Biological consciousness perceives the alterations the energies of the physical world's effect upon the body, informing biological consciousness of the relative meaning to the organism of the experience, and it is more about the experience than it is about the nature of the energies or said objects. In this sense apparent reality is a melody play upon the organism which is only heard by the organism.

I see things when I am asleep. Some people have defects where they cannot. Are you one of them?

I am guessing it is moe a case of you believing you see with your eyes … some basic attempt to study brain function may remove that idea.

I see things when I am asleep. Some people have defects where they cannot. Are you one of them? — I like sushi

If what you think you see is the same as what you actually see, then when, at the opticians, you think you see a 'W', but the optician tells you it's a 'V' what exactly are the glasses he prescribes you aimed at modifying. Not your ability to see, it seems, since you 'saw' the 'W' fine.

I see things when I am asleep. — I like sushi

This must be quite a skill. If I find you sleeping and held a stick in front of your face you would able to see it. I bet you are peeking.

Are you referring to Innatism, Enactivism, Kant's a priori intuition, etc, in that life has evolved in synergy with the world for at least 3.5 billion years. I agree, if you are. — RussellA

It seems I missed this response of yours previously. I'm not sure about "innatism", but enactivism and Kant's a priori intuition (if you mean space and time) seem about right.

I see things when I am asleep. — I like sushi


This must be quite a skill. If I find you sleeping and held a stick in front of your face you would able to see it. I bet your peeking. — Richard B

No doubt I'll be corrected if wrong, but I think the reference is to dreaming.

No doubt I'll be corrected if wrong, but I think the reference is to dreaming. — Janus

Yeah, even so, this does not make sense. Imagine a child wakes up from a deep sleep and says to their parent, “I just saw a pink elephant in my room.” The parent will assure the child that they did not see a pink elephant, and will correct the child and say something like ‘No, you dreamt that you saw a pink elephant’. Being in a deep sleep logically excludes that one sees anything.

Do you think we stop seeing when we sleep? That we close our eyes and find darkness in order to sleep suggests we might not. The whole time we are staring at the back of our eyelids. Perhaps dreaming serves to distract us from our senses.

I do not think it makes sense to use the word “seeing” when we talk about “when we sleep”. This is done by analyzing the grammar of “dreaming” and “sleeping”.

Of course, scientists can explore all they want when it comes to what is occurring in the brain when we sleep.

However, as for what psychologists are doing with regards to “dream” is a somewhat precarious.

The whole time we are staring at the back of our eyelids. — NOS4A2

If you closed your eyes, I would not say you are staring at all.

It's a fantastic question, and a most difficult one to solve, given that we have to assume certain things that cannot be proven: external world, permanent objects, other minds, etc.

At some level all perception is direct. For the direct realist, the man directly perceives a tree. X directly perceives Y. — NOS4A2

I've struggled quite a bit with this formulation, but discussion here and elsewhere makes me want to state this in a different manner:

Most perception is direct (edge cases aside), we directly perceive a tree. But direct perception does not imply unmediated perception. In fact, it wouldn't be possible to have any experience if we did not mediate it, we would be like lumps of clay, capable of no cognition or perception.

So, we can say we have direct mediated perception and differentiate that from direct un-mediated perception, which is sometimes obscurely implied when speaking about "direct realism".

something within the man (the mind, the brain, a little man) directly perceives something else within the man (sense data, representation, idea) — NOS4A2

This is the hard issue, subject to the most varied types of interpretations.

I'd say, we, as human being - biological organisms - perceive sense-data, caused by objects. The "I" we use to denote a self is a "fiction" - in Hume's sense, roughly something we postulate that goes beyond what can be asserted given the evidence we have at our disposal.

But then this "I" is just as fictitious as a "rock" or a "tree." Put rather simply, a bird or a snake does not perceive these things AS "rocks" or "trees" - they lack the relevant symbolic system that allows for human language and concept formation.

That's roughly my take on it, but there's a lot more that could be said...

I always took “unmediated” to mean that nothing else is intervening in the relationship between perceiver and perceived. In other words there is no veil or buffer or experience between man and tree. I could be wrong on that and appreciate any other formulation.

For me, problems arise when insert some other object of perception like sense data. If we are perceiving sense-data, then we ought to be able to instantiate it. If we can perceive it we ought to be able to point to it, because for anything to be perceptible (perceivable?) it must have some scope and position in time and space. The problem is, whenever we try to examine the nature of sense-data, experience, impressions, we end up examining a person’s brain or some other loci within the body. We are invariably examining the perceiver in search of the perceived, as if they were one and the same, or one was inside the other.

I always took “unmediated” to mean that nothing else is intervening in the relationship between perceiver and perceived. In other words there is no veil or buffer or experience between man and tree. I could be wrong on that and appreciate any other formulation. — NOS4A2

I mean, it depends on what you consider a "buffer" here. We need eyes (and a brain) to see, we need ears to hear, and so on. Now, some people aren't as lucky, they are born blind or deaf or anything else, which prevents them from getting the information we have by merely having eyes and ears.

Then there's interpretation - you see a puddle of water in the distance, but aren't thirsty now. A few hours later you get thirsty and you start walking towards the puddle - but it continues receding. Now you know you don't have a *puddle* (*=denotes concept), but a *mirage*. Of course, this is done so rapidly, we hardly notice this.

Now, if you don't consider these things to be "buffers" or "veils", then fine.

If we can perceive it we ought to be able to point to it, because for anything to be perceptible (perceivable?) it must have some scope and position in time and space. — NOS4A2

I'm not sure I see the problem. If you and me are next to each other and we are looking at the Empire State Building, I can point to it and say "that's the Empire State Building". I can only assume - all else being equal - that you will see something very similar to what I see. There's no way to literally get into somebody else's head, but, daily experience seems to show we see things similarly.

The problem is, whenever we try to examine the nature of sense-data, experience, impressions, we end up examining a person’s brain or some other loci within the body. We are invariably examining the perceiver in search of the perceived, as if they were one and the same, or one was inside the other. — NOS4A2

If you are interested in how the brain works, that's the topic of neuroscience and cognitive science. You aren't going to find an entity "the self" in the brain, even if such constructions originate there - with interplay with the environment of course.

I think I may be missing something, or probably am missing something.

The debate over the argument from illusion is quite extensive, already. Whatever your stance on it it’s an interesting one.

I'm not sure I see the problem. If you and me are next to each other and we are looking at the Empire State Building, I can point to it and say "that's the Empire State Building". I can only assume - all else being equal - that you will see something very similar to what I see. There's no way to literally get into somebody else's head, but, daily experience seems to show we see things similarly.

The problem is with the idea of sense-data. It leads us to believe we are not able to see the Empire State Building, only the sense data. JL Austen states it like this:

“The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.).”

It’s like saying we sense sense, or experience experiences.

If you are interested in how the brain works, that's the topic of neuroscience and cognitive science. You aren't going to find an entity "the self" in the brain, even if such constructions originate there - with interplay with the environment of course.

I think I may be missing something, or probably am missing something.

Right, there is no self living in the brain viewing experiences and perceptions. So indirect realism is redundant. That’s the basic point.

“The general doctrine, generally stated, goes like this: we never see or otherwise perceive (or 'sense'), or anyhow we never directly perceive or sense, material objects (or material things), but only sense-data (or our own ideas, impressions, sensa, sense-perceptions, percepts, &c.).” — NOS4A2

I'm familiar with Locke and Hume, who speak about these things. For Locke what we perceive are ideas which are directly caused by objects. Hume says something somewhat similar but speaks of perceptions instead of ideas.

Such a view as presented here gives the feeling that there is a fundamental difference between objects and our perceptions caused by objects. I fail to see why this implies a veil, as if, somehow, if we did not have ideas or perceptions, we would have a better view of objects.

It seems to me we would have no objects at all. I mean, we know now that colour is caused by reflected light bouncing off objects. In a sense, as pointed out by Neil DeGrasse Tyson, what color the object actually IS, is all the colours combined, except the one we see.

If we didn't have eyes to receive photons, we wouldn't see anything. But then we have to say light is mediated by the eye. But if this is a veil, then we could be seen as implying that a blind person has a better idea of objects, because the objects they perceive aren't mediated by eyes.

Right, there is no self living in the brain viewing experiences and perceptions. So indirect realism is redundant. That’s the basic point. — NOS4A2

I would agree. I think indirect realism is not a clear notion. But I don't see how we get out of the idea of something being mediated.

So, we directly see objects, precisely because they are mediated. That or we say Nagel's phrase that we aspire to a "view from nowhere". I don't see how we get out of the concept that knowledge is necessarily relational.

The essence of what you are experiences the world. Identity is formed from essences successes and failures in relation to environmental context. Think of it this way, identity clothes your essence, but it is your essence that feels the cold.