So move past the Tractatus and on to On Certainty. Instead of looking for what it makes sense to believe, look to what it makes sense to doubt. This post, here, now? — Banno

I find that rather unresponsive. No, I've read it, but I'm not going fishing because you can't find a fitting response. If you have a position, state it.

And yet science continues to make successful predictions and enhance understanding.

Maybe to phenomenologist, and for Quine sensory surfaces, but most scientists they continues doing what they are doing without worrying about phenomenologist's subjective content, or Quine's cultural posits, pragmatically speaking. — Richard B

Not sure about the point. Obviously, science's problems are not philosophy's. Scientists continuing "doing what they are doing"does nothing to address philosophical problems. The questions here are philosophical.

The fact that scientists can proceed so independently of what philosophy has to say is simply evidence that the two lines of inquiry are entirely distinct. Ask a scientist how it is, for example, that an object like a brain, an absolutely epistemically opaque thing, can generate experiences "about" other things. She will simply dismiss this. But then, such a question is central to philosophical interests.

To my (very limited) understanding phenomenology aspires to what the title suggests, an account of the "phenomenon of perception", of what it is like to perceive, in the abstract. Perhaps you can illustrate your point with a quote? I can't see how an abstract accounting like this can bridge the gap I described. — hypericin

In phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty’s hands, language is not the product of a meeting between private perceptions inside individual minds but of a primary intersubjectivity.

” My friend Paul and I point out to each other certain details of the landscape; and Paul's finger, which is pointing out the church tower, is not a finger-for-me that I think of as orientated towards a church-tower-for-me, it is Paul's finger which itself shows me the tower that Paul sees, just as, conversely, when I make a movement towards some point in the landscape that I can see, I do not imagine that I am producing in Paul, in virtue of some pre-established harmony, inner visions merely analogous to mine: I believe, on the contrary, that my gestures invade Paul's world and guide his gaze. When I think of Paul, I do not think of a flow of private sensations indirectly related to mine through the medium of interposed signs, but of someone who has a living experience of the same world as mine, as well as the same history, and with whom I am in communication through that world and that history.”(Phenomenology of Perception, p.471)

“ In the experience of dialogue, there is constituted between the other person and myself a common ground; my thought and his are inter-woven into a single fabric, my words and those of my interlocutor are called forth by the state of the discussion, and they are inserted into a shared operation of which neither of us is the creator. We have here a dual being, where the other is for me no longer a mere bit of behavior in my transcendental field, nor I in his; we are collaborators for each other in consummate reciprocity. Our perspectives merge into each other, and we co-exist through a common world. In the present dialogue, I am freed from myself, for the other person's thoughts are certainly his; they are not of my making, though I do grasp them the moment they come into being, or even anticipate them. And indeed, the objection which my interlocutor raises to what I say draws from me thoughts which I had no idea I possessed, so that at the same time that I lend him thoughts, he reciprocates by making me think too. It is only retrospectively, when I have withdrawn from the dialogue and am recalling it that I am able to reintegrate it into my life and make of it an episode in my private history”. (Phenomenology of Perception, p.413)

Not sure about the point. Obviously, science's problems are not philosophy's. Scientists continuing "doing what they are doing"does nothing to address philosophical problems. — Constance

To say that science needs a foundation that only phenomenology can supply because there appears to be a "philosophical problem"-yet science manages to successfully march forward with progress- is itself the problem you should examine. Your longing for foundations is due to what Wittgenstein said "when language goes on holiday"

You asked how "foundational matters" are worked out in analytic philosophy. On Certainty sets out why foundations do not matter... indeed, are

"when language goes on holiday" — Richard B

All I have ever asked of analytic philosophy is to simply tell me how foundational matters are worked out — Constance

"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." Wittgenstein PI124

o say that science needs a foundation that only phenomenology can supply because there appears to be a "philosophical problem"-yet science manages to successfully march forward with progress- is itself the problem you should examine. Your longing for foundations is due to what Wittgenstein said "when language goes on holiday" — Richard B

Well, you should know that Wittgentein's falling out with Russell was all about the latter's failure to understand that the Tractatus' importance was in that-which-should-be-passed-over-in-silence, and not the prohibitive delimitations analytic philosophers are so fond of. Russell thought he was a mystic! Witt thought he and Russell should sever correspondence on their difference regarding the matter of the question of value in ethics and aesthetics. Consider further that Witt's favorite philosopher was Kierkegaard, whose foundational longings are legendary (and terrifying to theologians). Did you know Witt held that divinity was found in "the Good"?

You should take a hard look at the simplicity of this, which I repeat: All anyone has ever witnessed is phenomena. This isn't contestable, and science is not in competition with this. What alternative is there to this, materialism (one form or another)? Pure metaphysics, materialism. Naturalism? Better. Dewey, Quine, Rorty were in this camp (in their own way), but note, the pragmatism that underlies this is what hs to be called pragmatic phenomenology.

Wittgenstein himself has been called a phenomenologist in his Tractatus. States of affairs are not a scientist's conception. A fact is a logical entity, which reminds us of the grandfather of phenomenology, Kant.

"Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." Wittgenstein PI124 — Richard B

And yet, there are all those occasions where he acknowledges what is "there" to be left "as it is". This is why I take him up in a discussion about ineffability. He rarely comments on it, but this is because it is too important to do so. One can infer a strong claim about the primacy of ethics/aesthetics/value that cannot be spoken: certainly what ineffability is all about.

Then there is Husserl. And here your objections may have their relevance. But then, phenomenology certainly does "leave everything as it is." It is a descriptive account. Any foundation Husserl posited was simply there, to be acknowledged.

You asked how "foundational matters" are worked out in analytic philosophy. On Certainty sets out why foundations do not matter... indeed, are — Banno

See my responses to Richard B

And yet we do talk about them. — Banno

Dualism. Human nature.

The system, in its proper modus operandi, is knowledge. That’s what reason is for. With respect to objects, then, sensation has no cognitive power, is not of that part of the system which cognizes what object shall be known as. Here, sensation is nothing but the alarm, the trigger for the knowledge system to initiate its operation.

“… For, otherwise, we should be required to affirm the existence of an appearance without that which appears, which would be absurd…”

Hence it is not given the attribute of conceptual schemata, the very root of its ineffability, which is to say the system doesn’t consider what sensation in general is, nor what sensations in general are, but only that by means of them alone, a representation of the object as it is perceived is possible, and that by means of the mode, re: the sensory apparatus, by which the sensation is delivered.

Talk of the form sensation is given, such that the effability of it is supposed, the sting of a bee, the taste of Lima beans, is still nothing but a post hoc recollection, in which reason has already judged the relation between the perception and the phenomenon which follows from it, because of the affect the sensation provided. In fact, albeit theoretically, what’s accomplished here is the assignment of a property or attribute to an object that relates that object in a non-contradictory fashion, to the sensation, but is mistaken as a condition by which the sensation itself can be named. See the conversation between myself and , pg 23, for a taste of the scientific/metaphysical cognitive dichotomy.

This systemic methodology goes back to Plato, reiterated with various names through Locke, Hume, Kant, Russell, et. al.. Knowledge of/knowledge that. Knowledge a posteriori/knowledge a priori. Knowledge by description/knowledge by acquaintance.

“….intuition cannot think, and understanding cannot intuit. It is only by them in conjunction with each other, is our (empirical) knowledge at all possible….”

Dualists one and all. As humans are by their very nature. Or, perhaps, the very nature of their intelligence. And the later-modern advent of phenomenology becomes self-justified, in that no one likes the idea that we cannot immediately describe our own sensations, as early-modern metaphysics demands. Rather than wait for the system to complete its task as a whole, it is claimed as possible to circumvent half of it, yet still lay claim to knowledge. Abysmally short-sighted, I must say.

Because "about" means concerning or referencing, but doesn't mean conveying, which would mean transferring actual content. — Hanover

How is talk of leaf and branch different to talk of smell and touch? — Banno

Of course language can't transmit sensation any more than it can trees. What it could do (but can't, for sensation) is describe.

We don't merely label trees, we have descriptive terms for them. If you only have labels, description is limited to

"What is an oak? It is like an elm, but not like a spruce? What is a spruce? It is like a pine, but not like an alder..."

Instead,

"An oak is a deciduous thick barked tree, growing to 100-200ft at maturity. It has broad, waxy, green, tri-pointed leaves. In autumn it bears conical, edible nuts with a fibrous cap..."

If I had patience and actually knew what I was talking about I could paint a picture in your mind of what an oak was like, without your actually ever seeing one.

But I cannot do the same for sensation terms. We only have labels for them, no descriptors. So while we can trivially use them in sentences "I have a red cup", we cannot describe them. At best we can only use impressionistic associations and metaphors ("Red is fiery", "Oak is majestic"). This lack of descriptive ability makes sense terms ineffable.

There's something very unconvincing about using biography to impute philosophical argument. It results in simplistic overgeneralisation. I'll leave you to your misleading biographical speculation.

The system, in its proper modus operandi, is knowledge. That’s what reason is for. With respect to objects, then, sensation has no cognitive power, is not of that part of the system which cognizes what object shall be known as. Here, sensation is nothing but the alarm, the trigger for the knowledge system to initiate its operation. — Mww

Frankly I don't understand what you are saying here. "The system... is knowledge"? "Sensation has no cognitive power"? "Dualism"?

Maybe we can find some common ground. You say that sensations are entirely ineffable. I point out that we do talk about sensations. Let's look at that, on the presumption that we are both right - that there is a charitable way of interpreting this discussion in which these statements are not contradictory.

So, I will presume that you agree that we do talk about bee stings and the aroma of coffee. I call such things sensations, and hence say that we talk about our sensations. I presume that you are using the term "sensation" in a somewhat different way.

You mentioned your chat with @Isaac. Is your claim something like, the action of a neural net in "registering" (looking for a neutral word) a bee sting or the aroma of coffee stochastic, rather than propositional?

To convey indicates the transporting of my thought to your thought, a metaphorical movement through space, akin to a mail delivery, and of course that cannot be done actually. — Hanover

This is the metaphor that holds sway with many here.

What if language is less like a mail system, more like a construction site. What if instead of passing thoughts from one private mind to another, we use language to build thoughts, together, in a shared space.

If thoughts are a shared construction, they are not ineffable.

If thoughts are a shared construction, they are not ineffable. — Banno

You don't have a vantage point on thought itself. Therefore, your theory amounts to language on holiday.

Doesn't mean you can't continue to speculate. Just don't try to go further than that.

You don't have a vantage point on thought itself. — frank

Nothing much stand on the choice of "thought". Narrative, dialogue, discussion, beliefs, would also do.

Frankly I don't understand what you are saying here. — Banno

Without a thorough study of Enlightenment speculative metaphysics, there’s no reason you should, and for the oversight, you are hereby forgiven. (Grin)

….a charitable way of interpreting this discussion in which these statements are not contradictory. — Banno

Best I can do is caution against mistaking the operation of a system in situ, for discussions about it after the fact. In the former sensation is ineffable, insofar as that part of the system responsible for language use is very far from that part to which sensation proper belongs, but in the latter it is not, insofar as all parts of the system are treated equally by the language used to describe them.

Ineffability is a fluid concept. It has been years since I was stung by a bee. My friend was stung yesterday and said, "It hurts!". I can more or less empathize. Now, suppose I had been stung last week. When she tells me she has been stung and it hurts I can empathize much more strongly - the conveyed experience is less ineffable.

I watch an Olympic diver, then he talks with me and explains how he has to twist and turn as he falls. Intellectually, it all make sense, but the actual experience is ineffable to me.

Relating something sensual is a matter of empathizing. Which shifts the focus away from the word "ineffable".

But this thread is going to 1,000 posts no matter what. :roll:

Our self (our subjectivity) is one of the lines of our current assemblage.
— Number2018

But is Protevi’s reading doing justice to Deleuze? He argues that “a sophisticated approach to phenomenology does not see it as reducing experience to what appears to a subject but rather as proceeding from that appearance to an understanding of what must underlie it.
Taken that way, Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, which seeks the conditions of real rather than possible experience, lies at not nearly as far a remove from say, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body, as many have thought.”

When we look at the way that Protevi wants to rethink enactivist, embodied cognition, however , we find his brand of Deleuzianism to be merely a more reductionist form of embodied cognition. For instance , his understanding of Deleuzian affect incorporates cognitive and neuroscientific approaches like Lisa Barrett, Griffiths, Panksepp and LeDoux, and he associates the anthropological work of James Scott with Deleuzian thought. I see these approaches as not particularly compatible with Deleuze. — Joshs

I want to get back to my previous post. It may be my fault that I could not articulate my central point clearly; it is about the question of the ineffable. For me, your, Protevi or even Deleuze's position regarding phenomenology is less critical than resolving or clarifying the issue. I believe that Deleuze is right, and we live and act within our assemblage; when Deleuze wrote it, that was his one, and right now, we have a different one. Its essential characteristics, according to
Deleuze and Guattari is that "There is only desire and the social, and nothing else. "(D & G, 'Anti-Oedipus, p 29). Later, in 'What is dispositif?' Deleuse introduces the third dimension of self.
Massumi develops this assertion: "There are the nonconscious presuppositions implanted in the field as you brace into it, making the coming event nonoptional. This is the aspect of perceptual judgement: conclusions about the situation that pre-make themselves as the premises of the event and as an energizer of the movements composing it.
The affective intensity of the situation powers it's playing out. Effectively, all this is about desire occurring, not on the individual level… The rational aspects of the event – judgment, hypothesis, decision -were mutually included in the event along with all the other cooperating factors." (Massumi, 2015, p 47) Where is our conscious personal autonomy here? In what way our self emerges and immediately disappears in this gap? An instantaneous translation, reduction, and transformation of the event endlessly occur at a level of our conscious engagement. Since we must act here and now, in a brief moment of time, just a little complexity can be envisaged and processed. We rely on
our reduced cooperative behavioural patterns and apply ready-made, adopted narrations and self-esteem. Our perceptional, cognitive, and social incentives are directly embedded into our environment. The ineffable is that we continue to believe in our conscious, individual autonomy.
How do you see this assessment from the position of embodied cognition? Is there another way to conceive the place and the function of self between the affective and social registers?

Without a thorough study of Enlightenment speculative metaphysics, there’s no reason you should, and for the oversight, you are hereby forgiven. (Grin) — Mww

Hiding in obscurity. Ok, disappointing, but I'll leave you to it.

Nothing much stand on the choice of "thought". Narrative, dialogue, discussion, beliefs, would also do. — Banno

You still don't have a vantage point on thought however you chose to define it.

Hiding in obscurity — Banno

‘S ok; I like it here.

What if language is less like a mail system, more like a construction site. What if instead of passing thoughts from one private mind to another, we use language to build thoughts, together, in a shared space.

If thoughts are a shared construction, they are not ineffable. — Banno

My thoughts are in my mind, and your thoughts are in your mind. Yes, your thoughts may influence my thoughts, and my thoughts may influence yours, through communion or whatever. But you and I disagree with each other, and that's clear indication that the thoughts I am constructing are not the same thoughts which you are constructing. And of course, there are many other examples, like the reality of deception, which prove you to be wrong.

What if language is less like a mail system, more like a construction site. What if instead of passing thoughts from one private mind to another, we use language to build thoughts, together, in a shared space. — Banno

If think the analogy correct, but I'm not sure it solves our ineffablity problem. Your statements are created by you and experienced by me, just as I experience your gesture, your clothes, the tree outside.

We both look at the same tree. I see X and you Y. I trust X and Y are very similar, but experiences are complex and filled with perspective, opinion, emotion, variations in our perceptability, and even the lingering taste of the morning's breakfast. There aren't raw data to be received all the same.

So you tell me about the tree, I liken those comments to my prior perceptions, and we share in the exercise of communication, which certainly does create within me a perception, perhaps a partially accurate sketch of your perception.

If that's sufficient for you to avoid a charge of ineffability, then we have a resolution. I'd contend though that it invokes an indirectness of the object to the perception, and doesn't work under a direct realism stance. In fact, it extend indirect realism to communicative events.

That takes us back to noumena and phenomena, which necessarily demands ineffablity. The object can't be known for what it is. The tree is an object as much as a proposition about an object is an object, both subject to interpretation, and neither coherently standing alone as a desipherable noumenal thing.

That is, I can't know what the tree objectively is and I can't know what you're talking about in an objective way.

There's something very unconvincing about using biography to impute philosophical argument. It results in simplistic overgeneralisation. I'll leave you to your misleading biographical speculation. — Banno

No no, Banno; you simply have it all wrong. The Tractatus is not a biography: "6.522 There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical."

His biography does, however, confirm the weight he gives this, and other things he says in the same vein. Perfectly honest?: I think you protest too much.

Wittgenstein also maintains in his later work that some knowledge is ineffable. From PI:

78. Compare knowing and saying:

how many metres high Mont Blanc is —
how the word “game” is used —
how a clarinet sounds.

Someone who is surprised that one can know something and not be able to say it is perhaps thinking of a case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third. — Philosophical Investigations

The Tractatus is not a biography — Constance

Well, that at least gave me a laugh.

Certainly not of one like the third — Philosophical Investigations

How does a clarinet sound? Of course, you can describe this, but this would be a contingent description, relying other said things, each of which would present yet a new context that needed to be explained. Even the height of Mont Blanc moves like this through definitional routing and rerouting. Circular. Heidegger understood this. In his Origin of the Work of Art, he discusses What comes first, the work of art or the nature of art that informs us what art is? He writes,

Thus we are compelled to follow the circle. This is neither a makeshift nor a defect.
To enter upon this path is the strength of thought, to continue on it is the feast of
thought, assuming that thinking is a craft. Not only is the main step from work to art a
circle like the step from art to work, but every separate step that we attempt circles in
this circle.

It is really well said-- this "strength of thought" is a true intellectual's delight through which art's meaning is wrought.

Well, that at least gave me a laugh. — Banno

That I will yield to.

That is, I can't know what the tree objectively is and I can't know what you're talking about in an objective way. — Hanover

Yep, it is not that you can’t know, it is that you don't know. You don't know because you don't know what counts as a objective tree. And just because there are illusions and hallucinations does not mean there is something behind those objects that we are familiar with.

But I think this chase for the tree’s objectivity has another problem. There is the illusion of searching for something fundamental like searching for the bottom of the sea. This is not some empirical discovery but creation of a concept that humans give meaning to.