What a dictator of Russia says and does isn't an opinion. — ssu
more than 800 Russian soldiers, many of them witless consripts dragooned into the killing machine, being killed every day. — Wayfarer
The prospect of peace lies wholly and solely with the Kremlin. They have instigated this entire catastrophe. — Wayfarer
I’m not arguing the case. — Wayfarer
My view is the same as the governments of Australia, US, Britain — Wayfarer
Which is hilarious.I've not denied anything Russia has been shown to say or do. I've denied your interpretation of what those actions indicate about intent. — Isaac
The intent is crystal clear. You simply cannot deny it. — ssu
I think that "opinion" is quite well shown from the actions and the reasons given to those actions by the leaders of Russia. Putin's article Article by Vladimir Putin ”On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians“ shows perfectly what he thought of the Ukrainian state. Among the multitude of other obvious examples. — ssu
Lol.I am interested in your reasons for preferring one interpretation over another — Isaac
Extensively, again and again.Yep, and evidence/arguments have been posted throughout the thread already. — jorndoe
I think the annexations, all the ceremonies, the fake referendums and the actions of Russians in the occupied territories are quite real, reported by a multitude of observers and thus seems that you really can say "you cannot deny it".So? Is that your threshold for considering a theory to be such that "you cannot deny it"? — Isaac
Comes to mind one inexpert laymen here that started arguing that the agreed definition of imperialism (in the dictionaries like Merriam-Webster) is wrong. :snicker:That inexpert laymen have posted what they consider to be evidence on an internet forum. — Isaac
Exactly. Just selling arms to a participant in a war doesn't make the seller of these arms to have a proxy war against the other side in the conflict.Arguably, Iran is technically in a proxy war against Ukraine, yet saying so is kind of misleading (incidentally, analogous to some comments hereabouts). — jorndoe
The intent to take territories from Ukraine and to dominate Ukraine is obvious there to see. — ssu
The Budapest Memorandum, the hearings entitled “Debate about NATO enlargement”. Mersheimer’s article "The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent” (1993). Russia starting a territorial dispute over Crimea practically immediately after recognising Ukrainian independence. — neomac
A-ha. So NATO enlargement was all about Ukraine, then? Interesting theory. — Tzeentch
The geopolitical gamble the US took with the globalisation: the implicit bargain the US offered to the Rest of the world was roughly something like the European countries proposed to the US, namely “let’s form a global market for everybody’s prosperity in exchange for global security assurance”. After ~30 years of trying to make this work the US concluded that some ambitious regional powers (e.g. China, Russia, Iran) instead of improving standard of life and regime of rights for their people with the resources available thanks to the globalisation (peaceful and convergent with western progressive views), they were growing more authoritarian, more sympathetic toward anti-western propaganda (if they weren't already, and exporting it also into western countries), more assertive (in economic-military terms) outside their borders and naturally converging into a front hostile to the West. And that's the opposite of security assurance. So Ukraine turned out to be willingly or unwillingly the plausible key test for the US to revise their security strategy both in Europe and on a global scale and address the threats coming from powerful authoritarian anti-Western regimes before it was too late. — neomac
Realism is the lens through which I understand the why and how. A moral framework is what I use to judge how I feel about that. — Tzeentch
What do you mean by "Russia is not a moral actor"? Is the US a moral actor? — neomac
Individuals are moral actors.. — Tzeentch
During this period the Russians were committed to playing nice with the West. Since there wasn't any indication that NATO or the EU were making serious attempts at incorporating Ukraine or that such a thing was even feasible, why would they have answered any different? It seems to me they went to great lengths not to give the impression of being aggressive, even when it touched on vital security concerns. Even when it finally did become a real worry to them, they gave warnings for 15 years. — Tzeentch
Crimea is about more than just access to the Mediterranean. It's about control over the Black Sea, the Kerch Strait, the Sea of Azov (highly important in connecting the Russian heartland to trade), Odessa, etc. — Tzeentch
Prior to 2008, there was a clear commitment from Russia to maintain good relations with the West, and the West was mostly receptive to that.
It is when the U.S. realized Russia was not going to subjugate itself to the U.S. that it started to pursue its policies in Ukraine.
I see no evidence for real security competition between the West and Russia prior to 2008. If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West. — Tzeentch
My perspective presupposes peaceful coexistence is (or "should be") the goal of nations. Sadly, many nations and certainly the U.S. are not driven by that goal. They are driven by hegemonic ambitions like the ones you consider risky to appease.. — Tzeentch
Security concerns were taken seriously, that’s the reason why Ukraine felt safer under NATO. What is implicitly suggested by that claim is that Ukraine should have surrendered to Russian demands... — neomac
That's presupposing that Ukraine sought to join NATO for security reasons. It also sought to join the EU, and join the "western world" at large - the U.S. sphere of influence. There were plenty of other benefits that could have guided their decisions.
What was stubbornly ignored were 15 years worth of the Russians voicing their security concerns. A recipe for disaster, anyone could have told you 15 years ago, and that is what we got.
What I'm explicitly suggesting that whoever drove Ukraine to try and join NATO was either A) extremely foolish, or B) not acting in pursuit of Ukrainian interests. (I'm still entertaining the hypothesis that this whole ordeal is largely U.S.-orchestrated).. — Tzeentch
Not sure what you are referring to. Is any of such trivia on wikipedia? Do you have links? — neomac
I'm referring to the 2008 NATO Bucharest Summit, during which it was decided that: "... [Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO."
NATO officially reaffirmed its commitment to this promise on several occasions between 2008 and 2014. — Tzeentch
If you believe puppetization or Russification was Russia's goal you must provide some evidence. I can go along with the idea that Russia, like any nation state, acts in its self-interest. I do not go along with the idea that Russia can only do so by acting in hostile ways, and therefore must always have sinister intentions even if we can't see them.. — Tzeentch
Brzezinski was a National Security Advisor and participated to the official “the debate on NATO enlargement” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg46832/pdf/CHRG-105shrg46832.pdf). Mearsheimer has always been just an academic. — neomac
I think it's crazy that you would dismiss academics in such a way, but whoever you base your views on is your business. If practical knowledge is required in order not to be considered by you a "armchair academic" then why are you referring to someone whose practical experience is nearly half a century old? Anyway. Have you ever considered the difference between the words of an "armchair academic" and a politician? — Tzeentch
If you are so quick to suspect intellectual dishonesty when someone disagrees with you, defer to phoney psychoanalysis and believe everybody here to only be "avg dudes", it begs the question what you are doing here. — Tzeentch
To clarify once more my views, my general argument is not that Americans supported NATO enlargement due to a current military threat posed by Russia to Europe or the US. But that the US did so driven by the need to shape a global order ensuring the American hegemony in a post-Cold War era in the longer term (e.g. by controlling international legal and economic institutions like EU and global market) wrt the evolving security challenges posed by main hegemonic competitors (e.g. China in Asia and Russia in Europe), and pretty aware of all the implied risks (including e.g. overstretch, militarisation, provocation). On the other side, in the post-Cold War era the European interest of preserving/enlarging NATO was to let NATO deal with regional and global security concerns (for historical reasons France and the UK were more worried about Germany, while central-eastern europeans were likely worried about Russia), and to focus on economic development and integration, while being pretty aware of the implied risks (demilitarisation, conflict of interests especially between East and West Europe wrt Russia, provocation, etc.). I tried to roughly summarise the American carrot&stick strategy (economic globalisation vs NATO expansion or US interventionism) elsewhere in these terms: — neomac
If you ground your expectations on your realist geopolitical views and at the same time you hold moral beliefs fundamentally incompatible with those expectations, then there is a cognitive dissonance. — neomac
[...] you keep talking about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” and “U.S. hubris” which seem to me bearing a moral connotation (even though neither Russia nor the US are moral actors). — neomac
Take the example of the Orange Revolution. — neomac
On one side, “peaceful coexistence” should be “the goal of nations” (at any price?), on the other, many nations pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of peaceful coexistence. How can any non-hegemonic geopolitical actor ensure that all other hegemonic or non-hegemonic geopolitical actors will give up on pursuing hegemonic ambitions? — neomac
You yourself keep overlooking the fact that for 15 years Russian security concerns led France and Germany to oppose Ukraine inside NATO. Plus, with pro-Russian governments, like Yanukovych’s, the Ukrainian cooperation with NATO wasn’t an issue for Putin, also because it didn’t exclude a strategic partnership with Russia at all. I understand that Putin got more worried when Yanukovych was ousted , however the popular opinion in Ukraine still wasn’t favourable to joining NATO until Putin aggressed Ukraine in 2014 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukraine%E2%80%93NATO_relations#Popular_opinion_in_Ukraine). As if it wasn’t enough, his “special military operation” is eroding also the support Putin got from the Western Europeans. — neomac
Allied leaders also agreed at Bucharest that Georgia and Ukraine, which were already engaged in Intensified Dialogues with NATO, will one day become members. In December 2008, Allied foreign ministers decided to enhance opportunities for assisting the two countries in efforts to meet membership requirements by making use of the framework of the existing NATO-Ukraine Commission and NATO-Georgia Commission – without prejudice to further decisions which may be taken about their applications to join the MAP. (Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm)
MAP is the Membership Action Plan, a programme which helps nations prepare for possible future membership. Participation does not guarantee membership, but is a key preparation mechanism.
As a commitment it’s still pretty vague about timing and in any case conditional on a series of requirements which Ukraine must fulfil prior to submit candidature. Not to mention that to realists like Mearsheimer such international commitments do not deserve much credit. — neomac
Yanukhovic was widely considered a Russian puppet by Ukrainians. Putin practically and publicly ran his political campaign, and supported him against fierce Ukrainian opposition. Besides Yanukhovic’s policies concerning national security although pursuing formal neutrality were arguably pro-Russian — neomac
So whatever doubt about Russification/puppetization one might have had prior 2014... — neomac
you keep talking about “the United States jealously guarding its position at the top” and “U.S. hubris” which seem to me bearing a moral connotation (even though neither Russia nor the US are moral actors). — neomac
I'd say it's a fairly accurate description of how the United States acts. I could have used more objective terms. — Tzeentch
There's no question that the West and Russia sought to influence Ukraine prior to 2008, but I explicitly used the term "security competition”. — Tzeentch
On one side, “peaceful coexistence” should be “the goal of nations” (at any price?), on the other, many nations pursue hegemonic ambitions at the expense of peaceful coexistence. How can any non-hegemonic geopolitical actor ensure that all other hegemonic or non-hegemonic geopolitical actors will give up on pursuing hegemonic ambitions? — neomac
They can't, which is why I consider myself a realist. But that doesn't change the fact that any reasonable human being desires peace. Geopolitical actors simply aren't very reasonable when it comes to that. They are only reasonable when it comes to maximizing their power. — Tzeentch
I have no illusions that geopolitical actors will ever pursue policies that are compatible with my moral views. You can stop spinning your cognitive dissonance yarn now. Didn't I recall you saying something about intellectual dishonesty? — Tzeentch
As I have said earlier in this thread, I don't believe what the French or the Germans wanted, or even to a large extent what the Ukrainians themselves wanted, was very relevant to Russia's perception of the threat of Ukraine joining NATO. And I would agree with that Russian assessment. If the United States wanted Ukraine into NATO, it was going to pursue that policy whether the French, Germans or Ukrainians wanted it or not, and it likely succeed also. — Tzeentch
The official statement was that "[Ukraine and Georgia] will become members of NATO." There's nothing ambiguous about that. Don't come at me with 2022 interpretations of what that sentence meant. Moreover, NATO explicitly reaffirmed their commitment to the Bucharest declarations on several occasions. And the U.S. took away all doubt, if any remained, when it supported the 2014 coup d'etat. — Tzeentch
Yanukhovic was widely considered a Russian puppet by Ukrainians. Putin practically and publicly ran his political campaign, and supported him against fierce Ukrainian opposition. Besides Yanukhovic’s policies concerning national security although pursuing formal neutrality were arguably pro-Russian — neomac
All very regrettable, of course. Sometimes Ukrainian leaders were in the pocket of the West, sometimes in the pocket of the East. It was a delicate balance that they had to protect.
Hard to see this as evidence of "puppetization”. — Tzeentch
After 2014 war was essentially inevitable, because from the Russian point of view, Crimea being cut off from Russia without a land bridge was unsustainable for the same reason Ukraine in NATO was unsustainable.
We must see everything after 2014 as the opening moves of war, and not as representative of policies prior, which is what you and many others here are trying to do. — Tzeentch
Meanwhile, the dreadful attrition rate of men fed into the meat grinder continues [...] — Wayfarer
Many Western politicians seem to be prioritizing signalling their political virtue in fighting what is seen as tyranny and promoting Western liberal democracy over realistic assessments of the costs and benefits of their actions.
... if we continue to ignore the idea that other state actors might have legitimate concerns — that are backed up by significant military power — we risk careering toward a global conflict that can only end badly.
... No matter how hard some might wish, Russia’s war in Ukraine is unlikely to lead to any sort of crushing Russian defeat on the battlefield, and sooner or later negotiations will have to take place. If future negotiations are to be meaningful, both sides will have to give ground and make some attempt to see something of the other side’s point of view. — https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/02/14/we-dont-have-to-engage-in-hysterical-crusades-against-russia-and-china/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=we-dont-have-to-engage-in-hysterical-crusades-against-russia-and-china
Not only do these global military contractors arm Ukraine, but they stand to benefit from the re-militarization of Western Europe, Japan, and the new NATO members.
... President Volodymyr Zelensky delivered an emotional wartime appeal to a joint meeting of US Congress pleading for more military assistance from the lawmakers, who were about to approve $45 billion in additional aid. It was necessary for "eventual victory."
Yet, there was a huge disconnect between the triumphant declaration and the realities. Earlier in the month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had acknowledged Ukraine’s losses in the war amounted to 100,000 soldiers and 20,000 civilians, though her tweet was quickly deleted and a new one was released without the true death count.
... even as international media was touting the mirage of Ukraine’s military triumph, the country’s real GDP declined over 35 percent on an annual basis in the third quarter of 2022; that is, before Russia’s massive infrastructure attack.
Starting on October 10, Russia’s waves of missile and drone attacks opened a new phase of the war. The direct physical damage to infrastructure soared to $127 billion already in September; that’s over 60 percent of Ukraine’s pre-war GDP. The impact on the productive capacity of key sectors, due to damage or occupation, is substantial and long-lasting.
The population share with income below the national poverty line in Ukraine may more than triple reaching nearly 60 percent in 2022. Poverty will increase from 5.5 percent in 2021 to 25 percent in 2022, with major downside risks if the war and energy security situations worsen. As casualties continue to mount, over a third of the population has been displaced and over half of all Ukrainian children have been forced to leave their homes. The nine months of war have caused massive population displacement. As of October 2022, the number of Ukrainian refugees recorded in Europe was over 7.8 million, and the number of internally displaced people was 6.5 million.
Ukraine is "absolutely a weapons lab in every sense because none of this equipment has ever actually been used in a war between two industrially developed nations," said one source familiar with Western intelligence to CNN. "This is real-world battle testing." — https://original.antiwar.com/dan_steinbock/2023/02/14/us-big-defense-the-only-winner-of-the-ukraine-proxy-war/
As historian Geoffrey Roberts has argued, President "Putin went to war to prevent Ukraine from becoming an ever-stronger and threatening NATO bridgehead on Russia’s borders.” The war was not the Ukrainians’ first choice either. When Zelensky, whom Ukrainians elected as a "peace candidate," flirted with the idea of reconciliation with Russia in 2019, Ukraine’s notorious far-right supported by the West, torpedoed it.
Even in April 2022, after a month of hostilities, Russia and Ukraine tentatively agreed to end the war. But that decision was undermined by former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. His Ukraine visit was designed to stop the talks, which were not acceptable to the US and some of its allies. Today, in Pentagon, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin sees the escalation as "a window of opportunity here, between now and the spring."
Only a year ago, Ukraine, under Zelensky’s leadership, was still positioned to embrace neutrality, opt out from military alignments and serve as a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe, due to its position in China’s Bridge and Belt Initiative. Had that future prevailed, Ukraine might today be peaceful. Its GDP would be a third bigger. Young men would alive and well and have good jobs. Ukrainian refugees would be returning for new opportunities at home. Children wouldn’t suffer from traumatic nightmares.
Today, all those dreams are in ashes. The proxy war is aimed against Russia. The Ukrainians’ role is to die in it. The puppet masters are the primary beneficiaries. — https://worldfinancialreview.com/the-unwarranted-ukraine-proxy-war-a-year-later/
without an overall political and strategic concept, arms deliveries are pure militarism...
We have a militarily operational stalemate, which we cannot solve militarily. Incidentally, this is also the opinion of the American Chief of Staff Mark Milley. He said that Ukraine's military victory is not to be expected and that negotiations are the only possible way. Anything else is a senseless waste of human life. — Erich Vad. From 2006 to 2013 Chancellor Angela Merkel's military policy advisor
Few outlets reported the recent revelations by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett about the ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Turkey that he helped to mediate in March 2022. Bennett said explicitly that the West "blocked" or "stopped" (depending on the translation) the negotiations.
Bennett confirmed what has been reported by other sources since April 21, 2022, when Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, one of the other mediators, told CNN Turk after a NATO foreign ministers’ meeting, "There are countries within NATO who want the war to continue… They want Russia to become weaker."
Advisers to Prime Minister Zelensky provided the details of Boris Johnson’s April 9 visit to Kyiv that were published in Ukrayinska Pravda on May 5th. They said Johnson delivered two messages. The first was that Putin and Russia "should be pressured, not negotiated with." The second was that, even if Ukraine completed an agreement with Russia, the "collective West," who Johnson claimed to represent, would take no part in it.
The Western corporate media has generally only weighed in on these early negotiations to cast doubt on this story or smear any who repeat it as Putin apologists, despite multiple-source confirmation by Ukrainian officials, Turkish diplomats and now the former Israeli prime minister. — https://original.antiwar.com/mbenjamin/2023/02/13/how-spin-and-lies-fuel-a-bloody-war-of-attrition-in-ukraine/
How would you rephrase those expressions in more objective terms? — neomac
All right, then what were you referring to when you wrote “If there was any, it was one-sidedly coming from the West” in your previous post? — neomac
There is a misunderstanding. — neomac
Second, maybe the US was going to pursue that policy as it did for 30 years, but it’s not evident that it would have succeeded since Germans and French could still have opposed Ukraine joining NATO — neomac
Yet even in the current conditions Western Europeans are still reluctant to discuss about NATO membership for Ukraine. — neomac
I wouldn’t exclude the possibility that Putin was in condition to keep supporting the separatist fight in Donbas and the annexation of Crimea with the revenue from Nord Stream 2 to destabilise Ukraine ... — neomac
I’m not sure to understand why you keep talking about “coup d'etat” supported by the US. — neomac
(why wasn’t the Kerch Bridge enough?) — neomac
If Putin’s was preparing for this war after 2014 for whatever reason [...], something has been holding his “special military operation” until 2022, — neomac
so I find your claim of “inevitability” debatable — neomac
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