• Art48
    480
    Solipsism: the view or theory that the self is all that can be known to exist. Solipsism (from Latin solus 'alone', and ipse 'self') says that only I exist; that I am the only existent consciousness and am dreaming the universe and everyone in it. Solipsism is logically irrefutable but seriously argued by hardly anyone, for the very good reason that the confirmed solipsist has no one to argue with. Philosophy textbook discussions often spend little time discussing solipsism, and even dismiss it as useless.

    I don’t believe in solipsism. But I wonder if somewhere in that logically irrefutable idea lies a hidden nugget of truth. Which brings us to Solipsism++: the idea that not I but some Universal Mind is dreaming the entire universe, that Universal Mind is, in fact, the only existent consciousness.

    Is Universal Mind merely another name for God? Not necessarily. Universal Mind need not be all-knowing, as in knowing the future. Or all-good. Or all-powerful; maybe there are some things Universal Mind just cannot do.

    If the universe is a dream dreamt by Universal Mind, then I am a character in the dream. So why do I feel like a separate individual? After all, Aunt Sally may have her own separate consciousness, but the Aunt Sally I create in my dream does not. How, then, can we have a separate consciousness if we are mere figures in the dream of some Universal Mind?

    A possible answer is as follows. For whatever reason, Universal Mind is not dreaming an idyllic, peaceful dream. Rather, the dream we call the universe contains division, war and famine, disease and death. To survive in such a world, evolution has equipped us with a strong feeling of separateness so that we protect our dream self. Feel at peace and at one with a tiger and you may become the tiger’s lunch. So, naturally, we feel distinct and separate; millions of years of evolution have shaped us thus. But mystics and saints and people who mediate say there is a state of mind where we feel at one with the universe. Such a state is not easy to achieve, probably because evolution has tuned us to the precise opposite. (Though difficult to achieve, the state is also described as supreme and well worth any effort. The state of oneness is called variously the kingdom of heaven, samadhi, nirvana, etc.)

    Of course, the above is speculation. It does not prove solipsism++ is true. But it does, I think, show how the idea is credible.

    Let’s take solipsism++ as true and see where it leads us.

    A metaphysical consequence would be that matter isn’t the standalone reality we often think it is. This may not be too difficult to accept if we reflect that matter is, in fact, an idea we use to make sense of what we directly experience. All we experience of the exterior world is sensations, sensations of sight, sound, taste, touch, and smell. To make sense of our sensations, we create the idea of a world of matter. Even if our ideas correspond perfectly with the real world, they are still our own private representation of that world. Our private representation and our sensory input are all we are certain exists. Neither is matter. Matter, therefore, is an idea we use to make sense of experience, not something we directly experience. It’s a theoretical construct. Said simply, if all is a dream in the mind of Universal Mind, then the “stuff” of the universe is Universal Mind’s “mind stuff”, not matter.

    Socially, some consequences might be beneficial. If you and I are but two different characters in Universal Mind’s dream, then you and I are essentially the same. We are different characters, with our own different personality, talents, faults, etc., but we are fundamentally the same.

    There might be some unfortunate social consequences, however. Solipsism++ might create or promote superstition. After all, if the universe is a dream in Universal Mind, then if Universal Mind decides to dream elves and goblins and ghosts and witches, then those things are as real as the universe.

    Of course, other possible consequences could be described. And more can be speculated about the nature of Universal Mind.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    A couple of quotes from some of @Wayfarer's past posts.

    The God-realised being - Ramana Maharishi, another Indian sage, died 1960, was the archetype - realises that only God is real, and says that the apparent world of multiplicity and strife is actually māyā, an illusion, with which the mind has become entanged through avidya, ignorance. (Although, this is a rather different 'God' [if there can be different Gods] to the stern patriarchal figure of the Old Testament - the Hindu name is Brahman.)Wayfarer

    This idea is not dissimilar to one in many of Alan Watt's books. For example The Book: on the Taboo against Knowing who you Are, which 'delves into the cause and cure of the illusion that the self is a separate ego. Modernizes and restates the ancient Hindu philosophy of Vedanta and brings out the full force of realizing that the self is in fact the root and ground of the universe.' Watts does bring an element of the 'divine play', the game that Brahman plays by manifesting as the multiplicity, each part of which then 'forgets' its relation to the whole. Which actually dovetails nicely with some elements of Platonism, i.e. the 'unforgetting' (anamnesis) of the state of omniscience that obtained prior to 'falling' in to carnal existence. Note well however the mention of 'taboo' in the title.Wayfarer

    I steal these whenever this type of subject comes up. Thanks again Wayfarer.
  • Art48
    480
    Thanks again Wayfarer.T Clark
    Agree.
  • Wayfarer
    22.7k
    You're welcome. Those books were staples of my reading in the 1970's.
  • invicta
    595
    Matter, therefore, is an idea we use to make sense of experience, not something we directly experience. It’s a theoretical construct. Said simply, if all is a dream in the mind of Universal Mind, then the “stuff” of the universe is Universal Mind’s “mind stuff”, not matter.Art48

    Just a slight problem with this, if someone was to approach you in the street and slap you in the face, have they simply slapped a theoretical construct (your flesh, matter) or merely the mind? (The universal mind, your mind …whatever)

    If this is how solipsists think I might wake early one morning and start slapping every solipsist I encounter…just for shits and giggles.

    And then hear them say it’s just the mind slapping itself, silly.
  • Wayfarer
    22.7k
    Is Universal Mind merely another name for God?Art48

    as T Clark mentions, there are similar ideas found in many forms of Eastern philosophy and religion. I think the underlying problem is that modern culture, of which you and I and everyone here are a part, is firmly grounded in individualism. It is, in philosophical language, egological - not the same as ego-centric, but 'tending to a perspective anchored in the perspective of the individual self'. Whereas Vedanta and Buddhism are not egological, but transcendental - they are grounded in meditative stillness and insight into the levels of consciousness (of which for example the chakras are the symbolic forms, as Jung would say). Hence the mythology of the 'higher self' or 'true nature' which is something that must be discovered by the aspirant, generally under the guidance of a teacher.

    These movements are, of course, also part of modern culture nowadays, in the form of the multifarious spiritual teachings and schools that have appeared to fill this gap in the Western mindset. In fact, perhaps that's what you're actually appealing to, consciously or otherwise.
  • Banno
    25.2k
    The world as a mental disfunction.

    Grasping at straws. Comforting just-so stories. But not clear, critical philosophy.

    Stop here, look at what you are proposing, and ask yourself what is wrong with it.
  • Tom Storm
    9.2k
    Is Universal Mind merely another name for God? Not necessarily. Universal Mind need not be all-knowing, as in knowing the future. Or all-good. Or all-powerful; maybe there are some things Universal Mind just cannot do.Art48

    The character of Universal Mind or Mind at Large (Kastrup) is different to god/s, in as much as it might be less personal and not be metacognitive and, perhaps, more of a blind and instinctive will, as per Schopenhauer. In other words, not an entity one has a relationship with.

    But Universal Mind still plays a god-like role in granting us a foundational guarantee of a shared reality and object permanence (even if these are the product of mentation). If, says Kastrup, your car is still in the garage after you have parked and walked off, it is because Mind at Large holds our shared reality together - K maintains we are like 'dissociated alters' of the one great mind.

    Whether you believe this will probably come down to personal taste and how poetic your imagination might be.
  • Art48
    480
    Matter, therefore, is an idea we use to make sense of experience, not something we directly experience. It’s a theoretical construct.Art48
    The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. From our physical sensations, the idea of a tree arises in our mind. The idea is a theoretical construct, i.e., something that unites and makes sense of what we are directly experiencing, in the case of the tree, brown and green, a feeling of roughness, perhaps, the scent, too. A "brain in a vat" could experience exactly what we experience yet no corresponding tree would exist.
  • invicta
    595
    The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. From our physical sensations, the idea of a tree arises in our mind. The idea is a theoretical construct, i.e., something that unites and makes sense of what we are directly experiencing, in the case of the tree, brown and green, a feeling of roughness, perhaps, the scent, too. A "brain in a vat" could experience exactly what we experience yet no corresponding tree would exist.Art48

    Let’s ignore the brain in VAT for a moment as the can of worms you’ve opened with solipsism is enough to deal with for now.

    One thing at a time dear,

    So back to the theoretical construct…you are walking along one sunny day contemplating the fact that trees are not real as your tree sensing sense is missing that day till suddenly you run into a tree and hit your head slightly … at this point does it actually matter if the tree is a theoretical construct or a physical construct? How would you answer this very pertinent question of solipsism ?
  • Art48
    480
    As I mention, the theoretical construct idea is independent of solipsism. The brain in a vat answers your question: we can be certain about what we actually experience, i.e., sensations, but as to what is causing the sensations (tree, supercomputer, LSD, etc.) we are less certain.
  • Art48
    480
    Those books were staples of my reading in the 1970's.Wayfarer
    Mine, too.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    Grasping at straws. Comforting just-so stories. But not clear, critical philosophy.Banno

    Much of what you call "critical philosophy" is grasping at straws and just-so stories. The parts that aren't mostly consist of pointing out that much of what is called "critical philosophy" is grasping at straws and just-so stories.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense.Art48

    People are always saying this, but it's really untrue in an important sense. The only worthwhile thing "direct experience of the external world" can mean is what we can experience with our senses along with any technological extensions we can devise. There's a song I've been singing for a long time here on the forum—it's metaphysics. Now, I love metaphysics as long as it's useful, but I think this particular one is not.

    Of course, no metaphysical position is more useless than solipsism itself. It ranks up there with the multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics, Descartes' malevolent demon, simulation theories of reality, dreaming butterfly, and any other position that can't be verified and isn't useful. I didn't include @Wayfarer's Hindu mythology in my list because I think it is specifically aimed at and useful for undermining our human need for stories and explanations; although Hindus, and Wayfarer, probably wouldn't describe it that way.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    does it actually matter if the tree is a theoretical construct or a physical construct?invicta

    I assume you're answer is "no." If so, I agree with you.
  • Banno
    25.2k
    Much of what you call "critical philosophy" is grasping at straws and just-so stories.T Clark

    ...for example?

    It seems to me that we agree on more than we disagree on... if you see what I mean.

    So the approach here:
    ...we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. From our physical sensations, the idea of a tree arises in our mind.Art48
    ...we agree is a bit of a muddle. There's an error in thinking of a tree as a mental construct. A tree is the epitome of the non-mental - along with the cup and the kettle. Here Art has misunderstood what is mental and what isn't, or at least is misusing those terms.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    ...for example?Banno

    As I've noted before, many, perhaps most, disagreements here on the forum come from 1) failure to adequately define the terms of the discussion; 2) mistaking metaphysical issues for matters of fact rather than convention; or 3) focusing on trivial or pointless formalities at the expense of insight, e.g. squawking about logical fallacies. Add to that inapt, unrealistic thought experiments; quoting famous philosophers as a substitute for thinking things through; irrelevant comments and non-sequiturs; personal attacks and uncivility...

    I can't claim never to have participated in some of these practices, but I try hard every day not to do so again.
  • Banno
    25.2k
    Perhaps. I'd at least add the present craze for giving inadequate, even inept, answers to philosophical questions using bad physics.

    But we might look for some agreement. The problem with the "universal mind" is perhaps the inverse of the combination problem had by panpsychism. Whereas, as Chalmers sets out neatly, the issue for panpsychism is explaining how little minds come together to make a big mind, the issue here is how a big mind splits itself into little minds.

    For our purposes here, examining that article, or similar, in detail might be a suitable way to deal with the conceptual issues involved.
  • schopenhauer1
    11k
    Add to that inapt, unrealistic thought experiments; quoting famous philosophers as a substitute for thinking things through; irrelevant comments and non-sequiturs; personal attacks and uncivility...T Clark

    Damn that’s the Constitution here no? :lol:
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    I'd at least add the present craze for giving inadequate, even inept, answers to philosophical questions using bad physics.Banno

    Ha, ha, ha, ha....Hey‽
  • Art48
    480
    The idea of matter being a theoretical construct is independent of solipsism. We do not directly experience matter, let's say, a tree. Why? Because we can only experience the physical sensations of touch, taste, sound, light, and odor. We have no special tree-sensing sense. — Art48

    People are always saying this, but it's really untrue in an important sense. The only worthwhile thing "direct experience of the external world" can mean is what we can experience with our senses along with any technological extensions we can devise.
    T Clark
    So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses. For instance, we may sense water but if it's a mirage, there is no water, merely the sensations that normally indicate water.

    There's an error in thinking of a tree as a mental construct. A tree is the epitome of the non-mental - along with the cup and the kettle. Here Art has misunderstood what is mental and what isn't, or at least is misusing those terms.Banno
    Can you explain exactly what the error is? Of course, if you assume the tree, cup, and kettle exist as independent objects, then I'm wrong. But you haven't justified your assumption. Or do you have some other argument?
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses.Art48

    As I noted, this is a metaphysical question, not a factual one. The proper way of evaluating metaphysical issues is in terms of their usefulness. I think saying that what we experience isn't real is denying the meaning of the reality of our daily lives—pork pies, pomegranates, pandas, Priuses. And what do we get in return? That doesn't mean your way of seeing things is wrong, only that it is not right either. It's just a matter of perspective.

    For instance, we may sense water but if it's a mirage, there is no water, merely the sensations that normally indicate water.Art48

    Of course, our senses are fallible. We make mistakes. In my way of looking at it, that means we don't see reality clearly, perfectly, not that what we see isn't reality.
  • Art48
    480
    So, in exactly what sense is my statement untrue? What we directly experience is our senses. — Art48
    As I noted, this is a metaphysical question, not a factual one.
    T Clark
    That my five senses are all I directly experience of the world is a fact, not a metaphysical statement. If you disagree, if you believe we have some other way of perceiving the world, then what is that way?
  • Banno
    25.2k
    Ok. I'll just watch. It might be interesting to see how you deal with 's disorientation.
  • invicta
    595


    Yes it’s affects on the subject are pain although the subject might say the pain is theoretical.
  • Art48
    480
    Yes it’s affects on the subject are pain although the subject might say the pain is theoretical.invicta
    Pain is a sensation we directly experience.
  • T Clark
    13.9k
    That my five senses are all I directly experience of the world is a fact, not a metaphysical statement. If you disagree, if you believe we have some other way of perceiving the world, then what is that way?Art48

    I think I misunderstood you. I thought you were saying that what we perceive with our senses is not the real world. That reality is inaccessible to us. I agree, our senses plus any technological extensions to our senses we devise are how we sense the world.
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