and if "empirical" denotes how something is experienced or appears to us — 180 Proof
transcendental idealism and not empirical realism better describes Kant. — Hanover
Well, that's not the common view. Where did you get this from, or is it just yours? — Banno
Idealism in sense (1) has been called “metaphysical” or “ontological idealism”, while idealism in sense (2) has been called “formal” or “epistemological idealism”. The modern paradigm of idealism in sense (1) might be considered to be George Berkeley’s “immaterialism”, according to which all that exists are ideas and the minds, less than divine or divine, that have them.
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We thus agree with A.C. Ewing, who wrote in 1934 that all forms of idealism
"have in common the view that there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience, and this might perhaps be taken as the definition of idealism..."
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We also agree with Jeremy Dunham, Iain Hamilton Grant, and Sean Watson when they write that
"the idealist, rather than being anti-realist, is in fact … a realist concerning elements more usually dismissed from reality. (Dunham, Grant, & Watson 2011: 4)"
namely mind of some kind or other: the idealist denies the mind-independent reality of matter, but hardly denies the reality of mind....
Metaphysical arguments proceed by identifying some general constraints on existence and arguing that only minds of some sort or other satisfy such conditions...
Materialist views say that, despite appearances to the contrary, mental states are just physical states.
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Idealist views say that physical states are really mental.
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Dualist views (the subject of this entry) say that the mental and the physical are both real and neither can be assimilated to the other.
But then if nothing is external, the difference between internal and external dissipates. — Banno
Kastrup seems to be swimming in the same esoteric waters that my own thesis merely dabbles in.I will admit I am interested in Bernardo Kastrup's 'analytical idealism'. — Wayfarer
Sure. The question remains, what is external doing in the phrase "external reality"? — Banno
Also not following how you got "idealism as simply being a substance monism" from "all that exists are ideas and the minds, less than divine or divine, that have them" or "there can be no physical objects existing apart from some experience, and this might perhaps be taken as the definition of idealism..", " the idealist denies the mind-independent reality of matter", or "Metaphysical arguments proceed by identifying some general constraints on existence and arguing that only minds of some sort or other satisfy such conditions"... even on bold.
Some Aristotelian notion of substance, I suppose. — Banno
Substance monism asserts that a variety of existing things can be explained in terms of a single reality or substance. Substance monism posits that only one kind of substance exists, although many things may be made up of this substance, e.g., matter or mind.
IF Kant is an "empirical realist",
and if "empirical" denotes how something is experienced or appears to us
and if Kant's ding-an-sich, or "in itself", denotes reality,
THEN, for the "empirical realist", appearances (i.e. "phenomena") are reality – or only aspects of reality;
THEREFORE, "for us"-"in itself" is a distinction without a difference either epistemically or onticly.
My re-question:
Where does my thinking about (the implications of) Kant's "empirical realism" go wrong? :chin: — 180 Proof
There is of course the basic dualistic character of Kant's philosophy in the sense of phenomena/ noumena or for us/ in itself, but that just reflects the ineliminably dualistic nature of all our thinking, and in no way entails substance dualism. — Janus
I read Kant's "dualistic thinking" as (an attempt at) 'ontologizing epistemology' (i.e. reify knowing) by designating "for us" the tip "phenomena" of the iceberg "in itself" above the water line "noumena". So on what grounds does Kant posit the "in itself" from which he then conjures-up the "for us" to 'retro-construct' with various "transcendental" sleights-of-mind? — 180 Proof
It's an interesting question whether Kant's "in itself" denotes a reality — Janus
controversy as to whether Kant's emprical/ transcendental dichotomy should be interpreted as a "dual aspect" or a "dual world" proposition. — Janus
“…. The schema of reality is existence in a determined time….”
“…. For I can say only of a thing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and experience….”
“…. we can have no cognition of an object, as a thing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as phenomenon…”
Put them together, you get an affirmation that the thing in itself denotes an existence in a determined time. — Mww
If there is no direct knowledge of the world, but only of its representations, there is no need for a dual world. There is one world affecting the senses, half of a dual aspect, and the system by which it is understood, the other half. — Mww
where does that leave us? — Janus
If #1…..not so sure a reality is a collective representation.
If #2…..real, and indeterminable.
If #3….that object which appears to us is determinable/knowable. The object in itself is the object as it doesn’t appear, hence is not determinable/knowable.
————- — Mww
It will then point out that whatever you claim is an ultimate constituent or object, can be nothing other than a consistent form of experience, something that appears invariant through time in your experience of the world. And that's not to deny the reality of such experiences - they're repeatable, governed by laws, observable by third parties, and so on. But they're all ultimately experiential in nature, that than ultimately material in nature. — Wayfarer
how does it show that the elements of experience have any ultimate material constituent? — Wayfarer
Materialism takes many forms - as does idealism - but it must rely on there being some ultimately real object or thing, which comprises the basic constituent of all other things. — Wayfarer
You agree the object in itself is transcendental (to experience) and real….so why not transcendental realism? — Janus
I'm not an adherent, so not what I had in mind. — Janus
As to why not transcendental realism, is the assignment of a mere conception alone to validate a physical object, and as we all know, conception alone is in no way sufficient for empirical knowledge. On the other hand, the fact of perception makes explicit the reality necessary for its cause, which makes the thing in itself a necessary antecedent condition, even if nothing can be known of it in itself, insofar as it is the representation only, of the thing in itself, that is. — Mww
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