As I said above, apart from the experience of the "external, objective" world there is also the experience of freedom and moral responsibility, and although we don't directly experience what goes on in other minds, similarly we don't directly experience an external world either, although we do have plenty of experience that provides individual evidence that something exists outside of our skins, just as we have plenty of experience that provides evidence for the existence of other people.. — Janus

I assume you're referring to Kant's ding an sich noumenon*1, which presumably exists "independent of representation and observation". Yet "Universal Mind/Consciousness" as an abstract idea, lacks phenomenal experience. So Realists tend to dismiss such unverifiable ideas, asserting that their phenomenal existence (as brain states)*2 is the only reality. Anything else suffers from the major limitation of Idealism : subjectivity. Which can be dismissed as "imaginary", or "mere opinion", or even "woo-woo" -- if it clashes with the Realist's noumenal worldview. — Gnomon

I wasn't referring to Kantian ideas. I intended to point out that we don't experience an external world, meaning that we don't experience anything that we know to be a mind-independent external world, even if an inference to a mind-independent external world might seem most plausible.

I don't think realists generally think that our existence consists merely in brain states; that would be just one part of our existence. Brain states, insofar as they are observable, are phenomena just like anything else. Also, I don't know what you mean by "realist's noumenal worldview".

The hard distinction between Realism & Idealism seems to imply that "my sensory experience counts as real" but your subjective experience counts only as hearsay. — Gnomon

I don't see it that way; even though we don't experience others' sensory experience, emotions, somatic awareness and whatever else constitutes human experience, we have no reason to suppose that others' experiences are any less real than our own, since they report their experiences, or that they have experiences, just as we do.

Whereas Functionalism*5 seems to be a half-step toward Idealism. — Gnomon

I'm not sure what you mean here. To my way of thinking functionalism just says that mind is a real function of the brain, which is again a kind of realism, if not strict eliminative physicalism.

I wasn't referring to Kantian ideas. I intended to point out that we don't experience an external world, meaning that we don't experience anything that we know to be a mind-independent external world, even if an inference to a mind-independent external world might seem most plausible. — Janus

OK. But that description sounds Kantian to me. Scientists & Philosophers may be aware that their observations are subjective, even when they are presented as objective : "most physicists agree that . . . . is a fact". Yet, non-philosophers, who haven't given it much thought, might not "know" that their experience is not of direct reality, but of the external world as mediated via an internal "frame" of prior beliefs. Kant seemed to be saying that, although we might infer an objective "mind-independent external world", our internal working model of that world is actually a subjective construct. Hence, we like to think we are seeing reality, when in fact we are imagining an artificial (man-made) model of reality. :cool:

Also, I don't know what you mean by "realist's noumenal worldview". — Janus

Sorry, I was obliquely referring to the realist's imaginary model of the world, which may be intuitively accepted as the true objective reality. That's how we navigate through the world, using our mental maps as proxies for the actual terrain. But on a philosophical forum we soon discover that my noumenal worldview (my map) may be rejected by others with different maps of true reality : e.g. Idealism vs Materialism. :nerd:

Whereas Functionalism*5 seems to be a half-step toward Idealism. — Gnomon
I not sure what you mean here. To my way of thinking functionalism just says that mind is a real function of the brain, which is again a kind of realism, if not strict eliminative physicalism. — Janus

Off the top of my pointy head, I was trying to say that a Function*1 is not a material thing, but an inference about a Causal Process*2 : not Real, but Ideal. The Brain is a real tangible object, but the Mind is an ideal imaginary subject. We know the Mind by rational inference, not by sensory observation. Hence Functionalism treats the idea of Mind as-if a Real thing.

The notion of "Phenomenal Experience" (mental currency) was new to me. But it makes sense that when we discuss the idea of a brain function (not what it is, but what it does) we must translate our perceptions of behavior into a conventional metaphorical language that serves as a representation of a concept that is not an objective thing, but a subjective inference : an idea. :smile:

*1. Function : an inferred causal relationship between an input and output

*2. Causation : Hume saw causation as a relationship between two impressions or ideas in the mind.

Also, I'd say taking consciousness as foundational and the world as derivative is similar to Descartes’ certainty about inner sensations (I think therefore I am) while admitting the world he perceived might be caused by some evil demon. — Art48

Regarding the OP, I'd like to re-word that statement. I take Causal Information as foundational and Mental Consciousness as derivative. Generic Information (the power to enform, to create) may or may not be conscious, but since mental consciousness did in fact emerge from eons of physical change, the potential for awareness must have been inherent in the First Cause -- or Initial Conditions, if you prefer. Causation is definitely directional, and possibly intentional, but I don't know what those intentions are. I can only guess about why the "demon" wanted to cause Descartes to believe a lie.

I'm just beginning to read a new book by astronomer Caleb Sharf : The Ascent of Information. Although he is a professional scientist, he writes like a philosopher, trying to see the big picture, instead of the microscopic view of Reductionism. In the first chapter, he says that "a number of thinkers . . . have asked whether information itself may be the fundamental currency of the universe". Currency is a medium of exchange, so Information is portrayed as the medium of Change (the essence of Energy) circulating within the world system.

Sharf goes on to note that physicist John A. Wheeler "explored the notion that the ultimate nature of physical reality is inextricably linked to observation and experimental interrogation" That may sound odd, but a lot of Quantum Physics is weird. Referring to quantum collapse of superposition, due to experimentation, he goes on to say that "the very act of observation or interaction is what causes their properties to snap into focus. In other words, this is a participatory universe of yes/no information, in which, as Wheeler put it, we get 'it from bit' " The implication is that the experimenter's setup is like a binary yes-or-no question : is a particle there or not? And the answer is to produce a local particle from a continuous wave-form : Voila!.

The notion of a "Participatory Universe" reminds me of the concept of Universal Mind/Consciousness. Yet in Wheeler's model, it's the human experimenter who consciously participates in the processes of physics by formulating a yes/no (1/0) question mathematically. Which leaves open the bigger question : is the universe conscious of our probing, or just a machine grinding out evolutionary products? In quantum experiments, the human operates the machine to output an answer. But is the response conscious or automatic? What do you think? :chin:

is the universe conscious of our probing, or just a machine grinding out evolutionary products? — Gnomon

Neither. :roll:

In quantum experiments, the human operates the machine to output an answer. But is the response conscious or automatic?

"The output ... response" is physical.

What do you think?

Another rhetorical question; you have no interest, Gnomon, in what anyone else, especially who differs with you, thinks.

Kant seemed to be saying that, although we might infer an objective "mind-independent external world", our internal working model of that world is actually a subjective construct. Hence, we like to think we are seeing reality, when in fact we are imagining an artificial (man-made) model of reality. :cool: — Gnomon

I read Kant more as saying that what we experience is a human reality. I think he was aware that the notion of 'things as they are in themselves', although we are logically driven to think it, is really an impossible thought,

Our sensory experience is not imaginary, and since it shows us a comprehensive invariance and consistency between senses and between individual percipients, the inference to, and collective representation of, an external world of identifiable entities seems most natural and plausible.

The point to keep in mind, in my view, is that we don't actually experience, moment to moment, such a world, but it is rather "there" as a kind of constant and inescapable background presumption.

But on a philosophical forum we soon discover that my noumenal worldview (my map) may be rejected by others with different maps of true reality : e.g. Idealism vs Materialism. :nerd: — Gnomon

I don't see it that way; I think our "maps" of an external world are pretty much the same. The metaphysical debates reflect more attenuated concerns about what might underly, and be the "ultimate foundation" of our phenomenal experiences and common representation of an actual, external
in the sense of external to our bodies) world.

(

The Brain is a real tangible object, but the Mind is an ideal imaginary subject. We know the Mind by rational inference, not by sensory observation. Hence Functionalism treats the idea of Mind as-if a Real thing. — Gnomon

The idea of the mind as a subject can easily be, and naturally pre-reflectively commonly is, reified as a mental substance, something thought to be not merely imaginary, but real in some "other way" than physical objects are thought to be real. The problem is that we cannot adequately model such an "other way".

I don't see functionailsm as being "the idea of Mind as-if a Real thing" but the idea of mind(ing) as a real process, attribute or function of a real thing (the body). (Of course we can refer to a process, attribute or function as a "thing", but I am sticking here for the sake of clarity to the conception that treats "thing" as denoting a tangible object of the senses).

I don't see functionailsm as being "the idea of Mind as-if a Real thing" but the idea of mind(ing) as a real process, attribute or function of a real thing (the body). — Janus

:100:

I read Kant more as saying that what we experience is a human reality. — Janus

Yes, vivid personal subjective realities. My experience is my reality. But, it's just one of many experienced "realities", because your experience may be different. For those born blind, their "reality" lacks the visual evidence of light-reflecting matter. So they may substitute imaginary representations of things, completely different. However, if they compare their partial subjective realities*1, they may be able to compile a comprehensive representation (objective reality), that more closely resembles the "reality" that sighted people experience. Kant's distinction was not between individual subjective reality, and collective objective reality -- that had already been made by previous generations of philosophers. Instead, he distinguished those mental models (maps) from ultimate Reality beyond*2 human experience.

In order to approximate "true" reality (ding an sich), we would have to compare our varying worldviews, looking for areas of overlap. Yet for scientific purposes, we have to ignore areas influenced primarily by personal emotional commitments and conventional belief systems. But even then, we are not guaranteed to reach the core reality. For example, not long ago scientists thought they had catalogued all forms of Energy & Matter. But now they have different opinions on the substance of Dark Matter & Dark Energy, constituting most of cosmic reality. :smile:

*1. Subjective Reality :
Knowledge of objective reality is gained by the five senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell. 2. Subjective reality is the inner world of the mind. The world of emotions and feelings.
https://corporatecoachgroup.com/blog/the-difference-between-objective-and-subjective-reality

*2. I don't mean supernatural, but comprehensive, global, universal view of Nature, which we can only imagine, based on what we experience via our limited senses.


BLIND MEN EXPERIENCING REALITY



THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT.
A HINDOO FABLE.
I.
IT was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined,
Who went to see the Elephant
(Though all of them were blind),
That each by observation
Might satisfy his mind.
II.
The First approached the Elephant,
And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side,
At once began to bawl:
"God bless me!—but the Elephant
Is very like a wall!"
III.
The Second, feeling of the tusk,
Cried: "Ho!—what have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp?
To me 't is mighty clear
This wonder of an Elephant
Is very like a spear!"
IV.
The Third approached the animal,
And happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands,
Thus boldly up and spake:
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a snake!"
V.
The Fourth reached out his eager hand,
And felt about the knee.
"What most this wondrous beast is like
Is mighty plain," quoth he;
"'T is clear enough the Elephant
Is very like a tree!"
VI.
The Fifth, who chanced to touch the ear,
Said: "E'en the blindest man
Can tell what this resembles most;
Deny the fact who can,
This marvel of an Elephant
Is very like a fan!"
VII.
The Sixth no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a rope!"
VIII.
And so these men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each in his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!

MORAL.
So, oft in theologic wars
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean,
And prate about an Elephant
Not one of them has seen!

The unseen ding an sich : the whole system of many parts

Yes, vivid personal subjective realities. My experience is my reality. But, it's just one of many experienced "realities", because your experience may be different. — Gnomon

Our experiences may be different, but if they have nothing in common then they would not qualify as experiences of reality, even though they might qualify as real experiences. We actually don't perceive reality at all, we conceive it.

In order to approximate "true" reality (ding an sich), we would have to compare our varying worldviews, looking for areas of overlap. — Gnomon

This is not Kant, though; according to him we cannot approximate to the noumenal. We can only say how things seem in our experience, and if our experiences align, then we have empirical reality. Empirical reality is reality for us according to Kant. So, logically we can then ask "what about reality in itself or beyond the "for us"?", and Kant's answer is that we can have no idea of what that could be.

So, logically we can then ask "what about reality in itself or beyond the "for us"?", and Kant's answer is that we can have no idea of what that could be. — Janus

Isn't that the "reality beyond the 'for us'" – the limit or horizon of our reasoning, namely that reality necessarily encompasses its conception such that the notion that 'conception encompasses reality' entails self-contradiction? In the Kantian sense, empirical knowledge (phenomenon) proximately approaches but asymptotically cannot reach the horizon/reality (i.e. noumenon). In other words, aren't we (embodied reasoners) just an aspect of the whole which cannot transcend – thereby 'totalize' – the whole (re: mereological self-consistency)? Inhabitants of the territory who cannot make a map (out of aspects of the territory) informationally identical to, let alone 'greater than', the territory itself? Well, isn't that a coherent "idea of reality in itself" (i.e. the territory > maps-of-the territory), of what makes "reality for us" (i.e. map-making/using) possible? I suppose I could be confusing myself with 'transcendental illusions' ... :chin:

My consciousness is all that I really know exists. — Art48

What is conscious is different from what it is conscious about - or what creates is different from its creation - meaning there is more than one thing.

Isn't that the "reality beyond the 'for us'" – the limit or horizon of our reasoning, namely that reality necessarily encompasses its conception such that 'reality's conception encompasses reality' is a self-contradiction? In the Kantian sense, empirical knowledge (phenomenon) proximately approaches but asymptotically cannot reach the horizon/reality (i.e. noumenon). In other words, aren't we (embodied reasoners) just an aspect of the whole which cannot transcend – thereby 'totalize' – the whole (re: mereological self-consistency)? Inhabitants of the territory who cannot make a map (out of aspects of the territory) informationally identical to, let alone 'greater than', the territory itself? Well, isn't that a coherent "idea of reality in itself" (i.e. the territory > maps-of-the territory), of what makes "reality for us" (i.e. map-making/using) possible? I suppose I could be confusing myself with 'transcendental illusions' ... :chin: — 180 Proof

That all makes sense to me. I don't think Kant denied that there is a reality in itself (i.e. something that would be in the absence of human life). Kant interpretation among dedicated scholars is notoriously controversial, and I am no Kant scholar. so I could be off the mark. (It seems the closest we have to Kant scholar on this forum is @Mww).

In any case, according to my limited understanding I think Kant would not deny that we experience noumena, in the sense that we are affected by it/them, and are part of it/ them in that they give rise to our being and perceptions, which we in turn model as "things", "bodies", "objects" or sounds or smells and so on, And those empirical objects cannot be known exhaustively, but I think it is controversial as to whether Kant thought of those objects as things-in- themselves, but if he did it would make sense to me, and would ratify the distinction between things-in-themselves and noumena, the latter being what we can attain no conception of.

So, I agree with what you seem to be saying: that the "territory" is the unknowable (because it cannot be encompassed) reality in itself. This stuff is seemingly impossible to talk about without some incoherence pr aporia, so I think it's fair to say that we all "confuse ourselves (to varying degrees) with transcendental illusions". .

:up:
Btw, I'm not actually interested in what Kant thought about reality (noumenon) because his phenomenon-noumemon distinction seems to me one of Kant's own "transcendental illusions" (re: an inconsistency of his schema).

Our experiences may be different, but if they have nothing in common then they would not qualify as experiences of reality, even though they might qualify as real experiences. We actually don't perceive reality at all, we conceive it. — Janus

Yes. That's what I was implying with the map vs terrain examples. But, to gain leverage in philosophical arguments, some people act as-if their personal map is the true model of reality. And, some claim that an abstraction -- sometimes labelled "settled science" -- is the final authority on Truth. Ideally, "settled science" would serve as a compendium of what all observer's models should "have in common". Yet philosophical debates tend to focus on unsettled marginal science : e.g. the meaning of quantum paradoxes, such as the Many Worlds interpretation. :smile:

Map–territory relation :
The map–territory relation is the relationship between an object and a representation of that object,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Map%E2%80%93territory_relation

Map/Territory Fallacy :
“The map is not the territory” is a phrase coined by the Polish-American philosopher and engineer Alfred Korzybski. He used it to convey the fact that people often confuse models of reality with reality itself. According to Korzybski, models stand to represent things, but they are not identical to those things.
https://www.the-possible.com/the-map-is-not-the-territory/

In order to approximate "true" reality (ding an sich), we would have to compare our varying worldviews, looking for areas of overlap. — Gnomon
This is not Kant, though; according to him we cannot approximate to the noumenal. We can only say how things seem in our experience, and if our experiences align, then we have empirical reality. Empirical reality is reality for us according to Kant. So, logically we can then ask "what about reality in itself or beyond the "for us"?", and Kant's answer is that we can have no idea of what that could be. — Janus

That aspirational assertion is merely my opinion, not attributed to Kant. Even though we cannot directly know the ding an sich, we can -- via the observational methods of Science, and the reasoning of Philosophy -- construct models of ultimate reality that "approximate" the true ding. On this forum we argue about whose model is Closer To Truth, which is the pragmatic goal of Philosophy. Even Kant seemed motivated to get as close as possible to Transcendental Idealism. :cool:

PS__Was the TI term a case of sour grapes?

The meaning of SOUR GRAPES is disparagement of something that has proven unattainable.

Kant vs Scientific Rationalism :
Science deals with what we can perceive (empiric knowledge = empiric truth), not with the Ding-an-Sich. We don't have access to it, and reaching it is not the goal of science, it is impossible.
https://philosophy.stackexchange.com/questions/84710/kant-vs-scientific-rationalism-do-we-need-the-ding-an-sich

Btw, I'm not actually interested in what Kant thought about reality (noumenon) because his phenomenon-noumemon distinction seems to me one of Kant's own "transcendental illusions" (re: an inconsistency of his schema). — 180 Proof

I can relate to that; there is a kind of tension in Kant, since he rejects the possibility of doing metaphysics (as traditionally conceived) via pure reason, while advocating practical reasons for believing in God, Freedom and Immortality. There may be inherent problems of inconsistency and incoherence in his philosophy which would explain why there is (apparently) controversy among Kant scholars as to just what he thought about some issues.

That aspirational assertion is merely my opinion, not attributed to Kant. Even though we cannot directly know the ding an sich, we can -- via the observational methods of Science, and the reasoning of Philosophy -- construct models of ultimate reality that "approximate" the true ding. On this forum we argue about whose model is Closer To Truth, which is the pragmatic goal of Philosophy. Even Kant seemed motivated to get as close as possible to Transcendental Idealism. :cool: — Gnomon

OK, but I don't believe we can construct models of ultimate reality, we can only construct models of how things appear to us, The very idea of ultimate reality is verging on being, if it is not actually, incoherent, in my view.

Even if our models were "approximating" to ultimate reality, how would we ever know, and how can we even know what it would mean for a perspectival model to approximate to a reality that is defined, as ultimate or absolute, as being beyond all perspective and context?

I don't agree with you that we are arguing, on this forum, about whose model is "Closer To Truth"; the way I see it we are arguing for how things seems to each of us, from our own perspectives. That is why so much talking past one another goes on. I don't purport to argue for transcendent truth, but aim to get a clear picture of just what our (human) situation consists in; and that is why I advocate phenomenology, because I think it's the closest we've come to a good methodology for that purpose.

Kant said that we cannot help trying to do metaphysics (do metaphysics in the sense of trying to get to empirically transcendent truth by means of reason), His project, as I understand it, was concerned with showing that to be impossible. So he acknowledges that we cannot help trying to do it, but wants us to realize it is impossible. This realization will not eradicate the urge to do it, but should help keep it in check.

Gautama Buddha realized the same things 2600 years ago.

I can relate to that; there is a kind of tension in Kant, since he rejects the possibility of doing metaphysics (as traditionally conceived) via pure reason, while advocating practical reasons for believing in God, Freedom and Immortality. There may be inherent problems of inconsistency and incoherence in his philosophy which would explain why there is (apparently) controversy among Kant scholars as to just what he thought about some issues. — Janus

:up:

I don't agree with you that we are arguing, on this forum, about whose model is "Closer To Truth"; the way I see it we are arguing for how things seems to each of us, from our own perspectives. — Janus

Perhaps. But don't you think each poster on a philosophy forum is trying to get as close as possible to ultimate truth : Ontology & Epistemology? Don't we tend to judge other opinions by how close they are to our personal model of true (ultimate) Reality --- even though we are aware that our models are merely approximations of The Truth? Science may be content with pragmatic understanding, but Philosophy aspires to ultimate Ideal Truth. Kant merely advised philosophical humility, in view of human limitations. Our ultimate sky-castles are constructed from mundane proximates.

Some models of ultimate Reality -- belief systems (-isms) -- include Meta-Physics (beyond Phenomena) while some exclude Noumena from consideration. Ironically, some posters seem to think they should be limited to pragmatic space-time (i.e. scientific) questions on a Philosophical forum. But, as you noted, even Kant couldn't help asking Ultimate Questions about the roots of Reality that lie beyond mundane Phenomenal experience via the senses. And the only way to such theoretical speculative knowledge is via rational inference from both personal experience and the shared experience of hypothetical conjectures. ad astra per aspera. :smile:

From the OP :
But whence the universal mind/consciousness? Is it eternal? How did it originate? What is its nature? If that’s what we really are, then we must be capable of answering the questions.
Note 1 : Isn't it ironic that Kant proposed both Transcendental Idealism and ding an sich, while believing in God (rational theology)? Regarding transcendent Truth, God only knows; but philosophers & cosmologists strive to "know the mind of god" (Hawking).
Note 2 : One answer to to OP might be : "Who cares? We'll never know. Besides, anything Noumenal or Transcendent has nothing to do with our Phenomenal Physical lives". But it's typical of Philosophers that they care about things that are not immanent phenomenal physical objects : e.g. beliefs, possibilities, cosmologies, worldviews, etc.

Einstein's Quest :
In 1925, Einstein went on a walk with a young student named Esther Salaman. As they wandered, he shared his core guiding intellectual principle: "I want to know how God created this world. I'm not interested in this or that phenomenon, in the spectrum of this or that element. I want to know His thoughts; the rest are just details."
https://www.livescience.com/65628-theory-of-everything-millennia-away.html

thing-in-itself :
…philosophy of Immanuel Kant, the thing-in-itself (das Ding an sich) as opposed to what Kant called the phenomenon—the thing as it appears to an observer. Though the noumenal holds the contents of the intelligible world, Kant claimed that man’s speculative reason can only know phenomena and can never penetrate to…
https://www.britannica.com/topic/thing-in-itself

Closer to Truth :
Asking Ultimate Questions
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Closer_to_Truth