Judging moral ‘means’ separately from moral ‘ends’

Mark S

Traditional moral philosophy has focused on arguing for the normativity (what we ought and ought not to do) of moral systems for:

1) the ends (goals) of moral behavior, such as positive and negative utilitarianism, with the means of achieving those goals left largely unconstrained,
2) the means of moral behavior, such as Kant’s categorical imperatives, with the goals of that behavior undefined and even stated to be irrelevant or,
3) combinations such as rule utilitarianism (an action is right as it conforms to a rule that leads to the greatest good).

This practice of making a single judgment about the normativity of moral systems may not be the most productive approach.

Making separate judgments about the normativity of moral means and ends offers the following advantages:

1) It accommodates moral ends (goals) being matters of preference. For example, there may be no fact of the matter about the mind-independent normativity of utilitarianism (act to increase well-being) and negative utilitarianism (act to reduce suffering).
2) It accommodates there being a fact of the matter about the normativity of moral means such as the claim “moral means are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems” (as implied by scientific work showing that the function, the principal reason they exist, of cultural moral norms is solving cooperation problems).
3) If “moral means are parts of strategies that solve cooperation problems”, then well-known problems with forms of consequentialism such as utilitarianism’s over-demandingness vanish.
4) Acceptance that the normativity of moral means and moral ends are separate topics promises to be a culturally useful approach to morality.

Why might it be culturally useful?

Consider a society that advocates moral norms that are parts of cooperation strategies such as the Golden Rule 2. (The Golden Rule 2 is the Golden Rule with the restriction that following it does not create cooperation problems as sometimes is the case when tastes differ, in time of war, and when dealing with criminals.)

Members of that society could advocate for a range of their preferred moral goals such as positive and negative utilitarianism with little moral conflict since they would have agreement on the function of cultural moral norms.

Separate judgments about the normativity of moral means and ends could define coherent moral systems that would support a well-functioning society even if the ultimate goals of morality remain forever a matter of preference.

Is anyone aware of discussions in the philosophical literature on judging the normativity of moral means and moral ends separately?

Does anyone have arguments that judging moral means and moral ends separately would necessarily be incoherent?

invicta

Does anyone have arguments that judging moral means and moral ends separately would necessarily be incoherent? — Mark S

The moral mean to prevent a murder would be to murder the would be murderer*

In the context above judging them separately would be incoherent as murder is universally wrong/immoral but taken together the moral ends and means are both justified.

I hope that makes sense Mark.

*If there was no other way to stop the would be murderer, such as talking them down, tasering them etc.

unenlightened

↪Mark S

Ends are ideas, means are behaviour.

My behaviour is to break eggs, with the end in mind to make an omelette.

But eventually, my end is achieved (or not) and becomes perhaps a means to a new end - breakfast in bed with my wife.

The law already has cognisance of this in the notion of mens-rea, or criminal intent, which is a necessary component of the crime of murder, but not in the same way of manslaughter, which requires only a criminal disregard for foreseeable outcomes of behaviour.

So I think if you keep clear that ends are ideas, and means are behaviour, your separation will work. But you need I think to give priority to behaviour, as the law does – eggs are broken, someone has died. The intention is important but the act is crucial. My diary entry where I plan the murder is important evidence of my criminal intent, but only if I at least attempted to carry out the plan.

invicta

↪unenlightened

My behaviour is to break eggs, with the end in mind to make an omelette. — unenlightened

So what’s the ethical or moral consideration of breaking a bloody egg ?

Are you a vegetarian? Egg murdering omelette making criminal!!!

Arrest him!

unenlightened

So what’s the ethical or moral consideration of breaking a bloody egg ? — invicta

It's a reference to the cliche that the ends justify the means, analogised as "you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs." But to answer your question directly, it would be wrong of me to break an egg on your head to humiliate you, but perfectly fine to do so (with your permission), to condition your hair as part of a beauty treatment.

That every egg is sacred is not part of my personal ethics, though I am, as it happens a vegetarian by habit. :love:

invicta

@unenlightenedOn the face of vegetarian objection to breaking an egg it is accepted that there’s nothing wrong with breaking an egg. Nor is there to enjoying an omelette so I do not see as how each of those seperate actions contradict each other.

The question mark is asking is where both the ends and the means are viewed as immoral when viewed independently of each other…

Can you think of a better example ?

schopenhauer1

↪invicta

I've held the position that in life, all actions will have a certain amount of amelioration and compromise. Ironically, the only time one can perfectly follow deontological principles (like non-harm), is by deciding NOT to procreate (which if not followed, would inevitably cause unnecessary harm unto the person who would result from this decision).

invicta

↪schopenhauer1

What if you were doing the deed for recreational purposes and the new born was unintended…what then ? Abortion ?

schopenhauer1

↪invicta

That doesn’t change the fact that if someone is not born, that person would not be harmed. That is just a fact. However, almost all other moral decisions in the world have an element of harm to them. This doesn’t mean that unwanted outcomes can never result from risky actions that lead to procreation, it is just providing the status of this particular state of affairs.

So again, it’s not about how easy this act is to keep, although it’s relatively easy compared to many other ones, it’s more about The status of the decision or action and question compared to other actions or decisions. Imagine that you wanted to cause non-harm, but you knew the risk would be driving somewhere to earn a living or something. It would be very hard to live in this kind of mindset, because at some point you will cause an infraction of some sort however, minor. Not being born means no ameliorating greater harms for lesser harms is taking place. That person would not have to be harmed in any small way for some greater good or lesser harm, etc. It would be perfectly not harming somebody to not have that person where they could have been born counterfactually.

Mark S

↪invicta

The moral mean to prevent a murder would be to murder the would be murderer*

In the context above judging them separately would be incoherent as murder is universally wrong/immoral but taken together the moral ends and means are both justified. — invicta

Moral ‘ends’ (goals) are a state of affairs, or perhaps an idea about a state of affairs as unenlightened suggests. Moral ‘means’ are actions. Murder is an action, not an idea about a goal.

Mark S

↪invicta

↪schopenhauer1
What if you were doing the deed for recreational purposes and the new born was unintended…what then ? Abortion ? — invicta

↪invicta

All,
The antinatalism and abortion topics you have brought up deserve their own threads. I'd appreciate it if discussions here were kept more relevant to the OP.

schopenhauer1

↪Mark S

The greater point is that all moral decisions except the one I mentioned have an element of harm, so that’s inescapable in this universe.

You mean to not harm, but you do. Maybe posing this question on this forum has somehow harmed somebody, but you didn’t mean it your ends was to just pose a question and not cause harm but you did.

invicta

↪Mark S

Simply stated your question is do the ends justify the means.

I thought you meant do two wrongs make a right.

schopenhauer1

↪Mark S

Also, I see that you’re trying to implement some sort of pragmatism of morality for cooperation l. However, this is endlessly subjective. One persons proactive prodding of someone else is another persons, hassling and pestering. Who is right?

Your answer will involve some sort of ends, which not everyone will agree on, and even the means which might be something like pestering to make it happen is not correct

Heiko

Moral ‘ends’ (goals) are a state of affairs, or perhaps an idea about a state of affairs as unenlightened suggests. — Mark S

From a deontic point of view the moral end is "the good" which deserves unconditional preference over "the bad" or "the evil". This is not a state of affairs but a value-in-itself which may appear to be represented by a state-of-affairs or some action. But as is always the case with mere appearances one can be oh so wrong about their true nature.

Mark S

↪unenlightened

So I think if you keep clear that ends are ideas, and means are behaviour, your separation will work. But you need I think to give priority to behaviour, as the law does – eggs are broken, someone has died. — unenlightened

Thanks for the supportive comment.

Interesting that you suggest giving priority to behavior.

Past and present cultural moral norms are all about behavior. Aside from philosophers, few people worry about ultimate moral ends. Cultural moral disputes are almost always about moral ‘means’, not moral ‘ends’.

As I have described elsewhere here, it is mind-independent truth that past and present cultural moral norms are parts of cooperation strategies. That is, what moral behaviors ‘are’ appears to have an objective basis which is not much affected by what we argue moral ‘ends’ (goals) somehow ought to be.

invicta

Can you please describe a moral end is? Why not simply describe it as a state of affairs rather than “moral state of affairs” (or moral ends as you put it)

Mark S

↪invicta

Can you please describe a moral end? Why not simply describe it as a state of affairs rather than “moral state of affair” (or moral ends as you put it) — invicta

Increased well-being (or flourishing) for all, and lessened suffering are common moral 'ends' in moral philosophy.

Mark S

The greater point is that all moral decisions except the one I mentioned have an element of harm, so that’s inescapable in this universe. — schopenhauer1

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is a non-zero-sum game. This produces many opportunities to increase the benefits of cooperation without harming others.

Mark S

From a deontic point of view the moral end is "the good" which deserves unconditional preference over "the bad" or "the evil". This is not a state of affairs but a value-in-itself which may appear to be represented by a state-of-affairs or some action. But as is always the case with mere appearances one can be oh so wrong about their true nature. — Heiko

To be meaningful don't we have to define what is good as a state-of-affairs?

schopenhauer1

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is a non-zero-sum game. This produces many opportunities to increase the benefits of cooperation without harming others. — Mark S

That's not true. The mere act of "trying" to cooperate may cause issues relating to autonomy or lack thereof.

Heiko

To be meaningful don't we have to define what is good as a state-of-affairs? — Mark S

Define? I don't think so. Mediate? May be. We could also point to examples what is bad and leave the conclusion open.

"The good" is that what can be wanted reasonably. Is that a state of affairs?

180 Proof

What is the difference between moral and non-moral "ends"? moral and non-moral "means"? Can "ends" be moral with non-moral "means" and/or vice versa? Are the relations of "means to ends" different when both are moral from when both are non-moral? Lastly, is tge distinction 'moral and non-moral' between independent, parallel concepts or is one concept dependent on – contingent to, or subset of – the other concept?

Alkis Piskas

Does anyone have arguments that judging moral means and moral ends separately would necessarily be incoherent? — Mark S

I will simplify the statement-thesis that is included in the question and which is to be debated, as follows:
"It is incorrect to judge means and ends separately".
(I replaced the word "incoherent", as it is somewhat ambiguous and I removed the attrribute "moral" from both means and ends, as it implies already a "judgment".
I hope this is OK for you. (Correct me if this is not what you mean.)

My position is that separating means and ends is not incorrect.

Ideally, actions (means) should be compatible with intentions (purpose, end). But this is not always the case. In fact, sometimes means and ends must be separated, as I will show.

Example:

I lie to my wife about a very serious matter --e.g. I have cheated on her-- which will have bad consequences for our marriage, even lead to a divorce, if she learns about that. But I lie with *good* intentions, i.e. to avoid this to happen and thus rescue our marriage. However, the action (means) that I've chosen to use for that are unethical and might lead to exactly the opposite of what I'm trying to achieve, if my wife discovers that I lied. But of course, I might also achieve my purpose (end) if my lie is not discovered.
So, the question is, "Is my intentions enough to justify my action?" I would say no. From an ethical viewpoint, my action was incompatible with my intentions.

Now, instead of lying, I decide to do something that she likes very much, to show that I really love her and I care for her: propose to her a trip to Paris that she always wanted to visit. Or, simply propose to her. :smile: I mean again. I mean a vow renewal and a start of a "new" marriage.
In this case my action (means) is compatible with my intentions. (Independently of whether I achieve my purpose (end) or not.)

So, actions (means) should be judged for themselves, independently of the purpose (end) they are supposed to achieve.
Actions have end results, consequences and possible outcomes. They can --and sometimes even must-- be judged for themselves.

As a general rule, the end does not justify the means.

Mark S

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is a non-zero-sum game. This produces many opportunities to increase the benefits of cooperation without harming others.
— Mark S

That's not true. The mere act of "trying" to cooperate may cause issues relating to autonomy or lack thereof. — schopenhauer1

Perhaps helping others and otherwise being kind could cause issues relative to autonomy or lack thereof, but wouldn’t that be rare? Why focus on possible rare bad effects instead of the normal, plentiful benefits?

Mark S

To be meaningful don't we have to define what is good as a state-of-affairs?
— Mark S

Define? I don't think so. Mediate? May be. We could also point to examples what is bad and leave the conclusion open.

"The good" is that what can be wanted reasonably. Is that a state of affairs? — Heiko

If we are going to effectively work toward achieving something, here a moral ‘end’, then we have to agree on what we are working to achieve – we have to define it. Sure, if you don’t care about achieving an end then you can leave it undefined.

Mark S

What is the difference between moral and non-moral "ends"? moral and non-moral "means"? Can "ends" be moral with non-moral "means" and/or vice versa? Are the relations of "means to ends" different when both are moral from when both are non-moral? Lastly, is tge distinction 'moral and non-moral' between independent, parallel concepts or is one concept dependent on – contingent to, or subset of – the other concept? — 180 Proof

!80 Proof,
“What is the difference between moral and non-moral "ends"? moral and non-moral "means"?”
Gert proposes that what is morally normative (what I was referring to here as “moral”) is what all rational people (with specified conditions) would advocate as moral for their society. If we accept that, then the difference is what “all rational people” would advocate as moral and non-moral “ends” and “means”.

"Can "ends" be moral with non-moral "means" and/or vice versa?"
Yes. Utilitarianism might be a moral end that could be achieved by an immoral means such as forcing a large penalty on one person in order to create a tiny benefit for many people. Or moral means such as defined by Morality as Cooperation Strategies could be applied to achieve immoral ends such as the extermination of outgroups. (Negative utilitarianism offers the interesting possibility that the "ends", lessening suffering, is the same as the "means", but I have not thought much about it yet.)

"Are the relations of "means to ends" different when both are moral from when both are non-moral?"
“Means” and “ends” can be non-moral, both moral, both immoral, or some mix of moral, immoral, and non-moral. I don’t see why the "means to ends" relationship would change.

"Lastly, is the distinction 'moral and non-moral' between independent, parallel concepts or is one concept dependent on – contingent to, or subset of – the other concept?"
Moral and immoral “means” and “ends” are subsets of possible behaviors and “ends”. Then non-moral “means” and “ends” would be subsets of all other possible behaviors and “ends”. I am not confident I am addressing your intent here.

Mark S

So, actions (means) should be judged for themselves, independently of the purpose (end) they are supposed to achieve.
Actions have end results, consequences and possible outcomes. They can --and sometimes even must-- be judged for themselves.

As a general rule, the end does not justify the means. — Alkis Piskas

And neither the ends justify the means (as per utilitarianism's possible over-demanding ‘means’), nor the means justify the end (as I have read Kant advocated).

Alkis Piskas

nor the means justify the end — Mark S

I have never heard of or considered this possibility.
It would be better of course if you supported that with some argumentation and/or examples ... (Referring to Kant cannot substitute that.)

Anyway, I'll try to do that for you. :smile:

Actions (means) in general are based on will and are done in order to accomplish something. That is, they are intended and have a purpose (end). So, in this case, the means follow the end and thus they cannot justify. So, from that aspect, means indeed cannot not justify the end.
(But this is not what the statement actually wants to convey, I believe.)

Now, let's consider the case of actions that are not based on free will or done consciously or on purpose: mistakes, accidents, actions dictated by the subconsious, etc. It's obvious that there's no purpose (end) to be attained here. So, neither here can means justify the end.

So, in either case, it makes no sense to talk about "the means justifying the end". Which makes this statement void of meaning and of no use.

I will be glad to "hear" about any arguments or examples that disagree with the above. :smile:

schopenhauer1

Perhaps helping others and otherwise being kind could cause issues relative to autonomy or lack thereof, but wouldn’t that be rare? Why focus on possible rare bad effects instead of the normal, plentiful benefits? — Mark S

It’s not rare that people will be forced to do X even if it’s supposedly to be in their interest. Who decides when and what and who and all that. They may not like that.

Heiko

If we are going to effectively work toward achieving something, here a moral ‘end’, then we have to agree on what we are working to achieve – we have to define it. Sure, if you don’t care about achieving an end then you can leave it undefined. — Mark S

This sounds like the definition would be a means to achieve the end...
Sorry - you see the problem with this I hope.

Judging moral ‘means’ separately from moral ‘ends’

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