The God-realised being - Ramana Maharishi, another Indian sage, died 1960, was the archetype - realises that only God is real, and says that the apparent world of multiplicity and strife is actually māyā, an illusion, with which the mind has become entanged through avidya, ignorance. (Although, this is a rather different 'God' [if there can be different Gods] to the stern patriarchal figure of the Old Testament - the Hindu name is Brahman.) — Wayfarer
This idea is not dissimilar to one in many of Alan Watt's books. For example The Book: on the Taboo against Knowing who you Are, which 'delves into the cause and cure of the illusion that the self is a separate ego. Modernizes and restates the ancient Hindu philosophy of Vedanta and brings out the full force of realizing that the self is in fact the root and ground of the universe.' Watts does bring an element of the 'divine play', the game that Brahman plays by manifesting as the multiplicity, each part of which then 'forgets' its relation to the whole. Which actually dovetails nicely with some elements of Platonism, i.e. the 'unforgetting' (anamnesis) of the state of omniscience that obtained prior to 'falling' in to carnal existence. Note well however the mention of 'taboo' in the title. — Wayfarer
Matter, therefore, is an idea we use to make sense of experience, not something we directly experience. It’s a theoretical construct. Said simply, if all is a dream in the mind of Universal Mind, then the “stuff” of the universe is Universal Mind’s “mind stuff”, not matter. — Art48
Is Universal Mind merely another name for God? — Art48
Is Universal Mind merely another name for God? Not necessarily. Universal Mind need not be all-knowing, as in knowing the future. Or all-good. Or all-powerful; maybe there are some things Universal Mind just cannot do. — Art48
The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. From our physical sensations, the idea of a tree arises in our mind. The idea is a theoretical construct, i.e., something that unites and makes sense of what we are directly experiencing, in the case of the tree, brown and green, a feeling of roughness, perhaps, the scent, too. A "brain in a vat" could experience exactly what we experience yet no corresponding tree would exist.Matter, therefore, is an idea we use to make sense of experience, not something we directly experience. It’s a theoretical construct. — Art48
The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. From our physical sensations, the idea of a tree arises in our mind. The idea is a theoretical construct, i.e., something that unites and makes sense of what we are directly experiencing, in the case of the tree, brown and green, a feeling of roughness, perhaps, the scent, too. A "brain in a vat" could experience exactly what we experience yet no corresponding tree would exist. — Art48
Grasping at straws. Comforting just-so stories. But not clear, critical philosophy. — Banno
The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. — Art48
Much of what you call "critical philosophy" is grasping at straws and just-so stories. — T Clark
...we agree is a bit of a muddle. There's an error in thinking of a tree as a mental construct. A tree is the epitome of the non-mental - along with the cup and the kettle. Here Art has misunderstood what is mental and what isn't, or at least is misusing those terms....we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. From our physical sensations, the idea of a tree arises in our mind. — Art48
...for example? — Banno
Add to that inapt, unrealistic thought experiments; quoting famous philosophers as a substitute for thinking things through; irrelevant comments and non-sequiturs; personal attacks and uncivility... — T Clark
So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses. For instance, we may sense water but if it's a mirage, there is no water, merely the sensations that normally indicate water.The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. — Art48
People are always saying this, but it's really untrue in an important sense. The only worthwhile thing "direct experience of the external world" can mean is what we can experience with our senses along with any technological extensions we can devise. — T Clark
Can you explain exactly what the error is? Of course, if you assume the tree, cup, and kettle exist as independent objects, then I'm wrong. But you haven't justified your assumption. Or do you have some other argument?There's an error in thinking of a tree as a mental construct. A tree is the epitome of the non-mental - along with the cup and the kettle. Here Art has misunderstood what is mental and what isn't, or at least is misusing those terms. — Banno
So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses. — Art48
For instance, we may sense water but if it's a mirage, there is no water, merely the sensations that normally indicate water. — Art48
That my five senses are all I directly experience of the world is a fact, not a metaphysical statement. If you disagree, if you believe we have some other way of perceiving the world, then what is that way?So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses. — Art48
As I noted, this is a metaphysical question, not a factual one. — T Clark
That my five senses are all I directly experience of the world is a fact, not a metaphysical statement. If you disagree, if you believe we have some other way of perceiving the world, then what is that way? — Art48
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