It may be that many see the entire idea of the 'ghost in the machine' as absurd in the context of neuroscience. However, on the other hand, there is the question as to what extent the nature of the senses is reliable, because it is open to question of altered perceptions, especially psychedelic experiences. These may be attributed to chemicals alone, or may raise the question of deeper states of 'mind.

In some ways the whole phenomenon of experiences of altered states of consciousness, including psychedelic experiences, could throw back the understanding of mind in the direction of idealism, such as Bergson's idea of -'mind at large', or the brain as a 'filter of consciousness', which may also be relevant in thinking of the nature of mind.

It can be asked to what extent is the brain and the conventional experiences of sensory reality the most 'real' and underlying perspective of reality, or the possibilities of any others. It may relate to the nature of concepts and the nature of reality, conceptually and metaphysically. In some ways, it may come down to what is the fundamental nature of reality? Is the idea of the 'ghost in the machine' one which is to be abandoned completely?

I've not read Ryle, so in deference to the specificity of your topic, I'll get my popcorn.

At the moment, I am finding the ideas of Ryle very helpful, and I am happy to share with you and anyone else who is interested. I nearly put the ideas onto the one on the poll on materialism, idealism and realism, but as it such a popular one, even though it started as a poll, I decided that the ideas of Ryle would probably get lost there entirely. My own reading of Ryle is that it raises the question of what is 'mind' in a fundamental way and the conception of consciousness itself.

Ryle traces the emergence of the idea of consciousness. He says,
'When the epistemologists' concept of consciousness first became popular, it seems to have been in part a transformed application of the Protestant notion of conscience...When Galileo and Descartes' representations of the mechanical world seemed to require that minds should be solved from mechanism by being represented as constituting a duplicate world, the need was felt to explain how the ghostly world could be ascertained, again without sensory perception.'
Ryle goes on to speak of how Locke understood inner states, and called this,
'supposed inner perception "reflection"(our introspection), borrowing the word "reflection" from the the familiar optical phenomenon of the reflections of faces in mirrors. The mind can "see" or look at it's own operations in the light given by themselves. The myth of consciousness is a piece of para-optics'.

In this way, Ryle is calling into question the idea of consciousness itself, especially in relation to what inner experience means and its significance in understanding the nature of 'reality', with the division of inner and outer being an important interface. He is questioning the nature of knowledge and how it connects to self-knowledge, which is such a crucial link in the interplay between subjective and objective understanding.

Gilbert Ryle taught Daniel Dennett and they both seem to be consciousness deniers which is a time wasting position.

I think Descartes was right that the only thing we can't doubt is that we exist (and that is based on us being conscious of our self.)

The external world is only a perception that we try and explore we cannot get behind perception and minds to some kind of perception free pure access to reality so everything we are exploring is some form of conscious state.
I think this favours idealism and solipsism but consciousness denial is the least plausible of all theories.

In his book "The Concept of mind" Ryle is very annoying and tiresome in his attempt to reframe of redefine words we use to describe mental states. Mental states are the only thing we have immediate infallible access to because we are directly a mental states all the time and they are private and subjective and immediate.

I think quibbling about definitions takes up a lot of philosophy. I think somethings existence does not rely in any way on how it is defined and it either exists or it doesn't.

If we are debating whether something exists there should be really good grounds to doubt its existence in my opinion.

The problem with mental states is that they are private and subjective so there seems to be no public objective way to analyse them.

I didn't realise consciousness was a thing until I was in my early twenties. I can't remembering anyone using the term consciousness throughout my childhood.

It is hard to think about something without a vocabulary or without a discourse being started. It doesn't mean I wasn't consciousness before I had the terminology. In a way science and philosophical investigation and language discovers what is already there (as opposed to limiting what can exist)

Funnily enough, I don't think that I reflected on the term consciousness that much until I began using this forum about 2 years ago. But, I was probably a dualist, and have questioned this, for better or worse. It can lead to tangents but I am hoping that reflection of such matters also leads to greater self-awareness, even though that idea may be open to philosophical speculation in it's own right.

I replied to your second post and see that, in the first, you describe how you have read Ryle's work and found it frustrating. I am finding it more helpful than not, mainly because so many writers I have read, such as Dennett, Pinker and B F Skinner seemed to dismiss introspection entirely. I came across Skinner during 'A' level psychology and have felt that so many psychologists dismiss introspection, which may be the fundamental seat of self-awareness and self-knowledge.

Is it fair to say the Ryle is attempting to conceptually synthesize matter and mind? In what way does this differ from "embodiment" (something with which I am quite familiar)?

Regarding inner-experience or the experience of consciousness itself, my own experience of that is clear and compelling. Your mileage may vary. I have no trouble at all when people claim there is no such thing as consciousness; speaking for themselves, I am sure they are correct.

dismiss introspection entirely — Jack Cummins

Yes. Introspection is subjective, hence not subject to empirical verification. Which makes it debatable, as in Philosophy, rather than established, as in Science. Ironically. established Science evolves as a new Paradigm succeeds an older worldview. Yet Materialism is still a common belief system, long after its classical atomic presumptions were turned into mental mush by Quantum Science. That's why the role of Consciousness in quantum physics is still debated, long after the practical applications of quantum queerness have become routine. :smile:

That is the basis of Ryle's idea of the category mistake. He argues that, 'the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but not dissipated by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way'. — Jack Cummins

Ryle's criticism is valid in saying that Descartes' division of 'mind and matter' has absurd consequences by proposing 'res cogitans' as a literal 'thinking thing' with no extension - how then can it contact or interact with extended but mindless matter?

But the downside of Ryle's criticism has been the tendency to dismiss the concept of mind altogether, which you see in its most extreme form in Daniel Dennett (who incidentally studied under Ryle at Oxford.) This has lead to the 'post-Cartesian' attitude prevalent in much English-speaking philosophy which tends toward materialist theories of mind, i.e. that mind is a product of brain, itself a product of evolutionary biology, itself a product of undirected physical laws, and so on.

When considering Behaviorism, I think it is helpful to decouple what Descartes claims from how he proceeds. The mind/body distinction he develops happens because of the conversation he is having with himself. Developmental Psychology diverged in many different directions because of different ideas about personal agency and whether this talking to oneself was central to the events or a byproduct of some kind. That is a different starting point than wondering whether a given self can 'introspect'.

In that regard, the antithesis of Skinner is not given by the likes of William James but from LS Vygotsky. Vygotsky looked at how children talking to themselves changed in relation to being able to talk with others. Vygotsky did call for methods other than introspection to investigate the phenomena. But the limits of 'self-reporting' was a discovery made during the investigation, not information as Skinner assumed was the case before making his claims.

[T]o what extent is Ryle's thinking compatible with nondualistic philosophy perspectives? — Jack Cummins

What exactly do you mean by "nondualistic"?

Is the idea of the 'ghost in the machine' one which is to be abandoned completely? — Jack Cummins

I think it had been decisively dismissed back in the 17th c. by Spinoza's dissolution of Descartes' MBP (substance dualism). Most philosophers have been in denial of this for almost three centuries even despite the ascent of cognitive sciences and methodological physicalism in the last several decades. It's been decades since I've read Ryle, but I recall appreciating his analytical deflation of "mind" and "consciousness" which probably inspired Dennett's methodological elimination of "qualia" from prospective empirical inquiries into the nature / mechanisms of 'phenomenal metacognition' (or consciousness).

I think Descartes was right that the only thing we can't doubt is that we exist ... — Andrew4Handel

I read Descartes' "Cogito" as demonstrating nothing more than this: 'when doubting, one cannot doubt that one is doubting' (i.e. I thnk, therefore thinking exists.) :chin:

I read Descartes' "Cogito" as demonstrating nothing more than this: 'when doubting, one cannot doubt that one is doubting' (i.e. I thnk, therefore thinking exists.) :chin: — 180 Proof

So, more of a closet one is stuck within than a theater with a show.

I don't think this follows (or I'm not understanding your comment).

Pardon me. I was contrasting the minimum of what was acknowledged as you described it with the grand scope of possibilities discussed afterwards by Descartes.

It is likely that many on the forum have read Ryle's work, so to what extent does his critique throw important light on the mind and body connection? — Jack Cummins

Ryle's critique reframes the mind/body debate. As you may know, Ryle was part of the ordinary language philosophy movement which included other luminaries such as Wittgenstein and Austin. As Ryle points out in his introduction:

This book offers what may with reservations be described as a theory of the mind. But it does not give new information about minds. We possess already a wealth of information about minds, information which is neither derived from, nor upset by, the arguments of philosophers. The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess. — The Concept of Mind - Gilbert Ryle

To give a sense of what this might entail, here is one of Ryle's examples of a category mistake:

A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks ‘But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University.’ It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their co-ordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum and the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the University’ stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong. — The Concept of Mind - Gilbert Ryle

Ryle points out that the foreigner's puzzle arose from his inability to understand how to use the concept of 'the University'. Note that there are at least two different ways the foreigner may have gone wrong here and, together, they demonstrate the hold that the 'Ghost in the Machine' metaphor can have on us. If the foreigner can't see the university, then perhaps it is something unseen - the ghost. That doesn't seem right, so perhaps it is reducible to the buildings he does see - the machine. So the foreigner may exorcise the ghost, leaving just the machine. But when that turns out to be unsatisfactory, the ghost soon returns to haunt the machine. And so the puzzle remains unresolved.

The solution is to recognize that these are false alternatives. Instead the university is the way in which all that the foreigner has already seen is organized. That is, the university is something we can see by virtue of being creatures with minds.

I definitely see links between Ryle's understanding of the link between mind and matter and the nature of embodiment. In the last few months I read a few works in the phenomenological tradition and embodiment as expressed here does seem to be about such a fusion. I guess the other side of the issue is whether there is any possible separation, which goes back to Descartes' own thinking. Of course, a dead body is a dead body but I have heard anecdotal stories of people sensing a spirit leaving the body, but what that represents is open to question.

Ryle points out that the foreigner's puzzle arose from his inability to understand how to use the concept of 'the University' — Andrew M

But Ryle is creating a straw man because no one thinks like that.


In the UK we have The Open University where you study from home.

I think most people understand that a University is more than just a collection of buildings and that it is not just one building but a learning institution with a wide reach.
It is not synonymous with the problem of squaring mental states with brain states and physicality with non physicality.

It is like Ryle is pulling the wool over peoples eyes to convince them that consciousness is somewhere among all the physical things we are acquainted with if we look at them in a different way. But it isn't.

The surprising fact is that all we have access to is mind. We cannot know what anything is like independent of mind.
Things you think are physical must be mental entities because they are within your consciousness.

Really strong sensations such as pain are only in the mind because it doesn't make sense for pain to exist outside of mind? What form would pain outside the mind take?

When you are deeply unconscious like I have been you are not aware of anything. Even the smallest most inconsequential seeming entity must be accessed by a mind.

The Physics picture of matter is apparently largely empty space, fields and mathematical entities.

I guess that I am interested in questioning the various perspectives on the mind and body question, as it is such a perplexing philosophical issue. I am not sure that I completely agree with his approach on introspection but I can see that he presents a valid argument. Self-knowledge through introspection is limited and open to doubt. I am sure that others' views of me are probably different from my own thoughts. Others' perspectives may be important as there are so many others, although those viewpoints would probably not be identical. But, with self-knowledge although it may be useful to know others' perceptions, including one's own blindspots, I have more time to devote to knowing myself. For that reason, I like to, as far as possible, be my own therapist.

The fact that we all view everything with our own minds is a central aspect of philosophy. Mind is inherent in all thought and I believe that Thomas Nagel argued this in, 'A View From Nowhere'. It makes the issue of objectivity itself problematic.

I definitely see links between Ryle's understanding of the link between mind and matter and the nature of embodiment. In the last few months I read a few works in the phenomenological tradition and embodiment as expressed here does seem to be about such a fusion. I guess the other side of the issue is whether there is any possible separation, which goes back to Descartes' own thinking. Of course, a dead body is a dead body but I have heard anecdotal stories of people sensing a spirit leaving the body, but what that represents is open to question. — Jack Cummins

I find information to be an illustrative analogy. Information can be encoded in any number of ways, so in some sense, the nature of the information is entirely independent of the nature of its encapsulation. Form versus substance. On the other hand, consider analog computers. In them there is a functional relationship between the nature of the information encoded and the physical form and the function of the information encoded - the embodied form of that information. Analog computers can be very efficient and very effective at doing specific things. They can instantly parallel-compute the solution to complex problems, as in fire-control systems, for example.

I come from the perspective of reading Dennett's ideas, which are so different from my own and that is why I think about it a lot. When I had a few out of body experiences on the borderline of sleep and on the two occasions when I took LSD I definitely had the sense of a separation between body and mind. This may have been a chemically induced illusion but it was certainly what I experienced.

Apart from the actual experiences the reason why I took acid a second time was I did feel that I had not got back into my body properly. At the time, I was starting my nursing training and others did notice my coordination difficulties. Also, I have always felt a little out of my body and it is as if I have to get into my body in order to do tasks. A couple of managers' queried my slightly delayed reaction times at times and it was extremely difficult to try to explain that I had to get into my body properly!

I had never thought of it as information until I read a couple of threads on this site on consciousness and information. To some extent, that perspective works, but what seems to be missing is both sentience and narrative identity in the construction of an autobiographical sense of self identity.

That is, the university is something we can see by virtue of being creatures with minds. — Andrew M

I think Ryle, (and certainly I,) would prefer to say that the university is something that we do together; if the building is lost, and the library burns, we can meet under a tree for a tutorial on whatever we can remember of the course. The ghost is the transient interaction that takes place in the machine of the facilities, which are there to facilitate the educational and researching goings-on, that constitute the university.

It is not synonymous with the problem of squaring mental states with brain states and physicality with non physicality. — Andrew4Handel

I think Ryle would say that talk of mental states and brain states is also confused talk. A brain that is in a state is a dead brain; a living brain is a brain that is interacting with itself, its body and its environment, and it is these interactions that constitute the mind.

It is an unfortunate locution for his thesis that the solution to the problem of the ghost in the machine can be easily formulated as "machines are real and ghosts are not." This is clearly not the conclusion he wants us to reach. To discover the real university is to join the university, not to do a tour of the buildings.

I see the husband and the wife, but where is their marriage?

I had never thought of it as information until I read a couple of threads on this site on consciousness and information. To some extent, that perspective works, but what seems to be missing is both sentience and narrative identity in the construction of an autobiographical sense of self identity. — Jack Cummins

Not just information, though, embodied information. Substance is meaningless without some kind of form, form without some kind of substance. I see information as a constituent of consciousness, but I wouldn't reduce consciousness to information.

I haven't read Yglotsky but I did begin reading Skinner's philosophy while I was studying psychology 'A' level. If anything, it seemed that he underplayed the role of inner experience, especially reflective self-awareness. We can question our own motives and look at these, which makes the whole issue relevant to that of free will. Behaviorism may be compatible with determinism, and it may come down to the actual reflective moment of choice. In some ways, the reflective element could be seen as connected to previously learned responses. On the other hand, it may depend on the level of self creation in the process of intentionality.

Why not letting science weigh in on this issue?

Giving Up on Consciousness as the Ghost in the Machine
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8121175/

Skinner certainly "underplayed the role of inner experience." He denied that it caused any outcomes. But it is not a 'determinism' because it is possible to change the environment that produces behavior.

Vygotsky saw the development of the individual as dialogical process. The capability is a cause that is interwoven with experience but not an agent that exists independently as a Cartesian ego before experience occurs.

I know that you think that Spinoza's understanding of substance dualism is important. However, you seemed to agree with me that his writing is not the best place for this. So, which authors do you think offer a good overview of his approach?