The logical positivists have trodden this path and metaphysics has survived that onslaught. If the op questions the place of metaphysics in the house of philosophy then an investigation into Object Oriented Ontology would provoke seizure! Even worse Triple O privileges aesthetics. Have enjoyed the discussion.

Consider this analogy: aces in poker. Suppose you were playing a hand, you had a pair of aces and your opponent had a pair of two's. You claim victory, but your opponent instead of conceding, demands that you prove that aces beat two's - after all, 2 is greater than one! You perhaps bring out the book of rules, and show the page were it says that aces beat everything; but your opponent just maintains that that's ridiculous, that since two is greater than one, a pair of twos beats a pair of aces... — Banno

Oh, yeah. The axiomatic, the limit of reasoned argument. — ucarr

No, not the axiom! Being axiomatic is considered being self-evident; but it is clearly not self-evident that aces beat two's! Nor is it something that cannot be questioned - it might have been otherwise, it is not a necessary truth!

It's just that if you would play poker, you have to accept that aces beat two's.

What you say is true. I must publicly acknowledge defeat.

I will, however, quibble as an exercise in futility in the following manner:

It's just that if you would play poker, you have to accept that aces beat two's. — Banno

This tells us the deuce-holding opponent in your example is playing Devil's Advocate for kicks, or doesn't know the game of Poker, which probably means the game couldn't've have gotten underway in the first place, which means your example, beyond the abstract, is dubious.

Alternatively, when the deuce-holder yells,"two is greater than one, a pair of twos beats a pair of aces," I yell "aces high!" Deuce-holder then yells, "numbers don't lie!" I then yell, "legal stipulations trump common sense!"

Furthermore, when a stipulation is common law by consensus and thus by a socially mandated definition, poker players, being savvy to "aces high!" by presupposition, must equate the stipulation with self-evident truth via the cognitive imperative of poker-as-defined.

I await your response to this word-salad.

P.S. I know it's pettifogging trench-fighting on my part. I think I could, in a courtroom, force a stalemate. What do you think?

...poker players, being savvy to "aces high!" by presupposition, must equate the stipulation with self-evident truth via the cognitive imperative of poker-as-defined. — ucarr

The point, as small one, is that there is a distinction between stipulating a rule and taking it as self-evident.

The point, as small one, is that there is a distinction between stipulating a rule and taking it as self-evident. — Banno

Yes. What you say is true.

My word game here -- not generally valid -- contextualizes stipulating a rule under the super-ordination of an arbitrary governing rule -- aces are the highest card -- that analytically equates by decree stipulation a = self-evident truth. A parallel is when a judge decrees that the jury disregard evidence they've already heard. Under this analytical artifice, hearing evidence = not hearing evidence. The equation is false, but the governing rule compels human subjects to act as if it were true.

The above sophistry, I expect, would be upheld in any court wherein the deuce-holder might try to claim a winning hand.



This tells us that {stipulated rule ≠ self-evident rule} is not a simple inequality, but rather a negotiable inequality under the hierarchy of super-ordination-by-consensus, an actionable edict therefore legal in court.

This tells us that 2 is greater than 1 along the cardinal_ordinal axis; along the existential axis, however, all points on the number line are equal. (It's the same argument in our US Constitution: all humans are existentially equal: the most physically_mentally incapacitated habituè of intensive care exists no less than the most thoroughly endowed polymath at the prestigious university.

Now we know that the claim {2>1} is conditional and, moreover, the condition of its superiority -- in the context of our example -- is precluded by one of the rules defining the game of poker.

No, not the axiom! Being axiomatic is considered being self-evident; but it is clearly not self-evident that aces beat two's! Nor is it something that cannot be questioned - it might have been otherwise, it is not a necessary truth! — Banno

By my argument above, I can claim existential equality of one point on the number line with respect to any other point on the number line. That {2>1}, or that {1>2} are equally logically debatable claims by force of existential equality.

By my argument above, I can claim existential equality of one point on the number line with respect to any other point on the number line ⇒ {1>2} and {2>1} are moot.

From here I can proceed to the claim that it is self-evidently true that existentially equal numbers have cardinal_ordinal inter-relations that are moot with respect to size.

The point is, ancient stoicism and other philosophies were indeed ways of life, on the basis that to make the 'philosophical ascent' required to attain insight into the 'first principles' required certain characteristics and attributes which the ordinary man (the hoi polloi) lacks. (This is very much the topic of many of the Castalian Stream entries.) It was presumed that those who had such insight were aspiring to be, or actually were, sages (although it was always felt that the true sage was exceptionally rare.) Even stodgy old Aristotle had that side to him. — Wayfarer

This makes a lot of sense to me and it's interesting. It made me think more about the place philosophy fills in my life. I don't have a spiritual practice. I certainly am not in any formal search for a spiritual path. As I see it, a path is something you push yourself on. It takes effort to keep going. For me, whatever it is I feel is more of a pull. Something is drawing me towards it. Even though the route is crooked, I never feel as if there is a chance I'll get lost. I'll think about this some more.

That being said, I don't think the conditions you describe are what is causing my frustration. That's simpler, very simple. As I wrote previously, the fact that aspects of religion are matters of fact gives me agita about where to fit it in my conceptual scheme. I do have a tendency to oversimplify things.

I think we’re all wresting with these things. It’s one of the main reasons that we’re members of a philosophy forum.

Well, as seems to be most prevalent, the definition of truth philosophy is most concerned about is one that appears in the correspondence theory of truth (a proposition must match with reality).

Metaphysics, on the other hand, subscribes to the coherence theory of truth which is about finding a model that fits the facts (as usually determined by observation). Mirabile dictu, metaphysics is one of two components in science viz. hypotheses generation, post-observation.

In conclusion, it depends on which theory of truth one is employing.

Are metaphysical doctrines such as aesthetics and ethics really "branches" of philosophy, or are they just thinly disguised poetry? The propositions issuing from metaphysics and philosophy seem logically and epistemologically distinct. — Zettel

Your objection to the conventional definition of "Metaphysics" touches on one reason why I prefer to define my own interpretation in posts of philosophical opinions, instead of scientific facts. The label itself was applied by Christian theologians centuries after Aristotle wrote his encyclopedia on "phusis" (Nature). In the first volume he described the contemporary understanding of the natural world, as observed via the senses. But in the second volume, he discussed various ideas & opinions that observers had postulated in order to make (rational) sense of the world as presented to the physical senses. So, volume 1 is what we would call "Science" today, yet volume 2 goes beyond (meta) the sensory observations of the external world, into internal ideas, opinions, concepts that observers have imagined in order to explain what they saw.

Therefore, I define "Meta-Physics" as being about the mental subjects instead of the physical objects. Hence, "metaphysics" is about Subjective Science instead of Objective Science. Unfortunately, while two people can agree on what both see with their eyes, they often disagree about the meaning & significance of those facts. Hence, Meta-Physics is the general subject/object of Philosophy. Even among scientists, there are few disputes about specific facts, but many divisive doctrines about general implications of those facts.

Unfortunately, whenever I use the term "Meta-Physics" --- referring to non-physical mental aspects of the world --- some TPF posters interpret that special spelling as a theological term, referring to imaginary gods & ghosts. And they don't seem to care what Aristotle intended, when he divided his treatise between physical observations and non-physical opinions. For me, Philosophy is all about Meta-physics, consisting of reasoned opinions instead of observed facts. Unlike pragmatic Science, theoretical Philosophy is endlessly debatable. :smile:


Subjective Meta-Physics vs Objective Science :
Generally speaking, subjective is used to describe something that exists in the mind of a person or that pertains to viewpoints of an individual person. . . . Subjective observation is centered on a person’s own mind and perspectives, as opposed to being general, universal, or scientific. In this way, describing an observation as subjective often implies that it comes with (or is based on) personal biases.
https://www.dictionary.com/e/subjective-vs-objective/

Zettel is not around any more, but if he was, I'd point him to Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Positivism.

The rules are not unproven. — Banno

Neither proven nor unproven.

The point, as small one, is that there is a distinction between stipulating a rule and taking it as self-evident. — Banno

I think the same can be said for at least some of the supposed principles of metaphysics - things such as the identity of indiscernibles, the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of causality and so on - just ways of playing the game. The rules are not unproven. — Banno

Self-evident does not strictly equate to proven. The three principles you mentioned above certainly seem self-evident, axiomatic, in ways that the rules of poker do not.

↪Gnomon
Zettel is not around any more, but if he was, I'd point him to Wittgenstein, Tolstoy and the Folly of Logical Positivism. — Wayfarer

Thanks. Since I have no training in formal Philosophy, and most of my relevant reading is written by scientists, I am quite ignorant of the "doctrines" of modern philosophers (since 17th century). That may be why some of my ad hoc 21st century arguments fall flat for those more accustomed to conventional formal expositions. I have learned from feedback on this forum that, for many posters, "Metaphysics" is an offensive four-letter word. :smile:

:up:

Contra the OP (yeah, I know s/he was booted), I've found metaphysics indispensible to my understanding of philosophy (thanks again, @Tobias), however, in a mode that breaks from tradition (e.g. ideality, onto-theology, transcendentals, etc) without eliminating speculative reasoning (e.g. Spinoza, Peirce, Rosset, Meillassoux, et al).

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/627625

I am quite ignorant of the "doctrines" of modern philosophers (since 17th century) — Gnomon

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/628146 :smirk:

I made the OP as a pretty straight-ahead positivist. Positivism generally expresses contempt for metaphysics as meaningless words. Originally it was a term coined by Auguste Comte who founded social sciences, but it was also the focus of the Vienna Circle school which was influential between the wars, and A. J. (Freddie) Ayer, whose book Language Truth and Logic was also very influential in 1940's 'Oxbridge'.

For a while. However after some time, people began to realise that the underlying argument of positivism was circular, because positivism itself was no more amenable to their verificationist criteria than their ostensible targets. As David Stove pointed out, if you read the concluding sentence of Hume's 'Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding':

"If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning, concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."

then ask yourself of the volume you have just finished, 'Does it contain....'

And the answer is in the negative. (Hume has been called the 'godfather of positivism'.) As Stove always then delighted in pointing out, positivism is like the uroboros, the mythical snake that consumes it's own tail. 'The hardest part', he would say with a wry grin 'is the last bite'.

I too learned a lot from Tobias posts on the previous forum.

:up: In other words, like e.g. nihilism & relativism, positivism is self-refuting.

Well, yes, but it's often difficult to make the case. It's also not true, as that article I lnked above, that Wittgenstein should be interepreted as a positivist, despite the fact that the Vienna Circle held him in awe. I also found this abstract although I'm not really interested in all the ins and outs.

I agree. Never thought of Witty as a 'positivist' from my first reading of the Tractatus ... which (along with learning how Einstein used the 'gedankenexperiment' (à la speculative reasoning)) broke that 'verificationist' spell, so to speak, back in my undergrad engineering days.

The Vienna Circle read him that way. erroneously, and to his chagrin.

The SEP article on Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics bears a read, putting an end to any such misunderstanding.

The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by — PI, II, sec. xiv

:up:

No, not the axiom! Being axiomatic is considered being self-evident; but it is clearly not self-evident that aces beat two's! — Banno

The point, as small one, is that there is a distinction between stipulating a rule and taking it as self-evident. — Banno

In philosophy axioms are supposed to be self-evident truths. But this is not the case in mathematics. In mathematics axioms are simply stipulated. This is what provides for the field of "pure mathematics", there are no such restrictions concerning the production of axioms. In philosophy we want to have basic rules which restrict the creation of rules (must derive from what is self-evident), but the mathematician wants to create rules in a way which is complete freedom from all rules. In general though, the mathematical axioms produced are reflections of practise already in process. This ensures that they will turn out to be useful. So practise usually precedes rules, and the rules are formulated to confine the practise to activity which has already proven successful.

Alternatively, when the deuce-holder yells,"two is greater than one, a pair of twos beats a pair of aces," I yell "aces high!" Deuce-holder then yells, "numbers don't lie!" I then yell, "legal stipulations trump common sense!" — ucarr

The poker analogy is completely out of place. Aces are not ones, just like jacks are not elevens, queens are not twelves, and kings are not thirteens. Poker is a pattern based game, not a math based game.

Aces are not ones... — Metaphysician Undercover

In most Western card games, the numeral 1 is designated ace and marked A accordingly. In games based on the superiority of one rank over another, such as most trick-taking games, the ace counts highest, outranking even the king. In games based on numerical value, the ace normally counts 1, as in cribbage, or 11, as an option in blackjack. In games based on arranging cards into ordered series, such as rummy, it may count either high or low or even both (as in a “round-the-corner” sequence such as Q-K-A-2-3). -- Britannica.Com

In Poker, the Ace is the highest card and the 2 card (Deuce) is the lowest. However, the Ace can also be used as a low card, with the value of 1. -- wsop.com

In Poker, the value of the ace is on a switch between highest card/lowest card. Which side of the switch is chosen by agreement prior to beginning of play.

An extension of the switch can be argued when numbers on the number line are viewed as being existential. Since this perspective on numbers destabilizes value as based on position, every number on the number line is on a highest card/lowest card switch by agreement, thus making the value of a given number arbitrary and axiomatic.

I can say axiomatic because through the lens of existential numbers, it's self-evident that an infinite line of positions unranked can be ranked axiomatically by agreement.

Something akin to this is demonstrated by the motion of a material object through surrounding space. Many -- perhaps infinite -- positions are open to the positioning-by-motion of the material object because those positions are unranked by any kind of physical difference that makes one position more-or-less attainable than another.

See, the ace is not a one, it's an ace. In some cases a person might be able to use the ace as a one. But having multiple possibilities is just part of what makes an ace an ace rather than a one.

Okay. The ace is a high card that can also be used as a low card with value of 1.

Presumably the value of an ace is not 1 but 0.9999...

not 1 but 0.9999... — Banno

Which interestingly are equal in mathematics - there are proofs for that equivalency.

"Equal" is an arbitrary designation.
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/777555

One should bear in mind that what we do when we discuss metaphysics is not what Aristotle had in mind when he was discussing his views. He was interested in what kind of things there were in the world, such as a house: what properties must something have in order for it to be considered a house.

We have long since lowered our standards of intelligibility in this field. We cannot say what a house is - in a mind independent manner. We can speak of what conditions do we take to be necessary to call something a house or a river or a statue, etc.

But that brings in forth important epistemological consequence, which turns metaphysics into a kind of hybrid field consisting of our knowledge and how the world is revealed to us.

So it becomes murky. Usually these discussions turn to matters of what kind of stuff the world is made of: physical, mental, neutral, etc. stuff. Most of these discussions are terminological and not substantive. With some minor - and interesting -exceptions.

Not unequivocal proofs:


There are genuine conceptual difficulties implicit in this question. The transition from the rational numbers to the real numbers is a difficult one, and it took a long time and a lot of thought to make it truly rigorous. It has been pointed out in other answers that the notation 0.999999…
is just a shorthand notation for the infinite geometric series ∑n=1∞9(110)n, which has sum 1. This is factually correct, but still sweeps some of the conceptual questions under the carpet. There are questions to be addressed about what we mean when we write down (or pretend to) an infinite decimal, or an infinite series. Either of those devices is just a shorthand notation which mathematicians agree will represent some numbers, given a set of ground rules. Let me try to present an argument to suggest that if the notation 0.99999… is to meaningfully represent any real number, then that number could be nothing other than the real number 1, if we can agree that some truths are "self-evident".

Surely we can agree that the real number it represents can't be strictly greater than 1
, if it does indeed represent a real number. Let's now convince ourselves that it can't be a real number strictly less than 1, if it makes any sense at all. Well, if it was a real number r<1, that real number would be greater than or equal to ∑n=1k9(110)n for any finite integer k. This last number is the decimal 0.99…9 which terminates after k occurrences of 9, and differs from 1 by 110k. Since 0<r<1, there is a value of k such that 110k<1−r, so 1−110k>r. Hence ∑n=1k9(110)n>r. But this can't be, because we agreed that r should be greater than or equal to each of those truncated sums.

Have I proved that the recurring decimal is equal to 1? Not really- what I have proved is that if we allow that recurring decimal to meaningfully represent any real number, that real number has to be 1, since it can't be strictly less than 1 and can't be strictly greater than 1. At this point, it becomes a matter of convention to agree that the real number 1 can be represented in that form, and that convention will be consistent with our usual operations with real numbers and ordering of the real numbers, and equating the expression with any other real number would not maintain that consistency.

From here

One should bear in mind that what we do when we discuss metaphysics is not what Aristotle had in mind when he was discussing his views. — Manuel

What Aristotle proposed as the fundamental question of metaphysics, is the question of why a thing is the thing which it is, rather than something else. He dismissed the question of why there is something rather than nothing as somewhat incoherent, unintelligible, and replaced it with the question of why there is what there is instead of something else, as the fundamental question of being. This puts causation into its proper context by recognizing that the idea of something coming from nothing is fundamentally flawed.

:up: