It is a description that shows the result of only considering "groups" of individuals and their opinions to adequately represent people living together in a particular society. All the different ways people work, judge themselves, mate, educate children, and govern themselves are not simply an aggregate of their opinions. — Paine

I've literally said that people could be grouped by any means (used dog owners as an example, if I recall). Owning a dog is not an opinion.

Opinions, by themselves, do not do anything. — Paine

We're not talking about what opinion 'do' so I don't see the relevance of this. we're talking about the moral weight one ought give the aggregated opinion of a certain grouping.

You present the absence of Ukrainian agency as a fact, authorizing the removal of their voice from any moral calculus. — Paine

Where? I'm arguing the exact opposite. That one could create any grouping at all and get an aggregated opinion. We could take into account the aggregated opinion of {all the people east of the Dnieper}, we could take into account the aggregated opinion of {all the people who've held a Ukrainian passport for more than 10 years}, or {all the people who own a Ukrainian flag}... I'm asking why we ought to take into account the opinion of your chosen grouping {anyone living within the current borders of Ukraine}.

You've not yet provided any reason at all why the aggregated opinion of that particular group matters to us more than the opinion of any other group.

You champion Mearsheimer's theory of International Relations as the best explanation of the events unfolding in Ukraine. You discount previous behavior by Russia as indicative of anything happening in this conflict. — Paine

Yes. What's that got to do with the argument here?

All of your 'moral' arguments are made upon the basis of what you have argued to be happening. — Paine

Some. Not all. Is that something you consider particularly unusual?

The only potential issue for Russia is the depletion of its stocks of long-range munitions at a much faster rate than the industry can produce. But they are already supplementing their dwindling stocks with hundreds of cheap Iranian strike drones, and according to Western intelligence, they are also negotiating to buy Iranian ballistic missiles. — SophistiCat

One thing that should be noticed is that it's missiles only, which shows basically that Russia failed from day one until today to cripple Ukrainian air defenses and Ukrainian airspace is too dangerous for Russian Air Force to fly in. The lack of air superiority is extremely important: Ukraine can move it's formations around an they aren't taking losses when not engaged on Russian ground forces. Another issue is that it's cities, not the Ukrainian army, which is a far harder target to get at, are the target. And to use for example surface to air missiles in the surface-to-surface role is quite inefficient as the missiles don't have a similar high explosive charge as actual artillery missiles and rockets.

Yet I think that creating simple "el cheapo" rockets/missiles to this role is quite possible even with the sanctions etc. Scuds were made in the 1950's and then there wasn't much computer chips around. Russia is likely transforming to a wartime economy and likely changes to the military industry can be done in a year or so. Hence likely a continuation of the missile barrage against Ukrainian cities will continue and I'm not so sure if the missiles will run out.

In any case, the way they have been bombarding Ukraine is completely unconscionable and must be prevented, thwarted or stopped by any means necessary. — Wayfarer

You do realise any means necessary includes nuclear weapons?

Or are you just talking virtue signalling nonsense to y'a boyz?

The Greatest Nuclear Threat we face is a Russian Victory, The Atlantic.

Argues that Putin's success would entail uncontrollable nuclear proliferation, whilst his defeat will deflate the attraction of nuclear weapons.

No. It argues that "If nuclear threats or the actual use of nuclear weapons leads to the defeat of Ukraine..."

It offers no argument at all suggesting that "any means necessary" will prevent that eventuality.

Clearly some means might, other means might fail so catastrophically as to bring it about.

No one here wants war to escalate. The debate is about the best means to prevent that.

Argues that Putin's success would entail uncontrollable nuclear proliferation, whilst his defeat will deflate the attraction of nuclear weapons. — Wayfarer

Even if true for some reason, that somehow Russian defeat would make other states look at nuclear weapons and not be as "attracted" to that sleek cold steel, what's the plan to actually "defeat" Russia?

Because if there's no effective plan, then even in the context of this idea there's nothing effective to do. So, failing a first option that is unworkable, the next option that is feasible and would actually reduce nuclear proliferation is the major powers getting together and resolving the conflict and continuing to cooperate to reduce nuclear proliferation.

This has been the deal since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, that the major powers will reduce their nuclear stockpiles, lower nuclear tensions and be generally more reasonable, and in exchange the non-nuclear powers will not seek nuclear weapons.

The country that eroded this deal was first and foremost the United States in invading Iraq and bombing Libya (countries that gave up their WMD programs to be "reasonable" parties to the WMD deal, which signalled to everyone else that the deal isn't honest but the US may attack you anyways for being a more reasonable global citizen: more reasonable than a dictator with plenty of WMD stockpiles), and the country that started to pull out of the non-proliferation deals is the US, and the country that kept baiting advancing its nuclear umbrella all the way up to to thousands of kilometres of Russian border for over 2 decades is the US.

The cause of nuclear proliferation since the non-proliferation global status quo is definitely the United States.

What the part of the world that finds nuclear weapons attractive learns from this conflict is that (Russian) nuclear weapons is an effective defence against US actions: Russia with nuclear weapons has deterred a no-fly zone whereas Libya without nuclear weapons got no-fly-zoned to rubble (with the insane logic that anything that could potentially support indirectly something that could fly is any imaginative wary whatsoever, is a legitimate no-fly-zone target, which is 1984 level nonsense).

No. It argues that "If nuclear threats or the actual use of nuclear weapons leads to the defeat of Ukraine..." — Isaac

The argument is completely nonsensical; all non-nuclear nations that might develop nuclear weapons would be for deterrence purposes, and mainly from the United States and not Russia or China or other neighbour's, they would not look at nuclear weapons as a means to expand their territory.

Thousands of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them are required to threaten the entire planet.

The Greatest Nuclear Threat we face is a Russian Victory, The Atlantic. — Wayfarer

:up:

To continue my analysis of the military situation, the UK, and I believe Poland as well, sending main battle tanks and the US sending Bradleys now is a pretty good evidence for the drip feed arms supply theory, which is that military support for Ukraine is calibrated to not let Russia lose; now that Russia is gaining ground again, suddenly the next military system is all the talk and needs to be supplied.

Germany has taken the common sense position that they'll supply main battle tanks if the US supplies main battle tanks. Totally reasonable, someone asking you to do A, and who can also do A, should be willing to also do A if they want you to do A.

Otherwise, the argument structure that you should do something I'm equally capable, but not willing to do myself, is called manipulation.

It's unclear which and how many Western tanks will be supplied to Ukraine, but what is clear is that if the will to "help Ukraine" was genuine these tanks could been supplied from the beginning, or, at minimum, Ukrainian tank brigades trained on these systems since February (or even before) in the event Ukraine loses a significant part of their entire tank fleet as well as all the other soviet equipment that could be scrounged here and there.

We can also safely conclude that all the reasoning provided before for not supplying Western main battle tanks was completely spurious and lies (which was in any case obvious), if suddenly the story is changing now.

As for the effectiveness of Western tanks themselves, this is now very much sub-optimal conditions. Lot's of experienced Ukrainian tank crews have been lost who could have made use of the Western systems.

In addition to the attrition of tank personnel, there's the logistical challenges. Of course, this could have been easily mitigated by fielding just one Western tank company since the start of the war to work out logistical issues in case it turns out that "anything Ukraine needs" includes Western tanks.

The complexity and maintenance of Western tanks is the major practical problem in suddenly fielding them, and it's very unclear how effective they can be in the remaining skillset and when they'll be effective. Operating tanks takes a considerable amount of skill, even starting with just manoeuvring without getting stuck, and tanks are of limited supply so it's not a case where people can just be thrown into it and we'll just assume the survivors learn something.

It's definitely an open question, even with proper training, how effective Western tanks would be against Russian tanks. Russian tank doctrine is more smaller tanks; with one less crew that also helps permit more tanks. What sort of proficiency Ukraine will have with these tanks is anyone's guess.

However, Western tanks will also remain vulnerable to drone and air power. If the Western tanks are effective against other ground units, this will increase Russian motivation to engage certainly a lot of drones but also their attack helicopters. Artillery may not be so effective destroying Western tanks but may damage them (a problem amplified if they are difficult to repair) as well as of course suppress and degrade supporting infantry and other vehicles. Electronic warfare seems to have become pretty effectively employed by the Russians.

On the offensive, both ATGM's (which the Russians also have) and mines are an additional problem.

To summarise, Western tanks at this stage maybe very late in the game, too late to have a major impact; certainly better than nothing but now fielded in sub optimal conditions, and the requirement of air power and electronic warfare to support the tanks remains, which likely we'll start to hear about if Western tanks start to lose against Russian combined arms or just tank-on-tank engagements (whether because Russian tank doctrine is good enough or just Russian tank crews are far more experienced at this point).

On the political side, there's a major symbolic element to the supply of Western tanks, definitely gives the impression this is NATO's war.

In terms of narrative for Russia they can credibly say they destroyed Ukrainian war fighting capacity and are now even more directly against NATO than before. Why this matters is first on the international scene of countries friendly to Russia it undermines the narrative of Russian incompetence in dealing with the much smaller Ukrainian army; it's difficult to continue to say Russia has underperformed if the West needs to send in Western tanks and difficult to continue to say that it's actually Russia that has lost a significant amount of tanks and not Ukraine. The supply of Western tanks, in itself, boosts Russian "strength" perception, which is what matters most to countries friendly to Russia.

Domestically, the supply of Western tanks simply confirms the Kremlin's narrative that they are actually fighting NATO and not Ukraine. This narrative is important in terms of increasing toleration for losses. If we compare the current scenario to one in which Ukraine was not helped at all by the West and the current front lines is 100% Ukrainian military achievement, it would indeed be a completely military debacle for Russia (an argument that the West continues to make regardless of the facts, but this only plays to a Western audience). The counter argument of course to Russian military debacle is that they are fighting NATO, which is out to get them, and therefore it's a harder fight requiring more sacrifice. Western tanks is a sort of step change in the symbolism of this argument; Russia can credibly say domestically and to their international audience that they defeated Ukraine and are now battling NATO tanks.

The optics of Western tanks being destroyed in Ukraine may also undermine support in the West for the war, lead to self-reflection of Western omnipotence as it maybe the end of the drip-feed escalation ladder, so if that doesn't work ... then maybe best to compromise.

That the move maybe underwhelming militarily and also counter-effective politically, is potentially a good explanation of why Germany is getting cold feat and the US just flat out says they won't deliver their tanks.

The UK committing 10 Challenger 2 tanks is, my guess, was meant to just break the taboo and get other countries, mainly Germany, to commit significantly more Leopard 2 tanks. Only 10 tanks was selected as a mitigation factor in the event they are all destroyed ... they can then say "well it was only 10 and no one else sent any tanks so what-are-you-going-to-do, don't blame the Challenger, blame Germany". Will be interesting to see if these tanks even get to Ukraine and fielded if there's not a deluge of other Western tanks.

The Greatest Nuclear Threat we face is a Russian Victory, The Atlantic.
— Wayfarer
:up: — neomac

Again, how do you actually prevent a Russian victory?

Sanctions haven't worked, international fighters haven't worked, the great Ukrainian offensive hasn't worked, the drip feed of new weapons systems hasn't worked, and there is likely no air defence even possible for defending the Ukrainian electricity grid.

If the real threat is Russian victory, how is that actually prevented?

If you can answer this question, then feel free to move onto the next question of likely the only situation in which Russia uses nuclear weapons is ... losing and not winning, and how would Russia using nuclear weapons to avoid limited defeat (likely successfully) in Ukraine (and also now there's a major power clearly willing to use nuclear weapons) somehow put other nations off building their own nuclear weapons?

This argument is nonsense built on-top of nonsense.

KYIV/BERLIN, Jan 19 (Reuters) - Ukraine pleaded on Thursday for the West to finally send it heavy tanks as the defence chiefs of the United States and Germany headed for a showdown over weapons Kyiv says could decide the fate of the war.

[...]

A German government source said Berlin would lift its objections if Washington sends its own Abrams tanks. U.S. officials say the Abrams is inappropriate for Ukraine, because it runs on turbine engines that use too much fuel for Kyiv's strained logistics system to keep them supplied at the front.

Poland and Finland have already said they would send Leopards if Germany lifts its veto, and other countries have indicated they are ready to do so as well. Britain added to the pressure by breaking the taboo on heavy tanks last week, offering a squadron from its fleet of Challengers, though far fewer of these are available than Leopards.

Germany has been reluctant to send offensive weapons that could be seen as escalating the conflict. Many of its Western allies say that concern is misplaced, with Russia showing no sign of backing away from its onslaught against Ukraine.

Colin Kahl, the Pentagon's top policy adviser, said on Wednesday Abrams tanks were not likely to be included in Washington's next massive $2 billion military aid package, which will be headlined by Stryker and Bradley armoured vehicles. — U.S., Germany head for showdown over tanks for Ukraine - Reuters

For those wondering about the tank situation. According to the article "U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was in Germany on Thursday to meet new Defence Minister Boris Pistorius, shortly after Pistorius was sworn into office," but I'm not sure if that means today or then next Thursday, so unclear when we'll find out if Germany "sticks to its guns" so to speak or capitulates.

Although I'm highly skeptical Western tanks would be enough to "defeat Russia", enough of them would help create a stalemate, which I think is what US is aiming at currently; calibrate the drip feed into a stalemate.

What I expect is on people's minds is that simply maybe not enough and a massive fleet of Western tanks being destroyed in Ukraine would be a major embarrassment. It cannot simply be assumed

Perhaps it is no coincidence that Germany ousted their last defense minister and appointed a new one yesterday.

↪boethius Perhaps it is no coincidence that Germany ousted their last defense minister and appointed a new one yesterday. — Tzeentch

Definitely, the only reason for this is to change policy and not need to deal with journalists bringing up previous statements all the time.

Nevertheless, Germany may still capitulate on their current policy, or then the change of ministers is to increase their negotiation position with a more credible threat that they may not do as they're told, and get concessions elsewhere.

However, considering the embarrassment of Leopard 2's being all destroyed in Ukraine, which not only can't be excluded but maybe the likely scenario (from the German perspective who knows this system best), it may simply be impossible for Germany to undermine themselves to that extent simply to be a good student of the US and no other practical reason.

Left as it is, the situation is actually a really great advertisement for German arms, as the American position is essentially: Well, German tanks are better than our tanks in an actual war, so yeah, take that Germany, fuck you.

There maybe little need to risk this recommendation from the Pentagon for a primary military export by sending them to be destroyed in Ukraine.

While I never particularly liked her, Merkel did a good job at providing a political counterbalance towards United States influence in Europe, and even veto'd Ukraine membership to NATO (or threatened to?).

The current German government doesn't seem to possess the same backbone, nor insight into international politics. But even they seem to understand that forcing Russia to build up its armed forces whilst simultaneously giving away their own seems like an odd strategy.

Well said.

The argument is completely nonsensical; all non-nuclear nations that might develop nuclear weapons would be for deterrence purposes, and mainly from the United States and not Russia or China or other neighbour's, they would not look at nuclear weapons as a means to expand their territory.

Thousands of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them are required to threaten the entire planet. — boethius

Agreed.

If Russia won any territory here, the only way one could invoke the threat of nuclear weapons as a factor would be in keeping US involvement at bay.

So the message, correctly, would be "getting intercontinental nuclear weapons will prevent the US from getting involved in your territorial and regional disputes".

Since the US has been responsible for the deaths of nearly half a million civilians in it's wars just since 9/11 https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human/civilians - that may prove to be a good thing.

(not that I'm claiming that message makes any more sense - just a reductio)

The only message which does make sense is, of course...

the major powers will reduce their nuclear stockpiles, lower nuclear tensions and be generally more reasonable, and in exchange the non-nuclear powers will not seek nuclear weapons. — boethius

... but any journalist who can, with a straight face, argue that the best way to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict is to provoke a nuclear power, has lost any right to be taken seriously.

... but then it's The Atlantic, so ...

You might be interested to look at historical analyses of US Lend Lease aid to the UK, and later the USSR. The aid was critical, more so to the UK, eventually supplying a large proportion of all UK material and a substantial proportion of food as well.

It's hard to argue that the US was "drip feeding" the Brits or Soviets. All internal documentation suggests that the Western allies were extremely concerned that the Soviets would capitulate, even into early 1943, when the threat of Soviey collapse had long passed. However, in both cases, aid to either was fairly anemic over the first year. Setting up supply chains for the amount of material needed for a major war is not easy.

It's even harder today given the amount of training required to operate and maintain modern MBTs and IFVs. The quickest way to get vehicles out would be to set up maintenance facilities in Poland and have them staffed by NATO personnel. This takes time too though, getting building leases, giving assignment orders, moving heavy machinery. You also need a plan for moving equipment within Ukraine without getting it blown up.

It makes sense to stockpile some stuff in Poland and not to turn it over yet, as the material can be neatly laid out in warehouses without fear of Russian missile attacks. The deployment of Patriot Missiles to Ukraine, itself not easy, was probably a prerequisite for defining high value shipments.

Point being, people underestimate how long this stuff takes. Even if the decision to go ahead with giving out Challenger 2s was mostly made almost a year ago, it still might take until now to get them out. For one, it makes sense to train people abroad where missile strikes can't hit the equipment.

If the prior Lend Lease is any indication, peak flows won't start until late 2023 or later.

I would not be surprised if the M1 is deployed, but perhaps it won't be. It's an absolutely atrocious fuel hog and hard to maintain. The US uses specialized refueling vehicles and crews to make the huge demand work. The thing is even heavier than the giant Merkava, and less than ideal for Ukrainian mud.

You might be interested to look at historical analyses of US Lend Lease aid to the UK, and later the USSR. The aid was critical, more so to the UK, eventually supplying a large proportion of all UK material and a substantial proportion of food as well. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The difference is that:

- The Nazi's did not have nuclear weapons that could strike the US, which severely limited military options to "lose slowly"
- US administration intended to join the war and were looking for pretext and did join the war (so not hypocrites)
- The UK, Empire + Common Wealth, and the Soviet Union could plausibly defeat the Nazi's, obviously even easier with the US directly involved, so it was not supporting a lost cause. And by "defeat" in the context of WWII meant actual defeat of Nazi Germany which was not only possible but did in fact happen.

It's hard to argue that the US was "drip feeding" the Brits or Soviets. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Where do I argue the US drip fed arms to the UK or Soviet Union in WWII.

Did the US severely limit the kinds of weapons it would deliver to the UK or Soviet Union?

There's a drip feed of weapons to Ukraine because of cold hard facts.

Are you seriously trying to argue that because the US named both programs the same thing they must therefore be the same thing?

The quickest way to get vehicles out would be to set up maintenance facilities in Poland and have them staffed by NATO personnel. — Count Timothy von Icarus

No, the quickest way was a year ago when the war started to start solving these problems in the event "whatever support Ukraine needs" requires Western tanks, or even anytime since 2008 when it was first declared that Ukraine would be joining NATO eventually ... one day ... maybe ...

It makes sense to stockpile some stuff in Poland and not to turn it over yet, as the material can be neatly laid out in warehouses without fear of Russian missile attacks — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe a reason Russia is keeping the fight in South-East Ukraine 1000 km from Poland.

Point being, people underestimate how long this stuff takes. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe people on the internet who don't have a clue about anything underestimate how long things take, but that's not my case (the person who explained all the lead times required) and it is not the case of NATO decision makers. No one involved underestimates the time things take, and NATO was fully aware that it would take significant logistics and training to introduce Western MBT into Ukraine, and they were and are completely cognisant that not preparing that months in advance and only "getting around to it" when Ukraine is in desperate need is setting Ukraine up for failure. Now they are severely tank-deficient and this will severely limit their ability to defend, not to speak of launching any counter offensives to relieve pressure or at least get some victories somewhere for propaganda purposes.

Furthermore, anyone with a pencil and paper could have worked out that this moment in the war would come as it's simply impossible that Ukraine would have basically a 4-1 tank attrition ratio in their favour required to simply stay par with Russia: therefore, Ukraine is going to run out of tanks and will need more ... and Russia isn't going to supply them their tanks and old soviet stuff lying around is both limited in quantity and quality, therefore, ipso facto, the only option will be Western tanks and if the idea is for Ukraine to "win" the logistics and training for that eventuality would need to be carried out at or before the "how long this stuff takes".

If the prior Lend Lease is any indication, peak flows won't start until late 2023 or later. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The two situations are not remotely comparable.

Both the UK and the Soviet Union had their own war industries and the US had to first ramp up production for it's own defensive purposes as well as deal with U-boats in the Atlantic. It was not the case that the UK and Soviet Union essentially depended 100% on the US for arms, funds, and material and the US was preparing to enter the war itself (so needed to prepare that).

In this situation the Ukraine military and government is kept on life support by continuous Western aid and has essentially zero war material generating capacity of its own.

Therefore, if you want Ukraine to "win" you need to do things very differently than in WWII and send massive amounts of material before and at the start of the war and all the systems necessary to be effective, since if there are no other armies that are going to enter the war and it has to be all "Ukraine" then you need to maximise the force multiplication of their original professional force: tanks, planes, artillery, helicopters, air defence, missiles and vehicles of all kinds, and while we're at it some submarines and torpedoes, and then rationalise the logistics and training as you go.

If you actually had as a goal Ukrainian "victory" you wouldn't have these months long deliberations about the next weapon system when the previous weapon systems failed to produce "victory", you'd supply directly everything Ukraine can use to force multiple in the present and train out-of-country on every weapons system that Ukraine may require in the future. That is what "winning" through Ukraine as a proxy force would look like.

Now, if you say "well, if NATO did that then Russia would just start using nuclear weapons, so they can't" then you are simply saying that NATO's policy is to not let Russia lose.

For, it wouldn't matter to Russia how they lose in their calculation to use nuclear weapons, just that they are actually losing; there is no "the fair way" to supply Ukraine in a way that produces victory but Russia says, "well, that's fair, you got us, played by the rules so we won't use nuclear weapons but accept defeat".

And that is the dynamic at play here. If NATO policy was "nuclear weapons be damned, glory to Ukraine!" then they would have been sending and training on every weapons system Ukraine does or might need since the start of the war or even before.

... but any journalist who can, with a straight face, argue that the best way to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict is to provoke a nuclear power, has lost any right to be taken seriously.

... but then it's The Atlantic, so ... — Isaac

It's truly bizarre.

It's basically kindergarten level of analysis.

Again, how do you actually prevent a Russian victory? — boethius

Define "Russian victory" and provide evidence from Russian officials in support of it.

Define "Russian victory" and provide evidence from Russian officials in support of it. — neomac

It's the Atlantic article arguing that a Russian victory must be prevented to avoid nuclear proliferation.

It is the people who are proponents of this position that must explain how they actually prevent a Russian victory so as (for completely non-sensical proposed reasons) prevent further nuclear proliferation, or then proponents of the general position of:

In any case, the way they have been bombarding Ukraine is completely unconscionable and must be prevented, thwarted or stopped by any means necessary. — Wayfarer

To explain what means are included in the "any means necessary" and how these means actually "stop" Russia (i.e. avoid a Russian victory).

Of course, proponents of this position that realise there is very little chances of evicting Russia from all the former Ukrainian territory and then that actually ending the war and Russia saying "yep, defeated" are free to move the goal posts around and explain how Russia "winning" some things (like the land bridge to Crimea) isn't really "winning" because they could have won even more things.

My own position is that the situation should be resolved by negotiation, in which case no side will be completely victorious but some compromise worked out.

However, in simple military terms complete victory would be one side forcing the unconditional surrender of the other side; allies were definitely victorious in WWII.

If Russia ends up in the long run with more territory but does not actually defeat Ukraine then it's up for debate if the price paid for the land was worth it overall, certainly not an outright victory over Ukraine, but of course Ukraine would have paid orders of magnitude, possibly 2 or 3, higher price and didn't win anything. If the "strategic defeat" concept proves true (which now seems extremely unlikely as Russia seems to have transitioned their economy successfully) then perhaps it's a "win" for NATO, loss of some sort for Russia (not great, not terrible), and a clear immense and unmitigated loss for Ukraine

Why would countries have sent Ukraine weaponry back in 2008? It had a pro-Russian government through 2014, and there was a path towards soft "annexation" ala Belarus for Russia.

Western countries didn't give Ukraine much by way of military aid pre-invasion over fears that it would provoke Russia. I think it's quite fair to see the West was caught flat footed at the outset of the war, without good plans for what it should do in the event of a full scale invasion. The Germans and French vocally disagreed with the US about the threat of war, and even top level US diplomats seemed skeptical about an actual war right up until the invasion.

Hence, things taking time. The other problem was that the West wasn't sure:

A. How likely aid was to provoke Russian escalation.
B. How likely Ukraine was to collapse. You don't want to give them a ton of equipment only to see the Russians take control of it (see: the collapse of the ANA and US aid becoming Taliban material).

Ukraine's long term survival didn't seem obvious until later in the spring of last year.

Anyhow, as far as the comparison, while it is clear now that Russia and the UK could have likely eventually defeated Germany, it was far from clear in 1941-43. US policy makers certainly didn't think it was clear, and even after it entered the war it planned on having to invade Europe with a much larger force, leaving Japan until later. But aid flows were still slow. Point being, even in a case where they obviously wanted to get aid onto the battlefield ASAP, it took over a year to get things in gear.

Why would countries have sent Ukraine weaponry back in 2008? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Do you not know the basic facts of the discussion?

Georgia and Ukraine had hoped to join the NATO Membership Action Plan,[3] but, while welcoming the two countries’s aspirations for membership and agreeing that "these countries will become members of NATO", the NATO members decided to review their request in December 2008.

So, if "these countries will become members of NATO" why not in 2008? And if not and declaring so may significantly increase tensions with Russia and send events towards this current war but for [insert reasons] Ukraine won't be allowed to join NATO before the reason for it (not being invaded) actually happens ... but, because we're nice, we'll send arms, then, yeah, why not start the training on all the potential weapons systems Ukraine may need in 2008.
— 2008 Bucharest summit - Wikipedia

It had a pro-Russian government through 2014, and there was a path towards soft "annexation" ala Belarus for Russia. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Ukraine did not have a government that was pro-Russian, or then Wikipedia is way off in stating "Ukraine had hoped to join the NATO Membership Action Plan" and Ukraine would have made it super clear this wasn't the case, they didn't want an invitation to join NATO, certainly don't want NATO to declare they'll be joining someday, they're pro-Russian!

Ukraine had a government until 2014 that was non-delusional enough to strike some sort of balance between Russia and the West, and played successfully one against the other (successfully getting a good deal from Russia to maintain the status quo, which was far preferable to Ukraine than the current war, which was an obvious risk in trying to spur Russia completely to anyone with a modicum of realism).

And to use for example surface to air missiles in the surface-to-surface role is quite inefficient as the missiles don't have a similar high explosive charge as actual artillery missiles and rockets. — ssu

Yes, much of what Russia is now lobbing at ground targets was not primarily intended for that purpose. And the problem with that is not only the size or penetration, but targeting as well. For example, the Kh-22 missile was originally designed to target aircraft carriers, so it has plenty of charge - enough to destroy an apartment complex in Dnipro. But, like most anti-ship missiles, it has radar homing, which works well for large metal bodies in open sea, but not for concrete structures on land. So on land it can hit hundreds of meters wide off target.

Yet I think that creating simple "el cheapo" rockets/missiles to this role is quite possible even with the sanctions etc. Scuds were made in the 1950's and then there wasn't much computer chips around. Russia is likely transforming to a wartime economy and likely changes to the military industry can be done in a year or so. Hence likely a continuation of the missile barrage against Ukrainian cities will continue and I'm not so sure if the missiles will run out. — ssu

Iranian drones that Russia is launching against Ukrainian infrastructure were found to be assembled from many Western components that Iran wasn't supposed to have. But over the years Iran has learned how to get around sanctions, so that they can manufacture their weapons in quantity. If Iran can do it, so can Russia. Indeed, sanctioned components have also been found in recently manufactured Russian munitions and drones as well.

Still, we are likely going to see primitivization of their weapons production, just as we are already seeing primitivization of civilian production (car manufacture, etc.)

I can't see how you square...

The Germans and French vocally disagreed with the US about the threat of war, and even top level US diplomats seemed skeptical about an actual war right up until the invasion. — Count Timothy von Icarus

...with...

Ukraine's long term survival didn't seem obvious until later in the spring of last year. — Count Timothy von Icarus

...?

It's not like literally every analyst thinks Ukraine are going to survive long-term now. Some do, some don't. Seems the same as before when some analysts thought there would be a war and some didn't.

You seem, if I'm reading you right, to be saying that it's obvious Western governments didn't prepare Ukraine for war before 2022 because only some (not all) analysts thought there'd be a war. Then you use exactly the same argument for why it's now obvious they do prepare Ukraine for war (some analysts, but not all, think they'll survive).

It seems hard to avoid the conclusion that Western governments pick and choose which analysts to believe depending on which support the policy they were rooting for anyway

When they didn't want to arm Ukraine, they listened to the ones saying there'd be no war. When they want to arm Ukraine, they listen to the ones saying Ukraine has a good chance of surviving and more weapons will work.

Western countries didn't give Ukraine tens of billions in aid before Russia invaded because they did not think Russia would actually invade, how Ukraine faired in said invasion isn't the main question there.

You are conflating the question: "will Russia invade," with "will Russia prevail in annexing Ukraine or a large portion of it, and/or destroying the government and replacing the leadership with one it chooses."

Those are two different questions. There is a very simple explanation for why governments wouldn't spend in excess of 100% of their annual defense budgets on hardware for another nation before a war actually started.

This is leaving aside the fact that public announcements of equipment deliveries are based on political/diplomatic considerations and may have little to do with when announcements were decided internally. If Ukrainians crews are using the Challenger 2 and Leopards in the early spring you'll know that the plans were in action months ago.

If I had to guess, the string of announcements in tanks and IFVs is an attempt to get Russia to rethink a spring offensive, although I don't think anyone thinks this is likely to be successful

Western countries didn't give Ukraine tens of billions in aid before Russia invaded because they did not think Russia would actually invade — Count Timothy von Icarus

That's not true. Some analysts thought Russia would invade. Others didn't. Western governments chose which analysts to base their policy on.

Likewise (even more so) with Ukraine's chances of achieving their objectives (with military aid). Some analysts think them reasonable, others think them very low. Western governments chose which analysts to believe.

Since we're not privvy to the full range of analysis, nor (most of us) qualified to assess its accuracy, our task, in holding our governments to account, is to analyse their reasons for those choices.

That's the analysis you're dodging by just blithely saying "no one", and "it's obvious".

It's never obvious and there are always dissenting voices, which means it's always a choice, and therefore there's always a reason for that choice.

Still, we are likely going to see primitivization of their weapons production, just as we are already seeing primitivization of civilian production (car manufacture, etc.) — SophistiCat

It's basically an issue of time: Russia can transform it's military industrial complex to wartime in year or two. The idea that sanctions work is nonsense, especially in a country which does have the knowledge to produce missiles and tanks.

Classic example is Iran and it's F-14 Tomcats. The Shah had gone on an amazing weapons buying spree and then after the revolution the new regime had these state-of-the-art advanced fighters, which had their maintenance and spare parts banned. The standard rhetoric was that they will have to be grounded, because Iran lacks the spare parts. Well, these fighters were successfully used in the Iran-Iraq war and I think even today they fly. The ban has just prevented there to be any flyable F-14 in the US (as spare parts are banned).

Hence the talk that Russia will go out of missiles. or tanks, is false. What can happen (or did happen) is that for time they cannot use them as much as earlier, and the lack of armed vehicles put the Russian forces on defense for some months and incapable of large operaions in several locations. But in spring it can be different.

I think the problem is that we compare the situation of Russia to the situation of the US and West Europe. The error is that both the US and Europe are at peace time and every aspect of peace time arms manufacturing is present with all the red tape, the haggling and the limitations starting from the fact that the arms industry is made to produce small quantities highly costly equipment to equip a small peacetime army. It's not like you put the factory to work in multiple shifts 24 hours to feed the Moloch of a conventional large scale war. Hence when a weapons manufacturer claims that the production is x amount in a year, that refers to what has been produced at peacetime.

But once a society has gone into mobilizing civilians to the front, I can assume it can handle the military industrial complex with similar sweeping changes and gets full focus of the society.

If Russia ends up in the long run with more territory but does not actually defeat Ukraine then it's up for debate if the price paid for the land was worth it overall, certainly not an outright victory over Ukraine, but of course Ukraine would have paid orders of magnitude, possibly 2 or 3, higher price and didn't win anything. If the "strategic defeat" concept proves true (which now seems extremely unlikely as Russia seems to have transitioned their economy successfully) then perhaps it's a "win" for NATO, loss of some sort for Russia (not great, not terrible), and a clear immense and unmitigated loss for Ukraine — boethius

The US and Russia are reluctant to offer a clear definition of "victory" and "loss". There are plausible military (e.g. keep Russia military engaged on all fronts) and propaganda reasons for that (i.e. offering plausible deniability in case of military defeat). However, as I said elsewhere, propaganda consumed by the general public is not all that matters, because general public is more focused on the present while strategic goals concern longer terms goals. Besides the leaders’ understanding of the realistic and relevant implications of this war, may differ from official propaganda (for once they are much more nuanced because they reason in terms of relative power), so I wouldn’t focus so hard on military outcomes independently from strategic concerns.
To me, if at the end of this war, Ukraine remains a sovereign non-pro-Russian non-Russified non-demilitarised country (even without Crimea), NATO members will increase in number and military capacity at the expense of Russian security, the overall Russian military projection capacity and reputation will be significantly decreased, the Russian propaganda machine in the West wrecked, and Russian economy impoverished & decoupled from the West long enough (whatever else being equal like the Rest relative neutrality), then Russia has much more likely lost its strategic power competition against the US and the power status it wanted so badly to be acknowledged by the West. So it doesn’t matter if Russia keeps Crimea&Donbas and sells this as a victory against the US/NATO/West to the Russians. Anyways, I’m not sure that the West is ready to leave Crimea to Russia, neither that the Russia nuclear threat is enough deterrent for all annexed regions (including Crimea). Besides this year is going to be decisive also for the future presidential elections, in Russia before the US. So there are domestic politics incentives pressing for a resolution of this war. We will see.

The US and Russia are reluctant to offer a clear definition of "victory" and "loss". — neomac

We're not talking about their definition, we're talking about whatever definition proponents of the idea "Russia must be defeated" or "Russia can't be allowed to get a victory" in various forms for whatever reasons.

Of course, the goal posts can be moved around within the framework of these proponents of the position or then any other discussion.

It should the authors of statements like "Russia must be stopped" in various forms or "a Russian victory in Ukraine must be prevented because it would encourage more 'rule breaking' or nuclear proliferation etc." to very precisely define what they mean "stopped" or "victory", otherwise they are of course setting themselves up to just move the goal posts later.

To me, if at the end of this war, Ukraine remains a sovereign non-pro-Russian non-Russified non-demilitarised country (even without Crimea), NATO members will increase in number and military capacity at the expense of Russian security, the overall Russian military projection capacity and reputation will be significantly decreased, the Russian propaganda machine in the West wrecked, and Russian economy impoverished & decoupled from the West long enough (whatever else being equal like the Rest relative neutrality), then Russia has much more likely lost its strategic power competition against the US and the power status it wanted so badly to be acknowledged by the West. So it doesn’t matter if Russia keeps Crimea&Donbas and sells this as a victory against the US/NATO/West to the Russians. Anyways, I’m not sure that the West is ready to leave Crimea to Russia, neither that the Russia nuclear threat is enough deterrent for all annexed regions (including Crimea). Besides this year is going to be decisive also for the future presidential elections, in Russia before the US. So there are domestic politics incentives pressing for a resolution of this war. We will see. — neomac

Of course, that this is or will happen is debatable and we are of course debating it.

But, for the subject at hand, it's easy to say as long as Russia is sufficiently harmed then the war is worth it, but at what cost to Ukraine is worthwhile to achieving these goals that are not analogues or close proxies but have only abstract connection to Ukrainian welfare?

If you're willing to say "if Ukraine has lost 100 000, then that's worth it for the harm to Russia so far, and another 1, 2, 3, hundred thousand dead would be worth it" then say so, rather than complain it's emotional blackmail. You are only considering the harm to Russia and not the harm to Ukraine, for you position to be coherent you must either state unlimited harm to Ukraine is worthwhile to achieve limited harm to Russia or then there must be somewhere you draw the line: 500 000 KIA, a million?

And, "they haven't / won't lose that much!" is not an answer to this question. You are free to say 100 000 KIA would be worth it, but no more, and then argue Ukraine has only lost some 15 000 or whatever the Ukrainian government number is and there's a ways to go before you'd consider the idea the harm to Ukraine is disproportionate to you objective. You are free to place the number much higher or then at simply then simply all Ukrainians dead would be in principle acceptable to you if Russia is harmed in the way you describe. Certainly, I think we'd all agree that all Ukrainians dying is unlikely, but it is either the morally acceptable sacrifice to achieve your goals in your framework and "anything goes" or then there must be a line somewhere between tolerable and intolerable losses for these military objectives. No military objective is worth unlimited losses to achieve (in this case it the losses are limited to Ukraine, not unlimited to all NATO, which you are not advocating getting involved; of course, by the same logic Ukraine cannot rationally accept unlimited losses to achieve NATO's objective, so it is necessary to manipulate them to do so, if the cause be just).

It should the authors of statements like "Russia must be stopped" in various forms or "a Russian victory in Ukraine must be prevented because it would encourage more 'rule breaking' or nuclear proliferation etc." to very precisely define what they mean "stopped" or "victory", otherwise they are of course setting themselves up to just move the goal posts later. — boethius

My point is that, if we talk strategy, nobody can specify a unique and accurate account of "victory" and "loss" during wartime the way you seem to expect (neither in this war nor in any other war). Possible but uncertain outcomes can be more than anybody can count and accurately account for. So any possible outcome (plausibly resulting from certain political choices) leading to significantly increased power asymmetries for one player wrt his opponents, especially if it engenders a relatively stable and beneficial trend over a long period (decades, generations) can count as a strategic victory.

If you're willing to say "if Ukraine has lost 100 000, then that's worth it for the harm to Russia so far, and another 1, 2, 3, hundred thousand dead would be worth it" then say so, rather than complain it's emotional blackmail. You are only considering the harm to Russia and not the harm to Ukraine, for you position to be coherent you must either state unlimited harm to Ukraine is worthwhile to achieve limited harm to Russia or then there must be somewhere you draw the line: 500 000 KIA, a million? — boethius

To my understanding, the West is interested in having Ukraine and living Ukrainians withing Western sphere of influence. And it's also interested to treat Ukraine as a sovereign state and therefore let Ukrainians decide how much they want to fight for their self-determination against Russia with Western. Besides it's Ukraine that is interested to convince Westerners with their fight and self-sacrifice that they should support Ukraine not for the sake of Ukrainians but for the sake of harming an expansionist Russia.

but it is either the morally acceptable sacrifice to achieve your goals in your framework and "anything goes" or then there must be a line somewhere between tolerable and intolerable losses for these military objectives. — boethius

There must be, that doesn't mean you can determine it beforehand, or that it's on me to determine it. I don't think that Ukrainians are suicidal, just capable of greater sacrifice than certain Westerners or Russians could expect.