Here's the formal argument from the first pages. — Banno
……that water boils at 100℃ is known a priori. I gather that you are thinking something like that 100℃ just is the boiling point of water, by definition? — Banno
Seems it would be worthwhile going over some of the "oddball symbology". — Banno
So, the fact that the lectern is made of wood, and not made of ice, is supported by the empirical observations. But empirical observations do not make it necessary that the lectern is made of wood and not ice. The necessity, (that it is necessary that the lectern is wooden and not made of ice), is derived from the a priori law of identity, which states that a thing cannot be other than it is. — Metaphysician Undercover
Well, one consequence is that, that x=y may be discovered empirically - examples are given - but has necessary implications. While this may seem obvious now, it is contrary to both Kant and Quine, fir different reasons. The notion that an empirical fact implies a necessary truth is one of the novelties of this paper. — Banno
The next step, then, says that there is nothing contained in the conception of P that does not belong to the conception of H, therefore, P and H are the same thing, or, that P is H is a necessarily true statement. We don’t need the experience those conceptions represent, only that all of them are thought to co-exist equally in one object. — Mww
Well, no, since as you will have noted, he gives examples where this is not the case. — Banno
My belief is that Hesperus has no existence over and above its set of properties, in that, if all the properties were removed, then there would be no object, as argued by FH Bradley. — RussellA
I searched through the essay and could not find any examples which deal with just what criteria we could possibly have for deciding whether it should be thought of as the same lectern in counterfactual scenarios. — Janus
Then I take it you are agreeing with Quine that modal utterances have no sense.The way I see it, since nothing is separable for everything else, the identity of an object is its entire history up the present and none of that could be changed without losing its identity. — Janus
If we set "100℃" as another term for "the boiling point of water", if they equal the very same thing in the way 2+2 equals 4, then in any possible world, the boiling point of water would be 100℃. And since that's our definition, then Mww would be correct that the boiling point of water is, a priori, that is, from the nature of the very terms used, 100℃.That water boils at 100C is known a priori only by those after having immediate experience, — Mww
But once we have this reference fixed, we then use the name 'Cicero' rigidly to designate the man who in fact we have identified by his authorship of these works. We do not use it to designate whoever would have written these works in place of Cicero, if someone else wrote them. — pp.183-4
After all, you might not have agreed with Quine... — Banno
And that's not something we might consider? — Banno
We go past the boiling of the water and fix 100℃ to the temperature. — Banno
If we set "100℃" as another term for "the boiling point of water", if they equal the very same thing in the way 2+2 equals 4, then in any possible world, the boiling point of water would be 100℃. And since that's our definition, then Mww would be correct that the boiling point of water is, a priori, that is, from the nature of the very terms used, 100℃. — Banno
I find your puzzlement, puzzling. — Banno
This is where Platonic idealism misleads us into nonsense. — Metaphysician Undercover
The reference of names is rarely or almost never fixed by means of description. — p. 185
So, let us suppose that at least one half of prevailing views about naming is true, that the reference is fixed by descriptions. Even were that true, the name would not be synonymous with the description. but would be used to name an object which we pick out by the contingent fact that it satisfies a certain description. And so, even though we can imagine a case where the man who wrote these works would not have been the man who denounced Cataline, we should not say that that would be a case in which Cicero would not have been Tully. We should say that it is a case in which Cicero did not write these works, but rather that Cassius did. And the identity of Cicero and Tuly still holds.
A description may be used to pick out some individual in order to give it a name. But thereafter, the name can be, and Kripke claims, is, used to pick out that individual without using the description. — Banno
This would only work for those who already know the individual being referred to by name. This requires context, which is established by description; so it seems rigid designation is always underpinned by implicit description, even in cases where no explicit description is required. — Janus
Well, that made me laugh. — Banno
A description may be used to pick out some individual in order to give it a name. But thereafter, the name can be, and Kripke claims, is, used to pick out that individual without using the description. — Banno
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