So far every contribution to this thread has used circular terms to ‘define’ the good. — Joshs

That'll be because definitions are circular....

In particular, the question as to whether it is good to "preserve stable ongoing self-consistency of interaction with an environment under changing conditions".

That's by no means obvious. Perhaps ask @schopenhauer1 or any other antinatalist.

If I say something and it's inconvenient, but valid... — god must be atheist

In more philosophical terms, your account is that the extension of good is the very same as the extension of any of advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating.

Moore's point is that even were this so, the open question shows that the intension is different.

And that's the problem with the open question - if there were such an extensional equivalence, then as you might say, who cares if it is not intensionally equivalent?

So Putin's invasion of Ukraine is, for him, advantageous and helpful and accommodating, if perhaps not altogether pleasant. And hence by your standard, a good.

So I don't see that your definition is of much help in working out what we ought do, which is, after all, the point of ethics.

:fire:

:cool:

He can't say for sure if even rape is not a good. — Banno

Sure I can. Rape isn't good. Which just means I don't want to do it nor do I want other people to.

Sure I can. Rape isn't good. Which just means I don't want to do it nor do I want other people to. — bert1

And yet it satisfies your definite of "good":

That which is willed — bert1

You don't see a problem here? Again,

So I don't see that your definition is of much help in working out what we ought do, which is, after all, the point of ethics. — Banno

Edit: Or are you saying that the rapist rapes against his own will?

This is the aspect of the good which survives changes in values systems, it’s formal rather than specific structure. This aspect of the good we all can agree on. Since eventually any good within a particular value system will stop working for us as we move beyond that system, the philosophers I mentioned above agree that it is universally ‘better’ to keep oneself mobile , to celebrate the movement from one value system to one that replaces it rather than getting stuck in any one system for too long. So you see that for these thinkers the universal , formal aspect of goodness as efficacy of relational change ( usefulness) is more significant that the contingent and relative aspect that you highlight. It is this understanding of the universal aspect of the good that allows us to honor an endless plurality of value systems, and along with them an endless variety of qualitative senses of the good, rather than looking for the correct one. We understand that each sense of the good works within its system, and is valid for that reason and within that context. — Joshs

So I gather what you're wanting to emphasize is how any value we posit will be valid within a system-context, where system-context is always changing and so the validity of a posited value will always be questionable. On one side of the reflection we might say what you say -- that all goods have their own specific place, and we should honor them all rather than compete over which of them is good.

I think I'd say this just moves the question one step back -- on the other side of the reflection now, rather than arguing over what is good, we're going to argue over which system-context is valid (and, at least for myself, I'd pick the system-context which validates what I believe to be good)

So the open-question argument would work still, I believe. It'd just be saying "Is it a good time to change values?" -- that element of choice that I've been emphasizing would still be there.

definitions are circular....

In @particular, the question as to whether it is good topreserve stable ongoing self-consistency of interaction with an environment under changing conditions"".

That's by no means obvious. Perhaps ask schopenhauer1 or any other antinatalist. — Banno

Definitions are circular within a finite frame. The circular series of terms for ‘good’ used in this thread that I referred to are mutually defined according to a common or interwoven sense, in which the ‘meaning of the ‘good ‘ is contingent, either relative to the individual or culture, but arbitrary in its basis. My circular frame of definitions for the ‘good’ are interwoven via a different sense. In my circle, the arbitrariness of the good is only an apparent arbitrariness. That it is only apparent makes it neither true nor false, but a certain useful way of understanding the good. My definition is useful in a different way , which leaves the previous definition intact ( if one only sees the good as arbitrary then that is valid, as far as it goes). I invite others to see my definition as enriching the arbitrary definition, by saying what others are unable to say about the good besides the fact that it is arbitrary. This would be like inviting others to see that the relation between an electric current and a magnetic field is not arbitrary but interlocked. I don’t need to say that what I show them is true, only that it allows me to do things that connect the two concepts in more ways than what they were able to do.


Schopenhauer1 believes it is good to not be born, and that it is not good to be alive. Is this a disagreement with
the idea that goodness is synonymous with "preserving stable ongoing self-consistency of interaction with an environment under changing conditions"?
I would say no, in the same way that showing a connection between electricity and magnetism is not a disagreement with seeing them as unconnected so much as having something more to say about them.
In this case , the more than can be said concerning the condition of possibility of having a desire to live , die or not be born involves showing what is presupposed in having any desire whatsoever namely the avoidance of interruption, discontinuity and chaos. This is not inconsistent with a circular frame of definitions that an antinatalist might use , rather it also says what they cannot say , or see.

The first thought I had was justice.

Justice is generally considered good.

And yet justice is not...

...a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating OR at least three at the same time and in the same respect of the aforementioned qualifiers.
— god must be atheist

because sometimes justice must deal with rule-breaking. So while it is disadvantageous and unpleasant and unhelpful nor accommodating to punish people for breaking the rules, it's a part of what makes justice just: That the rules are fairly applied, even if inconvenient. — Moliere

I think there is one fault in your logic. The rules for justice are set by a law. The law most likely is to promote something that the lawmaker considers "good". To punish the law breaker is just; this will deter the lawbreaker from breaking the law in the future, and will show an example to other would-be-law-breakers to not break the law. Therefore justice is good, because it reduces the number of breaches of law. And that is good for the law-maker. It is advantageous, helpful and accommodating for the law-maker.

-----------------------

What a mess. So far every contribution to this thread has used circular terms to ‘define’ the good. — Joshs

No, no, no. Read the previous page. Read my definition of "good". It is not circular.

Assuming bert1 is a Kantian, does it follow that which is willed, is the good?
— Shawn

Kantian or not, it's clear that bert1's account leads quickly to incoherence...

From a rapist's point of view, raping someone is fab, if a bit sweaty.
— bert1

He can't say for sure if even rape is not a good.

While Bert may have trouble seeing it, I'm sure most here would agree that what someone wills is not the very same concept as what is good.
— Banno

It's not good to you, it's not good to society, it's not good to most people, and it's not good for me, either, and presumably not to bert1 either, but to the rapist raping someone is good, because it gives the rapist pleasure.

You really did not see that?

According to my definition, you always must consider the point of view and the time. "At the same time and in the same respect."

You are one I suspect who deliberately did not read my definition, and then Bert1's adjustment on it, or else who deliberately ignored its contents, in order to be able to ignore its impact on the topic.

I abhor rape, and all senseless violence. But you must consider the logic imbedded in this vile example, which still proves the point.

The point of reference is the rapist's view. All other reference points are ignored for the time being, because we want to focus on how the rapist views rape. This was discussed in the definition, and you wilfully ignore that part:

Please don't juxtapose something that is good now but will be not good later, or something that is good for Mr. X but not good for Ms. Y. Those violate the rule in the definition, "at the same time and in the same respect." — god must be atheist

Regarding your argument:

I'm sure most here would agree that what someone wills is not the very same concept as what is good. — Banno

You conveniently switch (for your own benefit) and switch in an invalid way, the evaluation of "good" in Bert1's example. He says the rapists wills to rape, and to him it's good. You say "to most here" rape is not good. You are switching the point of view in a clandestine yet invalid way.

Your argument does not hold.

In more philosophical terms, your account is that the extension of good is the very same as the extension of any of advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating.

Moore's point is that even were this so, the open question shows that the intension is different.

And that's the problem with the open question - if there were such an extensional equivalence, then as you might say, who cares if it is not intensionally equivalent?

So Putin's invasion of Ukraine is, for him, advantageous and helpful and accommodating, if perhaps not altogether pleasant. And hence by your standard, a good.

So I don't see that your definition is of much help in working out what we ought do, which is, after all, the point of ethics. — Banno

I can't respond to the first part to "... intensionally equivalent?" because my education level does not include the knowledge of the names of concepts you mention. In particular, I don't know what you mean by "open quiestion", "intensional difference", "intensional equivalence", and "intension". I am not sure whether you wanted to say "intention"? I am not going to guess, I just say that I can't comprehend that part of your reply.

But your example that follows does not debunk my definition as amended by bert1. You admit that to Putin the invasion of Ukraine is good; then you turn around and say it's not good. But you did not invade the Ukraine. Putin's will was fulfilled. He feels pleasure. So compare this to the original definition.

And if you say to this: but Putin is not pleasured (emotionally) because the invasion has gone sour, then obviously the definition stands, because the goal that would have pleasured him, and which was going to be a "good" for Putin, did not happen. So the "good" is missing, because the act that would please him is also missing.

What you, I, or the rest of the world thinks is immaterial when you consider what is good for Putin.

And your opinion whether my definition serves the point of ethics is immaterial. All you needed to do is to give one, (1) ONE example that debunks my definition. Whichh you failed to provide.

My definition with bert1's adjustment certainly does not coincide with your idea of ethics. That's is not a fault with the definition, it is an artificial problem you superimposed on the whole. You are saying "whatever theory does not serve my idea of what ethics should be is bad", is not an argument. Your insistence on "good" to serve your ethical ideal is a demand that is unwarranted. It is a haphazard, arbitrary demand.

↪Banno :fire: — 180 Proof

:naughty: :rage: :down:

I can't beleive, 180 Proof, that you bought Banno's argument, which is full of holes when you consider my definition of "good" as amended by bert1. Have you read that part of the thread?

All I need is one (1) example that debunks my definition as amended by bert1.

You applaud something that miserably failed at it.

As I see the general problem in the reception of the definition is that people fail to distinguish between what THEY, the readers think is good, and what the actual point of view of of the actor in an action deems is good.

Without internalizing that there is a difference there, the whole exercise is to the shits. And that is certainly not my ineptitude, but that of those who are unable to see the importance of it.

I am certainly HUGELY surprised that you failed to see too, what a difference it makes to see or not to see the importance of the point of view.

That is, one can consistently conceive of someone approved off what is not good. — Banno

Good is not mere approval, as I point out:

Moreover, they are asserting that this approval springs from something intrinsic to x itself. — hypericin

Can a speaker assert they approve of x, due to an innate quality of x , while at the same time assert that x is not good? I say no.

Oh come on Banno. The same thing can be both good an not good depending on the point of view. From my point of view rape is bad. From the rapist's point of view it's good. That's not a contradiction.

Good stuff.

I prefer not to go into gory detail in talking about ethics -- it seems to defeat the point? -- but can you imagine a person who makes a law for themself? So, in the case of the lawmaker, the law is most likely promoting something which the lawmaker considers good. So it fits your definition. However, at the same time, the rule-breaker made a law for themself -- not institutionally, but just chose it all on their own -- that said the lawmaker was breaking their law.

Now, realizing that the lawmaker would punish them, being a clever sort, they just decided that they'd become the lawmaker themselves. Say the one who disagreed with the lawmaker (a king in a previous time) was a prince, and they could kill the king. Then --

. Therefore justice is good, because it reduces the number of breaches of law. And that is good for the law-maker. It is advantageous, helpful and accommodating for the law-maker. — god must be atheist

As Thrasymachus pointed out, what is just is what the powerful say. To even have an opinion on the matter, one must first be powerful.

So I don't see that your definition is of much help in working out what we ought do, which is, after all, the point of ethics. — Banno

Is that the point of ethics? I don't know. If so, it has always seemed to me to be a misguided pursuit. Suppose I work out, by a consideration of ethics, what I ought to do. What happens then? Why would I do it? My will has to somehow be engaged, no?

Well if you'd bothered to read my posts on this thread, especially
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/769109 then you'd not be so surprised, gmba, that I'm sympatico with

I don't see that your definition [of good] is of much help in working out what we ought do, which is, after all, the point of ethics. — Banno

"Good" is an adjective denoting that a thing that is good is a thing that is advantageous and pleasant and helpful and accommodating OR at least three at the same time and in the same respect of the aforementioned qualifiers.

I invite examples that debunk this definition. — god must be atheist

Suppose someone comes up with an example that they claim debunks your definition. How can we tell whether their claim is true? Is the example the standard by which the definition is to be judged, or is the definition the standard by which the example is to be judged?

There are two distinct, but fundamental questions in ethics that, at the time Moore was writing, were not carefully distinguished. Indeed, Moore is credited with having made us pay attention to the profound difference between them and how easily they can be confused with one another.

The two questions are these: "What is moral?" and "what is morality?"

The first question is the question at the heart of what has become known as 'normative ethics'. The second is at the heart of what is known as 'metaethics'. (I stress, these distinctions were not employed at the time of Moore's writing, but as a result of it).

These are very different questions. One is about which acts are right and which states of affair etc, are good. Whereas the other is about what the rightness and goodness themselves are.

The problem is that both questions can be expressed using the same words. The ones you have used. "What is good?". That question is ambiguous. There are two quite different questions that could be being asked by the same words. What things are good? And "what is goodness, in and of itself". So, both the normative question and the metaethical question can be asked with exactly the same expression.

What Moore called (somewhat misleadingly) 'the naturalistic fallacy' is essentially the mistake of confusing the answer to one question, with the answer to the other.

So, let's imagine that utilitarianism is true. Well, then that means the answer to "what is good?", when used to express the question "what things are good" is "those things that maximise happiness".

But even if utilitarianism is true, that is not the answer to the "what is goodness, in and of itself?" question.

This is what the open-question argument brings out. For as goodness itself is not identical with the property of 'maximum happiness', then it is possible for maximum happiness to lack goodness and for something else to possess it. That's true even it utilitarianism is true. That is, even if it is true that all right acts have in common that they maximize happiness, it remains entirely possible that there could be an act that maximizes happiness yet is not right. This is because the property of 'maximizing happiness' and the property of 'being right' are not one and the same.

So, the lesson from Moore is that you need to clarify your question. What are you asking when you ask us 'what is good?'? Are you asking us which acts are good and which ones bad? Or are you asking what goodness is, in and of itself?

Incidentally, I should add that Moore failed fully to take on board his own lesson. For he took the fact that answers to the 'what things are good' are not answers to the 'what is good, in and of itself?" question to demonstrate that the "what is good, in and of itself?" does not have an answer. Yet it is only if Moore has committed his own fallacy - that is, confused the answer to one question with the answer to the other - that one can get to that conclusion!

So, although Moore showed that no normative theory is an answer to the metaethical question "what is good, in and of itself?", he did not thereby show that the question "what is good, in and of itself?" lacks an answer. All he did (no mean achievement, incidentally) is show that a whole range of 'answers' to it were no such thing. But that isn't evidence there's no answer to it. It's just evidence that people have been confusing one question with another.

So, the lesson from Moore is that you need to clarify your question. What are you asking when you ask us 'what is good?'? Are you asking us which acts are good and which ones bad? Or are you asking what goodness is, in and of itself? — Bartricks

I'm asking mainly, what constitutes labeling an act or deed as good, and how that qualifier arises in our description of ethics.

I don't understand that question. Are you asking which things are good, or are you asking what the quality of goodness is?

For an analogy: there's the question "what is green?". That's ambiguous. Are you asking which things are green - that is, which things have greenness? Or are you asking what green is, in and of itself?

Similarly then, are you asking which things are good, or are you asking what goodness itself is?

Well, Moore provided the example of yellow existing at a certain wavelength for example. I think what one can call good is something like that, as a simple.

I don't think I'm concerned with the relations themselves but more with goodness itself as we all can discern what "good" is.

I am still unsure what you are asking.

It seems you are asking the metaethical question "what is goodness, in and of itself?" and not the normative question "what things are good?", yes?

It's crucially important to be clear about this, as you'll just confuse answers with one with answers to the other if you do not - which is precisely what Moore was trying to teach us not to do.

It seems you are asking the metaethical question "what is goodness, in and of itself?" and not the normative question "what things are good?", yes? — Bartricks

Yes.

Well, I think goodness in and of itself can be defined, contrary to what Moore thought. (For Moore's entire case for thinking goodness cannot be defined is based on the fact that answers to a different question failed to answer the question....which is no evidence at all that good cannot be defined, it is just evidence that a lot of people confused answers to one question with answers to another.)

For something to be morally good, is for it to be morally valuable. That is, 'morally good' and 'morally valuable' are synonymous expressions.

And for something to be morally valuable is for it to be featuring as the object of a valuing relation. That is, it is for it to be being valued.

For example, if I say "this is valuable to me" I mean no more or less than that I value it. And if I value something, then what I value is the object of a valuing relation. That is, it is 'that which is being valued'.

Of course, if I value something that does not entail that it is morally valuable. So we can rule out that goodness is made of our own valuing activity. (For what I have just said seems to apply to us all).

Whose, then? If moral value is made of valuing activity, whose valuing activity does it consist of? Well, the person whose values constitutes moral values. That's a Moorean-style conclusion. Moral goodness is made of the valuing relations of the person whose values constitute moral values (a person who is not me or you).

So, the axiology of good is what Moore advocated. I'd have to read about that... Got sources?

I was asking for your views on Moore's argument; didn't mean to say you were a subscriber to Moore.

I read the Wikipedia article. His argument is basically this:

What is good?

X is good if X possesses the property Y [we usually stop here, but not Moore]

Moore asks, why is Y-ness good?

For every property P that defines good, the question "why is P good?" can be asked - there's no end (it goes on ad infinitum).

↪180 Proof I was asking for your views on Moore's argument ... — Agent Smith

I think it's irrelevant to ethics (re: "goodness").