There you go again chatting with a ghost. :smirk:

Can you be specific. I'm pretty sure I raised a whole bunch of ontological issues and examples.
I also added issues to my previous post while you responded. — Bylaw

There are metaphysical truths (ontology) - do quarks exist? However, we can't know if quarks really exist (epistemology). The particle zoo is a model that fits observation.

Well, none of that remotely resembled Wittgenstein's Zettel.

Maybe it was a chat.gpt stunt:

"AI, what combination of identity and opinion would piss off the most people at the same time given their previous statements?"

:sweat:

metaphysical questions have no truth value. They are not true or false, they are useful or not useful. Metaphysics sets out the rules — T Clark

I burden T Clark with another question because he wrote this informative quote.

I hope others here will weigh in with responses to my following question: If metaphysics sets out the rules, and if rules can be construed as signposts pointing the way to specific truth claims, then does it follow that a signpost, like its referent, must in its role embody the same attribute it points the way towards?

Clarifying Example -- a signpost points the way towards a city wherein truth claims in arithmetic are taught to members of the public who wish to learn them. The signpost, in giving its direction to the traveler, makes no arithmetic truth claims. It does, however, embody -- or not -- the truth claim that its direction is true, thus aiding the traveler's quest to arrive at the chosen destination. In this situation, the truth claim of the signpost is an epiphenomenon of the truth claims of the arithmetic instruction it points the way toward.

If metaphysics sets out the rules, and if rules can be construed as signposts pointing ... — ucarr

What's basis for the second conditional?

I think that's pretty accurate. Metaphysics mainly comprises unproven first principles - unproven, because they are understood as the basis for any investigation to proceed. If you wonder what they are, it's because they're generally so deeply embedded in your outllook that they condition how you think about things, without your necessarily being conscious of them. They are often principles that are thought to 'go without saying'.

Consider the epistemological approach known as radical constructivism, which is a kind of anti-realist attitude - 'radical constructivism is an approach to epistemology that situates knowledge in terms of knowers' experience. It looks to break with the conception of knowledge as a correspondence between a knower's understanding of their experience and the world beyond that experience. Adopting a sceptical position towards correspondence as in principle impossible to verify because one cannot access the world beyond one's experience in order to test the relation, radical constructivists look to redefine epistemology in terms of the viability of knowledge within knowers' experience'. The metaphysical claim shows up in the inevitable debates with realists. 'What?' realists will demand. 'You think the whole world is only in your mind?' I've been a party in this debate many times, generally as the former, and it proves difficult or impossible to bridge the gap between worldviews, because there's a kind of foundational or temperamental disposition that I think is associated with those respective views, that is very hard to articulate.

I hope others here will weigh in with responses to my following question: If metaphysics sets out the rules, and if rules can be construed as signposts pointing the way to specific truth claims, then does it follow that a signpost, like its referent, must in its role embody the same attribute is points the way towards? — ucarr

First, let me be clear, the understanding I've described is not held by many, perhaps most, perhaps almost all philosophers. The source I usually reference is "An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. Collingwood is a respected British philosopher who died in 1943. To make it more complicated, this way of seeing things is itself a metaphysical position.

Signpost isn't the analogy I'd use. I guess I'd say metaphysics is the road you take to reach the truth or whatever philosophical goal you are searching for. There's not just one road, but some are better than others. One road isn't right and another wrong, but some roads are easier to travel than others.

There you go again chatting with a ghost. :smirk: — 180 Proof

:smile:

I guess I'd say metaphysics is the road you take to reach the truth or whatever philosophical goal you are searching for. There's not just one road, but some are better than others. One road isn't right and another wrong, but some roads are easier to travel than others. — T Clark

:up: :up:

I've been a party in this debate many times, generally as the former, and it proves difficult or impossible to bridge the gap between worldviews, because there's a kind of foundational or temperamental disposition that I think is associated with those respective views, that is very hard to articulate. — Wayfarer

For me, the bridge is the position I've described. You don't have to commit to just one metaphysical or epistemological viewpoint. Different metaphysics can be used in different situations. Of course, all I've really done is move the gap upriver a bit.

I think that's pretty accurate. Metaphysics mainly comprises unproven first principles - unproven, because they are understood as the basis for any investigation to proceed. If you wonder what they are, it's because they're generally so deeply embedded in your outllook that they condition how you think about things, without your necessarily being conscious of them. They are often principles that are thought to 'go without saying'. — Wayfarer

Yes.

The other point that might be considered is the confluence of metaphysics and religion. Quite often the two will be grouped, as they were by the Vienna Circle, who routinely lumped them together. Why is that? I think it's because they're both the attempt to account for the foundational bases of being itself. There also an historical factor - which is that early Christian theology incorporated a good deal of the terminology and conceptual tools from Aristotelian metaphysics (and neoplatonism) to provide the philosophical superstructure for belief. That found its ultimate expression in Thomism in the West and orthodox theology in Eastern Europe. They can be dealt with separately but because of the way they've ended up being blended there is a fairly porous boundary - it is clear that movements like positivism, again, tend to regard them as different aspects of the same meaningless morass of verbiage.

If metaphysics sets out the rules, and if rules can be construed as signposts pointing the way to specific truth claims, then does it follow that a signpost, like its referent, must in its role embody the same attribute is points the way towards? — ucarr

I'll offer a slightly different approach.

Metaphysics sets out the rules, as discussed, but what counts as true or false is part of those rules. That is, truth and falsity are assigned to sentences as a part of the game of metaphysics.

Metaphysical rules are not really "unproven", either.

Consider this analogy: aces in poker. Suppose you were playing a hand, you had a pair of aces and your opponent had a pair of two's. You claim victory, but your opponent instead of conceding, demands that you prove that aces beat two's - after all, 2 is greater than one! You perhaps bring out the book of rules, and show the page were it says that aces beat everything; but your opponent just maintains that that's ridiculous, that since two is greater than one, a pair of twos beats a pair of aces...

What is to count as proof here? In the end, you might just have to maintain that this is how we play the game...

I think the same can be said for at least some of the supposed principles of metaphysics - things such as the identity of indiscernibles, the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of causality and so on - just ways of playing the game. The rules are not unproven.

The other point that might be considered is the confluence of metaphysics and religion. Quite often the two will be grouped, as they were by the Vienna Circle, who routinely lumped them together. Why is that? I think it's because they're both the attempt to account for the foundational bases of being itself. — Wayfarer

I find the relationship between metaphysics and religion frustrating. On the one hand, as you note, religion is intended to "account for the foundational basis of being itself," which is exactly what metaphysics does. On the other hand, the existence of any particular god understood as a literal being rather than metaphorically is a matter of fact. Having claimed that metaphysical statements have no truth value, are not either true or false, I find myself in a contradiction. My solution is to put my fingers in my ears and go "la, la, la, la, la" until everyone goes away.

What is to count as proof here? In the end, you might just have to maintain that this is how we play the game...

I think the same can be said for at least some of the supposed principles of metaphysics - things such as the identity of indiscernibles, the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of causality and so on - just ways of playing the game. The rules are not unproven. — Banno

Yes.

There are metaphysical truths (ontology) - do quarks exist? However, we can't know if quarks really exist (epistemology). The particle zoo is a model that fits observation. — Agent Smith

I still don't see how I am comflating ontology with epistemology. He was criticizing metaphysics for being just a bunch of made up stuff with no purpose, no advances have been made, and hence it is not a part of philosophy.. I pointed out that this is simply not the case, but also that it's not quite presenting philosophy correctly. I chose science, though not only science, in part because science has used ontology, and includes ontological stances and that these have been contributed to processes that led to confirmation. That thinking about ontology, which is done in the sciences, has led to more knowledge. Yes, epistemology was involved. But remember his complaint was that we don't know anything more due to Metaphysics, of which ontology is a part. That's just not the case. It is also not the case that we have no way of finding out if a certain ontology is part of a good model. But we can. Not always, but sometimes. I think this is where he is confused about what philosophy is. Part of what philosophy is doing is coming up with concepts. Can we find ideas that help us conceive of reality of processes that form the basis for models. Yes, this certainly does lead ot things that we cannot immediately evaluate or apply or check. But it also leads to things we can evaluate and check. It is a productive process and does contribute to human knowledge - HIS criterion. His complaint is about it leading to no knowledge. Obviously I am going to pick examples where he is incorrect, which means epistemology is going to be part of a response. Hey, you're wrong, ontological ideas contributed to the creation of knowledge. Physicalism is an ontological stance and one taken by many scientists (and philosophers) and defended often as rational and necessary. Cosmologist talk about ontological issues all the time. And they do this because conception at the ontological level can lead to understanding of what is going on and also later to connecting phenomena that they did not connect. And, yes, even leading to proposals for experiments. Ontology can help knowledge production and has.

In your example of quarks, scientists find the quark idea, which does relate to be useful in their models. In your epistemology we can't know if quarks exist. Fine. I would probably agree with you on that issue. We might be pragmatists in relation to models or certain models. That hte model is useful but may or may not show us what is really out there. IOW our epistemologies and to some extent ontologies overlap. Other people may very well think that quarks exist (some scientists as well). But our stance in relation to quarks includes our positions on ontology and epistemology. What a model is. What is required for knowledge. Other people with different ontologies and epistemologies woud disagree.

And...

Wisdom requires knowledge, not belief, opinion, sentiment or personal view, else how does (read: "can") one 'know' who or what is wise? Unsupported and unsupportable metaphysical doctrines have gone nowhere despite tedious frequentation for more than three millennia. — Zettel

is not correct. The quark model is not merely a belief or sentiment or personal view. It is not unsupportable.
There's a reason that scientists are often physicalists and think this matters. They think it is true, period, those that hold that opinion. Scientists who think there are natural laws, think that is both important and true. That's ontology.

It's true that in some way someone might think that we never know anything about ontology. But that position includes their own ontology. They would need to use ontological propositions to support their position.

Three thousand years of metaphysics has yet to issue a single knowledge claim. — Zettel

That's simply not the case.

One can come up with a philosophical position that says that any ontological claim, the claim that anything exists (not just quarks but things we consider less exotic and can be experienced at least seemingly more directly) is false. That we can never know what exists. But if you read the argument why the person thinks this is the case, they will have to make ontological claims about the nature of reality. They'll need some model of perception and subjects and things. Yes, their hypothesis will include empistemolgy, but it will also, necessarily include ontology and the nature of things.

He can argue that model of reality is correct and important, but that will put him in precisely the camp he is arguing against.

...metaphysics consists of categorical inquiries into reality... — 180 Proof

The resulting categories, paradigms, criteria, methods, interpretations constitute reflective ways of 'being in the world' (or world-making)... — 180 Proof

Proceeding from the conclusion of the above quotes, it seems reasonable to understand the five terms listed as guidelines-by-example that suggest how one might make his/her way through the world with a grasp of actionable truth that has has been modeled conceptually. After reflection upon these models, the enlightened person embarks upon principled empirical journeys through the everyday world of society.

For these reasons I say that a first principle is a signpost. Moreover, in its action of pointing towards a truth claim, signpost must embody a truth-claim-as-directive pointing towards a truth claim.

I think the first-principle truth claim is an epiphenomenon of the empirical truth claim because the former has no causal influence upon the latter.

(Incidentally for those unaware the original poster has been banned.)

I find the relationship between metaphysics and religion frustrating. On the one hand, as you note, religion is intended to "account for the foundational basis of being itself," which is exactly what metaphysics does. On the other hand, the existence of any particular god understood as a literal being rather than metaphorically is a matter of fact. — T Clark

I think I'm starting to get some perspective here. I've been following a very good, scholarly writer who publishes on Medium Castalian Stream, specialising in stoic philosophers through the perspective of Pierre and Isletraut Hadot. Pierre Hadot is famous for his revival of the values of ancient philosophy, through his books such as Philosophy as a Way of Life, and What is Ancient Philosophy, among others. (More details below if required.)



The point is, ancient stoicism and other philosophies were indeed ways of life, on the basis that to make the 'philosophical ascent' required to attain insight into the 'first principles' required certain characteristics and attributes which the ordinary man (the hoi polloi) lacks. (This is very much the topic of many of the Castalian Stream entries.) It was presumed that those who had such insight were aspiring to be, or actually were, sages (although it was always felt that the true sage was exceptionally rare.) Even stodgy old Aristotle had that side to him.



The point is, us hoi polloi don't see these things, because we're not sufficiently trained. But don't worry! saith Martin Luther. All you need is faith! Who needs all this 'wisdom of the Greeks?' (which is likely to be luciferean, anyway). 'Faith in the Word' is sufficient!

I will grant that is something of a caricature, but I think it's near the point. Interestingly, the one mainstream Western cultural tradition in which Aristotelian metaphysics is still a living culture is the Catholic, and there are Catholic intellectuals who are adept in it (I'm thinking of Jacques Maritain, Edward Feser, Stephen M. Barr, and others of that ilk) because of Aquinas' synthesis of Aristotelian and Neoplatonist philosophy with theology.

In any case, the upshot of a lot of this is that large elements of the consensual metaphysical framework which used to underpin Western culture and society have been forgotten or abandoned, and not really replaced (although there are always nascent forms of a new metaphysic emerging.) But I think this is the deep cultural reason for the uneasiness (not to mention the outright hostility) directed towards metaphysics - too close to religion for comfort!

What is to count as proof here? In the end, you might just have to maintain that this is how we play the game... — Banno

Oh, yeah. The axiomatic, the limit of reasoned argument.

I don't follow any of this.

↪ucarr I don't follow any of this. — 180 Proof

Whaddya mean you don't follow? In making my explanation, I hewed to a close replication of your definition of metaphysics. I took in your definition and repeated it back to you in my own voice. This is meant to show I'm learning from what you communicated to me.

The reason I know a person uses a first-principle model (paradigm) to infer a truth claim about how the world works is because you taught the lesson to me.

Yes. I did add my two cents at the end. What's the mystery -- or incoherence -- about it? In order for a sign to point the way to wisdom, it must in itself be wise WRT to what it points toward. If you tell me you don't understand that small point, I can only say, once again, "Whaddya mean you don't follow?

Parsing precisely finely shaded distinctions of meanings between complex terms is your forté, not mine.

... to infer a truth claim about how the world works ... — ucarr

For me, that's physics, not metaphysics.

It's quite clear that @Zettel has absconded ... after setting the cat among the pigeons. :lol:

Such is the difference between knowledge and belief, between philosophy and metaphysics, between "what is" and "what is to you". Big difference. — Zettel

Though physics includes metaphysics (or better put some of what it includes metaphysical ideas/conclusoins and preconclusion model-postulating) The changes from Newton to Einstein's conceptions of space and time deal with changes into ontological (thus metaphysical) views in science.

IOW I also tend to separate the how from the what (how more central to physics, what more central to metaphysics) but then even this is an ontological position. That we have things and processes, say...that's a metaphysical position.

We know no more now about Anaximander's notion of "Apeiron" than we did at first utterance; — Zettel

For example, I think this is confused. He had an idea which he used this word for: This idea was embedded in arguments about reality (ontology), for example about opposites. This idea is still used and referred to by physicists and they use it and the arguments to consider models, make hypotheses. That is part of wisdom, being able to consider things in a greater variety of ways.

https://www.plu.edu/languages/wp-content/uploads/sites/26/2017/06/johnson_-final-paper.pdf
https://academic.oup.com/book/27932/chapter-abstract/206482572?redirectedFrom=fulltext
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/312595450_FROM_THE_INFINITY_APEIRON_OF_ANAXIMANDER_IN_ANCIENT_GREECE_TO_THE_THEORY_OF_INFINITE_UNIVERSES_IN_MODERN_COSMOLOGY

As an aside, I think we can eliminate as likely the ontologies in the presocratics saying that everything came from water or fire. So, it's not just tossing out stuff that can never be evaluated.

Further once Anaximander came up with this idea - which we know mainly through other philosophers, I believe, it entered the realm of ideas and arguements. There was direct influence, then indirect influence, so his idea not be mentioned specifically in its Greek name or he or it referred to, but the idea, given the way the Renaissance and other periods went back, amongst others, the Presocratics and then others read or listened to thos who did this, his influence - this option and set of postulates - became a part of the options and possibilities for use in knowledge generation, challenging assumptions, possible models and so on. Yes, I could find a few who actually named that concept, but others who don't are likely the recipients of the gift of the option via less direct routes.

I am not summing up philosophy as....

“philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts” .”
― Gilles Deleuze, What Is Philosophy?

but that a part of it. And it entials not simply, hey, let me make up something, but in the process using deduction, observation, etc. to come up with something that seems more likely to be the case or more useful (perhaps in the long long run) than other ideas.

In ... epistemology we can't know if quarks exist. Fine. I would probably agree with you on that issue — Bylaw

The problem is not with the mathematical physics of quarks but with the licentious use of exist and know which should not be allowed to seep into physics.

The problem is not with the mathematical physics of quarks but with the licentious use of exist and know which should not be allowed to seep into physics. — magritte

That's fine. I am not sure how physicists would manage to communicate without forms of 'to be' but I can see them managing to avoid 'exist.' In formal papers they need not use know, but I see no problem with them using knowledge or even know in other contexts. I don't think it would be heretical to say that we now know that time is relative, for example, in a lecture. Yes, science according to it's priniciples is open to revision, but we generally consider certain ideas to be part of knowledge and things we know, and so do scientists. This does not mean it has to be taken as 100%.

Further I am not sure how scientists are them supposed to communicate. Sure, they can avoid 'exist' but if we take a random title from Nature Journal...

Nature of excitations and defects in structural glasses

This is asserting that there exist both defects and excitations. In fact it is doing that even more strongly that if the article asserted that they exist. The author is not even postulating these things exist. That is assumed and need not be highlight at all. What is the nature of those (obviously existing) things. If you want to convince people that something exists, don't raise it directly as an assertion. Homelessness exists. Much better to just act as if this has been demonstrated. The main causes of homelessness are X, Y and Z. Then the existence of homelessness isn't even on the table. I am not even bothering to assert it. That's so obvious I am moving on to details related to that existing phenomenon.

Later the scientists in that random do use the verb 'exist'...

At intermediate density, collective defects exist only under a characteristic temperature ‘dome’, as predicted by mean-field theory

but that they are asserting conditions, causes, things exist is asserted throughout generally without qualitification. And every article will be doing that with or without the use of 'exist'. Know seems less necessary and awkward in scientific articles, but it is implicit in the same way above mentioned. It is assumed. Not as absolute, but as a part of our knowledge around, in this case related to structural glasses existing, and also defects and excitations in them. Those are considered knowledge now. That those phenomena/things are real.

As long as the culture knows that knowing is revisable I don't see a problem.

But actually this is a tangential issue to my posts.

... to infer a truth claim about how the world works — ucarr

For me, that's physics, not metaphysics. — 180 Proof

Can you write a flow chart showing the continuity extending from the five products of metaphysics (you listed: {categories, paradigms, criteria, methods, interpretations}) to the everyday world?

The problem is not with the mathematical physics of quarks but with the licentious use of exist and know which should not be allowed to seep into physics. — magritte

:up: :up:

"Flow chart"? No, this is philosophy, not project managenent. Instead of taking snippets out of context, man, read the post they come from in its entirety for my meaning. Anyway, as Spinoza might say: metaphysics consists in polishing conceptual lenses.