AGENT SMITH

You are right, of course. But there are complications when you include belief, knowledge and justification in the scenario.

Within this scenario “The man who will get the job will have 10 coins in his pocket” can be interpreted in three different ways, depending on context. This is quite normal for sentences that include a definite description.

1) In a general context, the application is “Whoever will get the job will have 10 coins in his pocket.”

2) In the context of Smith’s beliefs, the application is “Brown will get the job and will have 10 coins in his pocket.”

3) In the context of the objective outcome, the application is “Smith will get the job and will have 10 coins in his pocket.”

The first issue is whether these are three distinct propositions or one proposition with three applications.

If they are distinct, there is no paradox. But sadly, the criteria of identity of propositions are completely unclear. So that is not conclusive.

The second issue is whether he is justified in believing 2) or just believes he is justified in believing 2). Gettier posits that one can be justified in believing a proposition that is false and that that he is justified. Sadly, it does seem that he is right about the ordinary use of “justify” and a strict interpretation of “justify” seems to rule out cases that most people would want to accept.

The third issue is that whether a re-formulation of the J clause or an addition to it could exclude cases like this.

If we describe the situation as Smith believing the right thing for the wrong reasons, that could fall under the exclusion of guessing or luck, which is precisely what the J clause is meant to exclude. But there’s been a lot of discussion about whether luck plays a role in most knowledge and it is not difficult to construct examples. I’m not a fan of this route, because knowledge by luck seems to defeat the point.

On the other hand, it is not difficult to construct Gettier-like cases which do not seem to be problematic. Suppose I’m waiting by a bus stop. I have checked the timetable and traffic reports and have every reason to believe that a bus that will take me where I want to go is due. But there are all sorts of outcomes that don’t correspond to my expectations but would not necessarily undermine a claim to knowledge. For example, a bus turns up but not the bus that was scheduled to fill this slot, which has broken down. Or a bus turns up, but not the route that I was planning; nonetheless, it will take me where I want to go, so I catch it.

Smith doesn't know that he himself has 10 coins in his pocket and so when he "infers", from the interviewer's statement that Brown'll be hired, that the man with 10 coins in his pocket'll be a happy man, he's wrong.

1. Smith could have 10 coins in his pocket and hey may not be hired.
Ergo,
2. The man with 10 coins in his pocket doesn't necessarily get the job.

Smith is essentially ignoring a possibility that he shouldn't.

I was specifying a belief that I think Gettier’s practice shows that he holds. Yes, it does hark back to atomic propositions. — Ludwig V

Okay. Seems we're in agreement here as well. Gettier may well have presupposed such beliefs about propositions being clearly distinct. Michael seems to have as well. I'm more prone towards agreeing with Quine's idea of a web of beliefs. Davidson largely adopted it as well. Are you familiar?

I don't like "propositional attitude" much either. For me, it is a useful classification that groups together a number of different verbs that share a grammatical feature, that they are require a clause in what grammarians call “indirect speech”. Many, if not all, of these verbs are cognitive and hence of interest to philosophy. I wouldn’t have any objection to using “cognitive”, so long as other people would understand what I mean. — Ludwig V

So, we agree that belief as propositional attitude is problematic.

I know you mentioned speech acts earlier, and I did not see how it was an issue between our views. Would you consider yourself a speech act theorist along the lines of Austin and Searle? I see some definite similarities, based upon my very limited understanding. I own some of Austin's and Searle's literature, and have read Austin's "How To Do Things With Words", but my memory of it is not at all acute.

Is the clause you're referring to above a "belief that" clause, such that when we claim that someone believes a proposition, we're basically saying that they believe that, or believe that that proposition is true?

Could you elaborate on this mention of using "cognitive"? I'm curious what the benefits of the use would be, and if it were being used to replace or supplant some other common terminological use. I've no issue with your use of it. So, if it doesn't matter, we can leave it be.

I would like to express the point about "language-less" belief by saying that a proposition is (usually) an expression of a belief, but not necessarily the form of expression used by the believer. Actions, in which the belief is attributed as a reason for the action, are another way of expressing belief. Beliefs are reasons for action, if you like; and since that formulation includes speech-acts, it seems general enough to cover everything it needs to.

But that doesn’t really explain the concept. The core of it is a most the useful property. Without belief, there is no coherent way to say that someone acted for a reason but the reason is false. In other words, attributing beliefs enables the speaker to express an assessment of the truth or otherwise of the belief. — Ludwig V

It seems to me that belief has efficacy in that one's beliefs will cause one's actions, and by virtue of this fact we can attribute beliefs based upon actions. Witt made several convincing remarks over the years regarding this. I think we agree on that. The issue with that the approach is that it is underdetermined at best which sorts of beliefs caused which sorts of actions. Any number of actions could be caused by any number of beliefs. At least, that's my current understanding of it. There is always the chance of my being unaware of something or another of importance.

Trying to work out a way of expressing where I think we have got to, I have to start from my understanding of what the standard use of “proposition” amounts to. A proposition, on my account, is a sentence with its use in a context. This implies that each proposition comes entangled in a cloud of other propositions which are essential to understanding it. This includes, but is not limited to, its truth-conditions and its truth-maker (if I may use that term). An attribution of belief includes a proposition but locates it in a specialized context which requires special treatment. — Ludwig V

I've seen propositions defined in a few different ways. Attitudes towards propositions would follow the notion of "proposition" being used. I've seen others use it as you're using it here. If we take a proposition as a sentence with its use in a context, it may serve to eliminate the ambiguity of reference issue underwriting Gettier's Case I by allowing us to know that Smith was referring to himself and only himself despite the fact that the naked proposition is true regardless of who believes it.

This touches upon the issues I raised earlier regarding treating naked propositions as though they are equivalent to belief. Interestingly enough, it seems that treating a proposition as you suggest may very well be another way to dissolve the Gettier problem, at least in the first Case.

There's any number of tangents here, all of which are germane. Most folk approach Gettier's paper as though it is all about justification. You and I have been approaching it here much differently.

Smith is essentially ignoring a possibility that he shouldn't. — Agent Smith

That is certainly true.

Russell’s stopped clock is similar. It is an example devised by Bertrand Russell in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits as an example of true belief without knowledge; it is a man who looks at a clock which is not working, though he thinks it is, and who happens to look at it at the moment when it is right; this man acquires a true belief as to the time of day, but cannot be said to have knowledge.

A similar classic problem was produced by Jonathan Vogel. Al left his car parked on Avenue A half an hour ago. He knows where his car is. What Al has not thought about, however, is that every day a certain percentage of cars parked on public streets gets stolen. For example, Betty left her car parked on Avenue B half an hour ago. Her car, unfortunately, has been stolen and driven away. Clearly Betty believes, but doesn’t know, that her car is on Avenue B. Now, consider whether Al knows that his car is still parked on Avenue A. I don't have an acceptable solution to this one.

Both depend on assumptions that turn out to be wrong. But Gettier cases turn on “justified” beliefs that turn out to be wrong. So I tend to see Gettier cases as different from these. One can turn Russell's case into a Gettier problem by adding to it a justification for the assumption that the clock is working, such as having recently heard it strike and having checked it was striking correctly. But that still doesn't include the dodgy logic that "true" Gettier cases rely on.

One has to be careful here. If one insists on conclusive justification for all knowledge claims, including all assumptions, one sets off the Munchausen trilemma. (Forgive me if you know this one already. I include the explanation to save time if you don’t know it.) If it is asked how any given proposition is known to be true, proof may be provided. Yet that same question can be asked of the proof, and any subsequent proof. According to the trilemma, there are only three ways of completing a proof - a circular argument, an infinite regress, or a dogmatic argument (one that rests on accepted precepts which are merely asserted rather than defended.) Gettier’s acceptance that justification. (See Wikipedia “Munchausen’s trilemma)

I'm more prone towards agreeing with Quine's idea of a web of beliefs — creativesoul

I’m not unfamiliar with Quine and Davidson, but completely unfamiliar with this part of their output, though I've heard of Quine's "web of beliefs", which has a good deal to recommend it.

Would you consider yourself a speech act theorist along the lines of Austin and Searle? — creativesoul

I learnt about speech acts from Austin. I read some of Searle's and Grice's work, but decided there was nothing worth having down that particular rabbit hole. But I’ve made use of the idea in all sorts of contexts as a useful question to ask in philosophical practice, leaving others to wrestle with the intricacies of a theory. I look up Austin from time to time, but I haven’t read Searle or Grice for years.

Is the clause you're referring to above a "belief that" clause, such that when we claim that someone believes a proposition, we're basically saying that they believe that, or believe that that proposition is true? — creativesoul

Yes.

Could you elaborate on this mention of using "cognitive"? — creativesoul

There’s no great theory behind the suggestion. I was just trying to think of a more convenient way of referring to the class of words that are currently designated “propositional attitudes”. That’s all. I’m taking it to mean “to do with knowledge”.

At least, that's my current understanding of it. — creativesoul

It may just be pedantry, but I prefer to say that beliefs explain actions by identifying the reasons for actions. I wouldn't want to be labelled a causal theorist because I couldn't defend such a theory. I don't think there's much scope for some sort of general classification of which beliefs cause which actions, apart from the case by case identification of reasons for particular actions.

it may serve to eliminate the ambiguity of reference issue underwriting Gettier's Case I — creativesoul

Quite so. The problem is that no example since Gettier’s case I uses definite descriptions, probably because it was accepted that the reference issue is a serious flaw. I think the technique can be adapted to fit other cases, but not all – not even for Gettier’s case 2. But piecemeal refutation of examples is not proof against new examples, so a blanket solution would be preferable.

Most folk approach Gettier's paper as though it is all about justification. — creativesoul

Well, Gettier is taking advantage of the need to adopt “weak” justification in order to avoid the Munchausen trilemma. (See my reply to Agent Smith above if you are not familiar with it.) So it’s not wrong to work on it. But the only solution I can think of is very implausible.

Let's do a recap. A Gettier case is a justified, true belief that isn't knowledge. However, in every case we've analyzed, we've always found that there's an issue with justification i.e. the person in question isn't justified to believe whatever it is that he believes. In short Gettier problems are pseudoproblems in re the JTB theory.

If Smith’s belief is justified and true but not knowledge, then the JTB needs revision. If Smith’s belief isn’t justified, then the JTB has no problem. So what are the grounds for saying that Smith’s belief isn’t justified? The only possibility that I can come up with Is that his belief that Brown will get the job is false. In which case, the definition of justification needs revision or qualification. That means either a “no false lemmas” added to the JTB or something else.

An alternative would be to say that Gettier cases are all half-way houses, that don’t fit the mould. That doesn’t mean that the JTB is wrong; every rule is liable to encounter anomalous cases. Anomalous cases need adjudication.

Suppose Smith persuades Brown to accept a bet, that the man who gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket. Smith gets the job and coincidentally has ten coins in his pocket. Smith will argue that he got it right, on the ground that he has been appointed and has ten coins in his pocket but will accept that his prediction was not entirely accurate. Jones will argue that he did not, on the ground that he is right only by coincidence and that he lost.

Smith is right. A bet doesn’t pay attention to the reasons why stakeholders made their choice. So Smith’s grounds, whether they are right or wrong, don’t matter. But the JTB does and Smith has the wrong grounds.

Suppose Smith persuades Brown to accept a bet, that the man who gets the job will have ten coins in his pocket. Smith gets the job and coincidentally has ten coins in his pocket. Smith will argue that he got it right, on the ground that he has been appointed and has ten coins in his pocket but will accept that his prediction was not entirely accurate. Jones will argue that he did not, on the ground that he is right only by coincidence and that he lost. — Ludwig V

This being a coincidence is why I don't particularly like this example. A different example would be: I believe that my car isn't in my driveway, because I parked it in a garage. However, someone has stolen my car from the garage and is currently driving it on the motorway.

My belief that my car isn't in my driveway is both true and justified, but unlike your (and Gettier's) example, it isn't just coincidentally true.

The only way to properly discriminate between the three individuals is to report their belief as Q because P — creativesoul

It’s not unusual to say “we both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons.”

Max believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because he believes that Jane is a horrible person.

Jessica believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because she believes that marriage is a terrible practice.

They both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

It’s perfectly appropriate to distinguish beliefs from the reasons for having them. It’s absurd to respond to the above by saying that neither Max nor Jessica believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

no false lemmas — Ludwig V

Yep, that should've been obvious. A good justification can't contain a false premise.

My belief that my car isn't in my driveway is both true and justified, but unlike your (and Gettier's) example, it isn't just coincidentally true. — Michael

There might be all sorts of reasons for liking or disliking an example, but the most important criterion in our context is whether the example is clear and illustrates the point it is designed for. Perhaps you think that the question of coincidence is a distraction. I think that that getting the right answer for bad reasons is at the heart of the Gettier problem.

However, the problem that your case exemplifies is different, I think. Here’s the classic case (first proposed by Jonathan Vogel). Al left his car parked on Avenue A half an hour ago. He knows where his car is. What Al has not thought about, however, is that every day a certain percentage of cars parked on public streets gets stolen. For example, Betty left her car parked on Avenue B half an hour ago. Her car, unfortunately, has been stolen and driven away. Clearly Betty believes, but doesn’t know, that her car is on Avenue B. Now, consider whether Al knows that his car is still parked on Avenue A.

There is a name for this - the Harman-Vogel paradox. But I don't know whether it is in general use.

It’s perfectly appropriate to distinguish beliefs from the reasons for having them. It’s absurd to respond to the above by saying that neither Max nor Jessica believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane. — Michael

It depends how you define “proposition”, i.e. what you count as the same proposition and what you count as a different proposition. For me, a proposition is a sentence with its use in a context. Max and Jessica both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons and therefore in different contexts. The situation is perfectly clear. We choose to describe it in different ways; both are legitimate. But I am impressed by the colour exclusion problem; you appear not to be. So I think my description is more accurate than yours and avoids various difficulties (such as the Gettier problems).

Yep, that should've been obvious. A good justification can't contain a false premise. — Agent Smith

So we agree! :smile:

It follows that Smith’s belief that he is justified is not sufficient; we also have to accept that he is justified. In other words, the J clause, like the T clause, means that attributing knowledge to someone else requires endorsement of the claim. Knowledge is not just a psychological state, as belief is.

(At this point, I have to admit that I’ve got very confused about the name of Smith’s rival – whether is Jones or Brown or Robinson. So I checked. Gettier calls him Jones, so I’m going to stick to that, because I’m a pedant.)

However, suppose that, like Smith, we don’t know that he will get the job. His source – whether it is the president or the interviewer – is such that it is reasonable to believe the information and therefore reasonable to believe his claim to knowledge. Suppose that Jones does get the job. Wouldn’t we accept that Smith knew?

Awkward, I think.

Max and Jessica both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons and therefore in different contexts. — Ludwig V

Yes, that's been my point. They both believe that John shouldn't marry Jane, and if it's true that John shouldn't marry Jane then their belief that John shouldn't marry Jane is true – even if Jane isn't a horrible person and marriage isn't a terrible practice.

As another example, some Christians believe that homosexuality is wrong because they believe that there is a God who has commanded so.

Can an atheist respond to this by arguing that there is no God, and so therefore these Christians don't believe that homosexuality is wrong? Of course not. Even if the Christians' reason for believing that homosexuality is wrong is false, it is true that they believe that homosexuality is wrong.

I would beg to differ. Smith is categorically not justified to conclude that the man with 10 coins in his pocket will get the job, because a shaky premise is always shaky, even if Jones does get hired.

Yes, that's been my point. They both believe that John shouldn't marry Jane, and if it's true that John shouldn't marry Jane then their belief that John shouldn't marry Jane is true – even if Jane isn't a horrible person and marriage isn't a terrible practice. — Michael

There's something odd happening here. What you say is correct. Did I ever say anything to suggest that I thought something different?

a shaky premise is always shaky, even if Jones does get hired. — Agent Smith

I take it that a premiss is shaky if it is less than conclusively true and/or it is less than conclusive evidence for the conclusion?

That implies that most of what we think we know, we do not know.

Or perhaps you mean that the JTB is a paradigm of knowledge and cases that approximate to the paradigm can be accepted as knowledge. Something like the relationship between the abstract triangle defined by whatever geometry we are using at the time and the physical objects we accept as triangular. I could buy that.

That implies that most of what we think we know, we do not know. — Ludwig V

:chin: Intriguing. Leads to fallibilism.

We have to acknowledge that human beings are fallible and that we are human beings. But we are not always wrong, and it seems to me that the point of "know" is to signal when we have not failed and to pass on the information.

I can't get my head round fallibilism. If we claim or attribute knowledge and we are wrong, we need to withdraw the claim or attribution. The same is true of every assertion we make. What's the problem with that?

I hadn't thought that my speculation might lead to fallibilism. Perhaps if I said "cases that approximate to the paradigm can be accepted as knowledge provided they are true."?

Well, the question boils down to certainty, oui? The kinda logic that gurantees certainty is deduction, but then Agrippa's trilemma + good refutations. What hope is there for other logics? The obvious and most reasonable response is fallibilism, oui?

I'd go even further and say that not only is it redundant, it's misleading. It's as if we can not only see it's truth AND consider it's justification has merit. I could deal with JnFB: justified, not falsified belief (as far as we know), but if we're claiming it's true, then we are claiming it is not revisable. Whereas if we just say it is justified, it is not ruling out that some better justification for a different take may come along.

I agree with you that scepticism about the value of deduction is not unreasonable and that human beings are fallible.

Ever since Plato got hypnotised by mathematics, there's been a shared discourse in philosophy that takes as its model of certainty deductive reasoning. As you say, this definition of certainty does not, in practice, offer us much, if anything.

Yet, if human beings are fallible, it follows that they are not always wrong. For example, if we know that human beings are fallible, there is at least one thing that is certain.

I deal with fallibilism not by saying that knowledge is fallible, but by saying that if a knowledge claim turns out to be wrong, it should be withdrawn and classified as belief. Fallible knowledge is indistinguishable from belief and so pointless.

Unlike beliefs simpliciter, fallible knowledge has an accompanying justification.

Unlike beliefs simpliciter, fallible knowledge has an accompanying justification. — Agent Smith

I disagree. Having a justification does not automatically promote a belief to knowledge. In particular, if the justification fails, we call the result a belief, because knowledge is only knowledge if it is true.

How do you classify "I knew that horse would win because the stars were aligned."? If the horse loses, it is clearly a belief. Yes? If the horse wins, would you classify it as knowledge? I think not. But we do not think the justification is valid.

How about "I knew that horse would win because the jockey told me it would"? Again, if the horse loses, it is clearly a belief. If it wins, the justification is plausible because you would think that the jockey might know what s/he is talking about. Is it fallible knowledge? Is it belief?

But the underlying question is, Why does it matter what we decide?

Not having put out milk last full moon doesn't justify a belief that fairies exist and cursed his cabbages.

Whereas seeing something that looks like a cow in his field may justify his belief that there is a cow in his field. — Michael

Does the context in which the {observation ⇒ analysis ⇒ conclusion} unfolds play a critical role in the scope of the truth content of the JTB?

Can we reasonably support the scope of truth of a belief as valid by acknowledging the context of the OAC {observation ⇒ analysis ⇒ conclusion} is limited?

The above question is suggested to me by knowing all theories limit the scope of truth they posit conditionally against future additional OAC.

My generalization is that historical progress of knowledge tells us that for any given present day: knowledge has limited scope and is therefore conditional.

The horse example describes a fallible justified belief and it fulfills the JTB criteria although the justification is flawed and the proposition itself is false. Consider fallible knowledge as failed attempts at knowledge.

In my book, they certainly are failed and attempts at knowledge, so that’s fine.

It is also true that my tipster believes that his horse will win. So that's my preferred classification.

I’m not quite sure what the context is of your argument. But I do find that context is always important and it’s true that general epistemology, like what we’re doing here, doesn’t pay attention to the context of knowledge claims. However, I don’t think ordinary knowledge claims are in any way insured against surprises in the future.

The idea of scope is interesting. I’m not quite clear how it would apply to the everyday knowledge that epistemology usually discusses. One could suppose a general qualification along the lines of “so far as I/we know”. But I think knowledge expects all relevant considerations to have been taken into account and copes rather badly with unexpected developments.

Scientific theories are a somewhat different kettle of fish. It is true that they don’t always get thrown out when their limitations are revealed and can remain useful for specific purposes. But surely they can’t insure themselves against future developments? If they do, they are useless for making predictions and so pointless.

I can’t help feeling that there is a difference between Knowledge (“what is known”) – I would argue this is a variant of the concept - and people knowing things – I would argue that this is the basic use. I think of them as different contexts and what may be appropriate for one context may not be for the other. The kind of conditionality you are talking about may well be appropriate for Knowledge, but I don’t see any reason to think it is implicit in the ordinary one. But perhaps I’m just stuck in my ways.

In my book, they certainly are failed and attempts at knowledge, so that’s fine.

It is also true that my tipster believes that his horse will win. So that's my preferred classification. — Ludwig V

I've lost track of the discussion mon ami. Suffice it to say that Gettier "problems" are pseudoproblems and the timehonored practice of checking one's assumptions when doing philosophy will speak for me.

If you can I would like to see a mathematical Gettier case.

Scientific theories are a somewhat different kettle of fish. It is true that they don’t always get thrown out when their limitations are revealed and can remain useful for specific purposes. — Ludwig V

Newtonian physics in the wake of Relativity.

I can’t help feeling that there is a difference between Knowledge (“what is known”) – I would argue this is a variant of the concept - and people knowing things – I would argue that this is the basic use. — Ludwig V

I acknowledge the truth of your above distinction. I think one useful measurement of the difference between the two categories is duration. Knowledge-the-variant and knowledge-the-basic differ in how long a certain type of knowing has been accepted and established. Knowledge-the-variant I will generalize as being of longer duration than Knowledge-the-basic.

• For example: knowledge stones roll downhill is presumably older than knowledge France and Belgium have a border.

Another useful measurement of their difference is scope of application.

• Presumably more people in more places know stones roll downhill than people who know France and Belgium have a border.

The idea of scope is interesting. I’m not quite clear how it would apply to the everyday knowledge that epistemology usually discusses. — Ludwig V

The hostess at your favorite restaurant seats you at a booth. As you peruse the menu, you hear a woman talking in the adjacent booth. Within seconds you recognize her voice as belonging to Hermione. Hermione! She's the peachy girl you'll be asking to the prom at school tomorrow. Next moment, you hear the voice of Beatrice, your older sister. The two women are good friends in spite of the age difference. That's how you've enjoyed good looks at Hermione at home and, moreover, know she's quite mature for her age. "I've got a strong feeling he'll ask me to prom tomorrow." "I toldja. Whenever you come over to visit, he can't stay out of the living room. " "Maybe it's 'cause he's gotta use the unabridged dictionary. He's always hitting the books." "Ha! Ha! Ha! The dictionary is a cover. And, it's a good vantage point for catching glances at you in all of those smart outfits you never fail to wear on visits to our house. Ah! You're blushing." As you sink down in your seat, not wanting to be caught eavesdropping on the bestest girl in the world, you start thinking. "So, dad's refurbished Mustang and last year's tux were gonna be just fine for the prom, huh? Oh, I wish I knew yesterday what I know today! Now that I'm assured of getting Hermione for the prom, gotta get a top-of-the-line tux and I'm also renting a black Dodge Challenger SRT Hellcat!"