I don't have any criticism of people who judge and condemn those who have harmed them. I just don't think it does anything productive beyond helping them deal with the situation emotionally. — T Clark

You jettison emotion as if it were not a critical component here. Emotion is is that which moves and motivates, the word itself referencing motion. That is to say, if you don't care, you won't do anything about it. It's not about offering a therapeutic remedy to the traumatized. It's about expressing outrage at the outrageous in order to bring about change.

If we are speaking of therapeutic responses to victimization, I'd suggest forgiveness over bitterness and anger.

You jettison emotion as if it were not a critical component here. Emotion is is that which moves and motivates, the word itself referencing motion. That is to say, if you don't care, you won't do anything about it. — Hanover

If people I care about are hurt, what difference does it make whether it was something evil or just unfortunate? If a tornado kills 10 people, I care enough to act without blaming anyone. Why is 10 people being killed by a terrorist bomb different, at least in terms of the proper attitude required to make an effective response?

If we are speaking of therapeutic responses to victimization, I'd suggest forgiveness over bitterness and anger. — Hanover

I agree.

If people I care about are hurt, what difference does it make whether it was something evil or just unfortunate? — T Clark

So a car slides off the road and injures the passenger, the cause being low tire tread, a truly unfortunate event.

A mile away a speeding drunk driver injures another passenger to the same extent.

Do you not see how the first instance will not be reduced from societal anger and outrage but the second will?

my good friend Hume — unenlightened

Hume was onto something, eh?

What needs to be added, assuming I'm on the right track, to

1. People kill
2. X
Ergo,
3. Killing is bad [ex 1, 2]
4. Y
Ergo,
5. We ought not kill [ex 3, 4]

X = ?

Y = ?

?

Would you rather throw your lot in with an ethic reached with reason and some basic assumptions that reduces suffering, or one that could allow all of the worst things imaginable? — ToothyMaw

You're making a classic error if you hold that that reason only supports views you like. :wink: Reason has been used to support views dreadful and good, from eugenics to concentration camps. And the choice is rarely between reducing suffering and the 'worst things'. The difference in ethical systems is in values, which are arrived at from a whole different vantage point. People seem to hold their values as self-evident.

If people I care about are hurt, what difference does it make whether it was something evil or just unfortunate? If a tornado kills 10 people, I care enough to act without blaming anyone. Why is 10 people being killed by a terrorist bomb different, at least in terms of the proper attitude required to make an effective response? — T Clark

Makes a big difference to me. Specific details aside - one's an act of nature which could not be prevented. The other was a cruel and deliberate act by a human, designed to harm others and therefore, for me, more difficult to come to terms with because of its malicious intent and the possibility of its prevention.

Those are not adequate answers, as they just assume things. And while those assumptions are commonly held, and perhaps even reasonable, they do not address the claims in the OP.

Btw, I don't see why you added in the criticism of relativity. I criticize relativity in the OP. And I also agree that morality doesn't need justifications to exist. But assuming some - admittedly - basic things about morality, while practical, doesn't get us true moral claims.

You're making a classic error if you hold that that reason only supports views you like. — Tom Storm

It generally supports things I find much less problematic than those things that would be allowed under relativism. Selective infanticide for babies that will live short lives in agony? Unpleasant. But the systematic mutilation and oppression of millions of women in the Middle East? Evil.

Sometimes intuition has to take a hit for the team. And yes, no matter how much you reason you still derive your ethics from values. I state as much in the OP. But some values make more or less sense when evaluating if they will cause or reduce suffering.

Are you going to capitulate to your self-doubt, or will you at least try to support something that makes sense given some common goals?

Are you going to capitulate to your self-doubt, or will you at least try to support something that makes sense given some common goals? — ToothyMaw

Not sure if that's for me or a rhetorical question. My position is very clear from my previous posts.

You advocated for relativism, even if you said that you would argue your ethics are superior, which makes no sense.

So a car slides off the road and injures the passenger, the cause being low tire tread, a truly unfortunate event.

A mile away a speeding drunk driver injures another passenger to the same extent.

Do you not see how the first instance will not be reduced from societal anger and outrage but the second will? — Hanover

What benefit is derived from endorsing societal anger and outrage? On the other hand, it seems reasonable to me that the negative consequences for an action should be proportional to the responsibility of a person for the results of their actions. You and I would probably agree that the drunk guy is more responsible for the accident than the other driver, so their punishment should be more severe.

What benefit is derived from endorsing societal anger and outrage? On the other hand, it seems reasonable to me that the negative consequences for an action should be proportional to the responsibility of a person for the results of their actions. You and I would probably agree that the drunk guy is more responsible for the accident than the other driver, so their punishment should be more severe. — T Clark

This quote from Jesse Prinz comes to mind. He is among those who defend the value of righteous anger against writers like Martha Nussbaum who has written that anger is an irrational , backward-looking emotion that encourages only revenge and retribution rather than productive action.

“…we have strictures against killing innocent people; and we have strictures prescribing equal opportunity. These principles are grounded in reason and subject to rational debate. . But justice also requires passion. We don’t coolly tabulate inequities—we feel outraged or indignant when they are discovered. Such angry feelings are essential; without anger, we would not be motivated to act....Rage can misdirect us when it comes unyoked from good reasoning, but together they are a potent pair. Reason is the rudder; rage propels us forward.”

true moral claims. — ToothyMaw

They are norms or rules not propositions, so what do you propose any such "true moral claims" would even be like? :chin:

“…we have strictures against killing innocent people; and we have strictures prescribing equal opportunity. These principles are grounded in reason and subject to rational debate. . But justice also requires passion. We don’t coolly tabulate inequities—we feel outraged or indignant when they are discovered. Such angry feelings are essential; without anger, we would not be motivated to act....Rage can misdirect us when it comes unyoked from good reasoning, but together they are a potent pair. Reason is the rudder; rage propels us forward.” — Joshs

I disagree with this.

Makes a big difference to me. Specific details aside - one's an act of nature which could not be prevented. The other was a cruel and deliberate act by a human, designed to harm others and therefore, for me, more difficult to come to terms with because of its malicious intent and the possibility of its prevention. — Tom Storm

I recognize many people feel the way you do, but all I really care about is what we have to do to keep people safe.

They are norms or rules not propositions, so what do you propose any such "true moral claims" would even be like? :chin: — 180 Proof

"Murder is wrong" would be an example of a moral claim that could be objectively true (a proposition). "You shouldn't murder" would be normative. "Don't murder" would be a rule.

Do you know what meta-ethics is?

"Murder is wrong" would be an example of a moral claim that could be objectively true (a proposition). — ToothyMaw

And what's the truth-maker? It's a statement like 'I'm sexy' that has a sense (in some contexts and not in some others) but does not convey either a formal or factual truth-value.

Do you know what meta-ethics is? — ToothyMaw

I know enough now to know that you don't.

And what's the truth-maker? — 180 Proof

Okay, you obviously didn't bother to read and understand the OP. "Torture is wrong because it harms", for example, is an extrinsic moral claim that could be true or false based on a moral axiom such as "it is wrong to harm sentient creatures". The extrinsic moral claim is true if the axiom it is tied to is correct. The correctness of the axiom is the "truth-maker" for the moral claim.

I hope that is clear.

I know enough now to know that you don't. — 180 Proof

:100: :up:

Look up "moral realism" and "error theory".

They are norms or rules not propositions, so what do you propose any such "true moral claims" would even be like? :chin: — 180 Proof

I believe you're correct. The notion norm is self-explanatory as far as I can tell. The heart of the matter is but the question "What the f**k am I doing here?"

Once again, familiarize yourself with the relevant literature - something I should have done a while ago. And I don't know why you are here either, Smith.

Apparently, it hasn't occurred to you, Toothless, that "moral realism" is incoherent (re: assumption that moral statements are empirical propositions) and that, therefore, "error theory" is redundant.

Once again, familiarize yourself with the relevant literature - something I should have done a while ago. And I don't know why you are here either, Smith — ToothyMaw

Sound advice. Danke!

Well, truth is norms like "we should/shouldn't torture" can be true/false, but not in the same sense as say the statement "snow is white".

Norms are useful or not useful for some purpose; they are not truth-claims in any sense. A moral statement like "torture is wrong" is, to my way of thinking, only a shorthand for some custom or norm (i.e. mores).

Norms are useful or not useful for some purpose; they are not truth-claims in any sense. A moral statement like "torture is wrong" is, to my way of thinking, only a shorthand for some custom or norm (i.e. mores) — 180 Proof

Logic agrees with you mon ami, but the problem, for me at least, is in what sense are norms meaningful if not by being "true"?

whether or not moral claims can be objectively true. — ToothyMaw

"Taking candy from a baby is wrong." has the grammar of a proposition, but it does not have the meaning of a proposition. It has the meaning of a command: 'don't do it!' Commands are not true or false, they are obeyed or disobeyed.

Morality is not made of claims of fact but commands, demands, exhortations, pleas, advice to act thus and not so. It is not 'truth apt'. But to conclude that, if something is not truth apt it is false, would be a serious mistake; commands are not falsity apt either. The justification for 'tell the truth' is that lies are worthless talk, no one wants to listen to lies.

Do you know what meta-ethics is? — ToothyMaw

A mistake. The very same mistake that is made by those that try to make the world conform to reason and logic instead of conforming their reason to the world - metaphysicians.

"Look both ways before crossing the road." "Don't eat the yellow snow." I am not offering any proof, but try the experiment if you are sceptical and get someone to report the results in your obituary. "Honour thy father and mother, that they leave not the estate to the cat's home and that thine own children learn what is expected of them." Some ways of life are better than others, and one of the worst for humans is a life that concerns itself entirely with its own benefit - the proof is in the joy and misery of life, not in the pontifications of logicians.

Norms are useful or not useful for some purpose ... — 180 Proof

Commands are not true or false, they are obeyed or disobeyed. Morality is not made of claims of fact but commands, demands, exhortations, pleas, advice to act thus and not so. It is not 'truth apt'. — unenlightened

:100:

Ok. Arigato gozaimus.

"moral realism" is incoherent (re: assumption that moral statements are empirical propositions) — 180 Proof

That assumption does not lead to incoherence. You might argue, however, that we cannot verify if moral statements are true, as we have no effective means of discovering if they are true. This is a problem for moral realists.

But incoherence does not follow. Is the fact that biology is invented by people, is useful, and is used to certain ends, a reason to doubt the truth-aptness of biological facts? Biology is an edifice like morality, even if biological facts exist independent of the mind. Moral realists and error-theorists say that morality functions like that. No incoherence whatsoever.

edit: not saying morality functions exactly like biology, but rather that it has the similarities mentioned and reports facts like biology, even if not naturalistic ones