Mathematics isn't just grammar, is it? :chin: — Agent Smith

Math is formal grammar (i.e. logical syntax).

The math models seem to correspond one-to-one with the physical world.

Have you forgotten, Smith, that the only "model" (map) that "corresponds one-to-one with the physical world" (territory) is "the physical world" (territory) because map =/= territory?

Do you mean to imply math-based scientific descriptions (maps) are (necessarily) incomplete? Shouldn't we then do something nonscientific? You know, to get the whole picture?

Intriguingly, mathematical maps are more suited for inanimate stuff (like rocket and their payloads) than the living; not that I won't follow the laws of gravity when and if I jump off the 5th floor of my apartment complex, but we seem to be autonomous and that translates into a rebellious nature insofar as the laws that govern our world is concerned.

Do you mean to imply math-based scientific descriptions (maps) are (necessarily) incomplete? — Agent Smith

Of course.

(e.g. Compare Aristotle-Ptolemy's models to Copernicus-Galileo's models and Newton's model to Einstein's model.)

Shouldn't we then do something nonscientific? You know, to get the whole picture?

I suppose we should first question – speculate on – whether or not there is a "whole picture". For instance, the mathematical concept of infinity (re: continuum hypothesis?) implies there cannot be a "whole". There's also the ancient concept of the apeiron – endlessness – that radically calls "the whole" into question too. All it seems we can know it everything we can know is encompassed by an unsurpassable – transfinite? – horizon. Is that "nonscientific" enough for ya, amigo? :smirk:

It's dark, oui? It's an intriguing paradox that the further we advance into the future, the further back into the past we can see. Hubble $\to$ James Webb $\to$ ?

Tell that Chat bot poetry composer that "how" and "know" do not rhyme. Neither do "stars" and "ours" for that matter. Where does that thing get its sense of rhythm? Send it back to school. and tell it to work with sound waves rather than letters, if it wants to write poetry.

Incidentally, that is the reason why the physical universe doesn't reduce to mathematics properly, the difference between numbers and waves. Mathematics cannot accurately represent waves because human geometry uses ideal representations of space which are unreal (evidenced by irrational ratios), and the result is the Fourier uncertainty principle. In reality the physical universe would only be accurately reducible via temporal concepts like frequency and rhythm. But this reduction doesn't get very far because division of the octave has always been fraught with problems.

Succinctly, we have not yet solved the problems exposed by the Pythagoreans. Nor have we solved Zeno's problems. Modern mathematicians have created elaborate structures which merely hide 'unsound' foundations. We see immense elegant mathematical structures and simply assume that they must have sound foundations, or else they couldn't be sustained. But sustenance of these just requires endless maintenance.

So I'll argue that scientific reduction is the only rational approach. It works. With regard to consciousness, we only need to explore bridge principles. We don't need to start from a revolutionary paradigm. We only head in that direction as a least resort, and we're not presently at that juncture.

Anyone want to take the opposing view?

The second meaning of reductionism is the assertion that all sciences should reduce to physics (just as Apollo did). The argument for this hinges mainly on the success of physics up to this point. At least methodologically, scientists should continue to stick to what's been working for thousands of years. We should approach all topics available for scientific inquiry as if the goal is further reduction to physics.

Thoughts? — frank

I'd argue against this form of reductionism.

Scientists haven't stuck to any methodological consideration for thousands of years. What works is dependent upon a community of scientists. And sometimes reductionism is a method which works to resolve problems, and sometimes it doesn't. It's this view of science being that Feyerabend targets when he says "anything goes" -- if science is an immutable, transcendental method of knowledge generation, and the method to understanding said method is to be gleaned by understanding what scientists actually do, and we look to the historical evidence of science the only theory one can propose that unites all historical scientific activity is to say "anything goes" -- whatever the scientists do in a current era, that's what the science is. Else, you'll find counter-examples of a proposed transcendental methodology.

Even removing the historical scope wouldn't work to make way for the claim that scientists reduce to physics: chemistry nor biology concern themselves with reducing to physics, and yet both will utilize physics for their own purposes and both utilize mathematical expressions in their own domains. (of course, this would depend upon which chemist and biologist -- organic synthesis in chemistry, for instance, is more concerned with synthesizing novel molecules, which follow their own set of rules which ahve been documented from experiments, and the only area of biology I can think of where physics would commonly interact would be bio-chemistry, such as the description of proton pumps which utilize quantum tunneling).

Roughly, the diversity of sciences outside of physics (where their methods are certainly more than reducing to physics) argues against the claim that scientists should reduce things to physics. Rather, science, as a whole, is a multiplicity of methods and approaches and foci. It's a social practice rather than a methodology.

That's such a good answer, it's challenging me to come up with a response that wouldn't be a soft pitch. :grimace: Thanks!

Scientists haven't stuck to any methodological consideration for thousands of years. What works is dependent upon a community of scientists. And sometimes reductionism is a method which works to resolve problems, and sometimes it doesn't. It's this view of science being that Feyerabend targets when he says "anything goes" -- if science is an immutable, transcendental method of knowledge generation, and the method to understanding said method is to be gleaned by understanding what scientists actually do, and we look to the historical evidence of science the only theory one can propose that unites all historical scientific activity is to say "anything goes" -- whatever the scientists do in a current era, that's what the science is. Else, you'll find counter-examples of a proposed transcendental methodology. — Moliere

I'd emphasize that I said that reductionism is the most rational approach. For instance, it was advised by Augustine in cases of examining miracles. He said we should first look for explanations that are mundane (worldly). It's the less dramatic approach, so it puts mysticism on the shelf. Should we find in the future that we need to resort to ghosts and demons, we have those options available, but as we peek behind the curtain, let's first expect to find gears and levers.

So I would respond to you by saying that reductionism is already what rational scientists are doing. The normativity I'm presenting isn't meant to dictate to scientists some foreign methods. It is what they're already doing.

Even removing the historical scope wouldn't work to make way for the claim that scientists reduce to physics: chemistry nor biology concern themselves with reducing to physics, and yet both will utilize physics for their own purposes and both utilize mathematical expressions in their own domains — Moliere

I would just comment that most biologists are in the business of making medications, so they actually don't need much more than physics. This is to touch on the fact that science doesn't take place in a vacuum. Sages have always been called upon to use their wisdom to help grow crops, cure the sick, etc. Except in the 19th Century when scientists were usually wealthy gentlemen, scientists depend on society for funding and support. Science is grounded in the mundane from the start.

How'd I do?

Heh, well I'd say pretty good, considering you're on the losing side of the debate :D -- but that's clearly just what I think, too, so hey, it's always good to stretch no matter the side we find ourselves on. I'm still interested. "Anything goes" isn't exactly satisfying either, in the end, even if it guards against a certain kind of transcendentalism that is worse than not having a theory.

I believe "reductionism" can definitely be made richer than your opening does. If you could make the case that individual sciences utilize reductionism, and that said utilization is the most rational way of doing science, then that'd undercut my second point since I was arguing against the notion that science reduces specifically to physics, which I think is just an easily disproven belief. All you need do is point out the theory of evolution, which is clearly a novel scientific theory which didn't reduce life to physics. But if reductionism isn't just the restatement of scientific theories in the terms of physics, my second argument, at least, would then be irrelevant. (EDIT: And, to be clear, my first paragraph points out how my answer, while rationally defensible, is at least unsatisfying, so there's still room for conversation)

We should approach all topics available for scientific inquiry as if the goal is further reduction to physics. — frank

Despite the success of reductionist science it can lead to blindness. The zoologist Adolf Portmann gives careful attention to the appearance of animals. A biology that does not observe living things is necessarily deficient. Could a reductionist approach ever lead to Portmann's consideration of the difference between the the appearance of the inside and outside of animals?

Some distinct theories that we still hold that don't reduce to one another though they do receive support from one another, which is one reason why we look for this more general structure of science:

Mechanics (all kinds)
Molecular theory and its relationship to the atom. (in particular I think the notion of molecular structure, rather than just the structure of things smaller than atoms, is something which chemists use that isn't exactly physics)
Evolutionary theory of speciation
Anthropogenically caused global warming (chemistry gives this a lot of support, in my view, but it was climate scientists doing climate science)
The germ theory of disease (and medical science, generally, I think walks its own way while simultaneously using other sciences in its own practices)
The theory of Plate tectonics

At least, these are the sorts of theories that I think of as distinct, and non-reductive with respect to one another.

But that's just the big-picture theory of science where we really believe it constructs some kind of unified picture. As soon as we let go of that, reductionism really is everywhere in scientific practice. It's just not so straightforward as a reduction to physics.

I think, too, so hey, it's always good to stretch no matter the side we find ourselves on — Moliere

:up:

Anything goes" isn't exactly satisfying either, in the end, even if it guards against a certain kind of transcendentalism that is worse than not having a theory. — Moliere

Could you explain what's meant by "transcendentalism"?

. All you need do is point out the theory of evolution, which is clearly a novel scientific theory which didn't reduce life to physics — Moliere

So let me ask: do you think biology can't be reduced (in the Nagelian sense) to physics? Or are you just saying it hasn't been as of yet?

Could you explain what's meant by "transcendentalism"? — frank

There's a habit of thought where we come to see things with respect to that thought a lot. So with Popper you have this account which supposedly solves the problem of induction as well as the problem of demarcation, and lays out a rationality that scientists should follow in their theorizing.

It's all very interesting, only it doesn't look much like what scientists actually do.

Yet, we can double down and say, where scientists are not following a purported rationality, that is where they are being irrational and unscientific.

That's the move I think I'd guard against. I think it better to let history trump our ratio-centric re-statements of what we believe might be going on, in accord with a certain rationality we choose (because how else would you judge it rationally than be first choosing your rationality?)

For some reason or other, this way of doing things seems to produce sentences which are applicable to more than one -- and in fact many -- circumstances. But that "for some reason", so I believe, is not a conceptual boundary. So I think to answer your question here:

So let me ask: do you think biology can't be reduced (in the Nagelian sense) to physics? Or are you just saying it hasn't been as of yet? — frank

I was thinking how given that Darwin's proposal, in his own time, did not reduce to physics, yet it was science, and we continue to believe it and count it as science (though the story gets more complicated along the way), then that shows how science does not always reduce to physics.

Maybe in some sense in the future it could, but just having a moment is enough to show how scientific practice, in particular, does not reduce to physics.

But, more straightforward for what I believe: I don't really believe it could be reduced, though I'm not firm on that notion. But that's where I stand.

That's the move I think I'd guard against. I think it better to let history trump our ratio-centric re-statements of what we believe might be going on, in accord with a certain rationality we choose (because how else would you judge it rationally than be first choosing your rationality?) — Moliere

I'd agree that the argument from rationality has this weakness: that rationality pretty much just comes down to fashion. In the 18th Century it was rational to believe that exsanguination (draining blood) cures pneumonia. Medical experts said it did, and that's all it takes to get the rationality badge. In order for science to flourish and grow we'll have to allow scientists to develop tomorrow's fashion statements.

So yes, I agree with you.

I was thinking how given that Darwin's proposal, in his own time, did not reduce to physics, yet it was science, and we continue to believe it and count it as science (though the story gets more complicated along the way), then that shows how science does not always reduce to physics. — Moliere

But as a theory, I think evolution is amenable to reduction to physics. Darwin just didn't live long enough to read Schrodinger's book on it. I don't think he would have objected. If your point is that Darwin didn't start with Newtonian laws and work his way up to evolution, I don't think that's what reductionists are suggesting scientists should do. Are they?

But, more straightforward for what I believe: I don't really believe it could be reduced, though I'm not firm on that notion. But that's where I stand. — Moliere

Any reasons why?

If your point is that Darwin didn't start with Newtonian laws and work his way up to evolution, I don't think that's what reductionists are suggesting scientists should do. Are they? — frank

Oh no, I don't think they'd make that simple of a mistake. So not the latter. I haven't read Schrodinger's book, so I cannot comment on that work, only to say that even if we perform this reduction, the practice of science, rather than the concepts of science, are what make it what it is This distinction between concept and practice is mostly what I was trying to get at -- the reduction occurs between concepts, but science is defined by what scientists do rather than the conceptual content of their theories. At least with respect to how I generally come to understand science in my method (where history trumps conception, though there is an interplay there too)

What's your assessment of the book?

But as a theory, I think evolution is amenable to reduction to physics. Darwin just didn't live long enough to read Schrodinger's book on it. I don't think he would have objected.
...
Any reasons why? — frank

More in the realm of "difficulties" than full on reasons -- but then noticed your opening point fit closer to your question here.

The thing I'd bring up is that "species" doesn't have a physics analogue. And, at present, though we are still building a mechanical theory of life, there's no reason to believe that said mechanical theory of life will reduce to physics, since biochemistry still utilizes chemical terms (like identifying molecules by structure, mass, temperature, etc.). And descriptions of life frequently utilize teleological notions, which is something else you'd have to figure out how to reduce or explain away (something like "what they really mean is..." rules) Even with our metabolic pathway mapped out molecularly, you won't find a behavior in that map that puts the food into the mouth to get the metabolic pathway going. Animal behavior, psychology, frequently utilizes notions which at least are not clearly reducible to physics... you see a pattern. :D

I guess it would be looking at, what constitutes a bridge law? What counts as a reduction to physics?

One of the things I keep thinking of is how if I were to deny the reduction, in a way that, too, would be a transcendental condition on the history of science, which I want to deny(EDIT: i want to deny transcendental conditions of history). So I also don't want to come hard against it the reduction, but more highlight where there are problems and difficulties.

At the end, I think what convinces me that it's not possible is just the sheer diversity of the sciences today. There's so much, and so much of it has been successful without bothering with physics, that I begin to wonder what's the point of bridge laws anyways?

The inability of science to deal with the qualitative character of human experience is a feature not a bug. — Janus

:up:

Tell that Chat bot poetry composer that "how" and "know" do not rhyme. Neither do "stars" and "ours" for that matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah but I still thought it was pretty good.

The thing I'd bring up is that "species" doesn't have a physics analogue. — Moliere

One of Darwin's major contributions was to replace the idea of 'kinds' with variations. Is the difference between biology and physics a difference in kind or variation? Put differently could an intelligence that far exceeds our own that has knowledge of physics but no knowledge of biology eventually develop that knowledge?

However we might answer that question it should be kept in mind that for us any reduction of biology to physics is made possible because of our knowledge of biology. I don't think we could arrive at knowledge and understanding of the wholes of biological beings with only the "parts" from physics.

[Corrections made]

That's a great question. Are physics and biology a distinction between species which branched from one another, or are they of a distinction between kinds? (also, very true what you said of Darwin -- I wouldn't have been able to put Darwin's contribution so succinctly as you did)


I want to say they are a distinction of kinds, but I think I get there from the more general question about science as a whole, i.e. my reading of the interplay between mostly Popper and Feyerabend, plus just thinking about all the things science consists in when taken as a historical entity rather than a conceptual one.

So I want to say that biology, even with time and in an intelligence highly developed, cannot reduce to physics. However, I want to say it in this qualified sense where I just want to bring difficulties forward, rather than say, categorically, this cannot take place.

That is, I think that's my side. That's my suspicion. But, hey, I'm talking here for a reason. :D

Stumbling my way through I'll try this and see where it leads. Ontologically I am a reductionist. Life is not a fundamental, that is to say, life emerges from things that are not alive. Epistemologically, however, life is fundamental. We cannot understand life without beginning with things that are alive. We must work at it from both ends. The problem with reductionism is that it reduces things to something other than they are.

I appreciate you even trying, because I too am stumbling.

Ontologically I'm an absurdist, or at least that's how I like to put it now. I'm obviously still thinking through things. But this is just to say where I'm at, rather than go down another rabbit hole.

In the vein of Kant's denial that metaphysics is knowledge -- I'm uncertain where I'm at ontologically. It seems as if one could posit anything, and it would be accepted more based upon where we're at, how it'd help us, and all that. But ontology is supposed to be more general than desire, usually.

So while the words of philosophers which speak ontologically make sense I'm not comfortable with committing to any ontological reductionism I've come across so far.

Epistemologically, I think, is how I'm approaching the problem, through the lens of the history of science as scientists being the ones who make science.

. We cannot understand life without beginning with things that are alive. We must work at it from both ends. The problem with reductionism is that it reduces things to something other than they are. — Fooloso4

I agree with this! And I believe that is @frank's point, too, only noting that we might be able to make a reduction after all.

I suppose, given the diversity of all the sciences, I still feel skeptical about a reduction to physics.

I suppose, given the diversity of all the sciences, I still feel skeptical about a reduction to physics. — Moliere

Most broadly speaking, reduction is not about ontology. You could be an idealist reductionist (like Berkeley).

Nagel's approach is about the reduction of one theory to another. This leaves both theories intact. When we say biology should reduce to physics, we don't mean biology should disappear and be replaced by physics. That's eliminativism.

Pross claims that the rejection of reductionism is a mistake. That's why I'm wrasseling. I think he's wrong, but I'm reevaluating my position. — T Clark

There's no need to "reject" Reductionism as the method for scientific analysis (dissection) of Nature into its elements. There's still some de-construction work to do. But as your quote implied, you can't construct a real material universe from squishy superposed (not yet real) Quantum non-particles. Nevertheless, according to some physicists, the world now appears to be organized from fundamental "bits" of information (Wheeler's "it from bit").

Since the 20th century, belief in tiny (invisible) Particles of stuff (atoms), as the elementary element of Physics, has been gradually & grudgingly superseded by nonlocal continuum Fields of information patterns, consisting of an imaginary grid of mathematical points with no extension in space. At least that is true for theoretical (mathematical) physicists. Meanwhile, some empirical scientists, and Materialist philosophers continue to view the world in terms of ancient Greek atoms and 17th century Newtonian matter .

In the 21st century, the Santa Fe Institute, of which Anderson was a founding member, focuses on "Complex Systems" in which inter-relationships (Information) are more important than the nodes of the grid. YouTube physicist Sabine Hossenfelder seems to think that reductionist physics has lost its way. Maybe a "bit" of Holistic Physics can put it back on track. In any case, philosophers don't construct their models from particles of matter. :smile:

Physicists Debate Whether the World Is Made of Particles or Fields :
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-debate-whether-world-made-of-particles-fields-or-something-else/

Santa Fe Institute :
But the way in which complex phenomena are hidden, beyond masking by space and time, is through nonlinearity, randomness, collective dynamics, hierarchy, and emergence — a deck of attributes that have proved ill-suited to our intuitive and augmented abilities to grasp and to comprehend.
https://www.santafe.edu/what-is-complex-systems-science

What is it from bit theory? :
It from Bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — at a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that what we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions
https://www.themarginalian.org/2016/09/02/it-from-bit-wheeler/

What's Going Wrong in Particle Physics? :
Sabine Hossenfelder (This is why I lost faith in science.)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lu4mH3Hmw2o&t=254s

What's your assessment of the book? — Moliere

I haven't read anything by Shrodinger :razz: Even trying to understand the debate about chemistry reducing to physics goes straight over my head pretty quickly. I'd need a philosopher/scientist to give me the synopsis, and I don't know who that would be (yet).

Most broadly speaking, reduction is not about ontology. — frank

:up:

Particles of stuff (atoms), as the elementary element of Physics, has been gradually & grudgingly superseded by nonlocal continuum Fields of information patterns, consisting of an imaginary grid of mathematical points with no extension in space. — Gnomon

This is not true.

I think I'm tracking. I didn't think you were positing eliminativism.

More bringing up difficulties that come to mind. I'll admit to not reading the Nagel yet -- I gotta do Marx. I just had thoughts to get out there to share.



Cool.

I mean, it's Schrodinger, so I'm guessing it's pretty esoteric :D -- dude had beliefs about the reality of waves in opposition to the particle interpretation of quantum mechanics. (spoiler: turns out they are mathematically reducible to one another). All the quantum pioneers had very different beliefs, it seems to me. It has thus far been judged as uninteresting for scientific purposes.

But to concur with part of where you started, with respect to science really beginning in the mundane (I just hadn't thought of anything to respond to it until now): the reason quantum interpretation is judged as "pure theory" (so only pursued by the brave few who stake their career on it) is because we live within the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie!

is because we live within the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie! — Moliere

Very true. You read Marx. I'm reading The Sensible Guide to Forex by Cliff Wachtel. If you can't beat 'em, join 'em. :grin:

:lol:

Look, in the people's scientific resistance to the romans...