Look, in the people's scientific resistance to the romans... — Moliere

:razz:

Yeah but I still thought it was pretty good. — Wayfarer

That's the way poetry rolls. There's no need to follow any particular rules. And if certain styles become conventional, often it's stretching the bounds of the convention which makes the poetry good. Or, like in your example it's good for other reasons, and going outside the conventions really doesn't matter, because that 's the way poetry rolls.

The term ontology does not have an single agreed upon usage or definition . I mean that the most basic "stuff" of the world is physical. The term reductionist does not have a single agreed upon usage or definition either. As I am using the term in the sense that nothing else is posited as fundamental. All that comes to be, life, consciousness, mind, comes to be from the physical structures, forces, and interactions that underlie them.

Reductionism has a fighting chance of shutting naysayers up if they can demonstrate biology to be a special case of chemistry, à la how Werner Heisenberg showed how the macrocosm is a special case of the microcosm. :cool:

The term ontology does not have an single agreed upon usage or definition . I mean that the most basic "stuff" of the world is physical. The term reductionist does not have a single agreed upon usage or definition either. As I am using the term in the sense that nothing else is posited as fundamental. All that comes to be, life, consciousness, mind, comes to be from the physical structures, forces, and interactions that underlie them. — Fooloso4

Fair points.

So the belief that "The most basic "stuff" of the world is physical" and the belief that "all that comes to be, life, consciousness, mind, comes to be from the physical structures, forces, and interactions that underlie them" -- I think both of these beliefs would qualify as "ontologically" as I was using the term.

I am uncertain to the extent it is rational to believe either of those. Which isn't the same as to say they are not true. However, if they are not rational to believe, even if they are true, they'd fall into the mythic portion of philosophy: the stories told for those who need a story.

For my money it's a good myth. But I'm uncertain to what extent I believe it, really, or to what extent one can believe anything about what is fundamental. It seems to me that any posited fundamental stuff can be justified. You just have to pick the right rules of rationality for them.

From the Arche thread about likely stories.

Regarding terminology:

The language used by philosophers is already deformed, as though by shoes that are too tight. Wittgenstein, CV, p. 47].

I might say @180 Proof "atoms and the void" but there are no atoms.

I guess it would be looking at, what constitutes a bridge law? What counts as a reduction to physics? — Moliere

"Nagel describes his model as follows:

"A reduction is effected when the experimental laws of the secondary science (and if it has an adequate theory, its theory as well) are shown to be the logical consequences of the theoretical assumptions (inclusive of the coordinating definitions) of the primary science. (Nagel 1961: 352)

"The basic idea is simple: a theory TR reduces to a theory TB if and only if TR is derivable from TB with the possible help of the relevant bridge laws (here labeled ‘coordinating definitions’), often with an emphasis of the derivation of the laws of the reduced theory. If we add the remarks Nagel opened his discussion on reduction with—namely, that reduction has to be understood as a certain kind of explanation (1961: 338)—the core idea of the Nagel model is fully characterized. Adding Nagel’s idea of reduction as a kind of explanation, the so called “Nagel model of reduction” can be fully specified as follows: Reduction is (i) a kind of explanation relation, which (ii) holds between two theories iff (iii) one of these theories is derivable from the other, (iv) with the help of bridge laws under some conditions. The basic model covers two sorts of reduction, one in which bridge laws are not required (homogeneous cases) and one in which they are (nonhomogeneous cases; for a presentation of homogeneous cases of reductions and the question of whether or not alleged cases of reductions really should count as reductions in the Nagelian sense, see the entry on intertheory relations in physics). Nagel conceives of sciences or theories as developing entities that undergo changes, across which their vocabulary remains unchanged (though it is, presumably, sometimes extended). These successive states of theories are covered by the notion of homogeneous reductions—deduction of an early stage from a later stage of a theory is possible without bridge laws since they share a common vocabulary. Nonhomogeneous cases of reduction hold between pairs of different theories, employing different vocabularies. Whereas the former variant of reduction did not attract much attention (by Nagel and others), the latter has been a subject of intense discussion since Nagel introduced it in 1949." SEP article on scientific reduction

The downside:

"Many criticisms have been raised against both the original Nagel model and its variants. The original Nagel model was faulted as too narrow because it allows only for theory reduction (Wimsatt 1972; Hull 1976; Darden & Maull 1977: 43; Sarkar 1992), whereas an appropriate model would cover cases of reduction of mere models and the like—sciences like biology and neuroscience should be regarded as being possible candidates for reduction, although they do not contain full-fledged theories (see also the entry on reductionism in biology; for a discussion of this and the following criticisms, see van Riel 2011).

"In a more general sense,the Nagel model has been criticized as exemplifying all the shortcomings of the orthodox view on science. For example, it conceives of theories as syntactic entities, and it views reduction as explanation cashed out in terms of the DN model (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948), which has itself been challenged on many grounds, especially those regarding the asymmetry of explanation (for an overview that focuses on problems arising from reduction as explanation, see Craver (2007: chap. 2), and for problems concerning the DN model, see Salmon 1989)."

Would you agree that a scientific theory is a syntactic entity? If so, the bridge laws are just a matter of translation.

Particles of stuff (atoms), as the elementary element of Physics, has been gradually & grudgingly superseded by nonlocal continuum Fields of information patterns, consisting of an imaginary grid of mathematical points with no extension in space. — Gnomon

This is not true. — T Clark

Wow! Total rejection. Can you be more specific about which part of that assertion seems to be untrue to you : "nonlocal" or "continuum" or "fields" or "information patterns" or "imaginary" or "points", or all of the above? Information theory assigns value to the pattern of relationships (geometry) even if the dimensionless-point-in-space has no physical substance. Such an abstract notion is difficult to grasp, but it is essential to Quantum & Information theories. :smile:

Real talk: Everything is made of fields :
“To understand what is going on, you actually need to give up a little bit on the notion of particles,” physicist Sean Carroll said in the June lecture.
Instead, think in terms of fields.
Carroll’s stunner, at least to many non-scientists, is this: Every particle is actually a field. The universe is full of fields, and what we think of as particles are just excitations of those fields, like waves in an ocean. An electron, for example, is just an excitation of an electron field.
This may seem counterintuitive, but seeing the world in terms of fields actually helps make sense of some otherwise confusing facts of particle physics.
https://www.symmetrymagazine.org/article/july-2013/real-talk-everything-is-made-of-fields
Note -- Can you imagine a mathematical point in empty space getting excited? It's a philosophical metaphor attempting to make an invisible abstraction imaginable. Like much of Quantum Physics, such notions are counter-intuitive and seemingly paradoxical.

FIELDS AND PARTICLES :
Broadly speaking, a field is a collection of properties ascribed to regions of space (one might also speak of the region itself as being "the field"); if the properties are quantifiable then the field is a mathematical function of spatial coordinates,
https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/fields-and-particles

"In vector calculus, a field is an assignment of a value (vector value for a vector field, scalar value for a scalar field) to every point in space".
https://www.quora.com/What-is-a-Field-mathematics

"What is a Point in Math? :
In classical Euclidean geometry, a point is a primitive notion that models an exact location in space, and has no length, width, or thickness.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Point_(geometry)

I'm having a hard time coming up with a response. I've written a few and then I feel like it's entirely wrong :D I can't tell if we're in agreement here now, in that we cannot know that such a reduction could take place (so it is perhaps better to believe in a void), or if you advising me to adopt physicalism and reduction on the basis that it's the most likely story, and we cannot know more, so it's wise to accept this likely story?

And I'll try not to get stuck on terminology. I at least share your suspicion of philosophical terminology, in that while it can clarify it can also be the thing your mind is getting stuck on and it's actually confusing in some circumstances. But I'm not sure where in this conversation the terminology has led me astray. My guess is it's with the use of "ontology" and "reduction" and "metaphysics" -- but I thought we're using the terms closely enough. I understood your definitions of ontology and reduction.




OK, tomorrow, I'll read up. But the thoughts are still buzzing so that's what's shared here:


That's not how I'd put it, mostly because syntactic entities usually do not include activity. But I could go along with the notion all the same, because I believe I'm tracking what you've typed: and I'm still on the "no" side and working through the reasons why. (I have opinions, but I'm talking because I'm still not clear on them.)

"Logical consequences" seem odd to me. Do theories have logical consequences? It seems to me that theories have interpretations which can be used to do experiments to demonstrate or build upon what's been demonstrated. Theories, once called, usually are the means by which we explain individual experiments, rather than some kind of coherent uber-picture. They are very particular -- so we have the science of mechanics, and within the science of mechanics you have statics and dynamics of classically sized objects, you have thermodynamics and electrodynamics, statistical and quantum mechanics, and each of these has their own statements within their books that do not logically imply one another. They cohere, but that's not the same thing. If you're doing a thermodynamical experiment, you wouldn't use "F=ma" because that's not the sort of experiment you are doing.

However, you can crib from other sciences for your purposes (hence the kinetic theory of heat). If it works for your question, for your experiment, go ahead. And I'd say that treating the sciences as if they cohere is a very common, regulative belief that is fruitful. (But notice that's not the same thing as to say that it's a true belief).

But that's not the same as seeing theories as logical consequences of one another. And I don't think that's generally even a goal of scientists.

And if the sub-fields within mechanics don't even logically imply one another, and they are much closer in concept, I then have a reason to doubt that there will be, say, a mechanics which logically implies, say, that all living creatures are related through speciation of a common ancestor.

However, you can crib from other sciences for your purposes (hence the kinetic theory of heat). If it works for your question, for your experiment, go ahead. And I'd say that treating the sciences as if they cohere is a very common, regulative belief that is fruitful. (But notice that's not the same thing as to say that it's a true belief). — Moliere

True. Carnap says that all sciences have these in common: the same kind of observer, the same kinds of observation, and the same world being observed (that's loosely paraphrasing). It's a phenomenological approach that implies that science (and maybe all knowledge) is a unity.

IMO, "atoms and void" is a roughly analogous picture of quantum field excitations (events) and vacuum. :wink:

Not so. That model posits literal collisions between point-particles ‘colliding’ as per Lucretius. There’s nothing remotely like that in modern atomic field theory where the so-called ‘particles’ are separated by relatively vast spaces.

if you advising me to adopt physicalism and reduction on the basis that it's the most likely story, and we cannot know more, so it's wise to accept this likely story? — Moliere

I am not advising you or anyone else who might be reading this to accept this or any other likely story. It may be that what is and has been going on may turn out to not be likely at all. I am approaching these questions speculatively and dialogically, but I don't expect much will come of it. The real work is being done elsewhere.

But I'm not sure where in this conversation the terminology has led me astray. — Moliere

Although I was responding to your post I was speaking in general terms. It is common in these discussions for someone to insist that ontology or reductionism or metaphysics means this or that, and will carry in their baggage.

I may have been misled by your mention of Kant. Kant on metaphysics and ontology leads to the kind of rabbit hole you are wisely trying to avoid.

During the nineteenth century, the development of chemistry and the theory of heat conformed very closely to the ideas first put forward by Leucippus and Democritus. A revival of the materialist philosophy in its modern form, that of dialectical materialism, was this a natural counterpart to the impressive advances made during this period in chemistry and physics. The concept of the atom had proved exceptionally fruitful in the explanation of chemical bonding and the physical behavior of gasses. It was soon, however, that the particles called atoms by the chemist were composed of still smaller units. But these smaller units, the electrons, followed by the atomic nuclei and finally the elementary particles, protons and neutrons, also still seemed to be atoms from the standpoint of the materialist philosophy. The fact that, at least indirectly, one can actually see a single elementary particle—in a cloud chamber, say, or a bubble chamber—supports the view that the smallest units of matter are real physical objects, existing in the same sense that stones or flowers do.

But the inherent difficulties of the materialist theory of the atom, which had become apparent even in the ancient discussions about smallest particles, have also appeared very clearly in the development of physics during the present century.

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers. Here, the development of quantum theory some forty years ago has created a complete change in the situation. The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles. I cannot enter here into the details of this problem, which has been discussed so frequently in recent years. But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate Between Plato and Democritus

There's a habit of thought where we come to see things with respect to that thought a lot. So with Popper you have this account which supposedly solves the problem of induction as well as the problem of demarcation, and lays out a rationality that scientists should follow in their theorizing.

It's all very interesting, only it doesn't look much like what scientists actually do. — Moliere

This is why I much prefer Kuhn's description of science over Popper. What Popper describes is what a lot of scientists would like science to be in an ideal world, but it is completely impractical. It cannot be achieved in reality.

While Kuhn better describes what scientists actually do in reality.

That doesn't mean I think Popper's description has no merit. I think it has merit as an ideal, not as what scientists can practically do.

Understood. The denial of atoms was intended to illustrate my point about terminology. The term atom is still being used, but it means something different than what Democritus meant. And now it is not only that atoms are divisible but that talk of particles is being rejected and replaced by fields.

You do realize, don't you, that classical atomism is metaphysics – a gedankenexperiment – and not physics – a physio-mathematical model? That's why I referred to it as "a roughly analogous picture". Get John Dalton's premature misnomer out of your head, Wayf. :roll:

↪180 Proof

Understood. The denial of atoms was intended to illustrate my point about terminology. The term atom is still being used, but it means something different than what Democritus meant. And now it is not only that atoms are divisible but that talk of particles is being rejected and replaced by field — Fooloso4

:fire:

I am not advising you or anyone else who might be reading this to accept this or any other likely story. It may be that what is and has been going on may turn out to not be likely at all. I am approaching these questions speculatively and dialogically, but I don't expect much will come of it. The real work is being done elsewhere.

M'kay, cool.

I guess I just have a feeling about an answer to the question, more than anything. So I was attempting to work out that answer in the thread.

So dialogic, speculative -- but not work. I don't labor under the delusion that there aren't others who are better than I at this working on these very questions :D. I just have that itch to scratch!

Although I was responding to your post I was speaking in general terms. It is common in these discussions for someone to insist that ontology or reductionism or metaphysics means this or that, and will carry in their baggage.

I may have been misled by your mention of Kant. Kant on metaphysics and ontology leads to the kind of rabbit hole you are wisely trying to avoid. — Fooloso4

Cool. That helps me in thinking through your post.

The one thing I'm importing from Kant is the denial of metaphysics as knowledge -- however, in some of my initial attempts at responding I was trying to qualify in what way and all that, and it started to spiral off :D. But I'm not as clear on it as he is, and I don't even agree with his project. It's in the background of my thinking, however. And roughly what I think I'd try to defend is the belief that scientific knowledge does not lead to knowledge about what fundamentally is the case, or the fundaments of reality. Now, maybe that's entirely off base from the notion of likely stories, or even of theory reduction. But just to say more about why I mentioned Kant.

Can you be more specific — Gnomon

It is not true that particles have been superseded.

Particles have been superseded by fields
@gnomon was composed of particles.
Therefore
Gnomon has been superseded.

Sad.

I could produce any number of articles explaining the sense in which particles are 'excitations of fields (Ethan Seigel's articles are pretty good). Atoms are not the indivisible point-particles of yore. In fact, the model of the atom is now a 'particle zoo' a.k.a. 'the standard model', which is fundamentally mathematical in nature (hence Tegmark's 'only the math is real').

And what of the famous wave-particle duality? Is matter 'really' a wave, or is is 'really' a particle? Neils Bohrs answer was, basically, 'it depends on what experiment you perform'. In some contexts it manifests as a wave, in others as a particle, but what 'it' is, remains unknown (and futile to speculate about).

None of us here will solve these conundrums.

particles are 'excitations of fields — Wayfarer

In fact, the model of the atom is now a 'particle zoo' — Wayfarer

Is matter 'really' a wave, or is is 'really' a particle? — Wayfarer

And what of the famous wave-particle duality? Is matter 'really' a wave, or is is 'really' a particle? Neils Bohrs answer was, basically, 'it depends on what experiment you perform'. In some contexts it manifests as a wave, in others as a particle, but what 'it' is, remains unknown (and futile to speculate about). — Wayfarer

Sure looks like we're still thinking in terms of particles or quanta, even if not unequivocally so.

the point about the idea of the atom was that it was indivisible and indestructible, and was the primary constituent of every particular. It was, therefore, an ideal object. The current models in physics are nothing like that at all.

It is more or less common knowledge that the conception of what a particleis today is different than it was in Democritus' time, but the point is that we are still thinking in terms of particles.

‘We’?

// oh, I guess you mean the 'person in the street'.//

No I meant the physicists. What would the wave/particle duality be without the particle? How would entanglement be thought of without particles? What would the excitation of a field be, if not a particle? What would the so-called "particle zoo" be without its animals?

Particles are easy to envisage - look at a pinch of salt, or a handful of sand. The original atom was indivisible, the model of atoms and the void a binary comprising absolute existents and absolute non-existence. Very simple. The modern landscape is considerably more layered than that.

When I was a young physics student I once asked a professor: ‘What’s an electron?’ His answer stunned me. ‘An electron,’ he said, ‘is that to which we attribute the properties of the electron.’ That vague, circular response was a long way from the dream that drove me into physics, a dream of theories that perfectly described reality. — Adam Frank

Particles are easy to envisage - look at a pinch of salt, or a handful of sand. The original atom was indivisible, the model of atoms and the void a binary comprising absolute existents and absolute non-existence. Very simple. The modern landscape is considerably more layered than that. — Wayfarer

Well, yes all that much is obvious, but it doesn't change the fact that physicists still think in terms of particles. Democritean atoms are as easy to envisage as excitations of fields, and both are envisaged in terms of macroscopic analogs, like billiard balls and bodies of water. But neither are commonsense objects, since we cannot imagine how an object that exists could be indivisible .

Now we have electronic fields, fermionic fields, gluon fields and Higgs fields. but all those fields are understood to be related to their respective particles. And we have the fundamental quantum foam where existence and non-existence merge; still a binary. All our thinking is binary, there is no escaping that.

We should approach all topics available for scientific inquiry as if the goal is further reduction to physics. — frank

It seems clear enough to me that meaningful thought and belief(experience or consciousness, if you like) are reducible to neither physical events nor physics, similar to Davidson's anomalous monism(without 'mental' events).

How does one reduce meaningful correlations drawn between different things to physics?

But it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate Between Plato and Democritus

The problem though, is that mathematics really does not give a "clear-cut account of what is going on". The uncertainty principle is produced by the application of the mathematics, in an attempt to understand elementary particles. The uncertainty is not resolved by the mathematics. So this statement from Heisenberg is not true at all.

And the conclusion drawn from that statement, that the elementary parts of material objects are "Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics" is not a sound conclusion either. The reality of the situation is quite the opposite, that quantum theory demonstrates to us that the elementary parts cannot be understood through the application of conventional mathematics. The uncertainty principle is obviously a failing of our mathematics, in its capacity to understand the reality of space, time, and material existence, not a success of our mathematics.