Smell is not a thing, therefore cannot in itself be an experience at all. — Mww
Because coffee is an empirical object, the rule must follow from that which is the case for any empirical object, and that which is the case for any empirical object which makes the rule and thereby the circumvention of irrational reasoning possible, is the sensation by which objects are presented to us in order for there to be anything to even assign non-contradictory conceptions to in the first place. — Mww
Am I to understand by this, that the act of deceiving is the presupposition for the cause of errors in judgement? All we need to justify that, is posit what the act of deceiving is. If judgement is part of the cognitive process, the act of deceiving as cause must be antecedent to the error contained in the judgement as effect, thus also contained in the cognitive process. So what part of the cognitive process deceives? What’s worse, apparently, is whatever part that is, it may not deceive, thus may not be the cause of errors in judgement, which is to say there isn’t one. So some part of the cognitive process both deceives and doesn’t deceive, and the only way to tell which, is by whether or not there are errors in judgement. But determining whether or not there are errors in judgement can only arise from a judgement made on whether or not there has been a deception. — Mww
What a incredibly foolish….errr, irrational…..way to do things, wouldn’t you say? Let’s just remain with the idea there isn’t a deception, there is only a subsumption of conceptions in a synthesis of them that doesn’t relate to that which the conceptions represent. That this doesn’t belong to that isn’t a deception, it’s merely a misunderstanding, which manifests as a error in judgment, proven by a different understanding that does relate different conceptions properly. Simple, sufficient, logically non-contradictory. What more do we need? — Mww
The ability to distinguish colours is not dependent on what we do, some of what what we do is dependent on the ability to distinguish colours. The cart and horse are not the same; the horse pulls the cart, the cart does not pull the horse — Janus
you use "experience" in an unusual way — Metaphysician Undercover
What a incredibly foolish (…) way to do things, wouldn’t you say?
— Mww
I think that to deny the reality of deception is what is incredibly foolish. — Metaphysician Undercover
The ability to distinguish colours is not dependent on what we do, some of what what we do is dependent on the ability to distinguish colours. The cart and horse are not the same; the horse pulls the cart, the cart does not pull the horse — Janus
Sensorimotor theories of perception indicate that action is essential to perception in general. — Joshs
What an odd reply.Like…what makes this a block of wood? Why, because it’s a block and it’s made of wood. DUH!!! — Mww
Nothing to do with wood.1) A is true
2) The only way in which A could be true is if B
3) Hence, B is so. — Banno
So obtuse. And yet hallucinations are sensations that do not relate to objects in the world. You said:My sentence has sensation as its subject, and the only possible way your sentence makes any sense at all, is if yours has objects as its subject. — Mww
Clearly, not....sensation is always related to objects in the world... — Mww
One can see here a way of thinking that closes itself off from critique. If you are sitting in your head thinking you are not siting in your head then you are sitting in your head......as soon as you think it true you’re not just sitting in your head with a bunch of Kant’s a priori scripts, you’ve contradicted yourself, insofar there is at least that one Kantian a priori script in your head, immediately upon thinking a truth. — Mww
...don’t bring rope to a game of chains. — Mww
So here we are, two mutually indestructible foolish dialecticians. I don’t mind that either. — Mww
I was after all only ever your fleeting sensation anyway. — Banno
...comparing roasts and blends and so on, as well as the skills of various baristas (baristi? baristasi?))... — Banno
The problem here is the truncated "nothing but" pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. That's pretty much the assumption of Joshs and @Constance, too. — Banno
What? — Banno
“We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.” From Mill, On Liberty — Richard B
How is it that anything out there gets in here? — Constance
Out there, of course, is my cat, and in here is my brain. — Constance
That, of course, is the wrong question.
It's the wrong question because it is based on the presumption of an "in here" and an "out there".
Out there, of course, is my cat, and in here is my brain.
— Constance
The cat would have difficulty getting onto your brain because your brain is enclosed in a skull.
Yes, I understand that you want the question to be understood figuratively. But then, what is it that you are asking? How it is that you are aware of the cat? How it is that you divide the world up in such a way that there are cats and non-cats? How it is that your cat-sensations lead you to infer that there is a cat-in-itself? Which of these is supposedly represented by "How is it that anything out there gets in here?"
What is it that you actualy want an answer for? — Banno
First response: What does this have to do with the ineffable?which is how epistemic connections work between knowledge claims and objects in the world — Constance
It really shouldn't be so difficult, really. — Constance
The cup has one handle" is true IFF the cup has one handle. — Banno
My reply, to you and to various others, was summed up in what you quoted above,The reduction I have in mind is Husserl's. The idea is to consciously dismiss presuppositions that implicitly give us the familiarity of the familiar world in a perceptual event. — Constance
Your response was(it) pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. — Banno
To which I askedYou shouldn't raise questions about things you don't really have an interest in. — Constance
eliciting in turn your enigmatic response. If you think that T-sentences do not answer your question, then have a go at explaining what it is you are asking. "(H)ow epistemic connections work between knowledge claims and objects in the world" is an ambiguous question.What? — Banno
The cup has one handle IFF _____? — Agent Smith
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