:up:

I guess it's a matter of interpretation: to me an "understanding of how things can come to be as they are" suggests some kind of causal account of the genesis of the world, and i don't think Heidegger was concerned with that. Of course I might be mistaken, and I could be persuaded to change my mind by being presented with anything he wrote which would suggest otherwise. — Janus

No I don’t disagree. It does look too ontic.

But going back to the rock interacting with the tree, I would like to at least ask the question how it is that physical properties obtain without perception. What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? And you see, this IS where this direct/indirect/ideal becomes kind of "personal" for those who care about metaphysical theories. As I said before, I think informs the perceiving interactions.

I agree, the "purely negative effort to clear up some deep confusions" is precisely what I understand to be philosophy's "transformative process of liberation". I can speculate that Wittgenstein may have meant that philosophy leaves the world just as it is, in the sense of not adopting any metaphysical view about the nature of reality, and I would agree with that.

I see philosophy as a propaedeutic to spiritual transformation, to learning to see non-dually. Still, I would say that although philosophy cannot effect a far-reaching spiritual transformation, it can help to liberate us from being concerned with "views", just as Nagarjuna's dialectic is intended to do, and that that counts as a "transformative process of liberation"; albeit merely an intellectual one. — Janus

Sounds lovely. But I’ve run out of things to say about this, because I haven’t worked out what I think about it.

:up: :up:

But going back to the rock interacting with the tree, I would like to at least ask the question how it is that physical properties obtain without perception. What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? And you see, this IS where this direct/indirect/ideal becomes kind of "personal" for those who care about metaphysical theories. As I said before, I think informs the perceiving interactions. — schopenhauer1

We can only say what interaction between what we think of as non-perceiving objects is like for us. Personally I find metaphysical theories interesting in that they explore the possibilities that are (coherently or incoherently?) imaginable to us. I think that is worth exploring just for its own sake; it's aesthetic interest, if you like.

Beyond that level of interest, I don't care about them: I have no more objection to physicalism than I do to idealism, because I don't see any "ism" as ruling out anything important or as capturing the nature of reality, or as being more or less important for the ongoing evolution of humanity.

I could be a physicalist, an idealist or an anti-realist and still be fully committed to meditation, the arts and personal transformation, provided I didn't take the views I might entertain as being the most plausible so seriously that I couldn't let them go, and they consequently interfered with my peace of mind.

I can't relate to crusaders of philosophical correctness on any side of the argument; I think that is a deeply misguided and arrogant project. Although I don't agree with Hegel's notion of absolute knowledge, I think his treatment of the history of philosophical ideas as a progressive (not in the sense of "progress" but as analogous to the musical idea of a chord progression) dialectical unfolding presentation of what is imaginable to the human is right on.

We can only say what interaction between what we think of as non-perceiving objects is like for us. Personally I find metaphysical theories interesting in that they explore the possibilities that are (coherently or incoherently?) imaginable to us. I think that is worth exploring just for its own sake; it's aesthetic interest, if you like. — Janus

Yes indeed. Agreed. I think people get persnickety because it goes beyond the empirical descriptions of scientific textbooks. It is speculative and therefore abhorrent. To them, this makes philosophy garish and baroque rather than simply helping with some mathematical logic problems perhaps or simply clarifying terminology usage in service of the sciences. That's my guess anyways.

This is why I find Whitehead somewhat fascinating. Like Russell, he helped create complex proofs in mathematics like in Principia Mathematica, connecting them with symbolic logic. In that sense he was the most analytic of analytics. But then he wrote stuff like Process and Reality and Adventures in Ideas that couldn't be more baroque in its metaphysical system.

I'll not accept your characterising me as not calling realism into question. — Banno

Fair point and I’m not trying to offend, but I can’t help but notice the constant return to quotidian objects - spoons, trees, coffee cups - from which you seek to make your rhetorical point. You’d have to acknowledge this seems to indicate at least a realist tendency. And I don’t want to portray this as me casting aspersions - it’s more like a gestalt shift or change of perception which shifts the centre of gravity as it were.

With "learning to perceive truly" do you mean something like 'learning to see richness instead of paucity'? — Janus

Obviously a big call, but what I have in mind is very like what is described by avidya, in Eastern philosophy - it’s usually translated as ignorance, but I think something like spiritual blindness is more apt. It’s kind of like ‘sin’ albeit more cognitive than volitional - that ‘we don’t see the world aright’. (I’ve long thought that the fact that it became entangled with dogma about sin is one of the things that prevents us from seeing it.) Hey I know that’s bound to be controversial but I can’t help but see it like that.

Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. — Janus

Isn’t that cultural relativism? I know it’s very difficult to adjudicate betweeen the thousands of systems of ideas out there but some must resonate, and some decision must be made as to which.

But going back to the rock interacting with the tree, I would like to at least ask the question how it is that physical properties obtain without perception. What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? — schopenhauer1

One of the books I keep referring up to is Charles Pinter. Mind and the Cosmic Order, published February 2021, He’s a mathematics emeritus whose only other published books are on set theory and algebra but has a deep interest in neural modelling. This book is a real breakthrough in philosophy of cognitive science in my view. Google it and just scan through the chapter abstracts, it’s about just this question.

One of the books I keep referring up to is Charles Pinter. Mind and the Cosmic Order, published February 2021, He’s a mathematics emeritus whose only other published books are on set theory and algebra but has a deep interest in neural modelling. This book is a real breakthrough in philosophy of cognitive science in my view. Google it and just scan through the chapter abstracts, it’s about just this question. — Wayfarer

Cool I'll check it out.

Yes, there is always the illusion of progress bolstered by the obvious progress of the sciences, but philosophy is not like that in my view. The idea of progress inherent in (and kind of contradictory to the spirit of) Hegels' philosophy is its weakness and possibly why both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard reacted against it.

It seems to me that those who get "persnickety" are those who "have a dog in the race" and/ or are uncomfortable with uncertainty. I think uncertainty is, spiritually speaking, a blessing, because it makes for humility.

The idea of progress inherent in (and kind of contradictory to the spirit of) Hegels' philosophy is its weakness and possibly why both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard reacted against it.

It seems to me that those who get "persnickety" are those who "gave a dog in the race" and/ or are uncomfortable with uncertainty. I think uncertainty is, spiritually speaking, a blessing, because it makes for humility. — Janus

:up:

Obviously a big call, but what I have in mind is very like what is described by avidya, in Eastern philosophy - it’s usually translated as ignorance, but I think something like spiritual blindness is more apt. It’s kind of like ‘sin’ albeit more cognitive than volitional - that ‘we don’t see the world aright’. (I’ve long thought that the fact that it became entangled with dogma about sin is one of the things that prevents us from seeing it.) Hey I know that’s bound to be controversial but I can’t help but see it like that. — Wayfarer

I see ignorance as consisting, not in holding one view rather than another (except in the empirical context) but in being wedded to some (necessarily dualistic) view or other. For me sin, or "missing the mark", consists in not seeing the world non-dually.

Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. — Janus


Isn’t that cultural relativism? I know it’s very difficult to adjudicate betweeen the thousands of systems of ideas out there but some must resonate, and some decision must be made as to which. — Wayfarer

Right, I do think that ethically speaking, at least, there are right and wrong views, "right" views leading more to social harmony and "wrong" views more to disharmony, so I am no relativist in that domain. When it comes to aesthetics and even more so metaphysics, I am more of a relativist, as I see no criteria that can serve decidability.

That said, the best metaphysical view, for me personally is the one that resonates most strongly, and serves best to inspire and motivate praxis, aesthetically and metaphysically. But I don't expect that my preferred ideas will, or should, be preferred by others, so in that sense I am a relativist.

Yes, there is always the illusion of progress bolstered by the obvious progress of the sciences, but philosophy is not like that in my view. The idea of progress inherent in (and kind of contradictory to the spirit of) Hegels' philosophy is its weakness and possibly why both Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard reacted against it. — Janus

I also think there is a reification and exaltation of mundanity. If it's not about accuracy of numbers crunching, or a goal of some sort of complex culmination leading to outputs, it doesn't matter (think electronics, construction, and technology in general). Cue existentialists and meaning. I had this idea a while ago about instrumentality- we do to do to do to do. In this sense, Hegel has the illusion of being right. The mundaneites would say that the complexity of the modern world has a sort of axiological positive value. There is something inherently better about the complexity. I call it minutia-mongering. But some people will exalt in it. In that sense, the aesthetics of speculation is nonsensical derivations off the path of working towards more complexity of outputs. So to the mundane-ites, speculation is sinful as it doesn't contribute to outputs. There is no room for such. It is like metaphysical Marxism.. Marxism proposed that the superstructure is material. We must focus on the superstructure to change things. However, unlike the mundane-ites, his goal was so that we can enjoy life, perhaps in some Epicurean way (not sure exactly how that Communist utopia was supposed to look really). Certainly, drab grey uniforms and production outputs couldn't be it. If so, what a sad socioeconomic system.

:up: There's quite a lot in what you say there, most of which I agree with, but I have to go do something now, so a more comprehensive response will have to wait.

When you see a tree, you are directly seeing not the tree but it's reflected light. That is one level of indirection.

Your body might tumble around and bump into other objects. But, you are not your body. You are the part of your brain that is aware. If you fall into a vegetative coma, you are gone, even if the rest of your body is healthy. If your awareness survived your body's death, you would survive.

This part of the brain that is aware has no direct access to the world. It can only interpret certain brain activity sensorily. These interpretations, experiences, are at a great remove from the objects that stimulate them.

Which is not to say you only access these experiences. These experiences track real actions and properties of real objects, and so you are aware of objects, not merely experiences. But this awareness is at a remove from the objects, it is indirect.

You cannot see the tree as it really is, this is a contraction. To see is to experience subjectively. Bats will see the tree differently than us, and aliens will see it differently than us and bats. There is no right answer among these different ways of seeing, they are all interpretations.

Even if I accept that we don’t perceive trees, only light, I’m still directly perceiving the environment, which includes trees, leaves, stars, teacups, earth, light, darkness.

I cannot understand how I am a part of a brain and not a body. How is such a belief possible? But as is inevitable with these ideas, it gives us an opportunity to put body, or bodily processes, between a perceiver and perceived, as if another step in this linear account of perception is required to perceive at all.

One reason philosophers in the past have rejected Direct Realism is because of The Argument from Illusion, which is obviously a strong argument. — RussellA

So, the argument goes that we have hallucinations which seems to be indistinguishable from the veridical experience. To be consistent, whatever we say about the hallucination, we have to say the same thing for the vertical experience. Since the hallucination is not seeing a material object, we need to see something else. And along come "sense data."

But I have many questions here. If I come along and find somebody who does not hallucinate, does this mean they don't have "sense data"? Better yet, if no human being ever hallucinated, would that mean they don't have "sense data"? In this imaginary world, can we say these humans see the tree directly? What if I give two people a hallucinogen, and person #1 is determine to hallucinate, and person #2 is determine not to hallucinate, so does this mean we can conclude one person has "sense data", and the other does not. But if that is the case, we all know that most people don't hallucinate, so why to we talk like "sense data" is something universal to all human beings?

He does take this distinction as granted, as well as that the folk he is addressing can, at least for the most part, tell the difference. But I suppose that RussellA and @schopenhauer1 cannot tell if they are hallucinating gives us an explanation for why there is not much hope of "penetrating the darkness here". — Banno

I'm beginning to wonder if it's something about trees, some type of Agnosia (I'm going to here coin the term Arbagnosia).

The thing is, I recognise many of the names here from other discussions (particularly the political ones) - @hypericin and @Wayfarer spring to mind most - wherein they find themselves absolutely certain of some state of affairs in the world (widely acknowledged to be extremely complex) like the geopolitical goals and strategies of major world powers (Ukraine War), or the net benefits and risks of public health strategies (Covid). Yet neither of these people, despite such certainty about the state of extremely complex events, seem to find any way in which they can be certain about the tree in their back garden.

It is apparently easy enough to be sure about world events that one can quite hysterically object to alternative interpretations of them, and yet strangely, they can never be sure they're really seeing the tree as it is.

Likewise, here all are professing with some certainty the way the brain processes sense data (a very complex and as yet undecided model), yet still unsure about the tree. I find, among my colleagues, the majority are quite uncertain about how perception actually works despite being at the coalface of discovering new facts about it; yet none seem to have trouble with the tree in the courtyard. Here we have the exact reverse of that.

What is it about trees, for these people, that is so impenetrable, I wonder?

If you need that explaining you may want to seek professional help. — Isaac

I wrote that Searle doesn't explain how one knows whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience.

Searle wrote:
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes"
"The second mistake almost as bad is the view that we do not directly perceive objects and states of affairs in the world. For this view famous arguments were advanced, and I am going to argue in this article that the arguments are all variations on a single bad argument, which I will honor with the capital title “The Bad Argument”
"I think the great philosophers of the past rejected Direct Realism because of an argument which was, until recently, quite commonly accepted among members of the profession. Some of them thought Direct Realism was so obviously false as not to be worth arguing against. There are different versions of it but the most common is called ‘the argument from illusion’ and here is how it goes"

According to Searle, even the great geniuses of philosophy were concerned with The Argument from Illusion, in how to know whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience, so I am in good company.

But there's nothing causal here. Not knowing whether A caused B has no bearing on the plausibility of an hypothesis that A causes B. — Isaac

I agree, but I thought the whole point of Direct Realism is that one directly sees the green tree, not hypothesise about it.

Can we really talk about non-perceived events and interactions — schopenhauer1

There is a useful paragraph in the SEP article Nonexistant Objects.

"One of the reasons why there are doubts about the concept of a nonexistent object is this: to be able to say truly of an object that it doesn’t exist, it seems that one has to presuppose that it exists, for doesn’t a thing have to exist if we are to make a true claim about it? In the face of this puzzling situation, one has to be very careful when accepting or formulating the idea that there are nonexistent objects. It turns out that Kant’s view that “exists” is not a “real” predicate and Frege’s view, that “exists” is not a predicate of individuals (i.e., a predicate that yields a well-formed sentence if one puts a singular term in front of it), has to be abandoned if one is to accept the claim that there are nonexistent objects"

In order to talk about a non-perceived event, one first has to presuppose that we are able to perceive it.

concerned with ... how to know whether one's visual experience is an hallucination or a veridical visual experience — RussellA

This just misuses the word 'know'. In no other case is 'know' used other than simply having sufficient warrant (putting aside for now arguments about post hoc judgements of truth). You have sufficient warrant to believe the tree you see is, in fact, a tree, all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree.

In order to talk about a non-perceived event, one first has to presuppose that we are able to perceive it. — RussellA

Interesting. Physical properties interacting with each other without perceivers, becomes oddly anthropomorphic in its conception. The objects become idealized as like placeholders. But surely how objects, forces and events are said to be interacting is metaphysically mysterious. At what localization is an event taking place? There is no view from the object. Our minds imagine one but that can’t actually be the case.

You have sufficient warrant to believe the tree you see is, in fact, a tree, all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree. — Isaac

I agree with that. This is the position of the Indirect Realist, a pragmatic approach to the world.

I agree with that. This is the position of the Indirect Realist, a pragmatic approach to the world. — RussellA

We've heard talk from self-described indirect realists that contradicts this, including from yourself.

You questioned whether we know what we see is the tree.

If...

You have sufficient warrant to believe the tree you see is, in fact, a tree, all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree. — Isaac

...and...

'know' [is] simply having sufficient warrant — Isaac

...then we 'know' what we see is the tree all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree.

Which, for simple objects like a tree, is virtually all the time.

So we can conclude that virtually all the time we know what we see is the tree. It's not a mystery.

Other oddities from indirect realists here have been claims that, for example, we don't 'really' see the tree, we see light, but not the tree, we see a model of the tree, we don't see the 'tree as it is'...etc.

None of these odd expressions have anything to do with pragmatism. They are claims of certainty about what is the case. They're just wrong.

Physical properties interacting with each other without perceivers, becomes oddly anthropomorphic in its conception. — schopenhauer1

Exactly. A case of psychological projection, rather than onto other people onto the world around us. As the Wikipedia article on Psychological Projection writes, "Psychological projection is a defence mechanism of alterity concerning "inside" content mistaken to be coming from the "outside".

If you go back to the beginning of philosophy (with Parmenides and the Eleatics) the understanding of how things can come to be as they are is the fundamental question. — Wayfarer

When Aristotle addressed being qua being, in his Metaphysics, this he said was the fundamental question, why is a thing what it is, rather than something else. As an approach to this question, the law of identity, that a thing is necessarily what it is and not something else, was presented. When he considered the law of identity, (that a thing is necessarily what it is and not something else), along with the activity of becoming (coming to be), he concluded that the form of the thing is necessarily prior to the material existence of it. We can say that the form predetermines, as a cause, what the thing will be, so that when it comes to be, it will be the thing that it is, rather than something else.

Philosophy delivers only contextual truths, and there are as many possible assumptions to begin from as there are philosophies. The idea that some are "correct" and others not, tout court, erroneously fails to acknowledge the different presuppositions in play, and the reality of talking past one another on account of that. — Janus

The problem is that some assumptions lead us toward understanding, while others lead us toward misunderstanding. Since understanding is what is desired over misunderstanding, it is appropriate to say that some assumptions are correct and others incorrect.

What is it that interaction between non-perceiving objects is like? — schopenhauer1

The tree wraps its roots around the rock, and takes from the rock whatever it can get. Unbeknownst to the tree, the rock is also active, and may roll, killing the tree. This is the way of interaction between living things and inanimate things. The living being wants to take all that it can get from the inanimate. But the living being's inadequate knowledge of the activity of inanimate things makes this a very risky activity. So the being must develop a balanced approach between taking all that it can get, and producing the knowledge and capacity required to restrain itself, according to the dangers involved with the activities of inanimate things.

Beyond the problem of interaction between living beings and non-perceiving things, there is a further problem of interaction between distinct living beings. This problem is far more difficult because when the basic problem is complex, and unresolved, the difficulties tend to mount exponentially.

The question is moot, it looks like, from an antirealist standpoint.

One is my Anglo mode, in which I’m a plain-speaking direct realist, and the other is my sort of phenomenological, sort of Marxian, quite traditional, wannabe Hegelian mode, in which philosophy has ambitions as grand as you’ve set out here. — Jamal

I believe that Marx provided a very unique and informative approach (in the form of basic assumptions) toward the interactions between things, both animate and inanimate. He has very insightful principles which ought not be ignored by anyone interested in the interactions between beings, things, and both.

The question is moot, it looks like, from an antirealist standpoint. — Agent Smith

Enough with these comments Smith.

You questioned whether we know what we see is the tree. — Isaac

As an Indirect Realist, I believe that I directly see a model or a representation of a tree in my mind. I don't directly see a tree in the world, but only indirectly.

When I perceive a tree, I don't question that I am perceiving a tree, but I do question that what I am perceiving as a tree exists in the world as a tree.

As a believer in Realism, I believe the world exists, and believe that there is something out there in the world that I perceive as a tree. Even if it not a tree, I can act towards it as if it were. As you rightly said "all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree"

As a Realist, I believe that there is a world out there and I am part of it. In believing that I can transact with a world that is inseparable from my agency within it, my approach is that of a Pragmatist. As originally conceived by Charles Sanders Peirce, the core of pragmatism was the Pragmatic Maxim, a rule for clarifying the meaning of hypotheses by tracing their ‘practical consequences’, their implications for experience in specific situations. I can treat the something I perceive as a tree as a tree in the world, act towards it as tree, and follow the consequences of my actions. If the results are not as I expected, I can adjust my future interactions with the world.

So we can conclude that virtually all the time we know what we see is the tree — Isaac

I agree when you say that "all the while that interacting with it as if it were a tree yields the results you'd expect of it if it were a tree", but don't agree that your conclusion would logically follow "So we can conclude that virtually all the time we know what we see is the tree"

It doesn't necessarily follow that because we treat something as a tree then it is a tree.

I believe that Marx provided a very unique and informative approach (in the form of basic assumptions) toward the interactions between things, both animate and inanimate. He has very insightful principles which ought not be ignored by anyone interested in the interactions between beings, things, and both. — Metaphysician Undercover

Without knowing exactly what you mean, I tend to agree. However, it’s probably essential in understanding Marx to see that he was attempting a philosophy of praxis, a realization of philosophy in history:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.

This isn’t an anti-intellectual dismissal of philosophy but rather an imperative: philosophy ought to be more than simply speculative metaphysics (and certainly should not be less than speculative metaphysics, which would describe empiricism and positivism).

What is it about trees, for these people, that is so impenetrable, I wonder? — Isaac

Dunno about “these people”, but lil’ ol’ me…..go back to that picture on pg 4. See that word “tree beside the object? At the same time, notice the first condition of visual experience in Searle’s list? See where the picture says tree, but #1 says object?

In Searle’s list, object becomes tree at #3, and in the picture it can be a tree only after Searle’s #3, but without that condition, which is not even implied by the picture, it is the case that it should have been object on the left, at instance of perception, and never a tree. Nevertheless, the picture correctly represents the initial conditions for visual experience, demonstrating the presentation of an object directly to the system, according to physical law.
———-

Other oddities from indirect realists here….. — Isaac

Ehhhh….that’s just conflicts in domain of discourse. Over-extended physicalist reductionism adds nothing to the human physiological act of perceiving, such that without it knowledge of objects is impossible. Our intellect, in its empirical manifestations, concerns itself initially with the output of sensory devices rather than their input, and it shouldn’t be contentious that our intellect works indirectly with, and is necessarily conditioned by, the real in accordance with its own methodology, whatever that may in fact be.

Ya know, something I wondered about, given our conversations, fly on the wall kinda thing….are you and your colleagues appalled at the extent to which humans can’t find agreement among themselves on the most fundamental human considerations? To be honest, I might guess you guys just figure we all like to bark at the moon, confident in the pretension that it is listening.