folk have been using cognates of "S is F" without explaining what they are talking about. Is it that S=F (they are equal)? Or S ≡ F (they are materially equivalent)? Or just F(S) (predicating F to S)? or S∈F (S is an element of the set or class S), or none of these, or some combination, or something else? — Banno
There might be our difference. — Moliere
Well, stating the rule might come after the fact, but it might also come before it, when teaching someone to follow the rule, or when stipulating a new rule - consider the Académie Française. Neither is logically prior to the other.The rules come after the fact as explanations for our usage, — Moliere
In the place of that barrier I see a continuity from what we say to what we do and what is not said but shown. It's the place where stating the rule is replaced by enacting it, and where saying what the picture is of is replaced by showing it. That continuity means that we can always say more, but enough is said when the task is done. Hence the term "ineffable" is inappropriate. — Banno
Lukes error was to suppose that expressing a rule had to be either stating it, and hence effable, or enacting it, and hence ineffable, but you were pointing out that we can follow a rule that can also be stated, and hence the doing is not ineffable. — Banno
Or, suppose we had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would we then know how to ride a bike? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. — Banno
First, it's worth noting that predication applies more broadly than to "judgements of experience". 2 is a number. That's not generally something one experiences as a phenomena... — Banno
That re-framing is to see that what is being asked here, as in so many philosophical problems, is an issue of language use. Instead of asking if "The cup is red" is true, one asks if it is appropriate to use the word "red" in respect to that particular cup. — Banno
Perhaps, although I don't think so. I agree with much of what you are saying here. — Banno
We agree that there are rules for language use, and that these rules are regularly broken.
There are two ways of expressing a rule. One way is to set it out explicitly in words. The other is to enact it. Both "stop at the red light" and stopping at the red light express a rule.
Well, stating the rule might come after the fact, but it might also come before it, when teaching someone to follow the rule, or when stipulating a new rule - consider the Académie Française. Neither is logically prior to the other. — Banno
To see if two is a number, one looks at the list of numbers to see if it included two. — Banno
To see if "the cup has a handle" is true, just check to see if the cup is on the list of things with handles. — Banno
2 is a number. That's not generally something one experiences as a phenomena — Banno
It's also clear that whether the cup counts as red or not is a function of the activity in which we are involved, which includes other folk. — Banno
…..it is a bit silly to berate logicians for not starting with experiences. — Banno
if language is purely a system of grunts for getting things done, then the meaning could "float away". — Moliere
How do we know whether it is appropriate to use the word 'red'? Is it not simply appropriate when speaking of something that appears red? — Janus
Somewhat circular.
If you are asking how you tell if something is red, the answer is that it simply doesn't matter. It's your beetle, use whatever method you like. What counts is the public use. — Banno
↪Joshs, ↪Heracloitus
Presumably Joshs is bracketing the next part of the conversation... epoché. — Banno
First, it's worth noting that predication applies more broadly than to "judgements of experience". 2 is a number. That's not generally something one experiences as a phenomena... unless perhaps one has synethesia — Banno
— Banno
instead of “is it true that the cup is red" we ask if it is useful to talk of the cup as being red. And several things become immediately apparent.
It's clear that it is appropriate to call the cup red if it is helpful in the task at hand - "pass me the red cup" works if you are handed that cup and not the green one. And we can seek clarification: "Do you mean crimson one or the vermilion one?" and so on. There's an interaction between the participants here that can serve to specify the cup to whatever level one desires.
I hope it is clear why it is a bit silly to berate logicians for not starting with experiences. — Banno
But you know that people have been thinking about a possible link between consciousness and quantum mechanics at least since Penrose. — frank
“Everything we call real is made of things that cannot be regarded as real. If quantum mechanics hasn't profoundly shocked you, you haven't understood it yet.”
But you know that people have been thinking about a possible link between consciousness and quantum mechanics at least since Penrose. — frank
Far as I know it goes back to the very foundations of QM - Niels Bohr was a kind of idealist and often seen as a mystic (certainly by Einstein) and often quoted here by wayfarer. A Bohr quote that launched a thousand Deepak Chopras — Tom Storm
Surely the quote by Bohr implies idealism, ie everything is consciousness. That’s certainly what Mr Wayfarer seemed to think. — Tom Storm
Penrose is a Mathematical Platonist, isn’t he? Does this make him an idealist more generally? — Tom Storm
...and so on. "There's a meaning there, but the meaning there doesn't really mean a thing". Russel Morris. When I try to make sense of what you have attempted to say here, it seems to fall apart. So:The number 2 is an intentional experience in a particular mode of givenness. — Joshs
Predicative judgements have their origin in these pre-predicative judgements of identity, similarity and differentiation. — Joshs
Identity, similarity and differentiation are predictions. Presumably you wish to say something like that while they are predications, the judgement isn't; but how could one make a judgement involving a predicate without using that predicate? — Banno
Lukes error was to suppose that expressing a rule had to be either stating it, and hence effable, or enacting it, and hence ineffable, but you were pointing out that we can follow a rule that can also be stated, and hence the doing is not ineffable. — Banno
Or, suppose we had a list of the instructions for riding a bike, to whatever detail we desire. Would we then know how to ride a bike? Well, no. So what is missing? Just, and only, the riding of the bike. But that's not something it makes sense to add to the list! — Banno
That's pretty much it. — Banno
Language allows us to construct institutional facts; see the thread on Searle I presented earlier. These institutional facts are manifestations of collective intentionality; yet they can appear quite tangible - things such as property or incorporation... or word "meaning".
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