Mearsheimer claims that the strategic objective Russians were aiming at were either capturing or threatening Kiev. — neomac

He does say that, without any elaboration whatsoever. — Tzeentch

I don’t care about your excuses. I myself still do not understand what “threatening” means if not “threatening to capture”.

You look confused. — neomac

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch

Right, so it’s FALSE the assumption that one needs military control over the whole territory to install a puppet regime. — neomac

Do you know what a strawman is?

... yet in the same post you claim that my argument hinges on “occupy all of Ukraine”. — neomac

Which it essentially does, whether you realise it or not. — Tzeentch

Again you look confused. You made and apparently still making 2 claims [1], that Mearsheimer’s video supports your “diversion” theory but in that video Mearhsiemer is arguing against the hypothesis that Russia wanted to conquer the whole of Ukraine (which you claim my argument hinges on), so I argued against this by saying that no Russia didn’t need to conquer all of Ukraine. When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. So no, I’m not strawmanning you, at best you are strawmanning yourself.

Second, I do not have an equation on how many ground troops are necessary to ensure the success of a regime change in Ukraine. So the quantities you are considering in your arguments (“1/5th with the 4/5ths”, “occupy all of Ukraine”, “the vast majority of the country”) may make sense to support your claims under certain conditions, but not under all conditions (e.g. it depends on how hostile the population is, the contribution from state apparatus insiders, the support of aircraft/rocket shelling, the size of the targeted territory, etc.). — neomac

It makes imminent sense in the conditions the Ukraine war is fought under.
A large, capable Ukrainian military (outnumbering the Russians even). Vast amounts of Western support, etc.
Regime change under the conditions you have suggested is outlandish.


Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac

Again, lovely theory, but where is the evidence?
Every time you need to invent a more complicated explanation as to why the facts don't line up with your view it becomes less convincing. — Tzeentch

Your argument is just dismissive of what has been reported due to the lack of certain evidence, which is essential if your assumptions are correct. And the assumptions are roughly that the conditions at the beginning of the war were such that the Russians absolutely needed a certain number of ground troops which they didn’t deploy, and since they knew that all along that implies it was likely a maskirovka kind of operation (at best aiming at forcing the Ukrainians to a negotiation table).
But I’m questioning that assumption based on what has been reported. So your argument begs the question.

To achieve regime change ground troops might have not been enough (also depending on how hostile the population would have proven to be), but in addition to that rocket/air-force strikes, possible inside jobs (especially by collaborationists within military/intelligence service favourable to a coup [1]) and killing Zelensky might have compensated. All these conditions are not implausible since they have some support from the available reports. — neomac

You vastly overestimate the weight of miscellaneous factors, and underestimate the importance of boots on the ground. No control means no regime change.
Your own article already blows your theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population and what the Russians actually fielded.
Remember your example of Afghanistan? The US enjoyed every advantage imaginable. A decisive military victory, complete air dominance, support from multi-national coalitions and indigenous forces, a way higher troop-to-population ratio. It was fighting a third world country. And it still lost. Russia has NONE of those things. — Tzeentch

First, I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. If you find them unreliable, that’s still your problem not mine.
Second, no the article doesn’t blow out of the water my “theory out of the water since it puts into perspective what kind of force is needed to occupy and control a population” because the article (June 2022) is reporting about how the war in Kyiv actually evolved on the ground under the assumption that “a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population” and nothing of this questions the assumptions about Russian intentions that were made in the earliest phase of the war as reported on the same expert platform (March 2022): Russian intelligence and military agencies are also supporting paramilitary actors in Ukraine to conduct sabotage and subversion. The highest density of Russian-backed units appears to be in eastern Ukraine, where Russia has provided tanks, small arms, mobile artillery, fuel, training, and other aid to separatist rebels. Russian forces have helped create, sustain, and fund separatist political parties in Ukraine; established and aided paramilitary groups such as the Russian Orthodox Army and the Night Wolves; and recruited Cossack, Chechen, Serbian, and Russian paramilitaries to fight in Ukraine.16 But this Russian assistance to groups in Ukraine appears to be growing. One use of these groups may be in sabotage and other irregular warfare or “fifth column” activities in the capital of Kiev or in the rear of Ukrainian military forces while Russian conventional forces advance from the east. In addition, the Kremlin has developed plans to install a pro-Russian leader in Ukraine, according to British intelligence, possibly via a coup. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-gamble-ukraine
Indeed, even in the very same article you took that excerpts it is still claimed: Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare
Whether those assumptions about early Russian intentions were wrong can’t be proved just by size and movement of ground troops over one month (even more so if one takes into account Russian logistical and coordination failures).

Except that I'm not basing myself on Russian sources, but nice try. — Tzeentch

As if in Western media are impenetrable by pro-Russian propaganda that you can read and regurgitate here.

Here for more details: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23003689/putin-ukraine-russia-donbas-energy-feint — neomac

Don't bother with such blatantly biased and low-quality articles. The some of the sources linked in that article literally lead to Twitter. — Tzeentch

As if experts can’t comment the war on Twitter.

If the point of the advance on Kiev was to force the Ukrainian leadership to the negotiating table they succeeded actually. Those negotiations failed, though - blocked by the US, we now know. And obviously Russia is so far unable to end the western policy of NATO membership for Ukraine, which I agree is probably their primary strategic objective. — Tzeentch

So let’s not loop over the same arguments once again. (And notice I'm not claiming that your hypothesis is outlandish, while you do claim that mine is).



[1]

The Russians invaded Ukraine while outnumbered, with a force that was way too small to occupy all of it. This leads me to believe that the territories they occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion.
Mearsheimer makes that point in detail. — Tzeentch


Russia pursued regime change, denazification of Ukraine. This doesn’t require the occupation of all Ukraine, it requires to take control over Kiev and install a pro-Russian puppet regime (as the US did in Afghanistan). So far Russia tried but failed this objective. Along with the objective of demilitarization (or neutrality). Ukraine is getting more pro-Western and its chances of joining the West have arguably increased thanks to the war started by Putin.
The small number of troops at the beginning of the war was likely because Russians didn’t expect the kind of fierce resistance the Ukrainians demonstrated (due to the Russian intelligence failure).
Concerning Mearsheimer’s video, it’s too long. It would be easier if you specified at what point of that video Mearsheimer is offering arguments in support of your belief that "the territories they [the Russians] occupied in east and southern Ukraine probably roughly coincide with the initial aims of the invasion". — neomac

[2]

Are you really implying the Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country, with a western-trained, western-backed Ukrainian military occupying the rest, and an angry Ukrainian population to reckon with, with 190,000 troops? — Tzeentch


Yes I do. And also Mearsheimer is confirming it at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer of your video (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qciVozNtCDM) where he claims that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. And that is not implausible if one takes into account the Russian intelligence failure I was talking about (among other possible miscalculations, of course). — neomac

23:05 - 27:20 discusses the implications of the size of the Russian invasion force.
1:30:40 - 1:32:00 Mearsheimer makes the point that he believes Russian territorial ambitions escalated as the war progressed.
Mearsheimer throughout the lecture actually argues that Russia might not have had any major territorial ambitions at all at the start of the war.
And recent revelations about the peace negotiations that took place weeks into the conflict might actually confirm that. The Russians were willing to make major concessions when they negotiated for Ukrainian neutrality, and it might only be after the negotiations failed that the Russian strategy changed to annexing parts of Ukraine. — Tzeentch


In the first clip Mearsheimer’s is questioning the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. In the second clip Mearsheimer is questioning the alleged imperialistic ambitions of Putin. Neither of these arguments are relevant to counter the arguments that there were intelligence failures on the Russian side that might have compromised their strategic objectives whatever they were.
Said that, I also remark that at minute 24:20 Mearsheimer is claiming that the strategic objective of 190K Russian troops were aiming at either capturing or threatening Kiev and conquer a large swath of territory in East and South Ukraine. That doesn’t seem to support your claim “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”, it just supports the idea that the Russian military deployment wasn’t enough to subdue the entire Ukraine. — neomac

It's very hard to follow any of your arguments (as it was in your responses to me) because you keep vacillating between disproof, proof and plausibility.

It would significantly help those attempting to follow along if you could decide which you are attempting and stick to it.

If you want only to prove that your view is plausible, then you need to show that you have sufficient evidence and that it is trustworthy. You're failing to do that because you're instead asking others to show their evidence or to show yours isn't trustworthy. This is an incorrect burden of proof for this type of claim. Other people lacking evidence is not evidence that your position is plausible, it's evidence that their position might not be.

If you want to prove that another's view is implausible, then you need to show that their position is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. You keep failing to do this because you revert instead to merely showing that there is evidence to contrary (sufficient to show your view is plausible, but insufficient to show another's view isn't).

If you want to prove that your view is more likely true than another's, then you need to have some metric of likelihood. Again, you keep failing to do this, merely pointing out that there exists evidence of alternative views, none of which has any bearing on likelihood.

You've written huge volumes of text, all of which add up to nothing more than that there exists evidence which supports (some of) your views. That's not an argument. That's the bare minimum threshold of entry into the debate. You then have to go on to argue either likelihood, or the implausibility (lack of evidence) for the alternative view. Otherwise, all you're doing is showing, at enormous length, that you qualify to be heard. Something which no-one is now contesting.

If you want only to prove that your view is plausible, then you need to show that you have sufficient evidence and that it is trustworthy. You're failing to do that because you're instead asking others to show their evidence or to show yours isn't trustworthy. This is an incorrect burden of proof for this type of claim. Other people lacking evidence is not evidence that your position is plausible, it's evidence that their position might not be.

If you want to prove that another's view is implausible, then you need to show that their position is overwhelmed by evidence to the contrary. You keep failing to do this because you revert instead to merely showing that there is evidence to contrary (sufficient to show your view is plausible, but insufficient to show another's view isn't).

If you want to prove that your view is more likely true than another's, then you need to have some metric of likelihood. Again, you keep failing to do this, merely pointing out that there exists evidence of alternative views, none of which has any bearing on likelihood.

You've written huge volumes of text, all of which add up to nothing more than that there exists evidence which supports (some of) your views. That's not an argument. That's the bare minimum threshold of entry into the debate. You then have to go on to argue either likelihood, or the implausibility (lack of evidence) for the alternative view. Otherwise, all you're doing is showing, at enormous length, that you qualify to be heard. Something which no-one is now contesting. — Isaac

Your opportunistic accusations are overlooking context and assumptions of my claims and objections.
To me the “burden of proof” depends on what is claimed in the first place. If I’m claiming that “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war based on what has been reported”, I need to provide what has been reported. And I did.
Second “burden of proof” is limited by the available information, and how I can process them. I said and repeated that mine are just speculations under uncertainty (namely we lack enough relevant information to make my case conclusive) from a non-expert avg dude in a philosophy forum post format. Therefore there is no “overwhelmed by evidence” I can offer about “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war” other then what has been reported by experts. As I already clarified even talking generically about evidences in a non-principled way is pointless, because I might still be unable to assess their authenticity or relevance due to lack of expertise.
Third “burden of proof” can be assessed in terms of “likelihood” depending what it is claimed. “Likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. Generically speaking, the platforms I reported from (and they were just a part of the sources I consulted) are well reputed, domain-specific, corroborate each other and do not contradict my wider background assumptions. Hence the degree of confidence I put on them is enough to use them for my speculations.
Fourth “there exists evidence which supports (some of) your views” holds also e.g. for Tzeench’s argument. The problem is not on the evidence, but on the assumptions made to assess those evidences. The price to pay for holding Tzeench assumptions is to conclude “the entirety of your argument, nay the entire western narrative, hinges on the idea that the Russians went in with a force to destroy the Ukrainian military and occupy all of Ukraine - something which is almost directly contradicted by the facts”, which are wrong (as far as I’m concerned) or implausible (as far as experts’ feedback is concerned).

When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. — neomac

Where did you get the idea that Mearsheimer argues the Russians could install a puppet regime by capturing Kiev?

He doesn't make that argument at all. Are you really going to stake your argument on a single line by Mearsheimer which he treats as no more than a passing comment?

I'd love to hear someone go into detail about how they believe installing a puppet regime under the circumstances we've discussed is feasible. Until then, I don't treat such a theory seriously, and it's pretty clear the comment of Mearsheimer you're relying on was only indirectly related to the subject matter of the lecture.

The predominant theory at the time that lecture was given was that the Russians attempted a serious attack to capture Kiev. By suggesting that the attack may have merely meant to threaten Kiev Mearsheimer was in essence already putting forward a controversial standpoint.

I'll repeat myself: it's obvious that Kiev was an interesting military and political target for the Russians. If they could have taken it at no cost they probably would have, for a myriad of possible reasons. However, the data from the battle does not indicate they were prepared to pay much of a cost at all, which puts into question the idea that their entire campaign hinged on capturing Kiev.

Your argument is just dismissive of what has been reported... — neomac

I think my argument holds true in face of the reported facts. I'd love to hear you present facts that would be at odds with my theory.

Reported opinions by potentially highly biased sources I assign very little weight to, especially if they blatantly ignore the facts.

I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. — neomac

Your own source, Seth G. Jones, states that subdueing a country's population with a force ratio of 4 to 1000 is woefully inadequate, regardless of what metric you pick. I've already rebutted your example of Afghanistan which serves as a clear example in favor of the case I am making.

You're cherry picking at best.

Whether those assumptions about early Russian intentions were wrong can’t be proved just by size and movement of ground troops over one month (even more so if one takes into account Russian logistical and coordination failures). — neomac

I think it's by far the strongest indication of Russian intentions we have.

according to British intelligence — neomac

Newspaper articles claiming things were claimed by British intelligence.

This isn't evidence of a planned coup. At most it is a possible indicator Russia-aligned politicians were in Ukraine. Well, color me surprised.

even in the very same article you took that excerpts it is still claimed: Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation. — neomac

And no source or argumentation is given - not very convincing. Mearsheimer contradicts Jones directly and gives a detailed argumentation as to why he believes the Russians did not aim for a classic blitzkrieg.

As if in Western media are impenetrable by pro-Russian propaganda that you can read and regurgitate here. — neomac

Except that I don't base my arguments on western media sources either. I base it on simple verifiable facts of the war (which as far as I am aware are not being disputed), and only rely on expert opinions like Mearsheimer to the degree they put forward theories that also rely on verifiable facts.

Again, nice try.

If you believe one of my sources suffers from a pro-Russian bias, I'd love to see you point it out.

As if experts can’t comment the war on Twitter. — neomac

Of course they can. I just won't take them seriously unless they make an actual case. Twitter, wikipedia, newspaper articles - I take none of that seriously.

If I’m claiming that “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war based on what has been reported”, I need to provide what has been reported. And I did. — neomac

No. If your claim is about likelihood, you need to provide some metric of likelihood (or prove that your record of 'what has been reported' is exhaustive). Without either, all you've shown is that it is plausible that Russia pursued regime change in the first phase of the war. You've not presented an argument regarding the claim that it was 'likely'.

Second “burden of proof” is limited by the available information — neomac

That is why we are making alternative sources of information available to you. If you ignore them, that's an issue of bias, not availability.

Generically speaking, the platforms I reported from (and they were just a part of the sources I consulted) are well reputed, domain-specific, corroborate each other and do not contradict my wider background assumptions. — neomac

Nonsense. You cite US government sources and those who cite them in turn, occasionally turning to Western mainstream media. None of these are "well reputed". The US government have been shown time and time again to lie; with sources from military intelligence it is literally their job to lie (when it serves their country's interests). As to mainstream Western media, only recently has the Columbia Journalism Review written a damning report of press coverage regarding Russia, and here on the Ukraine war itself, The Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting group have written a considerable number of articles highlighting serious bias in press reporting (including specifically on Ukraine), not to mention the shocking level of blatant racism.

As I said. If you merely want to claim plausibility, it is sufficient that your sources meet a threshold of expertise (which military intelligence and sourced journalism would meet), but if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others, You've not even begun to make that argument.

When you objected (“Russians were going to install a puppet regime in Kiev while occupying less than 1/5th of the country”) I argued yes so does Mearsheimer in that video by saying that a possible aim of Russia was capturing Kiev [2]. — neomac

Where did you get the idea that Mearsheimer argues the Russians could install a puppet regime by capturing Kiev? — Tzeentch

Mearsheimer doesn’t explicitly talk about regime change in that video, all right. But he did it elsewhere:
You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine (March 1, 2022)
And it makes sense. What else would be the purpose of capturing the political capital of Ukraine be? Forcing a negotiation (so surrender) and/or regime change. One can’t exclude regime change.

Are you really going to stake your argument on a single line by Mearsheimer which he treats as no more than a passing comment? — Tzeentch

Don’t need to, but you used to support your claims that “It's equally unlikely that with such a small force they sought to both occupy and hold Kiev and install a puppet regime and occupy and hold the southern regions”. So that comment doesn’t seem to support such a claim of yours.

I'll repeat myself: it's obvious that Kiev was an interesting military and political target for the Russians. If they could have taken it at no cost they probably would have, for a myriad of possible reasons. However, the data from the battle does not indicate they were prepared to pay much of a cost at all, which puts into question the idea that their entire campaign hinged on capturing Kiev. — Tzeentch

I didn’t even exclude that “things may have evolved differently from what initially planned, and still be worth it”. The change might have happened any time over march. In any case, the reports talking about blitzkrieg in capturing Kiev are giving a meaningful time range of around three days.

I’m not over/underestimating anything because I’m relying on legit source reports. — neomac


Your own source, Seth G. Jones, states that subdueing a country's population with a force ratio of 4 to 1000 is woefully inadequate, regardless of what metric you pick. I've already rebutted your example of Afghanistan which serves as a clear example in favor of the case I am making. — Tzeentch

That’s evidently false, Seth G. Jones himself claims: “Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation.”
Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” (so there are some assumptions to make, to accept that formula)
https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare

And no source or argumentation is given - not very convincing. Mearsheimer contradicts Jones directly and gives a detailed argumentation as to why he believes the Russians did not aim for a classic blitzkrieg. — Tzeentch

Mearsheimer does not contradict Jones, because Mearsheimer is arguing against the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. If I’m reading more into Mearsheimer’s claims in that video, you do the same.

Except that I don't base my arguments on western media sources either. — Tzeentch

Really? Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? Did you count them yourself?

Mearsheimer doesn’t explicitly talk about regime change in that video, all right. But he did it elsewhere:
You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?
No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine (March 1, 2022) — neomac

This was a week into the war.

You're using statements made months apart, under entirely different circumstances and in both cases no actual argument is presented for your claim.

What else would be the purpose of capturing the political capital of Ukraine be? Forcing a negotiation (so surrender) and/or regime change. One can’t exclude regime change. — neomac

If the capture of Kiev would have forced a surrender and/or regime change, why was only a small portion of the Russian force dedicated to capturing it, and the Russians seemingly did not engage in heavy fighting in their operations around Kiev?

I don't believe capturing Kiev would have been decisive at all. With a sizable Ukrainian military and western support the war could have been carried on from elsewhere in the country, possibly even over the border from a NATO country.

Ironically, didn't Napoleon once invade Russia believing the capture of Moscow would end the war?

Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” — neomac

Ahem. From the very same article...

The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long.

____________________________

Mearsheimer does not contradict Jones, because Mearsheimer is arguing against the idea that Russia could conquer the entire of Ukraine. If I’m reading more into Mearsheimer’s claims in that video, you do the same. — neomac

Fair enough.

So the point of contention is whether regime change is a feasible option without occupying (the vast majority of) Ukraine.

I think it isn't because:
- The Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated.
- There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts.
- Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency throughout the entire country.

We've seen the United States try to enact regime change under much more advantageous conditions with no success.

Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? — neomac

The day-by-day campaign assessments by ISW. (note: not western media)

On February 26th, 2022 their report stated:

The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.

As you can see, these estimates are based on reports from the Ukrainian general staff.

31 BTGs each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.


As far as I know these numbers aren't being contested. If anything a western source would likely have a tendency to overstate rather than to understate Russian troop numbers. If they are being contested please show it to me and I might reconsider.

You keep focusing on the number of deployed ground troops as if my argument essentially hinges on that. But that’s not what I argued (nice strawman). Russia might have had a complex strategy wrt Kiev (based on different possible scenarios), which include regime change. — neomac

Tzeentch keeps desperately trying to argue this, which just shows his total lack of understanding just how deep Russian influence operations in Ukraine went. Prior to the February 2022 assault, there likely was a coup attempt in the works in Ukraine, hence that card was on the table before the conventional attack (but didn't go anywhere). And Russia had lots of willing Quislings on it's side, starting perhaps from Viktor Yanukovich himself.

And one should notice that afterwards the FSB department responsible for handling covert operations in Ukraine had it's leaders "heads dropping" in the spring 2022, obviously showing that they had botched the operation. Unlike in 2014, when the coordination between the intelligence services and the armed forces succeeded brilliantly.

how deep Russian influence operations in Ukraine went. — ssu

Evidence.

Prior to the February 2022 assault, there likely was a coup attempt in the works in Ukraine — ssu

Evidence.

Russia had lots of willing Quislings on it's side, starting perhaps from Viktor Yanukovich himself. — ssu

Evidence.

I guess everyone has different aspirations...

Chechnya's Kadyrov: one day I plan my own mercenary group
^{— Caleb Davis, Guy Faulconbridge · Reuters · Feb 19, 2023}

When my service to the state is completed, I seriously plan to compete with our dear brother Yevgeny Prigozhin and create a private military company. I think it will all work out. — Ramzan Kadyrov

As far as I can tell, there isn't a significant number of Chechens shooting in Ukraine, though they have been and are present. Kadyrov was among them around 2014. Most are doing the GKremlin's bidding.

• Chechen involvement in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine (Wikipedia)
• Kadyrovites » Ukraine (Wikipedia)

Apparently, some Russian military folk lament Biden visiting that "Russian territory" before Putin. :D

Almost a year after the beginning of the NWO, we were waiting in the Russian city of Kyiv for the president of the Russian Federation, and not the United States. — Notes of midshipman Ptichkin (Feb 20, 2023)

Hmm Could Putin stride about Moscow, Biden stride about Washington? Maybe, maybe not...
With the media shutdown/control in Russia, I wonder how much general access/information those military folk have.

On another note...

Russia targets Netherlands' North Sea infrastructure, says Dutch intelligence agency
^{— Anthony Deutsch, Bart Meijer, Hugh Lawson, Susan Fenton · Reuters · Feb 20, 2023}

Not really all that surprising.

Evidence. — Isaac

Lol! :rofl:

Are you serious? Do you have any remote idea of Ukrainian post-Soviet history? You really think Russia hasn't meddled in Ukrainian politics? Or in your mind just the West and the US do it?

(Ahh.. I forget that I'm talking to a guy who insists that the definition in the dictionary for imperialism is wrong.)

First of all, Russia has obvious interests towards Ukraine, and unfortunately Putin's Russia has chosen an aggressive, violent imperialistic stance here, not to build warm relations with a country that it has so many ties with. And that's the real tragedy: this war didn't had to happen as the last Soviet leaders avoided a civil war when the Soviet Union collapsed and things didn't go as in Yugoslavia. But Putin did what he did. So there wouldn't be good, warm relations between two countries that have so much in common. These ties include (from one article):

Family ties. Russia and Ukraine have strong familial bonds that go back centuries. Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, is sometimes referred to as “the mother of Russian cities,” on par in terms of cultural influence with Moscow and St. Petersburg. It was in Kyiv in the eighth and ninth centuries that Christianity was brought from Byzantium to the Slavic peoples. And it was Christianity that served as the anchor for Kievan Rus, the early Slavic state from which modern Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarussians draw their lineage.

Russian diaspora. Approximately eight million ethnic Russians were living in Ukraine as of 2001, according to a census taken that year, mostly in the south and east. Moscow claimed a duty to protect these people as a pretext for its actions in Crimea and the Donbas in 2014.

Superpower image. After the Soviet collapse, many Russian politicians viewed the divorce with Ukraine as a mistake of history and a threat to Russia’s standing as a great power. Losing a permanent hold on Ukraine, and letting it fall into the Western orbit, would be seen by many as a major blow to Russia’s international prestige. In 2022, Putin cast the escalating war with Ukraine as a part of a broader struggle against Western powers he says are intent on destroying Russia.

Crimea. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 to strengthen the “brotherly ties between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples.” However, since the fall of the union, many Russian nationalists in both Russia and Crimea longed for a return of the peninsula. The city of Sevastopol is home port for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the dominant maritime force in the region.

Trade. Russia was for a long time Ukraine’s largest trading partner, although this link withered dramatically in recent years. China eventually surpassed Russia in trade with Ukraine. Prior to its invasion of Crimea, Russia had hoped to pull Ukraine into its single market, the Eurasian Economic Union, which today includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

Energy. Moscow relied on Ukrainian pipelines to pump its gas to customers in Central and Eastern Europe for decades, and it paid Kyiv billions of dollars per year in transit fees. The flow of Russian gas through Ukraine continued in early 2023 despite the hostilities between the two countries, but volumes were reduced and the pipelines remained in serious jeopardy.

Political sway. Russia was keen to preserve its political influence in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly after its preferred candidate for Ukrainian president in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, lost to a reformist competitor as part of the Orange Revolution popular movement. This shock to Russia’s interests in Ukraine came after a similar electoral defeat for the Kremlin in Georgia in 2003, known as the Rose Revolution, and was followed by another—the Tulip Revolution—in Kyrgyzstan in 2005. Yanukovych later became president of Ukraine, in 2010, amid voter discontent with the Orange government.

And for anyone that actually is interested to know more about these actions, here are some links:

THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA ON GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES IN UKRAINE

And since you likely won't read, just a quote from the 2008 paper:

Ukraine remains vulnerable to subversive Russian influence deriving from cultural, structural, organisational and societal similarities, as well as from a deep connection between the business elites and populations of both countries. Since the Orange revolution, Russian-Ukrainian relations were increasingly shaped by conflicting political processes under way in both countries with Russia aiming to retain Ukraine within its sphere of influence by creating and strengthening anti-western platforms inside the country.

Russian Preinvasion Influence Activities in the War with Ukraine

Russia's modern-day KGB started massively expanding its Ukraine unit years before the invasion, hinting at a Putin plot long in the making: report

And prior to February 24th 2022:

Why Ukrainian forces gave up Crimea without a fight - and NATO is alert

10 facts you should know about russian military aggression against Ukraine

And the list could go on and on...

I can't find in there a single reference to...

a coup attempt in the works in Ukraine — ssu

... nor...

lots of willing Quislings on it's side, starting perhaps from Viktor Yanukovich himself. — ssu

Can you reference the source of those claims more clearly. A wall of text just looks like deliberate obfuscation. If you know where the evidence is, just quote it.

Also a considerable chunk of your 'evidence' comes directly from the US government or Ukrainian government sources. You can't seriously expect me to take those sources seriously in the circumstances.

This was a week into the war. You're using statements made months apart, under entirely different circumstances and in both cases no actual argument is presented for your claim. — Tzeentch

I’m talking about Mearsheimer only because you took him to support your claims, which I find questionable. Besides I’m less interested in the details of the military special operation than you seem to be. If Mearsheimer’s argument in that video was that 190K ground troops were not enough to conquer the entire Ukraine, why did Mearsheimer concede that Russians might have pursued the capture of Kiev knowing that they didn’t have enough troops to capture Kiev? And EVEN IF later Mearsheimer changed his views about regime change (something which is not evident since he keeps talking about capturing Kiev, the Ukrainian political capital) , why on earth would I discount Mearsheimer’s claims in the first week of the war if at that time he found already enough credible the idea that the Russians were pursuing a regime change (at least in the earliest days of the war) given that early estimates weren’t certainly supporting that belief?! I’m not discounting the possibility that over march Russians may have realised that their most optimistic plan (regime change) wasn’t achievable, so that they were left with other more workable options. But it would be a revisionist fallacy to infer Russian intentions at the beginning of the war from Russian intentions at later stages of the war, as you seem to do.

If the capture of Kiev would have forced a surrender and/or regime change, why was only a small portion of the Russian force dedicated to capturing it, and the Russians seemingly did not engage in heavy fighting in their operations around Kiev? I don't believe capturing Kiev would have been decisive at all. With a sizable Ukrainian military and western support the war could have been carried on from elsewhere in the country, possibly even over the border from a NATO country. — Tzeentch

I already answered, but if you keep dismissing my answers as baseless because they do not provide whatever evidence you would find compelling, what can I do about it?
If the Russians were relying on certain conditions like a military coup from within Ukraine and the population wasn’t so hostile (compare to the case of Crimea) and the logistic/coordination wasn’t so shitty and they manage to kill Zelensky, etc. things may have panned out differently for the Russians even with a small number of ground troops. As you suggested elsewhere the Russians had years to prepare for such war and a whole network of economic/state apparatus insiders to plot this with. So the likelihood of success depended on the cumulative effect of several factors in the most optimistic scenario the Russians might have had in mind at the beginning of the war. This is what I understood from different expert reports.
And any single evidence might be deemed only circumstantial if considered in isolation from all other factors and their background history.

Besides he’s claim is more cautious than yours: “There are no exact formulas for how many soldiers are required to hold conquered territory, but a force ratio of as many as 20 soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants has sometimes been necessary to pacify a hostile local population.” — neomac

Ahem. From the very same article...

The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long. — Tzeentch

Ahem. From the very same article: “Russia failed to achieve what was likely its main political objective: to overthrow the Kyiv government in a blitzkrieg military operation.”
So Jones’ claim (“The force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long”) doesn’t seem enough to assess what Russia likely intentions were (at least at the beginning of the war), as you do ! Jones is not arguing that since “the force ratio of Russian soldiers in Ukraine was far too small to hold territory—including cities—for long” therefore overthrowing the Kyiv government most certainly wasn’t the main political objective Russians and it would be outlandish to think otherwise, indeed he claims it was and they failed it.

So the point of contention is whether regime change is a feasible option without occupying (the vast majority of) Ukraine. I think it isn't because:
- The Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated.
- There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts.
- Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency.
We've seen the United States try to enact regime change under much more advantageous conditions with no success. — Tzeentch

OK but that’s your personal view. Maybe the Russians had different views. For example I wouldn’t exclude that the Russians might have considered the Malorossia region (Kiev) as less anti-Russian than the Western side of Ukraine (Galicia), giving them some hope to find less hostile masses. Or that Ukrainian military would have been less of a problem if part of it also in the highest ranks would have revolted against Zelensky. On the other side I wouldn’t exclude that the Ukrainians didn’t fully trust Western military aid, or they might have feared further mobilisation, escalations, involvement of additional Russian private militia, etc. from Russians.
In any case, I never said that regime change would have implied the end of the war.

Where did you get the estimates of the number of Russian troops were between 15000 and 30000? — neomac

The day-by-day campaign assessments by ISW. (note: not western media)
On February 26th, 2022 their report stated:
The Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate. The Ukrainian General Staff reported at 11am local time February 26 that Ukrainian forces halted 14 Russian BTGs northeast of Kyiv and that Russia has committed its northern reserves – an additional 17 BTGs – along this operational direction.
As you can see, these estimates are based on reports from the Ukrainian general staff.
31 BTGs each comprised of roughly 600 - 800 officers and soldiers amounts to roughly 21,000 troops.
As far as I know these numbers aren't being contested. If anything a western source would likely have a tendency to overstate rather than to understate Russian troop numbers. If they are being contested please show it to me and I might reconsider. — Tzeentch

Still Western source and no “tangible” evidence (you didn’t count them yourself, did you?). If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ?
The problem is not the lack of “tangible” evidence but a putative “blatant” incompatibility between the estimated number of ground troops and the estimated objective of the Russians. Yet if you find them so blatantly incompatible (because with 21,000 troops they couldn’t possibly overthrow Kiev’s regime), don’t you think that ISW would have noticed such blatant incompatibility? And once again, why did the Ukrainian feel threatened by 21k ground troops if this number was blatantly insufficient to capture Kiev, “Ukrainian military was never decisively defeated”, “There is/was plenty of anti-Russian/pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine, especially in the western parts”, “Western backing would likely counteract Russian influence in areas not held directly by the Russian military, if not outright create and fund a widespread insurgency”? Do you want me to believe that ISW, CSIS, WilsonCenter, RUSI, Ukrainian military experts don’t know the Russian military doctrine and couldn’t possibly think it was a maskirovka operation?
Again, the problem is not just that there is a “blatant” incompatibility, but that it appears to you a “blatant” incompatibility in light of your assumptions about the kind of war was fought in the first phase.

If I’m claiming that “Russia likely pursued regime change in the first phase of the war based on what has been reported”, I need to provide what has been reported. And I did. — neomac

No. If your claim is about likelihood, you need to provide some metric of likelihood (or prove that your record of 'what has been reported' is exhaustive). Without either, all you've shown is that it is plausible that Russia pursued regime change in the first phase of the war. You've not presented an argument regarding the claim that it was 'likely'. — Isaac

As already said, “likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. There is no formula about this. Just informal assessment about what I’ve read so far from different sources (which I partly linked). It’s like you talking about your experience, you can assess regularities and compare quantities, even without counting the exact amount of units, or computing and charting the actual stats. So at best I can try to explicit what kind of general criteria I consider to support such confidence on experts’ feedback, as I did. And what I could understand from there. But none of this will look like an academic review of course, nor does have to.

That is why we are making alternative sources of information available to you. If you ignore them, that's an issue of bias, not availability. — Isaac

No idea what you are referring to. In our most recent exchange Tzeentch didn’t point at any expert source for his “diversion” hypothesis, except for Mearsheimer. But we interpret Mearsheimer somewhat differently. In any case, I didn’t claim that Mearsheimer is running pro-Russian propaganda, nor deny that what he says in that video should be discounted or ignored.
Besides if Tzeentch can question experts, I can do the same. But, for the moment, he is the one questioning the experts I’m citing, while I’m just defending them.

Nonsense. You cite US government sources and those who cite them in turn, occasionally turning to Western mainstream media. None of these are "well reputed”. The US government have been shown time and time again to lie; with sources from military intelligence it is literally their job to lie (when it serves their country's interests). As to mainstream Western media, only recently has the Columbia Journalism Review written a damning report of press coverage regarding Russia, and here on the Ukraine war itself, The Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting group have written a considerable number of articles highlighting serious bias in press reporting (including specifically on Ukraine), not to mention the shocking level of blatant racism.
As I said. If you merely want to claim plausibility, it is sufficient that your sources meet a threshold of expertise (which military intelligence and sourced journalism would meet), but if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others, You've not even begun to make that argument. — Isaac

First, I didn’t cite only US government sources if you are referring to CSIS and WilsonCenter (why aren’t they “well reputed”? What are better reputed domain-specific sources?), I cited RUSI and Mearsheimer himself.
Second, I don’t know what to make about your hyperbolic skepticism about the US government or Western mainstream media. On one side Western people can also learn about the US administration’s lies from mainstream media and other US administrations. On the other, I don’t think that non-US and non-Western administrations and media are immune from accusations about their honesty. The same goes for non-mainstream and anti-system source, not mention that they can absolutely be infiltrated, exploited and financed by foreign powers. What one can infer from such predicament or how we may cope with it is up for debate. Certainly, I don’t need to unconditionally trust the sources I’m providing here, I’m fine with elaborating my understanding of the war from such sources and to what extent I find them compelling. Finally, as I repeated many times, I’m more interested in the geopolitical implications than in the military/intelligence details: even if the “diversion” hypothesis turned out to be correct, this may not significantly impact the main geopolitical implications of this war.
Third, you opportunistically jump into an exchange I had with another interlocutor to resume your most general objections in such a completely decontextualised way that demotivates any attempt to answer. For example, can you quote claims or objections of mine where your conditional (“if you want to claim 'likelihood' you need to show how your sources are more likely to be right than others”) is supposed to apply? Because I have no idea.

very interesting articles!

I just started to answer to your overall question:

how deep Russian influence operations in Ukraine went. — ssu

Evidence. — Isaac

But very well then, if you specifically want to about the coup 2022 attempt:

At the beginning of Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and recruited ATO veterans attempted to overthrow the Ukrainian government and install pro-Russian rule in various cities for their further surrender to the Russian Army. The coup plan was ultimately cancelled following the detainment of its participants by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).

Coup plan
Planning began no later than the summer of 2021. According to a detained agent who was set to participate in the coup, Russia was to send an appeal to current Ukrainian authorities and call on them to surrender; in the event that Ukraine declined, pro-Russian agents would stage a coup. The attempt would begin by creating incidents in Kyiv and along Ukraine's border with Transnistria, creating a pretext for invasion. Once the invasion started, agents would begin seizing administrative buildings in various Ukrainian cities, followed by the installation of pro-Russian leadership in them and the surrender and transfer of Ukrainian cities to Russian troops. Mass riots with the use of fake blood, clashing with law enforcement officers, terrorist attacks and assassination of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky were to also take place to further destabilize the situation. After the coup, the Verkhovna Rada would be dissolved and replaced by a pro-Russian "People's Rada" playing the role of a puppet government on the occupied territory of Ukraine and the newly created people's republics in Western Ukraine. A pro-Russian president was also to be installed in Ukraine.

The plan was eventually cancelled once the organiser and key persons of the plot were detained by the SBU in the Ivano-Frankivsk, Khmelnytskyi and Odesa Oblasts. Prior to their arrests, the agents managed to conduct one successful operation to ensure the capture of Chernobyl.

Of course, this coup attempt didn't happen as it was surfaced before. Naturally an unveiled coup plot has the obvious deniability of it not happening! And when there happened a full conventional invasion afterwards, possible coup plots aren't so important anymore. Other references:

More details emerge of alleged coup plot in Ukraine

Russia’s FSB agency tasked with engineering coups in Ukrainian cities, UK believes

Besides, it's totally logical for Putin to try a coup and when that option fails, the final "logical" option is an all-out conventional attack. Which happened on February 24th 2022.

But the obvious examples of the 2014 Ukrainian military leaders that became turncoats and landed in officer positions in the Russian military shows just how much ability to influence Ukraine Russia had. Hence the idea of a quick, short operation isn't as delirious as it now in hindsight can be seen.

You can't seriously expect me to take those sources seriously in the circumstances. — Isaac

I seriously don't consider you taking anything seriously. But I put the articles and links for others to look and make their mind, if they are interested on what Russia has actually done. You continue with your selected Mearsheimer quotes.

:up:

talking about Russian plots:

No specific evidence has been put forward to justify the two-step plan — https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/13/russias-fsb-agency-engineering-coups-ukrainian-cities

As already said, “likelihood” expresses to me an assessment of the degree of confidence. There is no formula about this. Just informal assessment about what I’ve read so far from different sources — neomac

Is there then a reason why you'd expect your "informal assessment" to be the same as anyone else's? You seem affronted by the fact that other people's views are different to yours. If you recognise it's all just "informal assessment" that should be expected.

CSIS — neomac

... seriously?

CSIS is funded largely by Western and Gulf monarchy governments, arms dealers and oil companies, such as Raytheon, Boeing, Shell, the United Arab Emirates, US Department of Defense, UK Home Office, General Dynamics, Exxon Mobil, Northrop Grumman, Chevron and others. — https://fair.org/home/nyt-reveals-think-tank-its-cited-for-years-to-be-corrupt-arms-booster/

WilsonCenter — neomac

... uh huh

Approximately one-third of the center's operating funds come annually from an appropriation from the U.S. government, and the center itself is housed in a wing of the Ronald Reagan Building, a federal office building where the center enjoys a 30-year rent-free lease. — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_International_Center_for_Scholars

RUSI — neomac

https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ourbeeb/why-is-bbc-presenting-rusi-as-objective-analysts-of-middle-east/

None of this is difficult to find. You just don't want to find it.

I don’t think that non-US and non-Western administrations and media are immune from accusations about their honesty. The same goes for non-mainstream and anti-system source, not mention that they can absolutely be infiltrated, exploited and financed by foreign powers. What one can infer from such predicament or how we may cope with it is up for debate. — neomac

It's really very, very simple. Don't dismiss dissent from mainstream views as if it were the notions of some conspiratorial nutters.

If mainstream outlets can't be trusted (and they definitely can't) then views which dissent from the mainstream are not compromised simply because of that dissent. It is not a 'mark against them' in terms of credibility.

Also a considerable chunk of your 'evidence' comes directly from the US government or Ukrainian government sources. — Isaac

Yet not all. Trails of (independent) evidence paint a picture and also suggests modus operandi, fingerprints, tell-tale tracks. The shamming, organized re-enculturation efforts, subversion (mentioned in the thread prior) are also parts thereof. And Girkin turned into an Achilles heel of deniability.

You can't seriously expect me to take those sources seriously in the circumstances. — Isaac

(Hmm poisoning the wells (plural)?)
Grabbing Crimea and eastern "insurgence" (followed by "annexation") are fairly hands-on type pieces of evidence, but a bit harder to hide/deny. :)
^{Feb 2014, Apr 2014, Nov 2014, Sep 2017, Jun 2018, Feb 2019, Sep 2022, Nov 2022}

The Nord Stream incident is less clear, which kind of makes it more interesting. (I'm still not quite convinced the saboteur(s) must be a state actor, for that matter.) Puzzle...

Trails of (independent) evidence paint a picture and also suggests modus operandi, fingerprints, tell-tale tracks. — jorndoe

Perhaps you could link to some? Despite truly bizarre assumptions to the contrary, the various governments are actually quite sophisticated in their 'information wars'. They don't tend to leave White House postmarks on their secret communiqués, or give anonymous tips to the newspaper calling themselves "Agent...I mean, Mr, Smith".

It's insufficient to simply point to a source that says it's independent. I don't want to shock delicate ears, but people have been known to lie sometimes. A little background checking (funding sources, affiliations, history) is the bare minimum requirement these days.

The shamming, organized re-enculturation efforts, subversion (mentioned in the thread prior) are also parts thereof.
...

Grabbing Crimea and eastern "insurgence" (followed by "annexation") are fairly hands-on type pieces of evidence — jorndoe

I don't see how. Pretty much all of Russia's actions so far which cannot be denied (the war itself, the sham referenda, the annexing, the bombing, the inhumanity...) are indicators of a ruthless country invading a neighbour. No one is disputing that simple fact. The dispute is over the question of why they invaded, and (more importantly) how best to bring the invasion to an end.

If the Russians were relying on certain conditions like a military coup from within Ukraine and the population wasn’t so hostile (compare to the case of Crimea) and the logistic/coordination wasn’t so shitty and they manage to kill Zelensky, etc. things may have panned out differently for the Russians even with a small number of ground troops. — neomac

190,000 troops is completely insufficient to control Ukraine. Everyone, even your own preferred experts, seem to agree on that. So we've made some progress.

Now we have two options:

Your option - that number is a product of astronomic Russian incompetence and wishful thinking. In other words: "the Russians are dummies".

My option - that number is a product of limited Russian goals.

Still Western source — neomac

Gee, really? You have a problem with western sources now? :roll:

If you rely on the estimate of “21,000 troops” from that report why don’t you rely on the claim “the Russian military’s main effort remains seizing Kyiv in an effort to force the Ukrainian government to capitulate” ? — neomac

Because those estimates are not being contested by anyone, while the claim is.

Are you really going to hide behind random objections like these?

This is getting a little childish.

OK but that’s your personal view. Maybe the Russians had different views. For example I wouldn’t exclude that the Russians might have considered the Malorossia region (Kiev) as less anti-Russian than the Western side of Ukraine (Galicia), giving them some hope to find less hostile masses. Or that Ukrainian military would have been less of a problem if part of it also in the highest ranks would have revolted against Zelensky. On the other side I wouldn’t exclude that the Ukrainians didn’t fully trust Western military aid, or they might have feared further mobilisation, escalations, involvement of additional Russian private militia, etc. from Russians. — neomac

That's a lot of "maybes".

Since you seem to like CSIS, here is an update they gave on the Russo-Ukrainian war on March 1st, 2022.



At several points in the video the topic of insurgency comes up.

Here's an amusing quote from one of the participants, starting at roughly 33:00.

Through indiscriminate killing of civilians and leveling cities Russian armed forces might eventually prevail, but they will have a lot of trouble in the urban areas trying to root out these many fighters, but much of [the Ukrainian armed forces] will survive.

And they have no prospects of being able to occupy the country. Putin has said (again you can't believe him) but he said he has no intention of occupying. So you think [with] the destruction that already happened, if we support an insurgency, and I know we'll get to this in a minute, Russian casualties will be through the roof.

This will be... This could be an insurgency that is bigger than our Afghan one in the 1980's in terms of things we could provide them that would really hurt the Russians.

And then if he pulls out, If he installs a puppet government, that government's not going to last hours. I don't see how they could control the territory.

What is amusing about this is that they are essentially making very strong arguments why the Russians probably did not intend to do any of these things.

The idea of a Russian puppet government is completely unfeasible to them, just like it is to me.

The only connection they fail to make is that the Kremlin was probably well aware of the risks they are describing, which is part of the reason, if not the reason, they pursued a limited aim strategy as described by Mearsheimer.


The connection you fail to make is that all these western sources have one thing in common - they all spin the "Russian incompetence" yarn. CSIS, as pointed out, is funded by the US government and the DoD - that could be a clear sign of bias, but perhaps it is just something so simple as intellectual arrogance or tunnel vision.

In any case, the contradictions in their analysis are plain for all to see, and I've been pointing them out repeatedly.

Do you want me to believe that ISW, CSIS, WilsonCenter, RUSI, Ukrainian military experts don’t know the Russian military doctrine and couldn’t possibly think it was a maskirovka operation? — neomac

Given the indicators that the northern operations of the Russian armed forces were not the main effort, I would expect them to openly discuss the possibility. I wonder why they don't. :chin: Maybe because it would make them look awful silly at this point.

_____________________________________________


Let's do a quick recap:


190,000 troops were insufficient to control large parts of Ukraine.


You argue instead that the Russians' main goal was to control Ukraine by installing a puppet in Kiev.


My objection to this is along two lines:

> A puppet regime is completely unfeasible under conditions that were known prior to the invasion. The amount of western influence in Ukraine, the threat of a western-backed insurgency, the lack of troops to maintain control, etc. Your experts at CSIS seem to believe a Russian puppet would have "lasted hours."

> The northern drive on Kiev in no way indicates either in its troop count or behavior that it comprised the Russians' main effort. If that had been the case we would have expected to see an attempt to overwhelm the Ukrainian defense through massed forces and firepower.

Note: I did not claim the drive was too small to capture Kiev, though it was likely too small to capture Kiev if any sizable Ukrainian defense was present, which likely there was since it's the Ukrainian capital, though the Ukrainian order of battle remains undisclosed.
Nor did I argue that the Russians didn't want Kiev. Just that the troop count and behavior does not imply the Russians were prepared to pay much of a cost to capture it, which in turn implies it was not of a high priority.


My alternative to this theory is as follows:

> Given the Russians' relatively low troop count in relation to the size of Ukraine and the Ukrainian military, their ambitions were likely limited to occupying strategically relevant areas in the south and east of Ukraine. Occupying small pieces of Ukraine mitigates the risk of insurgency.

> The drive on Kiev likely had multiple possible goals, the first of which was probably to try and force the West to negotiate. If this failed, the attack would still be functioning as a diversion to lure Ukrainian defenders away from the strategically relevant areas in the east/south. Had the Ukrainians left their capital largely undefended in favor of defending the east/south, Kiev could have been captured.



I've said all I have to say on the topic. I don't think further exchanges will yield much fruit, so I will leave it here. I suggest you try to make your case succinctly one last time like I did with my recap, so we end the conversation with a nice summary from both sides.

I don't see how. Pretty much all of Russia's actions so far which cannot be denied (the war itself, the sham referenda, the annexing, the bombing, the inhumanity...) are indicators of a ruthless country invading a neighbour. No one is disputing that simple fact. The dispute is over the question of why they invaded, and (more importantly) how best to bring the invasion to an end. — Isaac

Nah, I was commenting on Russia "influencing" Ukraine. Earlier covertly, insurgence'ly, all that, then when that started looking less and less promising, invasion. "Influence." Ruthless ✓, Machiavellian ✓, ... Now (theatrical) war-rallying at home ^{(The Telegraph, Newsweek)}. (Hmm Gotta' wonder what Putin would do with all that in case the diplomats came through with something...)

Hmm Gotta' wonder what Putin would do with all that in case the diplomats came through with something... — jorndoe

Well, yeah. That's a major problem for both sides. The more Putin portrays this as an existential battle for Russian pride, and the more the West portray Putin as nothing more than an evil supervillain bent on taking over the world, the further we get from a plausible negotiating position on either side, which literally every expert consulted agrees is the only way out of this.

Meyn opines:

What Putin’s speech reveals about his plans in Ukraine
^{— Colin Meyn · The Hill · Feb 21, 2023}

• Putin (paraphrased): The West is out to destroy Russia. It's a matter of life and death.
• Most others (including peace-mongers and diplomats): Huh?
• Zelenskyy (paraphrased): Hey hey I'm over here *finger*snap*, could you tell your soldiers to go home and leave us be already? Look over there *pointing*, we have rebuilding to do.

A couple or so continents are being accused of conspiring to destroy Russia.
Have to wonder how much of this was already in Putin's plan-decision-graph.

EDIT:

They intend to transform a local conflict into a phase of global confrontation. This is exactly how we understand it all and we will react accordingly, because in this case we are talking about the existence of our country. — Putin (Feb 21, 2023)

Notice how the rhetoric could be employed to justify whatever (including if Ukraine was to hand over their south + east). After all, it's about a couple or so continents conspiring to destroy Russia. And "accordingly"...

I think when Putin talks about the "destruction" of Russia, what he is talking about is the West seeking to end Russia as a great power. Of course with a typical narrative spin added to it.

Assuming that's what he means, he's not wrong. There are various respected western experts (Brzezinski for example) who argue that Russia without Ukraine and Crimea is not a great power. He states that pretty much verbatim in his book The Grand Chessboard.

Many (Sachs, Chomsky, Mearsheimer, etc.) also argue that a major reason behind NATO expansion was to contain Russia, and prevent it from rising back to great power status after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Brzezinski has even argued that the US should pursue NATO expansion precisely for this reason.

The idea that the West under US leadership sought to hamper Russia's rise to prominence is quite credible. I would even go so far as to say it's obvious.

, well, what they say (others on Putin's team as well) is what they want everyone to hear, including Jane and Joe Russian. They've talked about doom and destruction, a dire existential threat to Russia(ns). All the while doing a fair bit of that to Ukraine (Ukrainians) I might add. Their verbiage is distinctly political, often enough sufficiently vague/suggestive, with scattered fear-mongering, calls for hard nationalism, ... They'd be poor authoritarians otherwise. :)
(Incidentally, Brzezinski and whoever else confirm that Putin wants to assimilate Ukraine out of power aspirations.)

Anyway, wherewhen have we seen such moves before?

In May 2022, Bondarev wrote:

Minister Lavrov is a good illustration of the degradation of this system. In 18 years, he went from a professional and educated intellectual, whom many colleagues held in such high esteem, to a person who constantly broadcasts conflicting statements and threatens the world (that is, Russia too) with nuclear weapons!
Today, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not about diplomacy. It is all about warmongering, lies and hatred. — Boris Bondarev's resignation letter

Despite all their shortcomings, maybe Navalny and others ought to be allowed voices and participation, talk with Jane and Joe Russian, and in reasonable safety? Hopefully, no one suggests gagging Chomsky (or worse) similarly. :)

Hopefully, no one suggests gagging Chomsky (or worse) similarly. :) — jorndoe

Perish the thought...

https://scheerpost.com/2023/02/21/patrick-lawrence-totalized-censorship/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=patrick-lawrence-totalized-censorship