much trouble figuring out how matter-structures and how they behave somehow constitute consciousness, then suggesting that consciousness may just be a basic brute property of substance becomes more of a viable theoretical option. I know we should limit the number of fundamental properties as far as we can, after all it is cheating just to suggest that anything we don't understand is just a basic unexplainable fact of the universe, but sometimes such a move is justified. Charge, for example, seems to be one of these, perhaps, I don't know. Maybe spatiality. I don't know enough science to be able to say. I really think we are in that position now with the concept of consciousness.

I think it is based on a confusion between consciousness and the content of consciousness. — bert1

No Bert1, there is not confusion on my side. You weren't born conscious as you re today. The capabilities of your brain have changed. Your brain is born with the potential of being conscious and then it is the environment it grows in that enables and develops your consciousness. Your senses and the funcitonal areas of your brain will make your consciousnes more or less powerful. Ask your parent or your grandparents and they will tell you how their capacity to be consciouss diminish with time. Driving a car for example is not as easy for them as it is for you... The context of consciousness is within the functional areas of the brain that are synchronise (i.e memory, language, vision, etc...)

I agree with you that characterising consciousness as a 'state' is wrong, but not for the reason you give. The difference between experiencing something and experiencing nothing can only be a binary difference, no? There's no intermediate state between something and nothing, don't you think? — bert1

You're wrong, "things" can be experienced in different levels, it is not an ON/OFF. Don't confuse consciousness with experience (as Koch does). Do you think you experience things the same way when you're drunk? Consciousness is not a state as I say above but there re different states of consciousness ....
Consciousness makes experience richer and enables integrating it in a broader way in the "model of the world" that a conscious system has. Would be long... anyway, when you go to sleep you go to sleep gradually independently of what you remember the day after (this is studied and well known).
No one remember anything before having 3 years old because his brain was not ready to store memories and integrate them with your consciousness...

You weren't born conscious as you re today. — Raul

Do you think babies have experiences?

Of course they have experiences but they don't have a mature consciousness and as a consequence they don't have a Self but a kind of proto/primitive self that is arising and that will get richer and richer as they keep growing in an environment that will help developing its potential.

Of course they have experiences — Raul

Then I think we may be talking at cross-purposes. I think to understand one another we would need to examine the concept of consciousness and set the limits of the application of the word 'consciousness'. Conceptually, for example, if a baby has experiences it is, by definition, also conscious. That's just how I (and many philosophers of mind) use the word.

EDIT: I think you might mean 'conscious' in the sense of 'not asleep' or 'not knocked out', which is a perfectly good usage in medical and scientific contexts. But it's not quite the sense in use in discussions of consciousness that philosophers of mind typically engage in. Deviant perverts that we are.

I'm not saying they re not conscious but a primitive immature consciousness and so his experience is... very simplistic and immature.
Nevertheless it is a mistake done by several neuroscientists like Koch to say that consciousness is experience. It is too simplistic and doesn't help to understand consciousness, its complexity and its function.

I'm not saying they re not conscious but a primitive immature consciousness and so his experience is... very simplistic and immature. — Raul

Oh sure. I don't disagree with that. However I do think it entails that consciousness does not admit of degree. 'Primitive immature consciousness' is still consciousness. Complicated mature consciousness is still consciousness. The consciousness of an adult is the same kind of consciousness that a baby has, namely the kind of consciousness that permits experiences to happen at all. It is that very simple basic capacity to experience that is the subject of discussions in philosophy. It is in that sense that I don't think the concept of consciousness admits of degree.

EDIT: To put it another way, the adult is no more or less able to have experiences than the child. They do differ in the kind of experiences they can have. But that's a difference of content, not a difference of consciousness.

EDIT: To put it a third way, the hard problem is located at the difference between no experience happening at all, and some experience, no matter how 'primitive' it is.

It goes like this "dur...doing things to brain does things in mind....hit head, causes ow, ow is in mind. Therefore mind is brain. Neurscience. Sam Harris. Mind is brain. Dennett. Mind is brain. Take away bit of brain, person go dumb dumb. Therefore mind is brain." — Bartricks

While I wouldn't put this is quite such an annoying and dismissive way, I do agree with the substantive point, namely that too much is made of the relationship with brain function and what we experience. Not as much follows from this as people often immediately think. The close relationship between brain function in humans and what we experience is compatible with any theory of consciousness, even extreme forms of dualism.

Using consciousness to search for the cause of consciousness, is like getting in your car to go look for you car!

It's a state. Conscious state. Consciousness is a state of mind.

You have said it is a 'function'. That makes no sense. Explain what you mean. My mug has a function - it's function is to contain water. What sense is there in saying that consciousness 'is' a function. Functions are functions.

It's like me saying consciousness is a number.

Minds are things. They have states. We call them mental states. They include conscious states. That's why we call them conscious states.

So, to be clear, you think your consciousness is the state of what - an atom?
— Bartricks

No, not my consciousness, because I'm not an atom. — bert1

But you think atoms are conscious, yes?

You think you're an atom, do you?
— Bartricks

I don't. No sir! Not me. — bert1

What are you then? What else has consciouness aside from atoms?

Possibly, depending on definitions. — bert1

How would it depend on the definition? Do atoms have mental states?

And to be clear some more: you think the way to solve the problem of how consciousness - which is clearly not a property of matter - could be a property of matter, is to make all matter have it?
— Bartricks

It makes it easier, yes. — bert1

Really? Er, no it doesn't. So, you flood the bathroom. Your solution is to flood the rest of the house?

How do you 'solve' the problem of consciousness by simply supposing tiny things rae conscious and there are lots of them. How does that solve a thing?

If you're happy enough with atoms being conscious, why not be happy with lumps of meat being conscious? That is, why do you think there is a problem with lumps of meat being conscious until or unless you can show that the little atoms composing it are? The same leap - the same leap in defiance of reason is made either way, you're just making it a gazillon times for some reason.

It avoids the problem of explaining why only some things are conscious and not others. — bert1

"why the F is lounge sopping wet?"

You: "The bathroom and hallway are wet, as are the bedrooms and every other room in the house"

"Oh, okay. I am happy with that explanation.".

Only that's nor reality. In reality the question would be "and why the F are they wet!!! Why is the entire house sopping wet?"

And that's the same question you should be asked. How are brains conscious?
"The atoms composing them are."

Er, and how are they conscious? (and, you know, they're not and that doesn't do anything at all to explain how the brain is conscious).

You're not explaining anything at all. No problem has been solved.

The problem, note, is that extended things do not appear to have conscious states and anything that has a conscious state does not appear to be extended.

You don't do anything whatsoever to address that problem by supposing all extended things have conscious states. So, the problem is how any extended thing can be conscious, not how is it that some are and some aren't.

Note, if you think the problem is 'why are some material things bearing conscious states and not others, then you've already solved the problem of how any material thing can be conscious.

It goes like this "dur...doing things to brain does things in mind....hit head, causes ow, ow is in mind. Therefore mind is brain. Neurscience. Sam Harris. Mind is brain. Dennett. Mind is brain. Take away bit of brain, person go dumb dumb. Therefore mind is brain."
— Bartricks

While I wouldn't put this is quite such an annoying and dismissive way, I do agree with the substantive point, namely that too much is made of the relationship with brain function and what we experience. Not as much follows from this as people often immediately think. The close relationship between brain function in humans and what we experience is compatible with any theory of consciousness, even extreme forms of dualism. — bert1

Why would you not put it so dismissively? That really is the only argument I have ever been given for thinking that the mind is the brain (or anything else material).

Doing things to the brain affects what goes on in the mind......therefore brain is mind. That's it.

The slightly more sophisticated might throw in the dogmatic claim that two fundamentally different sorts of thing can't causally interact, but it's the same argument just with added dogmatism (and it backfires anyway, as the conclusion to be drawn is not that the mind is the brain, but that the sensible world is immaterial).

It's not, then, that 'too much' is made of the relationship. It is that the entire case - the whole of it - for the materiality of the mind is based on the fallacious inference from 'A causes B' to 'therefore A is B'.

There are loads and loads of arguments for the immateriality of the mind. I just want one for the materiality of the mind that isn't reducible to those appalling ones just mentioned above.

You don't understand consciousness. I recommend you read some of the authors I mention in my posts above.

I don't think you do. Again: what on earth do you mean by saying consciousness is a 'function'. It literally makes no sense.

Zzzzzz…..let’s end this in a respectable way. No one knows how consciousness works. Agreed?

Mind(ing) is what sufficiently complex brains do. That's a start ...

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/755060