As I said above, apart from the experience of the "external, objective" world there is also the experience of freedom and moral responsibility, and although we don't directly experience what goes on in other minds, similarly we don't directly experience an external world either, although we do have plenty of experience that provides individual evidence that something exists outside of our skins, just as we have plenty of experience that provides evidence for the existence of other people.. — Janus
I assume you're referring to Kant's ding an sich noumenon*1, which presumably exists "independent of representation and observation". Yet "Universal Mind/Consciousness" as an abstract idea, lacks phenomenal experience. So Realists tend to dismiss such unverifiable ideas, asserting that their phenomenal existence (as brain states)*2 is the only reality. Anything else suffers from the major limitation of Idealism : subjectivity. Which can be dismissed as "imaginary", or "mere opinion", or even "woo-woo" -- if it clashes with the Realist's noumenal worldview. — Gnomon
The hard distinction between Realism & Idealism seems to imply that "my sensory experience counts as real" but your subjective experience counts only as hearsay. — Gnomon
Whereas Functionalism*5 seems to be a half-step toward Idealism. — Gnomon
OK. But that description sounds Kantian to me. Scientists & Philosophers may be aware that their observations are subjective, even when they are presented as objective : "most physicists agree that . . . . is a fact". Yet, non-philosophers, who haven't given it much thought, might not "know" that their experience is not of direct reality, but of the external world as mediated via an internal "frame" of prior beliefs. Kant seemed to be saying that, although we might infer an objective "mind-independent external world", our internal working model of that world is actually a subjective construct. Hence, we like to think we are seeing reality, when in fact we are imagining an artificial (man-made) model of reality. :cool:I wasn't referring to Kantian ideas. I intended to point out that we don't experience an external world, meaning that we don't experience anything that we know to be a mind-independent external world, even if an inference to a mind-independent external world might seem most plausible. — Janus
Sorry, I was obliquely referring to the realist's imaginary model of the world, which may be intuitively accepted as the true objective reality. That's how we navigate through the world, using our mental maps as proxies for the actual terrain. But on a philosophical forum we soon discover that my noumenal worldview (my map) may be rejected by others with different maps of true reality : e.g. Idealism vs Materialism. :nerd:Also, I don't know what you mean by "realist's noumenal worldview". — Janus
Off the top of my pointy head, I was trying to say that a Function*1 is not a material thing, but an inference about a Causal Process*2 : not Real, but Ideal. The Brain is a real tangible object, but the Mind is an ideal imaginary subject. We know the Mind by rational inference, not by sensory observation. Hence Functionalism treats the idea of Mind as-if a Real thing.Whereas Functionalism*5 seems to be a half-step toward Idealism. — Gnomon
I not sure what you mean here. To my way of thinking functionalism just says that mind is a real function of the brain, which is again a kind of realism, if not strict eliminative physicalism. — Janus
Regarding the OP, I'd like to re-word that statement. I take Causal Information as foundational and Mental Consciousness as derivative. Generic Information (the power to enform, to create) may or may not be conscious, but since mental consciousness did in fact emerge from eons of physical change, the potential for awareness must have been inherent in the First Cause -- or Initial Conditions, if you prefer. Causation is definitely directional, and possibly intentional, but I don't know what those intentions are. I can only guess about why the "demon" wanted to cause Descartes to believe a lie.Also, I'd say taking consciousness as foundational and the world as derivative is similar to Descartes’ certainty about inner sensations (I think therefore I am) while admitting the world he perceived might be caused by some evil demon. — Art48
Neither. :roll:is the universe conscious of our probing, or just a machine grinding out evolutionary products? — Gnomon
"The output ... response" is physical.In quantum experiments, the human operates the machine to output an answer. But is the response conscious or automatic?
Another rhetorical question; you have no interest, Gnomon, in what anyone else, especially who differs with you, thinks.What do you think?
Kant seemed to be saying that, although we might infer an objective "mind-independent external world", our internal working model of that world is actually a subjective construct. Hence, we like to think we are seeing reality, when in fact we are imagining an artificial (man-made) model of reality. :cool: — Gnomon
But on a philosophical forum we soon discover that my noumenal worldview (my map) may be rejected by others with different maps of true reality : e.g. Idealism vs Materialism. :nerd: — Gnomon
The Brain is a real tangible object, but the Mind is an ideal imaginary subject. We know the Mind by rational inference, not by sensory observation. Hence Functionalism treats the idea of Mind as-if a Real thing. — Gnomon
Yes, vivid personal subjective realities. My experience is my reality. But, it's just one of many experienced "realities", because your experience may be different. For those born blind, their "reality" lacks the visual evidence of light-reflecting matter. So they may substitute imaginary representations of things, completely different. However, if they compare their partial subjective realities*1, they may be able to compile a comprehensive representation (objective reality), that more closely resembles the "reality" that sighted people experience. Kant's distinction was not between individual subjective reality, and collective objective reality -- that had already been made by previous generations of philosophers. Instead, he distinguished those mental models (maps) from ultimate Reality beyond*2 human experience.I read Kant more as saying that what we experience is a human reality. — Janus
Yes, vivid personal subjective realities. My experience is my reality. But, it's just one of many experienced "realities", because your experience may be different. — Gnomon
In order to approximate "true" reality (ding an sich), we would have to compare our varying worldviews, looking for areas of overlap. — Gnomon
Isn't that the "reality beyond the 'for us'" – the limit or horizon of our reasoning, namely that reality necessarily encompasses its conception such that the notion that 'conception encompasses reality' entails self-contradiction? In the Kantian sense, empirical knowledge (phenomenon) proximately approaches but asymptotically cannot reach the horizon/reality (i.e. noumenon). In other words, aren't we (embodied reasoners) just an aspect of the whole which cannot transcend – thereby 'totalize' – the whole (re: mereological self-consistency)? Inhabitants of the territory who cannot make a map (out of aspects of the territory) informationally identical to, let alone 'greater than', the territory itself? Well, isn't that a coherent "idea of reality in itself" (i.e. the territory > maps-of-the territory), of what makes "reality for us" (i.e. map-making/using) possible? I suppose I could be confusing myself with 'transcendental illusions' ... :chin:So, logically we can then ask "what about reality in itself or beyond the "for us"?", and Kant's answer is that we can have no idea of what that could be. — Janus
Isn't that the "reality beyond the 'for us'" – the limit or horizon of our reasoning, namely that reality necessarily encompasses its conception such that 'reality's conception encompasses reality' is a self-contradiction? In the Kantian sense, empirical knowledge (phenomenon) proximately approaches but asymptotically cannot reach the horizon/reality (i.e. noumenon). In other words, aren't we (embodied reasoners) just an aspect of the whole which cannot transcend – thereby 'totalize' – the whole (re: mereological self-consistency)? Inhabitants of the territory who cannot make a map (out of aspects of the territory) informationally identical to, let alone 'greater than', the territory itself? Well, isn't that a coherent "idea of reality in itself" (i.e. the territory > maps-of-the territory), of what makes "reality for us" (i.e. map-making/using) possible? I suppose I could be confusing myself with 'transcendental illusions' ... :chin: — 180 Proof
Yes. That's what I was implying with the map vs terrain examples. But, to gain leverage in philosophical arguments, some people act as-if their personal map is the true model of reality. And, some claim that an abstraction -- sometimes labelled "settled science" -- is the final authority on Truth. Ideally, "settled science" would serve as a compendium of what all observer's models should "have in common". Yet philosophical debates tend to focus on unsettled marginal science : e.g. the meaning of quantum paradoxes, such as the Many Worlds interpretation. :smile:Our experiences may be different, but if they have nothing in common then they would not qualify as experiences of reality, even though they might qualify as real experiences. We actually don't perceive reality at all, we conceive it. — Janus
That aspirational assertion is merely my opinion, not attributed to Kant. Even though we cannot directly know the ding an sich, we can -- via the observational methods of Science, and the reasoning of Philosophy -- construct models of ultimate reality that "approximate" the true ding. On this forum we argue about whose model is Closer To Truth, which is the pragmatic goal of Philosophy. Even Kant seemed motivated to get as close as possible to Transcendental Idealism. :cool:In order to approximate "true" reality (ding an sich), we would have to compare our varying worldviews, looking for areas of overlap. — Gnomon
This is not Kant, though; according to him we cannot approximate to the noumenal. We can only say how things seem in our experience, and if our experiences align, then we have empirical reality. Empirical reality is reality for us according to Kant. So, logically we can then ask "what about reality in itself or beyond the "for us"?", and Kant's answer is that we can have no idea of what that could be. — Janus
Btw, I'm not actually interested in what Kant thought about reality (noumenon) because his phenomenon-noumemon distinction seems to me one of Kant's own "transcendental illusions" (re: an inconsistency of his schema). — 180 Proof
That aspirational assertion is merely my opinion, not attributed to Kant. Even though we cannot directly know the ding an sich, we can -- via the observational methods of Science, and the reasoning of Philosophy -- construct models of ultimate reality that "approximate" the true ding. On this forum we argue about whose model is Closer To Truth, which is the pragmatic goal of Philosophy. Even Kant seemed motivated to get as close as possible to Transcendental Idealism. :cool: — Gnomon
:up:I can relate to that; there is a kind of tension in Kant, since he rejects the possibility of doing metaphysics (as traditionally conceived) via pure reason, while advocating practical reasons for believing in God, Freedom and Immortality. There may be inherent problems of inconsistency and incoherence in his philosophy which would explain why there is (apparently) controversy among Kant scholars as to just what he thought about some issues. — Janus
Perhaps. But don't you think each poster on a philosophy forum is trying to get as close as possible to ultimate truth : Ontology & Epistemology? Don't we tend to judge other opinions by how close they are to our personal model of true (ultimate) Reality --- even though we are aware that our models are merely approximations of The Truth? Science may be content with pragmatic understanding, but Philosophy aspires to ultimate Ideal Truth. Kant merely advised philosophical humility, in view of human limitations. Our ultimate sky-castles are constructed from mundane proximates.I don't agree with you that we are arguing, on this forum, about whose model is "Closer To Truth"; the way I see it we are arguing for how things seems to each of us, from our own perspectives. — Janus
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