Yes. Introspection is subjective, hence not subject to empirical verification. Which makes it debatable, as in Philosophy, rather than established, as in Science. Ironically. established Science evolves as a new Paradigm succeeds an older worldview. Yet Materialism is still a common belief system, long after its classical atomic presumptions were turned into mental mush by Quantum Science. That's why the role of Consciousness in quantum physics is still debated, long after the practical applications of quantum queerness have become routine. :smile:dismiss introspection entirely — Jack Cummins
That is the basis of Ryle's idea of the category mistake. He argues that, 'the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but not dissipated by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way'. — Jack Cummins
What exactly do you mean by "nondualistic"?[T]o what extent is Ryle's thinking compatible with nondualistic philosophy perspectives? — Jack Cummins
I think it had been dismissed back in the 17th c. by Spinoza's decisively dissolution of Descartes' MBP (substance dualism). Most philosophers have been in denial of this for almost three centuries even despite the ascent of cognitive sciences and methodological physicalism in the last several decades. It's been decades since I've read Ryle, but I recall appreciating his analytical deflation of "mind" and "consciousness" which probably inspired Dennett's methodological elimination of "qualia" from prospective empirical inquiries into the nature / mechanisms of 'phenomenal metacognition' (or consciousness).Is the idea of the 'ghost in the machine' one which is to be abandoned completely? — Jack Cummins
I read Descartes' "Cogito" as demonstrating nothing more than this: 'when doubting, one cannot doubt that one is doubting' (i.e. I thnk, therefore thinking exists.) :chin:I think Descartes was right that the only thing we can't doubt is that we exist ... — Andrew4Handel
It is likely that many on the forum have read Ryle's work, so to what extent does his critique throw important light on the mind and body connection? — Jack Cummins
This book offers what may with reservations be described as a theory of the mind. But it does not give new information about minds. We possess already a wealth of information about minds, information which is neither derived from, nor upset by, the arguments of philosophers. The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess. — The Concept of Mind - Gilbert Ryle
A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks ‘But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University.’ It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their co-ordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum and the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the University’ stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong. — The Concept of Mind - Gilbert Ryle
Ryle points out that the foreigner's puzzle arose from his inability to understand how to use the concept of 'the University' — Andrew M
I definitely see links between Ryle's understanding of the link between mind and matter and the nature of embodiment. In the last few months I read a few works in the phenomenological tradition and embodiment as expressed here does seem to be about such a fusion. I guess the other side of the issue is whether there is any possible separation, which goes back to Descartes' own thinking. Of course, a dead body is a dead body but I have heard anecdotal stories of people sensing a spirit leaving the body, but what that represents is open to question. — Jack Cummins
That is, the university is something we can see by virtue of being creatures with minds. — Andrew M
It is not synonymous with the problem of squaring mental states with brain states and physicality with non physicality. — Andrew4Handel
I had never thought of it as information until I read a couple of threads on this site on consciousness and information. To some extent, that perspective works, but what seems to be missing is both sentience and narrative identity in the construction of an autobiographical sense of self identity. — Jack Cummins
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