Smell is not a thing, therefore cannot in itself be an experience at all. — Mww

All I can say here, is that you use "experience" in an unusual way, which makes it difficult for me to understand your perspective. I think you are saying that an experience is necessarily of a thing. But I would think of an experience as being of an event, and an event is categorically distinct from a thing, as the activity which things are involved in. So I would understand the essential aspect of experience as activity rather than as things.

We might as you say, conclude the presence of things from experience, with a premise such as 'if there is activity then there is things which are active', but the soundness of this premise needs to be investigated, and i think that's what process philosophy does.

So I do not believe that we can get to the assumption of a particular thing in the way that you say. The "smell of coffee" is a generalization. And each time someone says "I smell coffee" this is a general statement which does not in itself give credence to the conclusion that there is in existence, a particular thing called "coffee" which is being smelled at that time.

And of course science supports what I am saying here because the experience of smelling is known to consist of an interaction of molecules inside the nose. So in this more scientific understanding there is the assumption of a multitude of things, molecules, with many differences, hence the wheel with a wide range of descriptive terms.

The assumption of "a thing" (coffee) being smelled, or "things" (molecules) really depends on the purpose of your communication. In some cases we would say there is a thing (coffee) giving off the specified odour, and that thing is smelled, but in other cases we would refer directly to the odour, assuming that there is something wafting in the air (molecules), which is what is being smelled.

Notice that the type of "thing", or "things". assumed to be involved in the activity of providing you with the experience of smell can vary greatly. This is because the existence of things is just an assumption made by us, to facilitate communication. We sense activity, and to talk about the activity we assume things which we say are doing the activity. But the type of things which we assume are doing the activity varies depending on our purpose. And so for example "things" in high energy physics is fundamental particle, and there becomes some question as to whether these things actually exist. And of course there is such questioning because "things" at any level of communication are simply assumed to facilitate the conversation.

Because coffee is an empirical object, the rule must follow from that which is the case for any empirical object, and that which is the case for any empirical object which makes the rule and thereby the circumvention of irrational reasoning possible, is the sensation by which objects are presented to us in order for there to be anything to even assign non-contradictory conceptions to in the first place. — Mww

This describes the basic premise you hold, which I don't agree with. You say "objects are presented to us" through sensation, and from this premise you conclude that "coffee is an empirical object". But I think that all sensation consists only of activity (consider the example given by others, neurological activity). What I think is that the mind creates the objects, as a type of conception, to facilitate understanding and communication. That the objects are created by the mind, rather than given by the senses is evident from the fact that the same sensation (smell in the example) can be explained through reference to different types of objects. In one description, coffee is the objects sensed. In another description, molecules are what are sensed. And in the neurological description there is some electrons or some vague type of object. This is very clear evidence that the objects are not presented to us by sensation, they are created, and assumed by the mind, in its attempt to understand its own experience of sensation.

Am I to understand by this, that the act of deceiving is the presupposition for the cause of errors in judgement? All we need to justify that, is posit what the act of deceiving is. If judgement is part of the cognitive process, the act of deceiving as cause must be antecedent to the error contained in the judgement as effect, thus also contained in the cognitive process. So what part of the cognitive process deceives? What’s worse, apparently, is whatever part that is, it may not deceive, thus may not be the cause of errors in judgement, which is to say there isn’t one. So some part of the cognitive process both deceives and doesn’t deceive, and the only way to tell which, is by whether or not there are errors in judgement. But determining whether or not there are errors in judgement can only arise from a judgement made on whether or not there has been a deception. — Mww

I don't think you are properly representing "judgement" here. Judgement necessarily applies to something external to itself, there is something judged. Even if the judger wants to judge one's own judgement, that's a second judgement which places the first as outside the second. So "judgement" necessarily implies something external, as it is always of something external or outside the act of judgement. This implies that the evidence employed in the judging, what is mulled in the mind, must say something about something other than itself, and this is what we know as inferring. So the error in judgement is principally a wrongful inference concerning the external to the mind judging.

The act of deceiving is to mislead the judge in the presentation of evidence, so as to create an erroneous inference. Notice that the concept of deception employs a separation between the judger, and the presenter of evidence. We assume such separations all the time, and this is the same principle whereby we assume "objects", through an assumed separation between a thing and its environment. The assumption is done for the sake of understanding. So for the sake of understanding, we assume a separation between senses and mind, and this allows that the senses deceive the mind. The senses present to the mind, evidence in such a way as to mislead the mind and create erroneous judgement.

The issue, or outcome of all this is that separation is very real and results in erroneous judgement. Separation is also the principle by which we assume "objects". However, our assumption of "objects" has a strong degree of arbitrariness, depending on purpose. This means that our understanding of separation has a strong degree of arbitrariness as well. But since separation is real, and is responsible for erroneous judgement, there ought to be real principles which we can produce for an understanding of separation, which would allow us to understand real objects.

What a incredibly foolish….errr, irrational…..way to do things, wouldn’t you say? Let’s just remain with the idea there isn’t a deception, there is only a subsumption of conceptions in a synthesis of them that doesn’t relate to that which the conceptions represent. That this doesn’t belong to that isn’t a deception, it’s merely a misunderstanding, which manifests as a error in judgment, proven by a different understanding that does relate different conceptions properly. Simple, sufficient, logically non-contradictory. What more do we need? — Mww

I strongly disagree with this. I think that to deny the reality of deception is what is incredibly foolish.

The ability to distinguish colours is not dependent on what we do, some of what what we do is dependent on the ability to distinguish colours. The cart and horse are not the same; the horse pulls the cart, the cart does not pull the horse — Janus

Sensorimotor theories of perception indicate that action is essential to perception in general. Seeing or hearing is the interacting with an object, a form of active, anticipatory doing rather than merely a passive taking in. As far as perception of color is concerned, preliminary studies show that saccadic eye movements may be involved in color discrimination.

More generally, how do sensorimotor analyses of perceptual ‘doing’ relate to public linguistic interaction? Certainly, the empirical concepts employed in the description of perceiving are shaped via a public doing. But can one also tease out a performativity associated with immediate perception that is not completely subsumed under the rubric of public language practices? Is sensorimotor perceptual ‘doing’ a kind of proto-linguistic activity, a kind of normatively oriented discourse subject to its own rules of error and correction, outside of public language?

you use "experience" in an unusual way — Metaphysician Undercover

Anachronistic might be the word you’re looking for. I get that a lot. I don’t mind.

What a incredibly foolish (…) way to do things, wouldn’t you say?
— Mww

I think that to deny the reality of deception is what is incredibly foolish. — Metaphysician Undercover

So here we are, two mutually indestructible foolish dialecticians. I don’t mind that either.

The ability to distinguish colours is not dependent on what we do, some of what what we do is dependent on the ability to distinguish colours. The cart and horse are not the same; the horse pulls the cart, the cart does not pull the horse — Janus


Sensorimotor theories of perception indicate that action is essential to perception in general. — Joshs

I don't disagree with that, but I was referring specifically to what we do with our colour perceptions, to what the ability to perceive colour enables us to do. The point was that, however we might have gotten there, we can distinguish colours (as can some other animals), and we don't necessarily have to do anything, at any given time, with that, beyond just noticing different colours, This was contra Banno's assertion that distinguishing colour consists entirely in what we do with it. .

Is it a good idea to respond reasonable to a rant such as this post by ? Probably not.

Like…what makes this a block of wood? Why, because it’s a block and it’s made of wood. DUH!!! — Mww

What an odd reply.
Here, again, is the logical structure of transcendental arguments:

1) A is true
2) The only way in which A could be true is if B
3) Hence, B is so. — Banno

Nothing to do with wood.

My sentence has sensation as its subject, and the only possible way your sentence makes any sense at all, is if yours has objects as its subject. — Mww

So obtuse. And yet hallucinations are sensations that do not relate to objects in the world. You said:

...sensation is always related to objects in the world... — Mww

Clearly, not.

...as soon as you think it true you’re not just sitting in your head with a bunch of Kant’s a priori scripts, you’ve contradicted yourself, insofar there is at least that one Kantian a priori script in your head, immediately upon thinking a truth. — Mww

One can see here a way of thinking that closes itself off from critique. If you are sitting in your head thinking you are not siting in your head then you are sitting in your head...

But what if you are not just sitting in your head.

...don’t bring rope to a game of chains. — Mww

Sage advice. I hope you enjoy your incarceration. I'll leave you to it. I was after all only ever your fleeting sensation anyway.

It's always concerning when we appear to be in agreement.

So here we are, two mutually indestructible foolish dialecticians. I don’t mind that either. — Mww

I'm good with it.

↪Joshs It's always concerning when we appear to be in agreement. — Banno

I must be slipping.

I was after all only ever your fleeting sensation anyway. — Banno

“Banno” the singular linguistic object, was a sensation; the manifold of linguistic objects related to “Banno” the singular object, were sensations. One and all merely phenomenal representations, just as are comets and cats, one and all absolutely useless without a judgement or a series of judgements made on them, by the subject affected by those objects.

Nothing whatsoever related to “Banno” the subject from which the linguistic objects arise, was ever a sensation of mine, nor anyone else’s. “You” were never a sensation, hence to say “I was your sensation” is exactly the paralogism, the transcendental argument of your reason formed into a proclamation of your language, you profess to dislike.

There is no difference in kind or relation between thinking objects sensed as red possess redness, and thinking linguistic objects sensed as words possess I-ness. Or, simplified, red does not belong to objects just as “I” does not belong to sensation.

“…. They are sophisms, not of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the wisest cannot free himself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he can never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and misleads him.…”

Here, lemme fix it for ya: my words were after all only ever your fleeting sensations.

Perfect. No need to thank me; I’m here to help.

Seems I've broken . Sorry.

@jgill, looks to me like the answer is just under twelve hundred post until Wittgenstein's silence wins.

But we still have hardly addressed the other pressing question - what's the proper plural of barista?

...comparing roasts and blends and so on, as well as the skills of various baristas (baristi? baristasi?))... — Banno

You wish.

jgill, looks to me like the answer is just under twelve hundred post until Wittgenstein's silence wins. — Banno

He's always had my admiration for his military heroics. Now his "silence" speaks volumes.

The problem here is the truncated "nothing but" pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. That's pretty much the assumption of Joshs and @Constance, too. — Banno

You shouldn't raise questions about things you don't really have an interest in.

You shouldn't raise questions about things you don't really have an interest in. — Constance

“We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.” From Mill, On Liberty

You shouldn't raise questions about things you don't really have an interest in. — Constance

What?

What? — Banno

In response to "What?" I wonder how you feel about Rorty's question, one of my favorites: How is it that anything out there gets in here? Out there, of course, is my cat, and in here is my brain. It is the kind of thing that leads very quickly to the issue of ineffability.
No need for a thesis, just jot me a sentence or two, if you would.

“We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.” From Mill, On Liberty — Richard B

Suggesting that something is fair game even if it cannot be conceived clearly or as a genuine interest at the outset. Quite right. But then, there is the matter of being dismissive of that which is taken up and not being stifled. Is one not being disingenuous if the determination that something is false when set up for analysis, is dismissive of that which gave rise to the inquiry in the first place? In other words, why bother opening a discussion about ineffability, if philosophical occasions of this are rejected out of hand? Or are not reviewed at all?

How is it that anything out there gets in here? — Constance

That, of course, is the wrong question.

It's the wrong question because it is based on the presumption of an "in here" and an "out there".

Out there, of course, is my cat, and in here is my brain. — Constance

The cat would have difficulty getting onto your brain because your brain is enclosed in a skull.

Yes, I understand that you want the question to be understood figuratively. But then, what is it that you are asking? How it is that you are aware of the cat? How it is that you divide the world up in such a way that there are cats and non-cats? How it is that your cat-sensations lead you to infer that there is a cat-in-itself? Which of these is supposedly represented by "How is it that anything out there gets in here?"

What is it that you actualy want an answer for?

That, of course, is the wrong question.

It's the wrong question because it is based on the presumption of an "in here" and an "out there".

Out there, of course, is my cat, and in here is my brain.
— Constance

The cat would have difficulty getting onto your brain because your brain is enclosed in a skull.

Yes, I understand that you want the question to be understood figuratively. But then, what is it that you are asking? How it is that you are aware of the cat? How it is that you divide the world up in such a way that there are cats and non-cats? How it is that your cat-sensations lead you to infer that there is a cat-in-itself? Which of these is supposedly represented by "How is it that anything out there gets in here?"

What is it that you actualy want an answer for? — Banno

It can go several ways, but here I am asking a simple question, which is how epistemic connections work between knowledge claims and objects in the world. I certainly don't defend anything like, heh heh, cat-in-itself. But that is in another world of thought
If you think your philosophy is too complicated and nuanced to give a simple response, I understand. For the same holds for me. But then, if the question were put to me, I would have a succinct reply, one that subsumes the details.
It really shouldn't be so difficult, really. If I asked Rorty or Quine or Dewey, e.g.s, a reply would be readily forthcoming, though they would have a lot of explaining ready to hand.

which is how epistemic connections work between knowledge claims and objects in the world — Constance

First response: What does this have to do with the ineffable?

Second response: What are you asking? How we talk about stuff "in the world"? How we refer using words? Or what truth is, or what knowledge is?

It really shouldn't be so difficult, really. — Constance

What's difficult here is sorting out what it is you expect me to provide.

What's difficult here is sorting out what it is you expect me to provide. — Banno

But I underlined this:how epistemic connections work between knowledge claims and objects in the world.
There is no question as to the embeddedness of the response. Just make the response.

"The cup has one handle" is true IFF the cup has one handle.

The cup has one handle" is true IFF the cup has one handle. — Banno

Adorable. And predictable.

:roll:

The cup has one handle" is true IFF the cup has one handle. — Banno

Ok. So the next question is

The cup has one handle IFF _____?

Because, Banno, it is a banality, one that simply begs the question about the world and language. You need to return to earth.

, in your first post on this thread you gave us:

The reduction I have in mind is Husserl's. The idea is to consciously dismiss presuppositions that implicitly give us the familiarity of the familiar world in a perceptual event. — Constance

My reply, to you and to various others, was summed up in what you quoted above,

(it) pretends that our sensations are prior to our "being in the world". It assumes the perspective of an homunculus. — Banno

Your response was

You shouldn't raise questions about things you don't really have an interest in. — Constance

To which I asked

What? — Banno

eliciting in turn your enigmatic response. If you think that T-sentences do not answer your question, then have a go at explaining what it is you are asking. "(H)ow epistemic connections work between knowledge claims and objects in the world" is an ambiguous question.

It's not enough just to read a bunch of philosophers and pick the bits you like. We are not doing philosophy until we engage with and critique those views. I think you agree with this.

That is what this thread involves. It sets out various ways of understanding the notion of ineffability, and seeks comment on them. It gives folk enough rope, a place to set out a part of their thinking or the thinking of their betrothed, with the aim of identifying problems and inconsistencies therein.

The problem is that you have still to set out what it is you are asking.

The cup has one handle IFF _____? — Agent Smith

That's an easy one: IFF it is topologically equivalent to a doughnut.

That's an easy one: IFF it is topologically equivalent to a doughnut. — jgill

That's amazing! :up: