As an Indirect Realist, I believe that I directly see a model or a representation of a tree in my mind. — RussellA
see
verb
uk
/siː/ us
/siː/
present participle seeing | past tense saw | past participle seen
see verb (USE EYES)
A1 [ I or T ]
to be conscious of what is around you by using your eyes: — https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/see
When I perceive a tree, I don't question that I am perceiving a tree — RussellA
I directly see a model or a representation of a tree in my mind. — RussellA
I do question that what I am perceiving as a tree exists in the world as a tree. — RussellA
I can treat the something I perceive as a tree as a tree in the world, act towards it as tree, and follow the consequences of my actions. — RussellA
I agree when you say that "all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree", but don't agree that your conclusion would logically follow "So we can conclude that virtually all the time we know what we see is the tree" — RussellA
In Searle’s list, object becomes tree at #3, and in the picture it can be a tree only after Searle’s #3, but without that condition, which is not even implied by the picture, it is the case that it should have been object on the left, at instance of perception, and never a tree. Nevertheless, the picture correctly represents the initial conditions for visual experience, demonstrating the presentation of an object directly to the system, according to physical law. — Mww
are you and your colleagues appalled at the extent to which humans can’t find agreement among themselves on the most fundamental human considerations? — Mww
On the contrary, I'm quite certian I'm not "seeing the tree as it really is" — hypericin
I'll see if I can state succinctly what I believe to be the important point. The difference between Hegel and Marx is the difference between idealism and materialism. The two are actually very similar, but there is an inversion between them in the way that first principles are produced, which results in somewhat opposing ways of looking at the very same thing.
So Hegel described the State as being a manifestation of the Idea. The Idea might be something like "the good", "the right", "the just", and being ideal, it's derived from God. From here, the history of the State is described as a history of the Idea, and how human beings strive to serve the Idea. The Idea comes from God, and there is always a need for the human subjects to be servants to the Idea.
Marx liked Hegel's historical approach, but figured he got the first principle wrong. In order to produce a true historicity he had to replace the Idea with matter, as the first principle. This was to place the living human being, and its material body as the first principle, rather than some pie in the sky "good", "right", or "God". So from Marx's perspective there is real substance grounding these ideas like "good", "right", "just", and this is the material needs of the material human being. From this perspective we can have a real history of the State, judging by its practises of providing for the material needs of material human bodies.
You can see the inversion. From the Hegelian perspective, the people must be judged in their capacity to serve the ideals of the State. From the Marxian perspective, the State must be judged in its capacity to serve the material needs of human beings. — Metaphysician Undercover
I don't believe animals parse experience in terms of subject/ object. — Janus
Animals do not deploy dualistic language; do you think they do not see at all? — Janus
I bet none of them are thinking 'what am I doing here?' or 'what does being an elephant mean, really?' They don’t have the predicament of selfhood. — Wayfarer
You've made a pretty puzzle for yourself. — Banno
Seems you can't tell that this post from me is a post from me - just by seeing this post, "one cannot know, of the several possible causes, which was the actual cause". — Banno
If I had to quibble or add something, I’d want to emphasize that “material needs” for Marx included social, creative, spiritual and intellectual needs. — Jamal
What is 'seeing' as a process for you? — Isaac
so are you seeing two things? One, the tree(indirectly) and two, the model (directly). — Isaac
What would it mean to exist 'as a tree'? As opposed to what? — Isaac
I don't see how you would know what 'treating it like a tree' would entail if no-one has any veridical experience of trees. — Isaac
If to 'know' something is to have sufficient warrant for believing it', and if 'sufficient warrant' is 'having something respond as expected when treating it as if it were what you believe it to be' - then is simply follows, by substitution, that you 'know' you see a tree all the while you treat it as if it were a tree and it responds accordingly. — Isaac
knowing what is meant often depends on context, which is often ambiguous. — RussellA
I think that I am seeing only one thing, a model of a tree in my mind. — RussellA
What exists in the world are elementary particles, elementary forces and space-time. — RussellA
a tree is is stored in the public domain — RussellA
I may believe that there is a tree in the field and can justify my belief, but a justified belief is not knowledge.
To be knowledge, the justified belief has to be true. There arrives the problem.
A Direct Realist argues that they have direct knowledge of the world, and therefore knows that there is a tree there. — RussellA
don't know why you think I have "trouble with trees". I have none. — hypericin
I'm quite certian I'm not "seeing the tree as it really is" — hypericin
you claim to doubt the reality of trees. — Isaac
Given this, human beings who hallucinate are few, and most human beings have never hallucinated, and when hallucinations do occur, it occurs infrequently. So how did something that few humans being will ever experience, may never experience, and, if experienced, will happen infrequently, turn into positing "sense data" that every human being must have when perceiving the world around them. — Richard B
You ask other minds, look at the evidence, and see what is persuasive. In this case, this is done in a public realm, not the private realm of "sense data". — Richard B
The indirect realist likes to claim that perceiving the material object is indirect because scientific theory shows this, but do we really think that using a hallucinogen that results in a hallucination is not also plague by a series of intermediary steps in the brain as well. — Richard B
So metaphysically, why am I not committed to the glasses having "sense data" just like when I push one of my eye balls and report I see two of the objects — Richard B
The moment of "great disaster" is when Descartes decided to retreat to the private world of introspection to look for certainty at the expense of the public realm in which we learn to communicate with words to convey understanding to our fellow humans about a world that can get a bit messy. — Richard B
The tree is real, and the tree as represented experientially is not the "way the tree really is" — hypericin
It is likely a faithful mapping of real properties of the tree, but it is a mapping — hypericin
I just don't get how that is possible when you have a massive network, distributing sensory experience from different regions and rei-integrating them together. No one is going to have complete understanding of what is going on, but certainly, the medium matters, and the fact that there is a medium means that something is going on that isn't simply a mirror reflected of "reality". For example, an input in a computer becomes an electrical signal that then gets turned into a logic gate that affects the system and thus produces an output. I press a key on my keyboard and it almost instantaneously shows up on a computer screen. The physical stroke of my fingers is not the visual representation that shows up on my screen.
You are mixing the hard problem and the easy problem in wildly unproductive and invariant ways that confuse the whole issue. I am a pro-hard problem. That is to say, I think there is one. People like @Banno try to downplay it, it seems.
In this computer keyboard/monitor situation, for example, there is already an interpreter that interprets the letters as something meaningful. Therefore there is an extra layer in the equation beyond just input and output. Thus, as I've stated before, this is the Cartesian Theater problem whereby there is a constant regress whereby the mind "integrates" (aka the Homunculus Fallacy). However, direct realism doesn't solve the problem so much as raise questions as to how it is that sensory information is simply a mirror and that there is no processing involved as well. Again, certainly other animals process the world differently, as do babies when developing. There are differences in individual perception, etc. This to me indicates construction not wholesale mirroring.
A Direct Realist argues that they have direct knowledge of the world, and therefore knows that there is a tree there — RussellA
No direct realist I've ever read claims this. Do you have a quote or reference to work from? — Isaac
If the Direct Realist doesn't claim that have they have direct knowledge of the world, what do they claim ? — RussellA
For the Indirect Realist:
1) We directly perceive sense data. — RussellA
So your eyes are not even involved in seeing? If you don't see the tree, then how do you know what it is your model is a model of? — Isaac
the model and what the model is of are one and the same, — RussellA
t’s direct because there is nothing between perceiver and perceived. The transformation and interpretation of “nervous activity” is indistinguishable from the perceiver and the act of perceiving, so is therefor not in between perceiver and perceived. — NOS4A2
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