So move past the Tractatus and on to On Certainty. Instead of looking for what it makes sense to believe, look to what it makes sense to doubt. This post, here, now? — Banno
And yet science continues to make successful predictions and enhance understanding.
Maybe to phenomenologist, and for Quine sensory surfaces, but most scientists they continues doing what they are doing without worrying about phenomenologist's subjective content, or Quine's cultural posits, pragmatically speaking. — Richard B
To my (very limited) understanding phenomenology aspires to what the title suggests, an account of the "phenomenon of perception", of what it is like to perceive, in the abstract. Perhaps you can illustrate your point with a quote? I can't see how an abstract accounting like this can bridge the gap I described. — hypericin
Not sure about the point. Obviously, science's problems are not philosophy's. Scientists continuing "doing what they are doing"does nothing to address philosophical problems. — Constance
All I have ever asked of analytic philosophy is to simply tell me how foundational matters are worked out — Constance
o say that science needs a foundation that only phenomenology can supply because there appears to be a "philosophical problem"-yet science manages to successfully march forward with progress- is itself the problem you should examine. Your longing for foundations is due to what Wittgenstein said "when language goes on holiday" — Richard B
"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." Wittgenstein PI124 — Richard B
And yet we do talk about them. — Banno
Because "about" means concerning or referencing, but doesn't mean conveying, which would mean transferring actual content. — Hanover
How is talk of leaf and branch different to talk of smell and touch? — Banno
The system, in its proper modus operandi, is knowledge. That’s what reason is for. With respect to objects, then, sensation has no cognitive power, is not of that part of the system which cognizes what object shall be known as. Here, sensation is nothing but the alarm, the trigger for the knowledge system to initiate its operation. — Mww
To convey indicates the transporting of my thought to your thought, a metaphorical movement through space, akin to a mail delivery, and of course that cannot be done actually. — Hanover
Frankly I don't understand what you are saying here. — Banno
….a charitable way of interpreting this discussion in which these statements are not contradictory. — Banno
Our self (our subjectivity) is one of the lines of our current assemblage.
— Number2018
But is Protevi’s reading doing justice to Deleuze? He argues that “a sophisticated approach to phenomenology does not see it as reducing experience to what appears to a subject but rather as proceeding from that appearance to an understanding of what must underlie it.
Taken that way, Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, which seeks the conditions of real rather than possible experience, lies at not nearly as far a remove from say, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body, as many have thought.”
When we look at the way that Protevi wants to rethink enactivist, embodied cognition, however , we find his brand of Deleuzianism to be merely a more reductionist form of embodied cognition. For instance , his understanding of Deleuzian affect incorporates cognitive and neuroscientific approaches like Lisa Barrett, Griffiths, Panksepp and LeDoux, and he associates the anthropological work of James Scott with Deleuzian thought. I see these approaches as not particularly compatible with Deleuze. — Joshs
What if language is less like a mail system, more like a construction site. What if instead of passing thoughts from one private mind to another, we use language to build thoughts, together, in a shared space.
If thoughts are a shared construction, they are not ineffable. — Banno
What if language is less like a mail system, more like a construction site. What if instead of passing thoughts from one private mind to another, we use language to build thoughts, together, in a shared space. — Banno
There's something very unconvincing about using biography to impute philosophical argument. It results in simplistic overgeneralisation. I'll leave you to your misleading biographical speculation. — Banno
78. Compare knowing and saying:
how many metres high Mont Blanc is —
how the word “game” is used —
how a clarinet sounds.
Someone who is surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it is perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third. — Philosophical Investigations
Certainly not of one like the third — Philosophical Investigations
That is, I can't know what the tree objectively is and I can't know what you're talking about in an objective way. — Hanover
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