I agree that our discussion is getting rather confused. Perhaps we've gone as far as we need to.

I agree with you that

Gettier "problems" are pseudoproblems — Agent Smith

.

Getter problems are all narratives in which different contexts - points of view - collide. I doubt if that could happen in a mathematical problem.

Your distinction between Knowledge and knowledge reminds me also that what can be known depends on the conceptual framework within which it is known. How this affects the definition of knowledge needs thinking about. Epistemology as discussed in the literature doesn't seem to want to take it on.

I'm always inclined to notice the link between Knowledge and knowledge and notice that there is usually an answer to the question "Who knows this piece of Knowledge". Presumably, the idea is that Knowledge is what is available to everyone, but it usually means what is available to me and my circle. Your distinction seems to recognize that.

Your example is interesting. What I take from it is that knowledge is time-based and that there is a difference between what is the case and what someone knows. The interaction between the two is crucial to the Gettier problems, though it hasn't been discussed in what I've read.

I have a memory worse than a goldfish's. Thanks to :zip:

Anway, my point is Gettier cases are interesting, but every single Gettier case I've encountered is flawed in the justification department so doesn't, in me universe, qualify as a JTB that's not knowledge. Gettier (pseudo)problems.

Your Knowledge/knowledge couplet is metaphorically illuminating. They're like tectonic plates rubbing against each other in a perennial state of (creative?) tension.

This tension, I'm tentatively imagining, has much to do with adaptation of sentient being to environment.

knowledge is time-based... there is a difference between what is the case and what someone knows. — Ludwig V

Oh, my gosh! This is why adaptation requires constant updating. This is why the info overload of the cyber world is killing people via stress.

The interaction between the two {Knowledge/knowledge} is crucial to the Gettier problems, though it hasn't been discussed in what I've read. — Ludwig V

I'm guessing with the time factor added into the mix, the math-based logic of Gettier Problem gets a lot more complicated.

It may be that human sentience is nearing a boundary line with permanent info-overload making skepticism a necessary defense. Consider the racial and gender phantasia now essential to political correctness and the pushback of staunch nativism.

There's no doubt that coping with all the information available demands some sort of strategy or mechanism. Skepticism is not the only possibility. How about trivialization - reacting to information and then forgetting it quickly - which prevents ever really thinking about it? Or treating info as entertainment - infotainment as they call it? Or knowing all about what's going on the other side of the world, and ignoring what's going on your doorstep?

But perhaps I'm just getting old.

Back to philosophy. The question of adaptation to the changing environment reminds me that philosophy seems to worry about the definition of knowledge (and, by implication, Knowledge) without ever asking what the point might be. My suggestion would be that identifying and passing on information is a crucial part of forming and being in a society and a great advantage to all the individuals. In fact, it's so basic and so useful that animals and birds do it too - even posting sentries (meerkats) and ignoring cheats who sound the alarm so the others leave the food for the cheat (birds). That's what the concept of knowledge fosters.

:smile: :up:

Skepticism is not the only possibility. How about trivialization - reacting to information and then forgetting it quickly - which prevents ever really thinking about it? Or treating info as entertainment - infotainment as they call it? Or knowing all about what's going on the other side of the world, and ignoring what's going on your doorstep? — Ludwig V

Today's world indeed. And moreover, the fact of trivialization is not trivial.

:lol:

I know you believe Gettier found a major flaw in the JTB theory of knowledge and I would like to discuss it further with you on a case-by-case basis. The Smith and Jones case is closed - Smith wasn't justified because he didn't take into account the fluid nature of the employment mechanism he was part of. Any other Gettier case you wanna discuss?

Oops! We seem to have a crossed wire. I don't think that Gettier found a major flaw in theory of knowledge, but I did get interested in how Gettier created the illusion that he had. It did worry me that our discussion was turning me into a defender of Gettier. But my aim was only to make sure that the flaws were correctly identified.

I concluded that weaknesses in the propositional calculus and the vagueness in the J clause, coupled with a reluctance to acknowledge the possibility of borderline or ambiguous cases were the main issues. I don't think they can be remedied within the requirements of Gettier's idea of philosophy. But then I discovered a major difficulty.

Refuting the cases one-by-one seemed futile, because new cases kept coming along, designed to get round the problems revealed in the old ones. (So, for example, after Gettier's original article, there are no new cases that use definite descriptions (case 1) and no new cases that use "or" (case 2). By implication, his supporters accepted they are flawed.

But the appearance of new cases suggested that there must be a general solution. However, the proposed cases morphed. In the process a problem was thrown up that I couldn't and can't fully resolve. These can be classified (I found this in a blog by Jennifer Nagel) as the "Harman-Vogel" paradox. They turn on false assumptions or unconsidered assumptions or the lottery paradox. Russell has no problem with it - if a claim to knowledge relies on a false assumption - it is unjustified and so merely a belief. But we make so many assumptions so it would seem that knowledge is a rare and precious commodity. My suggestion of considering the JTB as a paradigm rather than a definition was one attempt. My insistence that if a claim to knowledge turns out to be false, for any reason, it isn't knowledge and the claim is false is another.

At that point, I was distracted by other (philosophical) problems. However, it turned out that not everyone agreed with me about Gettier, so I got involved in this discussion. I have learnt some things through it. But I'm beginning to get itchy feet - a desire to think about other things for a while.

If we follow up that problem, it could well be considered off-topic and some forums are quite strict about that, so I'm cautious about doing so. In addition, I don't know whether I'm qualified to start a new discussion and not sure there would be interest in it.

Perhaps that was too much information, but you do seem to be asking where we go from here, and that's where the Gettier problem is leading me.

[reply="ucarr;779591"

Oh, I think that all of those ways of coping are flawed.

I'm often reminded of the painting "Landscape with fall of Icarus". It seems brutal, but somehow necesary.

That's what happens to amateur philosophers (like me) - we're not up-to-date with current/latest developments in philosophy.

Hah! I may be somewhat up to date about Gettier. About nearly everything else, I'm hopelessly out of date and scrambling to catch up. Although many things have not changed much.

:up: Proceed ... as planned? :cool:

OK. But it will take me a while to get things together.

OK. But it will take me a while to get things together — Ludwig V

:up:

I'm often reminded of the painting "Landscape with fall of Icarus". It seems brutal, but somehow necesary. — Ludwig V

Yes. Although Alien has terrified me, I generally favor bold exploration into new territory, hazards notwithstanding.

The Gettier problem is a very technical critique of a very specific declaration of what knowledge is. If you state, "Knowledge is a justified true belief," you must answer Gettier's problem.

Justified - Adequate evidence

In the case of the farmer why would he think there was a cloth that was cow shaped? He has cows in his field all the time.

True belief - The end stated belief must be true

In this case the technical true belief is, "There is a cow in my field".

So the farmer is justified and has a true belief. So the farmer then knows there is a cow in his field.

According to the strict interpretation of justified true belief, something is wrong here. Here we have a situation in which the farmer has a justified true belief, so thus should know there is a cow in his field, and yet he doesn't really know there is a cow in his field.

The Gettier problem points out the JTB is missing something. Must someone believe in something that is true to have knowledge? Do we need greater specification of what justification entails? Despite the farmer not knowing the full picture, can we still say, "That is what the farmer knows?" However you want to tackle it, Gettier in his criticism of a base JTB theory of knowledge is unquestionably correct.

Although Alien has terrified me, I generally favor bold exploration into new territory, hazards notwithstanding. — ucarr

I've no problem with exploration. But I'm also cautious enough to find about as much as I can about what I'm getting into, and a clear idea of what I'm going to get out of it.

I saw "Alien" and one of the sequels. Not they're talking about "Alien %". It's turned into a franchise. I'm not a fan of horror movies. I just don't enjoy being scared.

However you want to tackle it, Gettier in his criticism of a base JTB theory of knowledge is unquestionably correct. — Philosophim

So what is your solution?

I have thought about this. I would like to start a new discussion for it. If we start what I have in mind on this thread, things will get confusing for me and probably anyone else who joins it.

Is that OK with you?

So what is your solution? — Ludwig V

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge I have written a knowledge paper divided into four parts. It answers the Gettier question, explains what knowledge is, and provides a hierarchy of induction that we can use when the limitations of knowledge are reached.

Thanks. I'll check it out.

I have thought about this. I would like to start a new discussion for it. If we start what I have in mind on this thread, things will get confusing for me and probably anyone else who joins it.

Is that OK with you? — Ludwig V

No problemo! Raise anchor!

I've posted a starting-point with the title "Vogel's paradox of knowledge"

Will drop by.

I just don't enjoy being scared. — Ludwig V

Yeah. Likewise for me. However, when friends pressure me into going, I must admit I get entertained (thrilled) and educated. I think the director needs to possess a masterful sense of how far to go. Pushing it way out there is scary_thrilling, then going another step or two affords a transcendent experience that's educational; any further and it transitions from entertainment to suffering, a no-no.

One of the Hannibals, wherein Hopkins has a stir-fry meal at the expense of Liotta, that was transitioning from entertainment to suffering. Hitchcock never made this mistake.

I'm a bit puzzled. On the one hand, you've expressed the desire to have an all-encompassing solution. On the other hand, you've expressed several times that you're not interested in theory. In addition, you've expressed agreement that what I've proposed dissolves the Gettier problem in both cases. It also dissolves all the cottage cases discussed here as well, then you mentioned qualifications...

Which of the 'qualification cases' are you not satisfied with my answer to?

What stops you from agreeing with the accounting malpractice charges I've levied against the historical and current conventional practices of belief attribution(including believe that approaches), belief as propositional attitude, and treating naked propositions as if they are equivalent to belief?

Not only are these practices inherently responsible for the inability to make sense of language less belief, they are also responsible for the inability to defend Gettier's cases as well as understanding the lessons of Russell(the clock) and Moore's paradox. In other words, understanding the accounting malpractice results in dissolving all three issues.

It’s not unusual to say “we both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane, but for different reasons.”

Max believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because he believes that Jane is a horrible person.

Jessica believes that John shouldn’t marry Jane because she believes that marriage is a terrible practice.

They both believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane.

It’s perfectly appropriate to distinguish beliefs from the reasons for having them. It’s absurd to respond to the above by saying that neither Max nor Jessica believe that John shouldn’t marry Jane. — Michael

What I'm saying is that Max's and Jessica's beliefs are equivalent to neither the proposition "John should not marry Jane", nor their attitude towards that particular proposition.

What I'm saying is that they have different beliefs about whether or not John should marry Jane, clearly as you yourself have stipulated. You seem to want to call part of their belief about whether or not John should marry Jane "reasons", as though part of their belief about whether or not John should marry Jane are somehow different than their belief about whether or not John should marry Jane.

In addition, you seem to place far more importance and justificatory weight than I do upon common speech patterns/practices. It does not follow from the fact that it is common to say that they both believe that John should not marry Jane, but for different reasons, that their belief is equivalent to the proposition "John should not marry Jane", or that the distinction you're drawing between their belief and their reasons somehow reflects that there is a difference between reasons and beliefs such that reasons are not beliefs.

What is clear is that they hold completely different beliefs about whether or not John should marry Jane, and yet the notion of belief you're using along with the belief attribution methods you've been practicing, inevitably leads you to say otherwise.

Their beliefs about whether or not John should marry Jane are far more complex than your accounting practices are capable of admitting. The same fatal flaw underwrites the earlier example you gave of belief about your birthplace.

Perhaps this has already been discussed but it seems to that JTB is a case of the dog chasing its tail. That P is true is taken as a given, that it is known that P is true. But what does it mean to know that P is true? To say that it known because it means the criteria of JTB is tautological.

No, it hasn't been discussed - so far as I remember.

It's a good point. That's why "I know that p" is a pleonasm, i.e. adds nothing except rhetorical emphasis - or possibly a claim to being in a particularly good position to know.

The definition only really has meaning with "You know that p" or "S/He knows that p", where the speaker is different from the knower. Then, the J clause works to ensure that the knower has access to the basis for the knowledge. It really is pretty vague. Philosophers always concentrate on first hand knowledge, for understandable reasons. But the vagueness of the J clause allows the justifications other than the first hand evidence - for example S may know because he has it on good authority without knowing the first hand evidence. That enables me to report what I have learnt from someone else.