I will always be in awe of such people: applying their intelligence and talents to revolutionising our fight against suffering. I will always commend them, their courage and persistence. Long live the good amongst us. — Benj96

That's not @Tzeentch argument at all in this current argument. In fact, it wouldn't matter what people do or don't do in terms of technological breakthroughs with his argument about impositions.

The antinatalist viewpoint is a weak jelly, in comparison with such people. Past, present and future.

The antinatalist viewpoint is a weak jelly, in comparison with such people. Past, present and future. — universeness

That doesn't even mean anything.

Don't worry about it, such can never be for you.

But you are asserting that your person/being is NOT omnibenevolent.
Why do you think I asked about an omnipotent and omniscient person and left off omnibenevolent?

Do you think it was a mistake? It wasn't.
— Bartricks

I have been trying to work within your conceptual framework - to figure out what exactly you are saying. Up to now I have not succeeded at this task. — EricH

I think the problem here is twofold; a) you are a bad faith interlocutor and b) IQ

If we reflect on what an omnipotent, omniscient person ought to do in circumstances X, we then learn what an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person would do in those circumstances.

a) you are a bad faith interlocuter — Bartricks

I will repeat things I've said in the past. You're a smart person and you are obviously well educated in many aspects of philosophy. You are not a troll. I find your ideas bizarrely fantastical and illogical, but I keep trying to figure out what (if any) logic is underlying your posts. This is why I take this step by step approach to try to echo back to you what I think you're saying.

If we reflect on what an omnipotent, omniscient person ought to do in circumstances X — Bartricks

And here's where you are just not making any sense. In the absence of omnibenevolence there are no constraints on the actions of your person. There is no aught for such a person. Your person is free to do whatever she pleases.

You have not given any explanation or description of (in the absence of omnibenevolence) what an omnipotent, omniscient person ought to do in any circumstance.

I have given you an account of [url=http://an omnipotent, omniscient person ought to do in circumstances X]my understanding[/url] of The Problem Of Evil and what it means to be a proponent of this problem. You have not done so.

I find it hard to believe that you can re-formulate The Problem of Evil without omnibenevolence, but I keep an open mind. Maybe you have some unique approach. But in the absence of any explanation your argument fails.

If there is no problem of evil then you never even get to your Ps and Qs.

If we reflect on what an omnipotent, omniscient person ought to do in circumstances X — Bartricks

So one last time, if your argument is to succeed you have to successfully resolve this issue.In the absence of omnibenevolence, how does an omnipotent, omniscient person decide what to do? What ought she do?

Please show us your reasoning.

And here's where you are just not making any sense. In the absence of omnibenevolence there are no constraints on the actions of your person. There is no aught for such a person. Your person is free to do whatever she pleases. — EricH

I don't understand your reasoning. I think you are confusing descriptive claims with normative ones.

Moral constraints do not prevent you from doing things. If it is immoral for me to do X, that doesn't mean I am being somehow prevented from doing it.

Now, again, try and understand the point: if an omnipotent, omniscient person 'ought' to do x, then an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenvolent person 'would' do x. Not because they have do, but because they're omnibenevolent.

So, if an omnipotent, omniscient person ought not to introduce innocent life into a dangerous world without first removing the dangers, then that's what an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent person would do.

It really doesn't matter if an omnipotent, omniscient person will, by dint of being omnipotent, also be omnibenevolent, for the same point would apply

Anyway, you seem very confused to me.

I find it hard to believe that you can re-formulate The Problem of Evil without omnibenevolence, but I keep an open mind. Maybe you have some unique approach. But in the absence of any explanation your argument fails. — EricH

Again, you're just saying stuff. You have not explained why my argument fails. You have just stated that it does, though you admit that you don't actually understand what I am saying. You don't understasnd why premise 1 of my argument is a premise that any proponent of the problem of evil must endorse, do you?

Now, do you think I don't know what I am talking about? Just out of interest. Do you think I know a lot about the problem of evil, or not much at all?

Perhaps you should explain your reasoning.

Premise 1 of my argument states:

Either remove the evils from the world before subjecting innocent persons to live in it, or do not subject innocent persons to live in it.

Now, my claim is that a defender of the problem of evil - so, someone who thinks the evils of the world imply God's non-existence - has to endorse premise 1.

If you think they don't, explain why.

In the absence of omnibenevolence there are no constraints on the actions of your person. There is no aught for such a person. — EricH

In the Muslim and Jewish traditions God is not omni-benevolent. Yet theodicy still exists; see book of Job. One can be good without omni-benevolence. God lays down the law but he is fundamentally beyond us.

@Bartricks The ‘confusion’ yiu talk about is likely due to struggling to take on some completely intangible alien position and then stating ‘aught to’ as if it is a given.

You will find there is more relation to asking ‘What an Ant aught to do?’ and any answer from such a hypothetical is just as relevant as from an omnipotent being (who we cannot relate to as much as an ant).

If you just ask if a human had the choice to end all suffering by stopping procreation in some fashion or another then ‘aught they’ do so? Then there is the question of how this would be done.

Antinatalism is merely a thought to ponder not a realistic position to take as we are not omnipotent nor if any being omnipotent ‘exists’ can we shoehorn in human sensibilities.

In the Muslim and Jewish traditions God is not omni-benevolent. Yet theodicy still exists; see book of Job. One can be good without omni-benevolence. God lays down the law but he is fundamentally beyond us. — Moses

I've read Job, and I while I am not an expert in these matters I get the basics. But AFAICT that's not what B is saying.

If B had said that a person who believes in God in spite of the problem of evil (either via theodicy or some other explanation) should be an anti-natalist, then that would have made some sense.

In fact that was my initial assumption as to what he was saying, since simply denying God's existence due to the problem of evil does not oblige one to take any moral position about how an imaginary God/person aught to behave. But AFAICT that's not what B is saying. B is saying that by virtue being a proponent of the problem of evil (one who denies God's existence) it logically follows that such a person must also be an antinatalist.

However, as if that weren't illogical enough, B goes one step further and asserts that the problem of evil does not require omnibenevolence. I have asked B to explain this, but he keeps repeating that it's obvious and that I'm not getting it.

Dear Professor B,

This week's homework assignment in Philosophy 101 was to explain the problem of evil. I went back to the primary sources and here is my understanding of the standard definition:

1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
4. If God is omnibenevolent, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

Please grade my homework. If I have gotten anything wrong, please correct me.

Your humble student,
EricH

That was not the homework, was it!? Go back and answer the question set, not one of your own invention.

Write out hundred times: I will answer the question set and not an easy one of my own invention.

Then answer the actual question. You are not a promising student.

Now, my claim is that a defender of the problem of evil - so, someone who thinks the evils of the world imply God's non-existence - has to endorse premise 1.

If you think they don't, explain why. — Bartricks

I cannot answer your question set until you explain how YOU define/explain the problem of evil (POE) and what it means to be a proponent of this problem.

Just to recap where we are in this discussion:-
- You have stated that omnibenevolence is not required for the POE.
- This does not even remotely correspond with any standard definition of the POE.

Now maybe there is some formulation of the problem within the writings of one of the medieval philosophers about which you are highly knowledgeable - or - maybe you have your own explanation.

But either way, you need to clarify your question before it can be answered.

1) How do you define/explain the POE without omnibenevolence?
2) What does it mean to be a proponent of this problem?
3) In what way does your definition require that a proponent of the POE must agree with AN?

In the course of our conversation I have asked you these same questions multiple times in a variety of different ways, but for some reason you choose not to answer them. This I do not understand, but I am still trying.

BTW - if you are realizing that you made a mistake and you now agree that the POE does require omnibenevolence, I will not hold it against you to change your mind.

You have failed. Like I say, you're a bad faith interlocutor and then there's the IQ thing

if you can't understand why a proponent of the problem of evil has to accept this principle

Either remove the evils from the world before subjecting innocent persons to live in it, or do not subject innocent persons to live in it. — Bartricks

Then I'm afraid I consider you the intellectual equal of the crow that is currently strutting about on the lawn outside. I think you're just trying to be annoying.

You can't begin to explain, can you, why you think a proponent of the problem of evil does not have to endorse that principle? Like I say, you haven't a clue - not a clue - what you're talking about. You don't understand the problem of evil or anything I have said. It's just noise, yes?

if you can't understand why a proponent of the problem of evil has to accept this principle — Bartricks

If you can't understand that without omnibenevolence there is no problem of evil, then I'm afraid I consider you the intellectual equal of the crow that is currently strutting about on the lawn outside. I think you're just trying to be annoying.

You can't begin to explain, can you, how the problem of evil requires omnibenevolence? Like I say, you haven't a clue - not a clue - what you're talking about. You don't understand the problem of evil or anything I have said. It's just noise, yes?

You have failed. Like I say, you're a bad faith interlocutor and then there's the IQ thing.

This is my last exchange to you on this topic. It's been most revealing.

It's been most revealing. — EricH

It has revealed that you do not understand the problem of evil. Or how to reason.

You think that there is no inconsistency in thinking that God could have introduced innocent life into this world without removing any of its evils and not thereby have done anything wrong and also thinking that God would not introduce innocent life into a world like this without first removing some or all of its evils as that'd be wrong. That's quite something. Good job! What an excellent thinker you are.

Again: someone who thinks that the problem of evil is a problem is someone who thinks that principle is true:

Either remove the evils from the world before subjecting innocent persons to live in it, or do not subject innocent persons to live in it. — Bartricks

You can't see why. That's somewhat astonishing, given how blindingly obvious it is. But it doesn't affect the matter.

The question remains how we are meant to relate to some hypothetical omnipotent, omniscient person when we are neither.

You can pretend to know what you do not know but I do not see how such is at all relevant as a foundation to build a argument from. As a place to explore from and create new ideas … maybe there is something there for someone with an extremely open mind and/or a more fluid interpretation of the terms used.

People often get offended by antinatalism, as a position, rather than antinatalism as an idea. The former appears as a personal dogma whereas the later is merely a place to think about what it means to bring life into the world, how we were brought into the world and how we can apply/should/might apply terms such as ‘responsibility,’ ‘ethics’ and ‘innocence’.

This has all been pointed out to you before though and remains unanswered, ignored and/or attacked with vitriol.

Antinatalism is certainly an idea worthy of contemplation. As a doctrine to be applied to a humanitarian lived life it has no foundation. Believing that procreation is not the best idea is fine too. Trying to provide ‘ethical’ evidence for it is complete nonsense though.

It may or may not be ‘better’ not to live a life (assuming such can be judged by some hypothetical omnipotent being) but we as mere human beings have sparing insight into that we cannot do more than attach a highly sceptical and unrealised concept to - the concept of ‘omnipotence’.

This is my last exchange to you on this topic. It's been most revealing. — EricH

Would you enjoy having bar tricks as one of your teachers?

:grin: :joke: :rofl:

:scream: Perhaps why many decided to skip certain classes!

Awww. Now you're being cruel.

Antinatalism is certainly an idea worthy of contemplation. As a doctrine to be applied to a humanitarian lived life it has no foundation. Believing that procreation is not the best idea is fine too. Trying to provide ‘ethical’ evidence for it is complete nonsense though. — I like sushi

Antinatalism IS an ethical idea that that is what is being contemplated. There are many arguments of various takes on the matter. Why wouldn't it be any different than other human behavior in its evaluation as an ethical question?

I never once said it was not an ethical idea. Do not bother quoting my words back at me just read them in the context written.

An ethical idea can be turned over without it being taken as wholly applicable to real lived lives - like with the trolly problem.

There are no real ethical arguments. They are just positions to consider and jostle with because there is no way of drawing a clear line under some item that is universally right or wrong. Antinatalism as an idea is on par with the trolley problem it is just dressed up differently.

It's fair play to fire some arrows back in the direction they are coming from towards yourself or towards others unjustly.

I can't take any of his insults seriously (I'm assuming B is a he) - he's like a child at a playground.

But thanks for the support. :pray:

:up:

What are you on about? I have no idea.

A proponent of the problem of evil must believe this disjunctive moral principle is true:

1. Either remove the evils from the world before subjecting innocent persons to live in it, or do not subject innocent persons to live in it.

EricH can't understand why this is, but that's why he has to eat everything with a plastic spoon.

Now, in respect of us this premise is also true:

2. We are unable to remove the evils from the world before subjecting innocent persons to live in it

From which it follows:

3. Therefore do not subject innocent persons to live in it.

Now totally ignore the argument and say some stuff that occurred to you while you looked at it. That seems to be the policy of most around here.

It's a highly significant argument. Why? Because loads and loads of philosophers - probably the bulk - would agree that the problem of evil is a significant problem for the existence of God.

Yet none of them have noticed that this commits them to affirming antinatalism.

One could run the argument in the other direction of course. One could argue that as it is clearly morally permissible for us to procreate despite our inability to rid the world of its evils, then it is not wrong for God to subject innocents to life in it either.

But either way, we have something of an earthquake: either most philosophers have to accept that the strongest objection to theism fails, or most philosophers have to accept that antinatalism is true.

I can only assume you frame ‘evil’ as ‘suffering’. If life exists therefore ‘evil’ must exist. So then, should all life be exterminated so rid the world of ‘evil’/‘suffering’ or does committing such an act (that many would label as ‘evil’) okay if the end result is the complete annihilation of ‘evil’?

I know that people overtly fond of the antinatalist idea do not wish death and extinction on the human race, but at the same time they effectively are shifting towards that result if procreation itself is regarded as propagating ‘evil’.

The ‘buddhist’ belief is more or less that it is a lie that life must contain some suffering … this is perhaps partially true but it depends exclusively on how one defines and delineates ‘suffering’ and ‘evil’.

If the base argument you are offering up is simply that people born will inevitably ‘suffer’ to some degree then I cannot disagree. I would also add that ‘suffering’ is tied into learning, change and growth so one either opts for change, learning and potential growth or they opt for oblivion and death … that is where any serious dogmatic application of antinatalism falls down.

As a means of questioning our existence it is a worthy idea to ponder on and see where our personal sense of responsibility lies.

It is not at all clear cut to everyone what the difference between ending a life, taking a life or even defining what ‘life’ is in the first place. That is why there is so much contention around items such as abortion and euthanasia.

Surely you know what I am on about now and why it is an intrinsic part of what antinatalism is bringing into question. What can we do about suffering? Yet, why not ask if we should look to eradicate suffering completely if the price paid is effectively the end of all life now and in the future? Clearly there is a wide area of middle ground that for some reason is difficult for us to realise and explore.