We sure do, and not a slight difference either. "...completely arbitrary,...assumed, ...existing only in the minds which assume them." As I read you, this is your bottom line. The ultimate reality of truth is just no reality at all. — tim wood

But the reality of "truth" as "no reality at all" is not my bottom line. The bottom line is that the reality of truth, is that truth is entirely within the mind. Remember how we've progressed through this discussion. You first suggested truth was a attitude. I responded that it's an attitude of honesty. Isn't "attitude" within the mind? So I described it as subject matter, which is in the mind. But you keep wanting to put the "matter" or substance of truth outside the mind.

All I am doing is trying to bring your attention to the inconsistency in your approach. Why do you have this feeling, that "truth" must be explained through some outside force, when you keep returning to internal aspects to explain truth? I look at this as either a mistake, or downright dishonesty. You describe something by referring to the internal, yet you claim that there's got be something external here or it doesn't make sense. Why do you insist on this external aspect of truth? It appears as an unsupported prejudice which is completely unnecessary. Where do you pull this necessity for the external from?

How do you square this with any notion of reality? Let's look a little deeper: a rock hits you. You're angry (say), at what, at whom, for what? It's all just completely arbitrary assumptions on your part that exist only in your mind.It must needs be that you are angry at, and can be angry only at, yourself (never mind the problems with that notion). Nor are you rescued by the possibility of the existence of indeterminacies; after all, such indeterminacies can only be conjectural. — tim wood

Why be angry? Was the rock thrown with intent? If so you have reason to be angry, but the anger is caused by, and directed at the intent which threw the rock. There is no anger toward the rock. The rock was just the passive means by which the bad intent was carried out. If there is no intent, if the rock just fell, or you stubbed your toe, there is no reason to direct anger at the rock, you could only be angry with yourself. So it appears like you want to bring ager into the scenario where there is no warrant for anger. Its totally unreasonable to be angry at a rock, so I cannot accept your example as such.

I say, on the other hand, that true-ness is a real property, of propositions. — tim wood

You have an issue with "meaning" to overcome here. An utterance consists of a collection of symbols, having physical existence which can hit you like a rock. What is judged for trueness is an interpretation of the utterance. I'm sure that you respect the difference between the physical existence of the symbols and the interpretation of the symbols. The physical symbols themselves cannot be judged for truth.

There are some who claim that "proposition" refers to a mysterious conflation of physical symbols with interpretation, as if the physical symbols exist with an interpretation attached to them. You and I, tim wood, know that this is not the case. This could not be reality, it is impossible that there is a interpretation attached to the physical symbols when they hit you like the rock, because it requires a mind to interpret. So if you insist that a proposition exists in this way, as a set of symbols with an attached interpretation, I will insist that you are being dishonest. Therefore we must give up this idea "that true-ness is a real property, of propositions". The collection of symbols needs to be interpreted in order that it may be judged as true or false. Truth of falsity is attributed to the interpretation, and therefore true-ness is a real property of the interpretation.

So if true-ness is attributed to the interpretation, and the interpretation is within the mind, how do you get truth out of the mind? We could assume that the physical words, which hit you like a rock, have meaning inherent within them, but it is the essence of meaning that it must be interpreted before it can be judged. And it is an inherent property of meaning, that it may be interpreted in various ways depending on one's perspective. This is the fact which relativity theories employ. The meaning, or information which is inherent within the physical world will be interpreted in different ways depending on the perspective. Since meaning is interpreted in various ways, how can we get to a truth which is attributed to meaning itself rather than to an interpretation of that meaning?

So we come to an elemental recognition: true-ness is a function of meaning. Probably we knew this all along, but just failed to make it explicit. Where I think you have gone astray is by descending into sub-minimal considerations. I'm thinking that a sign of that confusion is when the real becomes unreal, it's "turtles all the way down," or when the ordinary becomes impossible. Does this put us on one page? — tim wood

No, see this is the root of our difference in opinion. True-ness cannot be a function of meaning, because it is an essential property of meaning that it can be interpreted in various ways. That is why I keep stressing the importance of indeterminateness. Meaning itself is indeterminate, requiring an interpretation as a mode of determination, in order that we can have any sort of truth. So true-ness is really a function of the interpretation. It cannot be a function of meaning itself, because meaning like information, and everything else with physical existence, (i.e. the entire physical world), must be interpreted before truth can be attributed to the interpretation.

But the reality of "truth" as "no reality at all" is not my bottom line. The bottom line is that the reality of truth, is that truth is entirely within the mind. — MU

You run close along the line of saying everything is in the mind. But I don't think that's you. Is it? I half agree with, and in that half, completely. That is, I think truth is a creature of mind. And I agree that nothing out there in physical reality is either true or truth. But I think you're putting both halves in mind and nothing out there. And maybe you're right, but that's radical, don't you think? And if you agree, don't you think that kind of radical understanding of truth needs rigorous demonstration?

I'm looking for the something out there that grounds truth, makes it a) possible, b) sensible, and maybe c) singular. Let's take a brick of the yellow metal, gold. Clearly everything that is understood about gold is in the mind. But are you willing to exchange what I call real dollars for my mental gold? Of course not. There has to be something out there in reality that corresponds to the gold, that just is gold as understood. That you might be interested in exchanging for, at a good price. Any discussion about how we know it's gold, or how we know anything, is here simply the wrong discussion. (Maybe the right discussion somewhere else.)

Generalizing, I think that for each true statement, there is something out there that corresponds to it, and grounds it. "There is a horse," is true if there just is a horse there, and not otherwise. And let's not be distracted by or get lost in notions of real v. fake horses, or how we know it's a horse, or are just mistaken, and so forth. We presuppose we can determine if a horse is there - the question being is it there, or not.

With true statements about ideas, that themselves have no physical counterpart, I'll simply retreat to the notion of demonstration, which can always be rendered in a physical form. That is, the thing not strictly in the mind can be "out there" in the sense of the demonstration of ideas, and must be in the sense of the horse. So far, all this seems simple, intuitive, practical.

Maybe I should check here - agreement so far? If not, I must accuse you of ignoring the practical side of all of this. "Practical" sounds second rate, I know, but it's actually the best that can be done in its own arena - and this question of truth is in the practical arena.

If we agree so far, that only leaves the question of the singular aspect of truth, if it has one (that isn't trivial). Again, I agree completely with half of your idea: that truth is in the mind. Is there any singular thing "out there" that corresponds to and grounds it? Or is it a many (out there)? Or is it not there at all?

Did you take note of my short reply to Terrapin Station? In that I referenced the (ancient) idea that universals - of which I think truth is one - can refer to something, have meaning, but denote nothing at all. I'm almost there, but if it's true it has large implications for the use of universals in ordinary language.

---

No, see this is the root of our difference in opinion. True-ness cannot be a function of meaning, because it is an essential property of meaning that it can be interpreted in various ways. That is why I keep stressing the importance of indeterminateness. Meaning itself is indeterminate, requiring an interpretation as a mode of determination, in order that we can have any sort of truth. So true-ness is really a function of the interpretation. It cannot be a function of meaning itself, because meaning like information, and everything else with physical existence, (i.e. the entire physical world), must be interpreted before truth can be attributed to the interpretation. — MU

Meaning is out of court, here, except in the practical sense. If you're going to argue that we cannot really know anything, then I invite you back to the horse and the gold: at some point we know as a practical matter, and correctly, that the horse is a horse and the gold is gold.

True-ness is the quality - truth - of a single true proposition. Qua itself, it cannot be interpreted in various ways (except in error). The proposition itself may give rise to different truths, but each in itself is univocal with respect to that truth.

Now, it may be we're saying the same thing. Let's check. In this context I presuppose that indeterminateness is in the mind, and that it can be resolved into one or more determinatenesses, given appropriate effort. And there is no truth until that task is completed for at least the indeterminateness in question.

If it cannot be resolved, then no truth can come from it (other than, perhaps, that it's unresolvable).

I have a new version of truth (grown from this discussion): truth is the capacity for a proposition to be grounded, in a practical sense, outside the mind, whether in exemplification or demonstration. Which seems just another way of saying that truth is the collection of singular true-nesses.

I think we can cut through a whole lot of bullshit about belief and truth by looking at the etymology of "true". It has to do with trust.

Belief is a form of trust/expectation - trust/expectation that the world is the way words propose the world is. And that's all it is, it's not a form of knowledge, nor is knowledge a modified form of belief.

Knowledge is more like "aperiodic crystals" (language, symbols, digits, DNA, etc.) that have an objective structure, that's mediated through our habits (how we "take" those symbols, how we use them, how we embody their instructions) that induce us into particular ways of interacting with the world, with particular expectations and trusts, that are either satisfied or baulked.

True is what's trustworthy.

From Wikipedia :
The English word truth is derived .... perhaps ultimately from PIE (Proto-Indo-European language) *dru- "tree", on the notion of "steadfast as an oak".
So I like to think that something is true if I know it as undoubtedly as I do that there is a tree in front of me.

You run close along the line of saying everything is in the mind. But I don't think that's you. Is it? I half agree with, and in that half, completely. That is, I think truth is a creature of mind. And I agree that nothing out there in physical reality is either true or truth. But I think you're putting both halves in mind and nothing out there. And maybe you're right, but that's radical, don't you think? And if you agree, don't you think that kind of radical understanding of truth needs rigorous demonstration? — tim wood

I'm not saying that everything is in the mind, just that truth is in the mind. Truth is what defines the terms. It is true that a square is an equilateral rectangle. It is true that pi is the ratio between the circumference of a circle and the diameter. It does not matter whether or not one of these things (circle or square) exists in the world. And these are not tautologies, they are definitions. They form the means by which we create these objects (squares and circles) in the world, and the means by which we recognize objects according to these names.

I'm looking for the something out there that grounds truth, makes it a) possible, b) sensible, and maybe c) singular. Let's take a brick of the yellow metal, gold. Clearly everything that is understood about gold is in the mind. But are you willing to exchange what I call real dollars for my mental gold? Of course not. There has to be something out there in reality that corresponds to the gold, that just is gold as understood. That you might be interested in exchanging for, at a good price. — tim wood

Truth is "grounded" by justification. When we draw a square, we demonstrate yes, it is possible to have such a figure. We draw a circle and demonstrate that it is possible to have this figure. The described figure is justified. These acts justify the definitions, and the truth is grounded. Everything which we know about gold, all those truths, are all justified by our dealings with gold in the world.

Any discussion about how we know it's gold, or how we know anything, is here simply the wrong discussion. — tim wood

But this is where I think you are really missing the point. The discussion of how we know it's gold is really the relevant discussion. This is where we find the essence of truth, how we know that a thing is actually the proper thing to be called by the name we are using to refer to it. If it is fools gold, then there is no truth to us calling it gold, and all the conclusions we make about its value will be wrong. Therefore how we know that it's gold is of the highest importance, because if it isn't gold yet we are calling it gold, this is an untruth which could have catastrophic consequences.

Generalizing, I think that for each true statement, there is something out there that corresponds to it, and grounds it. "There is a horse," is true if there just is a horse there, and not otherwise. And let's not be distracted by or get lost in notions of real v. fake horses, or how we know it's a horse, or are just mistaken, and so forth. We presuppose we can determine if a horse is there - the question being is it there, or not. — tim wood

"There is a horse" is only true if there is an animal which is correctly called by that name, "horse". The question is not whether it is there or not. There is always something there, the question is whether it is true to refer to what is there with the word "horse". This determines whether "there is a horse" is true or not. If it's a rock or a house there, then it's not true. Why do you desire to "presuppose" that we can determine whether there is a horse there, without referring to a definition of "horse"? There are ponies which look a lot like horses, so the thing which is there might have to be measured or checked for other features. We need to know which features to check for to confirm that it's a horse. That's why we have to consult the definition. The definition gives us the truth, of what it means to be a horse. We assign "horse" to animals that fulfill these conditions, and that is a fundamental truth.

With true statements about ideas, that themselves have no physical counterpart, I'll simply retreat to the notion of demonstration, which can always be rendered in a physical form. That is, the thing not strictly in the mind can be "out there" in the sense of the demonstration of ideas, and must be in the sense of the horse. So far, all this seems simple, intuitive, practical. — tim wood

Demonstrations are forms of justification. "Justify" is defined as demonstration. You do agree that there is a difference between truth and justification don't you? I believe that as much as you think that there is some part of truth which is "out there", you are conflating justification with truth, such that you see the justification which is "out there", and you are assuming that this is somehow a part of truth. But you should consider that there is this thing called "knowledge", and knowledge is generally believed to be a combination of justification and truth. So I think that you are looking at knowledge, and calling knowledge by the word "truth", and you see that which is "out there", justification, as a part of this "truth", when it is really a part of knowledge instead.

Meaning is out of court, here, except in the practical sense. If you're going to argue that we cannot really know anything, then I invite you back to the horse and the gold: at some point we know as a practical matter, and correctly, that the horse is a horse and the gold is gold. — tim wood

There is a problem with your so-called knowing "as a practical matter". Such knowing is often mistaken. What if the thing you called a horse is really a pony, or the thing you called gold was really fools gold? This is why we need clear, coherent, and consistent definitions. Sure, it's practical for you to call your rock gold, and tell everyone you have a golden rock, but when the time comes for you to sell it, and it's fools gold, then the practicality vanishes. Having definitions is a fundamental part of knowledge. Without them you'll insist that the rock is gold, and the buyer will insist that it's not, and how can you proceed other than to fight?

True-ness is the quality - truth - of a single true proposition. Qua itself, it cannot be interpreted in various ways (except in error). The proposition itself may give rise to different truths, but each in itself is univocal with respect to that truth. — tim wood

If it is true, as you say, that a proposition cannot be interpreted in various ways except in error, then whose interpretation is the correct one?

Now, it may be we're saying the same thing. Let's check. In this context I presuppose that indeterminateness is in the mind, and that it can be resolved into one or more determinatenesses, given appropriate effort. And there is no truth until that task is completed for at least the indeterminateness in question. — tim wood

The fact is that different minds will interpret the same physical collection of symbols in different ways. Each mind may designate "a meaning" and this creates an illusion of determinateness. It is an illusion because different minds designate different meaning, so the meaning of the symbols is really indeterminate. Therefore if we assume that the physical collection of symbols has meaning, this meaning must be inherently indeterminate.

If it cannot be resolved, then no truth can come from it (other than, perhaps, that it's unresolvable). — tim wood

That's right, there cannot be truth to the physical collection of symbols, so if you assume that a proposition is a physical collection of symbols there can be no truth to it. That is because, as I said in the last post, the symbols need be interpreted. But they are interpreted within a mind, according to definitions, and there can be truth here, within the mind. If we both agree that a particular proposition is true, our interpretations may be consistent. But if I believe the proposition is true according to my interpretation, and you believe it not true according to yours, then all we can do is attempt to justify our respective interpretations.

I have a new version of truth (grown from this discussion): truth is the capacity for a proposition to be grounded, in a practical sense, outside the mind, whether in exemplification or demonstration. Which seems just another way of saying that truth is the collection of singular true-nesses. — tim wood

This might be consistent with what I am arguing, where "grounding" is justification.

You seem focused on the how of truth, how it works, with justification and definitions and the risk of error and so forth. My interest is in what truth is. To answer, I suppose it exists, and then see where that goes. How comes into it, but incidentally.

I think you've somehow got knowledge on your mind, and the truth of the justified-true-belief notion of knowledge - not a topic of interest to me, here. Truth in that theory seems - well, I don't know what. But you can't have a how until you have a what (then you can ask how).

As to definitions, I fail to see what they have to do with truth. As to justification, take a moment and make clear exactly how you know you're justified. (E.g., what justifies the justification?)

Maybe we can sidestep the impediments, if you will tolerate another scenario: A fellow leads an animal into a barn, either a horse or a cow. We can't see into the barn; we haven't seen the animal. He comes and tells us what it is - horse or cow. He could be lying; he could be telling the truth. I am not interested in how we resolve that. Further, the truth in this singular case is not of much interest: we agree that in singular cases there can be truth (and we can be satisfied it is the truth). What I'm looking for is an understanding of the generalization of this singular case, so I can use it (the understanding) to inform and answer the question, what is truth (if it's anything). The purpose of this example is to kick free of distracting notions of verifiability, indeterminateness, definition, justification, etc., which all seem to presuppose truth, and focus on just truth itself (again, if that's possible)..

As to justification and grounding, I find a difference in that justification seems limited to mind. Grounding allows for the possibility of a reality independent of mind. We escape nearly all the pseudo-problems of reality by simply accepting it as a practical matter - which is in fact the way it works!

True-ness is the quality - truth - of a single true proposition. Qua itself, it cannot be interpreted in various ways (except in error). The proposition itself may give rise to different truths, but each in itself is univocal with respect to that truth.
— tim wood

If it is true, as you say, that a proposition cannot be interpreted in various ways except in error, then whose interpretation is the correct one? — MU

Not quite. It's probable that every ordinary language proposition has multiple interpretations. Given an interpretation, there is a truth function associated with that interpretation. It is the value of that truth function for that interpretation that I hold is not variable. This implies, and I accept, that different interpretations could have different and inconsistent truth values.

I think truth must have "contact" with something real, that bridges subject and predicate, and makes the proposition true. I think you're stuck in a relative subjectivism. Your position may facilitate critiques of how truth works, or how knowledge may work, or what certain limits of knowledge are. But for the question of what truth is, your position seems to destroy it.

My interest is in what truth is.

...

As to definitions, I fail to see what they have to do with truth. — tim wood

Why the contradiction? Do you not see this as contradiction? You are interested in "what" truth is, and this implies that you want a definition of "truth", yet you cannot see how "definition" is related to what "truth" is. As I've been explaining, definition is truth, and truth is definition, they are one and the same. You simply reject my definition of truth, as definition, but this does not make my definition false, it means that I have not successfully justified that definition.

Let's try a different approach. Do you agree that truth is what makes a statement true? And do you agree that what constitutes truth is the impossibility of falsity? Whatever it is which is impossible to be false, this type of thing is what truth is. Will you recognize that "definition" fulfills this condition, of that which is impossible to be false?

Suppose I define "square" as equilateral rectangle. I say that this is a definition, it is impossible that it is false, because it is not the type of thing which can be judged as true or false. You may reject my definition, if you do not like it. But your rejection of my definition does not make the definition false, it only means that I have failed to justify it. So a definition is a type of thing which can never be false. It can fail in attempts to be justified, but this does not make it false. Nor is a definition ever really true, it is just accept as that which defines the term. But since a definition can never be false, this is the type of thing which truth is.

What I'm looking for is an understanding of the generalization of this singular case, so I can use it (the understanding) to inform and answer the question, what is truth (if it's anything). The purpose of this example is to kick free of distracting notions of verifiability, indeterminateness, definition, justification, etc., which all seem to presuppose truth, and focus on just truth itself (again, if that's possible).. — tim wood

I'm telling you, "definition" is the generalization which informs us of what truth is. Suppose in your example, the man offers the proposition "a cow is in the barn". The truth of this statement is determined by the definitions of the terms. Is "barn" defined by the building which the man brought the animal into? Is "cow" defined by the animal which was brought into the building. If so, we have truth. But without such definitions we have no truth.

Not quite. It's probable that every ordinary language proposition has multiple interpretations. Given an interpretation, there is a truth function associated with that interpretation. It is the value of that truth function for that interpretation that I hold is not variable. This implies, and I accept, that different interpretations could have different and inconsistent truth values. — tim wood

The point here though, is that every interpretation is dependent on a mind, and exists only within that mind. We could offer our interpretations to each other, but this requires that we put them into words, and then these would need to be interpreted. So each separate mind has a separate interpretation of any proposition. The truth function which you refer to, therefore, can only be within that mind as well.

I think truth must have "contact" with something real, that bridges subject and predicate, and makes the proposition true. I think you're stuck in a relative subjectivism. Your position may facilitate critiques of how truth works, or how knowledge may work, or what certain limits of knowledge are. But for the question of what truth is, your position seems to destroy it. — tim wood

I am only looking for the reality of what truth is, as you claim to be doing as well. If the inquiry leads us to a relative subjectivism, then so be it. It seems to me like you are swayed by some prejudice, so you will not follow the inquiry. But if you look closely you will see that there is something real which bridges the gap between subject and predicate, and this is definition. When one defines the other, the gap is bridged, and we have truth. "The sky is blue." If your premise is that a definition is not something real, then you might be forced to the conclusion that truth is not something real, but how are you defining "real" here?

perhaps ultimately — A Seagull

The general etymology seems to be related to "faith, faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty; veracity, quality of being true; pledge, covenant," from Germanic abstract noun *treuwitho, from Proto-Germanic treuwaz "having or characterized by good faith". A solid oak would be something like a metaphor for someone who is trustworthy.

Not that etymology is some magic key, just that it shows something like the genealogy of a concept, and in this case it's related to trustworthiness Truth is that which you can rely on.

Which is exactly how it is, more or less. You can still be betrayed by a loyal friend, for any number of reasons, but generally loyal friends are loyal friends, and you can rely on them, lean on them. Likewise, at an epistemological level, we know we are fallible, we can sometimes be mistaken when we were ever so sure; but we also know that lots of things about which we are ever so sure are reliable.

This is obviously also related to the pragmatic insight: truth is a guide to action. Propositions set up in us expectations as to how the world is likely to behave in response to our actions. These are our "beliefs" (again, "belief" is etymologically related to faith too).

But I think it's important to note that our beliefs are not knowledge as such, knowledge as such is the picture painted for us by the words, which we can believe or not - these propositions we secondarily call "beliefs" too, but that's been the source of a lot of confusion in philosophy.

The primary sense is all about trust in expectations, which are set up by propositions which are then only secondarily called "beliefs." But if you take that reification seriously, then you have the futile search for things "in the head" ("in the mind") that have a similar structure to the structure of propositions.

We do have things in the head, but they're expectations that are triggered by the propositions, which are objective artifacts in the world (which is why the things going on in the head can vary from person to person and time to time, while the propositional structure that triggers them is invariant, and depends on objective rules, standing social habits, etc.).

You may reject my definition, if you do not like it. But your rejection of my definition does not make the definition false, it only means that I have failed to justify it. So a definition is a type of thing which can never be false. It can fail in attempts to be justified, but this does not make it false. Nor is a definition ever really true, it is just accept as that which defines the term.But since a definition can never be false, this is the type of thing which truth is. — MU

Help me out here. Do you mean that a correct definition can never be false? Meaning that, if it is not a correct definition then it is no definition at all? If so, this leaves untouched the question of how anyone knows a definition is correct; and per your remark above, the some holds for truth.

Do you agree that truth is what makes a statement true? And do you agree that what constitutes truth is the impossibility of falsity? Whatever it is which is impossible to be false, this type of thing is what truth is. Will you recognize that "definition" fulfills this condition, of that which is impossible to be false? — MU

Certainly not! Do I agree that being an onion is what makes an onion an onion? Yes. Because the onion always already was an onion. The word for this that comes to my mind is "primordial." The onion-ness of the onion is primordially part of the onion. If we ask how it is possible to know it is an onion, we first have to decide what we mean by asking. One way is, how do we know it is an onion and not something else? Admittedly definitions can assist, here, but as part of a larger effort. The other way is how do we know it is an onion qua onion? This asking has no truck with definitions; definitions are irrelevant. We know it is an onion because it just is an onion.

Truth, on the other hand (imo), is not at all like an onion. There is nothing that just is truth. No primordial truth (truth not equal to true, here). On the other hand, The question as to whether this potentially true thing is actually true, and not something else, is a question that covers and conceals the question actually being asked, because it confuses true and truth.

That is, quiddities, here. First, is it? Second, what kind of a thing is it. I do not think you have made this distinction.

Makes sense so far?

Suppose in your example, the man offers the proposition "a cow is in the barn". The truth of this statement is determined by the definitions of the terms. — MU

Nonsense, sez I. The truth of "A cow is in the barn," is a function of whether or not a cow is in the barn. To shave this a little closer: We could understand the question this way: "Is there something in the barn and if there is, is it a cow (or something else)?" But I tried to get away from this by positing that the man who put the animal there knows perfectly well what a cow is (a fortiori what a barn is). The question, then, of the truth of the proposition "a cow is in the barn," has simply nothing at all to do with definitions.

But you would have it all in the mind. In that case my offer to you of mental gold for legal tender dollars still stands.

Are we irreconcilable, here? I think if you understand my distinction between the two questions then we do find common ground, and can continue looking for the elusive and perhaps illusive truth.

The general etymology seems to be related to "faith, faithfulness, fidelity, loyalty; veracity, quality of being true; pledge, covenant," from Germanic abstract noun *treuwitho, from Proto-Germanic treuwaz "having or characterized by good faith". A solid oak would be something like a metaphor for someone who is trustworthy.

Not that etymology is some magic key, just that it shows something like the genealogy of a concept, and in this case it's related to trustworthiness Truth is that which you can rely on. — gurugeorge

"Truth is that which you can rely on." Super post! This and the rest of your post above are worth the price of admission! You have given the thing the depth and clarity it needs. I'm going to chew on it for a while, but I don't think I'll crack it or even scratch it. I'll watch to see how MU replies - but I do not see where his arguments to date can gain any purchase at all.

Is anyone else besides myself still interested in this discussion?

Actually, I didn't see Tim's reply to my post at the time, and I was sort of busy. Maybe I'll make a stab at a reply right now.

Certainly not! Do I agree that being an onion is what makes an onion an onion? Yes. Because the onion always already was an onion. The word for this that comes to my mind is "primordial." The onion-ness of the onion is primordially part of the onion. — tim wood

How is it that an onion is an onion before it is named as an onion? It is the fact that it is called "onion" which makes it an onion, rather than a thing with a different name. Suppose there is some part of the universe which has yet to be discovered by human beings. Since it has not yet been discovered, and we don't know of its existence, it has no name. Now imagine it is discovered, and given a name "X'. How can you claim that the thing was X prior to being given the name "X"? That doesn't make sense. Prior to being given the name "X", the thing was an unnamed, and undiscovered thing, it was not X.

The "onion-ness of the onion" is our interpretation. It is how we sense and describe the onion, our perceptios. Therefore the onion-ness of the onion is what comes about as a result of our interaction with the onion. It cannot be the primordial part of the onion.

Nonsense, sez I. The truth of "A cow is in the barn," is a function of whether or not a cow is in the barn. To shave this a little closer: We could understand the question this way: "Is there something in the barn and if there is, is it a cow (or something else)?" — tim wood

You're not getting the point. You are focusing on the word "cow", and neglecting the rest of the statement. You are assuming that there is a barn. But what makes it true that there is a barn? Perhaps there is a shed, a garage, or a house. Why are you so sure that it is a barn where the animal called a "cow" is?

To begin with, when justifying the truth of a statement, we cannot start with any assumption beyond the assumption that there is something, and even that is just an assumption. To assume that what there is, is some specific named thing, is to assume as true, something which is unjustified. So we may assume nothing more than that there is something.

We cannot justify the claim that there is a barn, without a definition of what a barn is, and comparing what there is, to that definition. That definition acts as the fundamental truth, from which we can proceed to justify the claim "there is a barn". Then we can proceed toward the proposition concerning what is in the barn, something called a cow. Now we need a definition of "cow" which acts as a fundamental truth by which we can justify the claim that there is a "cow". Also, we need a definition of "in", which serves as a fundamental truth by which we can judge the relationship between the barn and the cow.

All the terms of the statement must be judged. It doesn't suffice to say that the truth of the statement is dependent on whether there is a cow or some other animal in the barn, because you are then taking for granted the truth of "in the barn". By what principle can you take it for granted that this portion of the statement, "in the barn", is necessarily true?

I suppose I'm a phenomenalist. By that I mean that whatever can be experienced is a phenomenon, of some kind, whether cabbage, onion, justice, unicorns, or dragons. I buy the Kantian notion that we have a hard time grounding phenomena anywhere but in perception. At the same time I find the world as I experience it seems to be consistent with phenomena as I encounter them. That is, it's a chair. Establishing "it's a chair" as a grounded scientific statement is admittedly a problem, but here's the thing: I can sit in the chair, and similarly with pretty much everything perceptible.

That is, there is an entire phenomenology prior to language. Yet it seems to me that you're stuck at language - if there were not a world prior to - primordial to - language, then how would language have anything to talk about? I am not too interested in where the word "onion" comes from, or if indeed we have any understanding or knowledge of onions before we encounter them. Once they're part of our phenomenal world, I simply take it as given, and uninteresting, that they existed before we knew they existed.

Your truth, then, appears simply a verbal truth, a consequence of definitions and well-formed propositions. If that's all there is, then truth is a pretty dodgy concept - not even a concept but a rough idea not thought through. I say not thought through because whatever you aver is true, and however you do it, is subject to the critical "Who says?" Or as you might say, "By what principle?"

I'm coming around to seeing that truth is a quality of experience. It's not proved; its judged. (Once judged, it's fair game for your kind of critical analysis, if that's appropriate, and all kinds of things can be said, true or false, depending on the criteria.)

That's why I like Gurugeorge's post. It seems just right: truth is prior to true, is based in trust about experience in the world, or judgement, not in language, and may turn out to be not true, once you get that far. But not before you get that far.

I suppose I'm a phenomenalist. By that I mean that whatever can be experienced is a phenomenon, of some kind, whether cabbage, onion, justice, unicorns, or dragons. I buy the Kantian notion that we have a hard time grounding phenomena anywhere but in perception. — tim wood

I can agree with this, but I would proceed to distinguish between reason and experience. If experience is limited to phenomena, then reason must be separate from experience because reason is not phenomenal.

At the same time I find the world as I experience it seems to be consistent with phenomena as I encounter them. — tim wood

So when you say here, that according to your experience, the world is consistent with the phenomena which you encounter, what you really mean by "consistent" is logically consistent, the world is reasonable. Notice how logic, or reason, bridges the gap between the world which you assume, and the phenomena which you encounter.

That is, there is an entire phenomenology prior to language. Yet it seems to me that you're stuck at language - if there were not a world prior to - primordial to - language, then how would language have anything to talk about? I am not too interested in where the word "onion" comes from, or if indeed we have any understanding or knowledge of onions before we encounter them. Once they're part of our phenomenal world, I simply take it as given, and uninteresting, that they existed before we knew they existed. — tim wood

I have no doubt that there is a primordial world, prior to language, that is not the issue here. The issue is "truth", and the question now is whether there is truth prior to language. As I've been arguing, truth is in the mind, it is related to reason, and reasoning is dependent on language. So I am very doubtful that there is any truth prior to language.

Your truth, then, appears simply a verbal truth, a consequence of definitions and well-formed propositions. If that's all there is, then truth is a pretty dodgy concept - not even a concept but a rough idea not thought through. — tim wood

That's right, I really don't see how truth can be anything other than this, the fundamental principles which allow logic or reason to proceed, such as definitions, the law of non-contradiction, etc.. And yes, truth is dodgy, you must know this by now, from your experience.

I'm coming around to seeing that truth is a quality of experience. It's not proved; its judged. (Once judged, it's fair game for your kind of critical analysis, if that's appropriate, and all kinds of things can be said, true or false, depending on the criteria.) — tim wood

If truth is judged, then what is it judged by, other than reason? If truth is the result of judgement, then it is consequential to reason. If we maintain the necessary separation between experience and reason, described above, then truth cannot be a quality of experience itself. Experience must be judged through the means of reason in order that truth is produced, so it is a property of the judgement not a property of the experience which is being judged.

If your intent is to deny the separation between experience and reason, then you will have to demonstrate how reason is phenomenal. The problem here is that we use reason to judge phenomena, and the judge must be independent from the thing being judged in order that we can have a fair judgement. With no possibility of a fair, unbiased judgement of the phenomena, truth is impossible.

Is there any sense of "truth" that is not existentially contingent upon language? Perhaps this be better put a bit differently:Does any sense of "truth" define something that we discover? Does any sense of "truth" set out something that is not existentially contingent upon language? Is any sense of "truth" necessarily presupposed by all others? Is any sense of "truth" necessarily presupposed by statements, regardless of whether or not they are actually true?

[quoteAs=MU] I've been arguing, truth is in the mind, it is related to reason, and reasoning is dependent on language. So I am very doubtful that there is any truth prior to language.[/quote]

Truth is in the mind - check. It is related to reason - um, hm, provisional check. How are you defining reason, here? Reasoning is dependent on language. For true propositions, sure. But maybe just here is your problem (lol). I think most folks acknowledge that animals reason, many manifestly so. But where does that put you? (I.e, animals have language, or animals don't reason.)

And following your lead, it's neither true nor reason we're after, here, but truth. Understanding what truth is, is my difficulty. As merely the collective of true, not a problem. But as such truth itself has no content. I think it does.

Your construction is, to have truth you gotta have reason; to have reason you gotta have language; if you have reason and language, your propositions need only be in the right form.

And that's it, yes?

But why not truth as primordial to language? Maybe "primordial" is too fancy a word, perhaps "underlying" is better. Consider: do you have experiences that cause in you a reaction of judgement and then of action (or reaction), all prior to any articulation? Certainly after the fact you can verbalize them, but maybe not entirely. Something gives you goosebumps and makes you jump, or even just makes you wary (or happy, or whatever). Does the after-the-fact report engender the same set of reactions/behaviors? If not, then something's different between the experience/phenomenon and the report. I'm looking for truth in that difference.

Another example occurs to me: at dinner there's something disgusting on your dinner plate. Do you need/use either of language or reason to react to it? Again, after the fact, sure, but that's after.

Truth is correspondence.

Regarding positive assertions, propositions, assertions...

That which makes statements of thought/belief true is correspondence with/to fact/reality. Assuming sincerity in speech, all statements of thought/belief presuppose, regardless of the particular content, their own correspondence with/to fact/reality. An insincere speaker is one who deliberately misrepresents their own thought/belief. An insincere speaker may state 'X', but does not believe 'X'.

Somewhere along the line... all thought/belief and statements thereof presupposes correspondence with/to fact/reality. All worldviews consist of thought/belief about the world and/or ourselves.

Everyone thinks that things are a certain way.
Everyone forms and/or holds thought/belief.
All thought/belief presupposes it's own correspondence with/to fact/reality.
Everyone's worldview presupposes it's own truth everywhere along the line.

Regarding logic...

Premisses presuppose their own correspondence with/to fact/reality. Logic presupposes correspondence with/to fact/reality by virtue of being existentially contingent upon premisses. Premisses presuppose their own correspondence with/to fact reality by virtue of consisting of thought/belief.

Being logically true is nothing more and nothing less than being a valid conclusion from two meaningful and consistent premisses. Being a valid conclusion is insufficient for being a true one. That is because validity is insufficient for truth.

Truth is correspondence with/to fact/reality.

It is humanly impossible to knowingly believe a falsehood. As soon as one realizes that what one thought was the case, was not; as soon as one realizes that one was wrong about something or other; as soon as one comes to know that one held false belief, one can no longer believe it.

Well a couple of problems here. The correspondence theory of truth is really just a test to see which propositions (P) are true, or alternatively, a machine for cranking out true Ps. To call the quality all these Ps possess, that they're true, truth, is simply to use "truth" as a collective term that means only that the Ps in question are true. The question of this thread is if that's all there is to truth (i.e., the set of all Ps true under correspondence), or if there is something more.

Now things get obscure. (What follows is partly borrowed from an online article, but I forget where.) Let P be "John is married to Jane." Under correspondence, P is true if John is married to Jane. Could not be simpler: the relevant part of the world corresponds to P. But how about P1, John is married? In the world John is married to Jane. That means that P1 is true not as a matter of correspondence, but because P is true. P1, then, is a dialectical truth

Two points: correspondence clearly does not exhaust the possibilities for there being true Ps. And all that's accomplished is a larger generalization of truth.

But for the moment, you take up the question: is there more to truth than just trueness of the P(s) in question? Before answering, read gurugeorge's last post above.

That which makes statements of thought/belief true is correspondence with/to fact/reality. — creativesoul

How do you account for counterfactuals?

Truth is in the mind - check. It is related to reason - um, hm, provisional check. How are you defining reason, here? Reasoning is dependent on language. For true propositions, sure. But maybe just here is your problem (lol). I think most folks acknowledge that animals reason, many manifestly so. But where does that put you? (I.e, animals have language, or animals don't reason.) — tim wood

No. I don't think most people would say that other animals reason. Animals think, but to reason is to think with the use of logic, which animals do not do. That's why Aristotle defined man as rational animal, it's what sets human beings off from other animals. So I think it's quite clear that other animals don't reason. Here's the definition of reason, used in this context: "The intellectual faculty by which conclusions are drawn from premises."

But why not truth as primordial to language? Maybe "primordial" is too fancy a word, perhaps "underlying" is better. — tim wood

I've already given all these reasons why truth is not primordial to language, but you just keep insisting that it must be, without properly refuting my reasons, or giving any real support to what you keep asserting.

Here's a straight forward way of putting it. Truth is what we attribute to what people say, i.e., "that person speaks the truth". Can you think of truth being attributed to anything other than what people say? If not, then why not just accept that truth is a property of speech? Creativesoul will argue that truth is attributed to beliefs, but will be unable to demonstrate that these beliefs are anything other than as expressed by words.

Consider: do you have experiences that cause in you a reaction of judgement and then of action (or reaction), all prior to any articulation? Certainly after the fact you can verbalize them, but maybe not entirely. — tim wood

I can't apprehend the relation you are trying to make between emotional feelings and truth. You appear to be going in the opposite direction to truth, as emotions are far from truth. Truth is more like an ideal, what we seek, and attempt to bring into existence through the use of logical reasoning. This is to proceed away from emotional feelings, which are highly deceptive.

Another example occurs to me: at dinner there's something disgusting on your dinner plate. Do you need/use either of language or reason to react to it? Again, after the fact, sure, but that's after. — tim wood

That reaction is not a reaction of truth, it is instinct, or habit, and this is far from truth. It might well be that the thing on the dinner plate which appears to be disgusting, is actually very delicious. This is why we look to logical reasoning to provide us with the truth, not to primitive emotions.

You wrote:

How you account for counterfactuals?

By calling things that are contrary to fact "counterfactual" given an appropriate context for my doing so. It's use by me is rare.

Yes, 'counterfactual' just means contrary to actuality and/ or truth. I don't see what Michael seems to think needs accounting for regarding counterfactuals.

You wrote:

Well a couple of problems here. The correspondence theory of truth is really just a test to see which propositions (P) are true, or alternatively, a machine for cranking out true Ps. To call the quality all these Ps possess, that they're true, truth, is simply to use "truth" as a collective term that means only that the Ps in question are true. The question of this thread is if that's all there is to truth (i.e., the set of all Ps true under correspondence), or if there is something more.

Well, there is indeed a couple of problems here. First off, when talking about what there is to truth, the only approach worthy of taking must involve all senses thereof. I do not adhere to the traditional correspondence theory. On my view, correspondence is not a quality. Rather, it is a relationship. That is most certainly not to say that truth is relative in a relativist sense. That inevitably leads to incoherence.

Now things get obscure. (What follows is partly borrowed from an online article, but I forget where.) Let P be "John is married to Jane." Under correspondence, P is true if John is married to Jane. Could not be simpler: the relevant part of the world corresponds to P. But how about P1, John is married? In the world John is married to Jane. That means that P1 is true not as a matter of correspondence, but because P is true. P1, then, is a dialectical truth.

I don't see the purported problem here, though. If P1 is true, then it is so by virtue of corresponding to fact/reality. P could be false, and yet P1 could still be true.

Two points: correspondence clearly does not exhaust the possibilities for there being true Ps. And all that's accomplished is a larger generalization of truth.

I find that correspondence theory accomplished much, but unfortunately mistakenly presupposes that truth is existentially contingent upon language, and perhaps worse yet... Like so many other schools of though across the board do as well, it fails to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.

But for the moment, you take up the question: is there more to truth than just trueness of the P(s) in question? Before answering, read gurugeorge's last post above.

Trust, truth, and meaning are irrevocably entwined and virtually inseparable during initial language acquisition, so the origin is of no surprise here. Relevance to what I've said?

No. I don't think most people would say that other animals reason. Animals think, but to reason is to think with the use of logic, which animals do not do. — MU

Clearly you have never owned a pet. Or if you did you paid no attention to it. My experience is just ordinary cats and dogs, but they figure things out, sometimes difficult things, sometimes quickly! As to logic, what logic? Aristotelian categorical logic, with syllogisms? Mathematical logic? Rhetorical logic? So many kinds. Maybe they use animal logic. And how do you think if you don't use some sort of logic?

Or maybe you just mean they do not reason as people do. That seems intuitively reasonably, but maybe it isn't. At some level, I think all reasoning must be essentially the same, if not at the same level or degree.

Truth is what we attribute to what people say, i.e., "that person speaks the truth". — MU

I think you're on to something, here. In your sentence you attribute something; the word you use for what is attributed is truth. What, exactly, is that? What do you mean? How can truth be attributed if it's what you say above? I recognize this is just ordinary usage, but the whole point of this thread is to examine these ideas, to part the curtains of ordinary usage, to see if there's anything behind them.

Can you think of truth being attributed to anything other than what people say? If not, then why not just accept that truth is a property of speech? — MU

Really? All the books in the world contain zero truth? All the speeches, before they're spoken? And as well my thoughts, and everyone else's, barren of truth? You're stuck on truth as a speech phenomenon, and that sounds like a bespoke definition for sure - a perfectly god one, as far as it goes. But tell me how it's not begging the question in this discussion.

But what you do hint at is the aura that goes with, "That person speaks the truth!" This is exactly not simply agreement that P is true. Indeed it does not even say it! For brevity's sake I'll just refer again to Gurugeorge's post. There's an element of revealing/"unconcealing." And this leads to Heidegger, which path I'm content to gesture to, but am not especially eager to travel.

Let's try this. I concede the accuracy of all your points, so far as they go. If you say truth goes no further, then I disagree. On the other hand, if you catch a glimpse of the possibility of there being more to truth than just the several trueness of some spoken propositions, then we can continue. But near as I can tell, you have defined us into a dead end.

I don't see the purported problem here, though. If P1 is true, then it is so by virtue of corresponding to fact/reality. P could be false, and yet P1 could still be true. — Creativesoul

We're talking about correspondence, which I understand to mean correspondence to the world, and precisely not to language about the world, except as that language accurately "contains" the world. In particular, no one is just married, in the world. Being married is always being married to someone. This distinction returns accuracy to language that language too often scants. That John is married is a conclusion - that happens to be true - but not a fact about the world, and therefore not a truth under correspondence. The fact in the world is that John is married to Jane.

Trust, truth, and meaning are irrevocably entwined and virtually inseparable.... — Creativesoul

Interesting. Things that are merely mixed can be subsequently separated, but these are more like baked together (irrevocably entwined), and thereby inseparably, as you say. It's you that baked them, can you develop the thought some more?

On my view, if it is a fact of the world that John is married to Jane, then it is a fact of the world that John is married. The truth of the latter is not at all contingent upon the truth of the former, as already argued. Again, I'm not defending traditional correspondence theory.

During one's initial language acquisition, s/he cannot doubt whether or not the teaching is truthful. Trust here is akin to faith... unquestioned trust in the truthfulness of a source. Correspondence with/to fact/reality is necessarily presupposed in all thought/belief by virtue of consisting entirely of mental correlations. Meaning consists entirely of mental correlations. Correlation presupposes the existence of it's own content. <-------- That is the presupposition of correspondence to fact/reality at work(during language acquisition).

Is there any sense of "truth" that is not existentially contingent upon language? Perhaps this be better put a bit differently:Does any sense of "truth" define something that we discover? Does any sense of "truth" set out something that is not existentially contingent upon language? Is any sense of "truth" necessarily presupposed by all others? Is any sense of "truth" necessarily presupposed by statements, regardless of whether or not they are actually true?

We can be mistaken about things that exist as they are prior to our discovery.

By calling things that are contrary to fact "counterfactual" given an appropriate context for my doing so. — creativesoul

And that's the problem. Counterfactuals can be true, even though they don't correspond to any fact. "If I were born a woman then my name would be Michelle", for example. I'm not a woman, my name isn't Michelle, and yet this claim is true.

What makes it true?