The word refers to other words, or to people who are not Santa. Language exists, certainly, but Santa does not. — NOS4A2

On a close examination, would you assert that Santa alone exists as the sum total of descriptions that we have assigned to him? Such as the the man that delivers presents or exists on the North Pole with reindeer? Is Russell's theory of denoting entities really here at the gist of all Santa's descriptions?

Yet, we can instantiate him freely in movies, — Shawn

Do you mean, depict him freely?

We can, but not in the sense of pointing his likenesses at him. Only in the sense of making Santa-pictures.

See https://monoskop.org/images/1/1b/Goodman_Nelson_Languages_of_Art.pdf pp. 21.

On a close examination, would you assert that Santa alone exists as the sum total of descriptions that we have assigned to him? Such as the the man that delivers presents or exists on the North Pole with reindeer? Is Russell's theory of denoting entities really here at the gist of all Santa's descriptions?

Assuming that everything exists, and to discover the nature of a thing we must describe what it exists as, I wager there are some extant particulars that we could gather into an aggregate and call that “Santa”. However it would never resemble how we imagined Santa to be.

It's funny to see that the central question of the title stated hasn't been addressed. Here it goes again with a little more,

In what sense does Santa Claus or even - Pegasus exist?

Well, at the least, in the sense that we can predicate to him: Santa wears a red hat. "Santa wears a red hat" is true. It is true that Santa wears a red hat.

This one will upset some folk: Santa wears a red hat. Therefore something wears a red hat.

What I'm referring to is the fact that Pegasus or Santa doesn't exist in the world, maybe perhaps Meinongs jungle, but we refer to him as if he does. — Shawn

"Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" do exist in our world, which is why we refer to them as if they exist in the world, but this is a world that exists only in our minds.

As it is difficult to justify that relations ontologically exist in a mind-independent world, it would follow that
it would be difficult to justify that things such as "mountains", "factories", "apples", "universities", "governments", "tables", "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" exist in a mind-independent world.

It would also follow that "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" don't exist in a possible world of Lewis, they exist in the actual world of our mind. Also, "Pegasus" and "Santa Claus" are not the non-existent things of Meinong's Jungle, they are the existent things of our minds.

These things can only exist in the mind, which is our world, which is why we refer to them as existing in the world.

"Santa wears a red hat" is true. — Banno

Sure. As fiction. Fictionally true. It's a fiction that "Santa wears a red hat" is true. So, it's false. Logic with oxymorons. Great fun!

This one will upset some folk: Santa wears a red hat. Therefore something wears a red hat. — Banno

Yes, this is quite upsetting to say the least, and to add to the confusion, then what does Santa denote? Or is that the wrong way to present the issue as him only denoting his own descriptions?

It's a fiction that "Santa wears a red hat" is true. So, it's false. Logic with oxymorons. Great fun! — bongo fury

Yes, so why is it necessarily an oxymoron? Must Santa denote something the the world or can he just denote his own descriptions as I already believe he does?

Santa as a physical person does not exist. But the "work of Santa", Santa's "action", does exist through those that either believe in him wholly/intrinsically (children) and those that sustain the belief for the benefit of those that truly believe - again, children.

In that way Santa is an immaterial thing that acts materially. There is a colossal amount of evidence of his existence sufficient enough to maintain his belief by children - film, media, literature, songs, the postal service, Santa's grotto, Nasas broadcast of Santa's flight path around the globe, the news, every question posited to children by adults that confirms his existence such as "are you excited for Santa visiting you?" or "have you been good for Santa?" or "what do you want Santa to bring you this year? " All questions based on the assumption that he exists.

We bolster his existence out of love for the innocent amongst us. We believe the innocent deserve such a figure in their life.

The adult existent of course is God - the one that knows if they have been naughty or nice and rewards them with a gift (heavenly afterlife) if they choose to be a source of love rather than hatred.

Santa, in essence, is religion/spirituality for children. Used by adults as a moral compass to guide children to understand action and consequence, to be better people.

Can Santa be his own referent since he doesn't denote anything in the real world?

It's funny to see that the central question of the title stated hasn't been addressed. Here it goes again with a little more,

In what sense does Santa Claus or even - Pegasus exist? — Shawn

Nicholas Griffin, in an essay in 'Russell vs. Meinong: One Hundred Years after ""On Denoting"' https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/19960205-russell-vs-meinong), points out that we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole. In this particular 'context of supposition' (to use Griffin's own term), both Santa and the North Pole exist, and so does the relation between them 'Santa lives at the North Pole.' Outside this context of supposition, in the real world, the North Pole exists, but Santa does not, and nor does the relation 'Santa lives at the North Pole.'

Works for me. :)

Can Santa be his own referent since he doesn't denote anything in the real world? — Shawn

Do you mean, can the name "Santa" be its own referent, since it doesn't denote anything in the real world?

[...] we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole. — Herg

To suppose Santa's existence is to ontologically ascribe him to the domain of discourse based of of his fiction as an entity. Yet, a fictitious entity is an oxymoron, so how is that so?

In this particular 'context of supposition' (to use Griffin's own term), both Santa and the North Pole exist, and so does the relation between them 'Santa lives at the North Pole.' — Herg

I'm not sure if this is some sort of category error. The North Pole actually obtains in the real world; but, Santa over at the North Pole, does not. How is that so?

Do you mean, can the name "Santa" be its own referent, since it doesn't denote anything in the real world? — bongo fury

Yes, well, if you pick up my gist, my intention here is to suppose that Santa has no referent outside of his fiction that are elucidated by his ascription to the non-denoting ontological placeholder of living at the North Pole. So, don't we just default to making his descriptions representative of his obtaining relations in fiction (the sum total of fiction about "him").

Does justice exist?
Is life fair?

Life is patently not fair, and in the sense that justice does not prevail, it does not exist. It exists though, to that small extent that we live justly.

St Nicholas, according to the myth is related to good King Wenceslas; power employed to the benefit of the powerless. This is the non-existent truth behind the multi-billion dollar industry of Santa Claus. If you are looking for the real Santa Claus, you will find him at the homeless centre, treading down the snow, and delivering a little warmth to those with nothing, not just at Christmas, but every day - everyone knows that. Santa Claus is an idea you can live by, not an old man creeping about in children's bedrooms.

Does justice exist?
Is life fair? — unenlightened

Santa is a person that ascribes a jolly old man over at the North Pole. He is known by two names, both "Santa Claus" and "St. Nicholas".

Soo, what can be said about him is based off, of his descriptions we all know about him as delivering presents on Christmas and other stuff about him.

He is known by two names, both "Santa Claus" and "St. Nicholas". — Shawn

Also "Father Christmas". But he is an archetype, not a person.

But he (Santa Claus) is an archetype, not a person. — unenlightened

Yet, we refer to him as a person in everyday language. Is that a feature of language, and why is that so?

We personify the sun as Sol, and the dog as Rover, the sea as Neptune, wisdom as Sophia ... It would be better to turn the question around and ask why we have started to depersonalise our world. It is the depersonalisation that leads to these absurd questions as to what or who exists or fails to exist. Can you believe that there are people who study philosophy, yet deny the existence of Sophia, who they profess to love? You have to laugh.

It is the depersonalisation that leads to these absurd questions as to what or who exists or fails to exist. Can you believe that there are people who study philosophy, yet deny the existence of Sophia, who they profess to love? — unenlightened

Psychologically, that makes sense. But, I believe language acquisition came first or its primacy dominates over psychologies, not depersonalization.

To suppose Santa's existence is to ontologically ascribe him to the domain of discourse based of of his fiction as an entity. Yet, a fictitious entity is an oxymoron, so how is that so? — Shawn

A fictitious supposed entity is not an oxymoron. We suppose that there is such an entity, when in fact there is not.

In this particular 'context of supposition' (to use Griffin's own term), both Santa and the North Pole exist, and so does the relation between them 'Santa lives at the North Pole.'
— Herg

I'm not sure if this is some sort of category error. The North Pole actually obtains in the real world; but, Santa over at the North Pole, does not. How is that so? — Shawn

Apologies, I should have been clearer. The North Pole in the context of supposition is not the actual North Pole — actual entities can't exist in contexts of supposition — but a fictitious analogue of it.

I think that as long as we are careful not to mix the real with the supposed or fictitious, there's no problem. If we mix them, unsolvable puzzles ensue, but they are puzzles of our own making. "We have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.”

A fictitious supposed entity is not an oxymoron. We suppose that there is such an entity, when in fact there is not. — Herg

Soo, when we talk about God, or Allah, are those supposed entities or do they just have a historical background? Are you noticing that the lines are getting blurry when thinking about stipulating existence to supposed entities?

The North Pole in the context of supposition is not the actual North Pole — actual entities can't exist in contexts of supposition — but a fictitious analogue of it. — Herg

This seems incoherent. We can't assume that Santa lives in his "own" North Pole, while the "true case" of the actual North Pole not having Santa Claus over there.

I think that as long as we are careful not to mix the real with the supposed or fictitious, there's no problem. — Herg

But, this happens all the time. We don't distinguish for children that Santa lives over at Walmart or at the North Pole. It's all ad hoc here.

points out that we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole. — Herg

How is this different from saying that we merely entertain the fiction?

A fictitious supposed entity — Herg

You might as well say, a fictitious fictitious entity.

Clearly, I'm running in circles, and leave it to the reader to explain in what sense does Santa Claus exist? How can we instantiate his existence over the North Pole, and yet knowingly, without doubt, know he doesn't exist? — Shawn

If our knowledge is by description, then "Santa Claus" is no less nor no more fictional than "The North Pole"

Denoting phrases
For Bertrand Russell, "Santa Claus" and "The North Pole" are denoting phrases, which have no meaning in themselves. A propositional function containing a denoting phrase is neither true nor false, such as "Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth". Only when something is added to the propositional function to turn it into a proposition does the proposition become true or false, such as "it is said that Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "many believe that The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth".

Knowledge by description
The vast majority of people only know The North Pole by description rather than acquaintance. We take it for granted that The North Pole exists even though we may never have seen it, yet we take it for granted that Santa Claus doesn't exist although we have never seen him. We know "The North Pole" by description as "the northernmost point on the Earth, lying antipodally to the South Pole, defining geodetic latitude 90° North, as well as the direction of true north." We know "Santa Claus" also by description as "bringing children gifts during the late evening and overnight hours on Christmas Eve of toys and candy or coal or nothing, depending on whether they are "naughty or nice."

The fact that I have never seen Santa Claus is not proof that Santa Claus doesn't exist, as is the fact that I have never seen The North Pole proof that The North Pole doesn't exist.

Our belief in the existence of things we have never seen rests on description, and description is not proof one way or another.

The question is, how do we know things without doubt that have only been described to us.

Only when something is added to the propositional function to turn it into a proposition does the proposition become true or false, — RussellA

... such as, some indication of which quantity (e.g. none, some or all) of the world's objects are to be denoted by each denoting phrase. Whereas, your suggested examples of suitable supplementation:

... such as "[it is said that] Santa Claus brings children gifts" or "[many believe that] The North Pole is the northernmost point on the Earth". — RussellA

are way off. This might not affect your stuff about knowledge. But it shouts a bit.

The fact that I have never seen Santa Claus is not proof that Santa Claus doesn't exist, as is the fact that I have never seen The North Pole [likewise not] proof that The North Pole doesn't exist. — RussellA

Typo, I presume.

The question is, how do we know things without doubt that have only been described to us. — RussellA

@Shawn might agree that this is the question.

I expect it's only the question if you are a foundationalist, and assume that some absolute kind of knowledge is required.

Soo, when we talk about God, or Allah, are those supposed entities or do they just have a historical background? — Shawn

I'm not sure what dichotomy you're setting up here. By 'have a historical background', are you suggesting that they may be based on something that once really existed? Anyway, all gods are merely supposed entities, until it is shown otherwise, if that answers your question.

Are you noticing that the lines are getting blurry when thinking about stipulating existence to supposed entities? — Shawn

No. Real entities have real existence. Supposed entities only have a supposed existence (that is, we only suppose that there are such entities and that they exist.). If someone wrote a scientific paper claiming that Santa existed in the real world, that would be claiming real existence for him. But if someone wrote a story in which a scientist went to the North Pole and found Santa, and said, 'Wow, Santa really exists,' Santa in the story would not have real existence, he would only have a supposed existence, like everything else in the story. There is real existence, and there are supposed existences which are analogues of real existence, just as there are real objects, and supposed objects which are either analogues of real objects such as the North Pole with Santa living in it) or are supposed objects with no real analogue (such as Santa himself).

The North Pole in the context of supposition is not the actual North Pole — actual entities can't exist in contexts of supposition — but a fictitious analogue of it.
— Herg

This seems incoherent. We can't assume that Santa lives in his "own" North Pole, while the "true case" of the actual North Pole not having Santa Claus over there. — Shawn

That Santa lives only in a fictitious or supposed or imaginary North Pole isn't an assumption, it's a necessity. Being imaginary, he can't live anywhere else.

I think that as long as we are careful not to mix the real with the supposed or fictitious, there's no problem.
— Herg

But, this happens all the time. We don't distinguish for children that Santa lives over at Walmart or at the North Pole. It's all ad hoc here. — Shawn

I don't think I really understand your point. What you describe doesn't sound to me like the kind of mixing I had in mind. When I spoke of mixing, I was referring to the mistake made by some philosophers (e.g. Meinong) of thinking that merely supposed objects can have real properties (such as existence). This sort of mixing is a category mistake.

Walmart and the North Pole both really exist, and if you wrote stories about Santa living in Walmart, that wouldn't be the real Walmart, because the real Walmart doesn't have Santa living in it; it would be a fictitious analogue of the real Walmart, having only a supposed existence, an existence only in the context of supposition created by the story. But if I've misunderstood your point, please explain further.

Santa is a person that ascribes a jolly old man over at the North Pole. He is known by two names, both "Santa Claus" and "St. Nicholas". — Shawn

No. This is where it gets complicated. Can you demonstrate that Santa Clause is identical with those others? I would suggest to you that Santa Clause, St Nick, Kris Kringle and Father Christmas are four separate figures who work together over Christmas. Their stories appear to be different and don't match up.

points out that we merely suppose that there is someone called Santa who lives at the North Pole.
— Herg

How is this different from saying that we merely entertain the fiction? — bongo fury

It doesn't differ in any important way. I think the reason Griffin talks about 'contexts of supposition' rather than 'fictions', is that there can be other contexts of supposition than those created by writing fiction. For example, if kids play at cowboys and Indians (though I guess they don't do that anymore), this play creates a context of supposition in which they are, indeed, cowboys and Indians.

A fictitious supposed entity
— Herg

You might as well say, a fictitious fictitious entity. — bongo fury

Mea culpa. 'Fictitious supposed entity' does not accurately capture my meaning. A fictitious entity is a supposed entity. As you imply, a fictitious supposed entity would be an entity that is merely supposed to exist by people who are themselves fictitious. I apologise for my terminological inexactitude.