But if I know that John knows that p, I do know that p is true. If p had been false, I wouldn't have known
that John knows that p. What's the problem? — Ludwig V
You are also changing the definition of knowledge, by allowing that it might be false and still be knowledge. — Ludwig V
Still, given multiple conceptual possibilities (lines of action), one needs to be actualized. That actualization is a specific kind of intentional act. — Dfpolis
Because objects act on the senses to inform the nervous system, thereby presenting themselves for possible attention. When we choose to attend (focus awareness on) to them, we actualize their intelligibility, knowing them. — Dfpolis
Doubts question his commitment to the truth of what he continues to know and believe. — Dfpolis
Being hungry is not a commitment. — Dfpolis
I can believe that I am hungry yet muse about not being hungry, without contradiction. No contradiction is involved. And thinking about what I might do were I not hungry is not the same as believing that I am not hungry when I am.That we can continue to know while suspending belief shows that belief is not a necessary condition for knowing. — Dfpolis
Yep.Suspending belief isn't the same as ceasing belief. — Ludwig V
Sure. The need is to reduce the many potential plans contemplated to one line of action. The act doing this is not the result of contemplating its own meta-options, but of relating to the same options differently.Could you please explain how that the requirement of a specific kind of intentional act before any action doesn't give rise to an infinite regress? — Ludwig V
I am not sure that you did not, at least implicitly. Far greater wounds are suffered in battle and may pass unnoticed because attention is not focused on one's body, but on something else. So, I would say that by not fixing on another focus, we default to focusing on our body state.But I also think that sometimes we do not. When I burn my fingers on a hot stove, I do not choose to attend to the pain. — Ludwig V
That is not what I said. I said doubt can affect commitment. I did not say that commitments can change what we know. Doubts can only affect our commitment to the truth of what we continue to know. Of course, we can refuse to look, but that is a different issue.Doubts question his commitment to the truth of what he continues to know and believe. — Dfpolis
Ah, so knowledge does also require commitment. Thank you for clearing that up. — Ludwig V
I mean that if one really knows, doubts cannot change that knowledge to ignorance. They can only lead us to suspend our commitment to the truth of what we know. This can happen as the result of social pressure or brainwashing. Discrimination can convince people who know their self-worth to doubt it.Do you really mean to say that one knows something that one doubts? — Ludwig V
Believing it adds a commitment to its truth. Suppose a child is hungry and says so. An abusive parent says, "You're not hungry, you just want to complain." The child might believe this, even though she continues to know she is hungry.That's right. And so is believing that your are hungry. — Banno
Will is a power that allows us to value and so choose. Intentionality is not a power, but a property of certain acts, in virtue of which they point beyond their own existence. E.g. we do not just know, we know something. The same for hoping, fearing, loving, hating and so on. This is often described as possessing "aboutness." Valuing and choosing are instances of intentionality, as there is no valuing or choosing without something valued or chosen.How does what you are calling "will" differ from what philosophers call "intentionality"? Or does your theory not make such a distinction? — Banno
Musing is not doubting. It is imagining. Doubting questions our commitment to a proposition. Musing does not.I can believe that I am hungry yet muse about not being hungry, without contradiction. No contradiction is involved. And thinking about what I might do were I not hungry is not the same as believing that I am not hungry when I am. — Banno
If you agree that for non-skeptical accounts of truth, truth is a redundant criterion of knowledge in the first person case, then you also agree that it is redundant for the nth person case. — Ø implies everything
Now, as for my definition of belief as emotional and knowledge as justified belief; what else do you propose? — Ø implies everything
First, some options are imagined. — Dfpolis
Far greater wounds are suffered in battle and may pass unnoticed because attention is not focused on one's body, but on something else. — Dfpolis
Doubts can only affect our commitment to the truth of what we continue to know. — Dfpolis
Will is a power that allows us to value and so choose. — Dfpolis
How does that contradict what I said? I am simply further specifying the "attitude" as commitment. Isn't "taking" p to be true the same as committing to the truth of p?When philosophers talk about belief, they are talking about the attitude we have towards something such that we take it to be the case, to be true, and that is all. — Banno
I beg to differ. Commitment is indicated by consequent behavior. If A believes p, then when asked "is p is true?" A will say, "Yes." That verbal behavior signifies commitment.The sense of belief in JTB does not involve commitment. — Banno
I agree. I do not see it as a genus in which knowledge is a species. This is because I take a narrower view of what constitutes knowing.I'm sugesting that the way you are using belief is somewhat different to the way it is used by epistemologists in general. — Banno
By 'further specifying the "attitude" as commitment'.How does that contradict what I said? — Dfpolis
An odd phrasing, but sure. But "taking p to be true" is not the same as "willing P to be true".Isn't "taking" p to be true the same as committing to the truth of p? — Dfpolis
Fine then, I'll leave you to your variation.I agree. — Dfpolis
Yes, generating initial options for consideration is an action, but it need not be rational in the sense that the options result from judgement. Judgements come later, after there are options to judge. I see it as akin to Humean association, which results from neural net activation processes.First, some options are imagined. — Dfpolis
Could you clarify whether this is an action and, if so, a rational action? — Ludwig V
Choices need not require long reflection. I have not been in battle, but I have been in life and death situations, and I know I chose my responses in under a second. Teachers of meditative practice train their disciples to focus their minds, excluding distractions from the chosen object. In my paper, I cite numerous philosophers' examples of consciousness focusing on one thing, while generating complex neurophysical behavior or responses to unrelated stimuli.I would agree. But I would not believe that I chose to focus my attention elsewhere. — Ludwig V
It does not. The truth is unaffected, which is why the Cartesian meditation does not undermine cognition. What is affected is our commitment to the unaffected truth. Our commitments are reflected in our willingness to act on the truth we know. The abused child who has been told she is not really hungry, but only seeking attention, may cease asking for food and feel guilty about seeking attention -- all the while knowing she is truly hungry. When asked if she is hungry, she says, "No, sir" instead of "Please, sir, more gruel."How does doubt affect our commitment to the truth of what we know if it does not undermine it.? — Ludwig V
Did I? I only named that power "will."We have the power to value and to choose. Why do you posit anything over and above those powers? — Ludwig V
I do not understand the contradiction.By 'further specifying the "attitude" as commitment'. — Banno
Of course, it is not. We do not will p to be true. We will to act as if p is true (or false). While commitment is an intentional act, it has behavioral consequences. (See my response to Ludwig V above.)But "taking p to be true" is not the same as "willing P to be true". — Banno
Donald Trump in his claims that he had the largest crowd at his inauguration and that he won the 2020 election. — Dfpolis
all who chose to believe him, knowing that there was no basis for doing so other than their own desire that it be so. — Dfpolis
People who know, but will not believe, that they have insufficient funds to buy what they want, and act on this commitment by buying it because they want it. — Dfpolis
information is conveyed to the visual association cortex for integration with prior experience. — Dfpolis
without the action of the object, none of the consequent changes of neural state, which are our visual representation of the object, would exist. — Dfpolis
He certainly lied. The sign of commitment is subsequent behavior, not a clear conscience. I could distinguish sincere and insincere commitment, and say that the intentional state we call belief requires sincere commitment. I am unsure precisely how to define sincere commitment. Using behavior as a criterion is pretty clear-cut. Suggestions?What makes you think he committed to that? He said it. He probably lied. — Isaac
I mean no basis in reality, of course.What do you mean 'no basis'? Trump said it. That's basis for someone who trusts Trump. — Isaac
We are saying the same thing in different ways. You call the awareness of their state "believing." I find that confusing because people also believe things they have no knowledge of. So, I choose to call awareness of reality "knowing." Further, if you are going to do something that rationally requires p to be true, I call that committing to the truth of p -- and we agree that people do that knowing that p is false.Again, this doesn't mean they believe they have sufficient funds, it just means they're going to do it anyway. — Isaac
If I accused a particular person, that would be arrogant and presumptuous. To say that it happens without accusing a specific person is not. It is a generalization based on experience.Without actually asking you just come across a really arrogant, assuming you know what's going on in other people's minds. — Isaac
Of course, it does. The action of the object on the sensing subject effects the changes described.nowhere in it does the object even make an appearance. — Isaac
You are confusing having sense data, with the classification of sense data. To apply the term "the tree" we need to classify the "this something" (Aristotle's tode ti), a particular sensory complex, as an instance of a sortal. That comes later. The perceived interacts with its environment in specific ways, one of which is to scatter light capable of being focused into a retinal image into our eyes. That image, together with data from other sensory modalities (perhaps the smell of pine or of orange blossoms), combines into what Aristotle called the phantasm (cf. the binding problem), which we now know to be a modification of our neural state."the Tree" hasn't even got in there yet, nor will it until much after the visual cortex has finished with the processing. — Isaac
While it is of great neurophysiological import where and when various stages of sensory processing occur, it is really of little philosophical interest. What is of interest is that they do occur, and occur in and can be explained by, our neurophysiology.In fact, nothing we could call "the Tree" arrives in the whole process until at least the inferotemporal cortex near the end of the ventral stream.Until that point, the photons from beside the tree and the photons from the tree are processed exactly the same way, no distinction is made. — Isaac
I do not recall asserting this. In a recent article, I argued the opposite (http://gilsonsociety.com/files/847-891-Polis.pdf p. 855 in discussing the definition of man).The idea that objects are recognised as a result of some unique 'signal' sent from them is not supported by the science on the matter. — Isaac
You are mixing cases. I am speaking of the normal perception of an existing sense object. I am not discussing pathological conditions. Please deal with the case at hand. In the case you describe, there is no sensed object, only a neural disturbance.without the action of the object, none of the consequent changes of neural state, which are our visual representation of the object, would exist. — Dfpolis
This is also untrue. Hallucinations are an obvious example of objects having the appropriate neural state associated with their presence being created, without their actually being there. — Isaac
The sign of commitment is subsequent behavior, not a clear conscience. I could distinguish sincere and insincere commitment, and say that the intentional state we call belief requires sincere commitment. I am unsure precisely how to define sincere commitment. Using behavior as a criterion is pretty clear-cut. Suggestions? — Dfpolis
What do you mean 'no basis'? Trump said it. That's basis for someone who trusts Trump. — Isaac
I mean no basis in reality, of course. — Dfpolis
You call the awareness of their state "believing." I find that confusing because people also believe things they have no knowledge of. — Dfpolis
if you are going to do something that rationally requires p to be true, I call that committing to the truth of p -- and we agree that people do that knowing that p is false. — Dfpolis
The action of the object on the sensing subject effects the changes described. — Dfpolis
We identify organic unities because it was evolutionarily advantageous to do so. If it were not, we might well model the world differently. — Dfpolis
their activation is the result of the sun's action on, the sun's dynamic presence in, the sensing subject. — Dfpolis
I think we still need to be careful in identifying the experience as (as opposed to associating it with) a tree. As Paul M. Churchland notes, no neural structures correspond to propositional attitudes ("Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes," — Dfpolis
I am speaking of the normal perception of an existing sense object. I am not discussing pathological conditions. — Dfpolis
Suppose a child is hungry and says so. An abusive parent says, "You're not hungry, you just want to complain." The child might believe this, even though she continues to know she is hungry. — Dfpolis
I think that wording is misleading. You'r over egging the cake.Believing it adds a commitment to its truth. — Dfpolis
A little slide from "belief being an act of will" to our acts being indications of our beliefs. There's a difference between something's being believed because one wills it and someone willing some act as a consequence of their belief.Commitment is indicated by consequent behavior. — Dfpolis
I agree that this is possible and likely. Still, the possibility that Trump may have convinced even himself (self-deluded) is all that I need to show that knowledge is not a species of belief. In that case, he may well have seen the pictures comparing his to the Obama inauguration crowds, found them so distasteful that he put them out of his mind, and comforted himself with the belief that his was crowd was bigger.In your example, lying about the crowd size is 'acting as if it were bigger'. It's acting entirely consistently with two other beliefs. 1) the crowd size was smaller, and 2) if I say it was bigger nonetheless, some people might believe me and I might be more popular. It Trump believed (1) and (2), he would act as he did. His 'commitment' to those two beliefs would be demonstrated in his claiming "the crowds were the biggest". — Isaac
The question is not if it is rational, but if it is possible, to construct beliefs. One cannot construct knowledge out of whole cloth, only make explicit what was only implicit in what we already know. One might construct a belief that was adequate to reality, but unless it was informed by the reality it was about, it would not be knowledge. Its adequacy would be accidental -- a coincidence.It's perfectly rational to construct a system of beliefs where one cannot trust the media representations — Isaac
I would suggest that with over 13,000 lies in office, it is virtually impossible to follow Trump and not to know he routinely lies.there's nothing in such a belief system which is contrary to that same person's knowledge. — Isaac
How can being confused be begging the question? My only assertion was that "people ... believe things they have no knowledge of." Are you denying that?You call the awareness of their state "believing." I find that confusing because people also believe things they have no knowledge of. — Dfpolis
That's begging the question. — Isaac
Again, it need not be true in every case. If there is one case in which a rational actor knows p is false and acts based on the belief that p is true, by the modus tollens, knowledge is not a species of belief.Nothing in the actions you describe requires p to be true. — Isaac
It is my opinion, based on listening to Mary Trump, Donald's niece and a clinical psychologist, that Donald could never commit to his crowd size being less than that of an African American. He would see it as being utterly demeaning and so impossible.he's committing to it being false and acting to cover up that fact. — Isaac
Information is an abstraction, not encountered in a disembodied form. Rather, there are informing actions: sending a message, forming an image on the retina, causing cochlear cilia to vibrate, etc. Sensible objects are agents that effect changes in sense organs, and it is those changes, specified jointly by the nature of the object and of the organ, that embodies information.o. The information from assumed external states effects the changes described. All external states. — Isaac
This is not a sentence.The entirely of the heterogeneous soup of data states that the hypothesise as being external to our system. — Isaac
I find this unintelligible until you define "'objects.'" There are sensible existents with organic unity prior to being perceived. I could argue this, but the burden is on you to clarify and possibly justify your claim.No 'objects' are defined prior to our defining them. — Isaac
Very different groups of people have different rules of distinction. Take colour, for example. There are several different ways of dividing up colour responses in different culture. the evidence seems, rather, to point in the direction of language and culture being at least substantially, if not mainly, responsible for the 'dividing up' of our sensory inputs into objects. — Isaac
Of course, I do. Experiments show that some stimuli activate specific neural net nodes while others do not. Those that activate nodes might be called "privileged" (your term, not mine).This would be to privilege one neural response above others. without begging the question, you've no grounds on which to do that — Isaac
You are mischaracterizing my position. I do not deny that any neural response is real. Still, some activate nodes formed by prior experience, and some do not. Those that do not lack discernible immediate consequences. They may not even activate the next neuron.None of these responses is the 'real' one (with others being merely peripheral). Only our culturally embedded values can determine such a thing. Scientifically, they're all just equally valid responses of a system to stimuli. — Isaac
I am not a metaphysical naturalist, but I think this claim is unsupportable. The neural net model seems a reasonable first approximation to how information is categorized. If so, there ought to be nodes assocated with each sortal in our conceptual space and activated by its instances. Thus, there ought to be a "tree" node, which is activated by encountering trees. Further, its activation should be consistent, though not infallible. If not, we would have great difficulty in predicating "tree" of an oak we have encountered.And no neural structures correspond with 'tree' either (or at least not consistently). — Isaac
I am not sure what you mean by "valid" here. Are all responses equally logical? No. Equally adaptive? No. Equally effective in activating sortal nodes? No. They are only equal in all existing. That does not make them "valid" in any sense I can think of.Scientifically, they're all just equally valid responses of a system to stimuli. — Isaac
To hallucionate is to "experience an apparent sensory perception of something that is not actually present." I am discussing the case where an object is actually present. Thus, what you are describing does not meet the defintion of a hallucination.It's not 'pathological'. We hallucinate, for example, the content of a scene which is behind our punctum caecum. We hallucinate a stable scene despite regular changes in the angle of perception. — Isaac
The problem with this is that the sequence begins by the child knowing they are hungry. Being convinced they are not is an abusive consequence of that.I'd characterise this differently. The child, ex hypothesi, believes they only want to complain; they do not believe they are hungry, and hence can not know that they are hungry. — Banno
I think the difficulty is that in common use, believing and knowing are often used interchangeably. The question is, is there a difference between being aware of a state and being willing to act (even mentally) on the fact of that state. I am saying there is.Believing it adds a commitment to its truth. — Dfpolis
I think that wording is misleading. You'r over egging the cake. — Banno
I would say that if you claim to believe something, and are unwilling to act on that "belief," you do not really believe it.here's a difference between something's being believed because one wills it and someone willing some act as a consequence of their belief. — Banno
So, why speak about propositional knowledge at all then, why not speak about more or less justified propositional belief instead, thus dissolving all the attendant paradoxes, and saving us from going over and over this same old boring ground ad nauseum? — Janus
I think it is very hard to let the idea of knowledge go, because it carries a promise of certainty. Even if we did speak only about justified belief, we would still argue about what counts as justification. It is not an unimportant idea.
Sadly, every philosopher has to be convinced of everything for themselves. It's foundational that one cannot trust anyone on any subject. Perhaps it's overdone, but I don't think there is any cure that would not be worse than the disease. — Ludwig V
Perhaps not, but either atheists will themselves to believe there is no God, or theists will themselves to believe there is a God. Both cannot know the truth of the matter, despite claiming that they do. So, there must be another source of their commitment. I claim that it is will.One might will oneself to believe Canterbury-Bankstown Bulldogs will win against the Sharks, but one does not will oneself to believe that this text is in English. — Banno
I agree that generally these acts are spontaneous rather than the consequence of deep reflection. I do not think that willing requires such reflection. I think that in most cases it is a spontaneous and unreflective valuing.While one might be said to will oneself to act in a certain way based on one's beliefs, one does not in every case will oneself to believe this or that. — Banno
but either atheists will themselves to believe there is no God, or theists will themselves to believe there is a God. — Dfpolis
Why? As in, why must there be a commitment? Why not just a belief?...there must be another source of their commitment. — Dfpolis
And when you take this far enough, will becomes no more than intentionality - directedness.I do not think that willing requires such reflection. — Dfpolis
the possibility that Trump may have convinced even himself (self-deluded) is all that I need to show that knowledge is not a species of belief. In that case, he may well have seen the pictures comparing his to the Obama inauguration crowds, found them so distasteful that he put them out of his mind, and comforted himself with the belief that his was crowd was bigger. — Dfpolis
Our willingness to act on p is what I am calling commitment to the truth of p or believing p. It is different from knowing it is the case that p. We can know p, but lack the confidence to commit to the truth of p, and act on it. — Dfpolis
I would suggest that with over 13,000 lies in office, it is virtually impossible to follow Trump and not to know he routinely lies. — Dfpolis
If there is one case in which a rational actor knows p is false and acts based on the belief that p is true, by the modus tollens, knowledge is not a species of belief. — Dfpolis
Donald could never commit to his crowd size being less than that of an African American. He would see it as being utterly demeaning and so impossible. — Dfpolis
The entirely of the heterogeneous soup of data states that the hypothesise as being external to our system. — Isaac
This is not a sentence. — Dfpolis
They both cannot know what they claim, so what kind of act do you see engendering belief? And, when they each believe what they believe, is that not the same as being committed to that position?Well, no. Atheists believe there is no God, or theists believe there is a God. Will has little to do with it. — Banno
If you engaged in a discussion of God's existence, you would quickly find that theists and atheists are strongly committed to their positions. So, it is a contingent fact that firm belief is inseparable from firm commitment.Why? As in, why must there be a commitment? — Banno
Almost. It is the cause of intentionality in the sense of directedness.And when you take this far enough, will becomes no more than intentionality - directedness. — Banno
Not at all. I am articulating a common and accepted view, viz. that people are capable of self-deception. Cf. Zengdan Jian, Wenjie Zhang, Ling Tian, Wei Fan and Yiping Zhong, "Self-Deception Reduces Cognitive Load: The Role of Involuntary Conscious Memory Impairment," Frontiers of Psychology 10 (30 July 2019) https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01718/full.Again, this begs the question. If you assume the possibility, you are not investigating it, you're simply declaring it. — Isaac
What they are calling "a contradictory unconscious real belief" I am calling "knowledge."People often hear classic allusions such as plugging one’s ears while stealing a bell, pointing to a deer and calling it a horse, drawing cakes to satisfy one’s hunger, and the emperor’s new clothes. These allusions reflect the principle that people believe in nonexistent phenomena to satisfy their desires. This is called “self-deception.” Self-deception is a personality trait and an independent mental state, it involves a combination of a conscious motivational false belief and a contradictory unconscious real belief. — Jain et al. (2019)
I am not saying it is sufficient. I am saying that it is an accepted psychological fact that some people self-deceive as described by Jain et al. above.There's obviously a difference between mere belief and actual knowledge, but that difference is not sufficient to justify a claim that people believe something despite knowing its opposite. — Isaac
I would say that it could indicate either. I only claimed that acting on a belief was a sign of commitment, not that it necessarily entailed commitment. Smoke is a sign of fire, but that does not mean that every instance of spoke entails an instance of fire.people acting as if p is not an indicator that they believe p, it is an indicator that they believe acting as if p is in their best interests. — Isaac
We agree entirely on this.stuff you believe is true is not necessarily true. — Isaac
I saw the picture of his crowd next to the picture of Obama's crowd. You could pettifog with various objections, but that is a rational basis for my conclusion on crowd size.Just because you personally believe Trump didn't have the largest crowds, doesn't mean he didn't. you didn't personally count them, you didn't personally see them. — Isaac
Hardly! It is paranoid behavior unless one has specific sound reasons for distrusting. I suggest you consult DSM 5.It is perfectly rational behaviour to not trust those others — Isaac
PPD (Paranoid Personality Disorder) is a DSM-5 (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition), diagnosis assigned to individuals who have a pervasive, persistent, and enduring mistrust of others, and a profoundly cynical view of others and the world. — American Psychiatric Association, 2013
Pettifogging. You are creating a diversion instead of addressing my point that no rational follower of D.T. could fail to notice many of his lies.Case in point. who told you he told over 13,000 lies? — Isaac
I am not seeking metaphysical certitude with my examples. I am merely suggesting directions to look in order to see what I see. So, raising possible alternatives in specific cases misses the point. The point is that this type of behavior occurs, and it is useful to reflect upon it. It is not that my example is infallibly a case of such behavior. I am morally certain it is -- certain beyond a reasonable doubt. Aides normally inform presidents of such things. I am not metaphysically certain that it is -- my conclusion lacks absolute necessity.That may well be true, but you haven't demonstrated that he, at the same time, knows it to be true that his crowds were smaller. — Isaac
"No ground"? In that case, you have a long way to go. It seems clear to me that many of our perceptions have specific, enduring sources, and that specificity grounds our property concepts.I'm arguing that there is no ground for saying that external objects (with properties consistent to that object) exist outside of our definition of them. — Isaac
I agree that sensible objects have no intrinsic necessity. They are metaphysically contingent. Beyond that, I have no idea what you mean by thinking it could have been otherwise. Do you mean that ants might not have evolved? Or that we might not have noticed that ants are organic unities, and so might not have formed the concept <ant>? Or that we could have evolved without giving "privilege" to sensations of organisms? Or what?no grounds for assuming that it could not have been otherwise. — Isaac
Quite true, but, I think, entirely irrelevant. In thinking of an ant, we are not saying this little six-legged thing in the sugar bowl is like something else. We are saying it is an ant. It is also like many other things -- say, a moving speck of pepper -- but that likeness is irrelevant to calling it "an ant." We call it "an ant" because it has the objective capacity to elicit our concept <ant> -- not because it is like a moving pepper speck. Orion does not have the objective capacity to elicit the notes of comprehension in our concept <a man with a belt and a bow>.Like the constellation Orion. It definitely is in the shape of a man with a belt and a bow. We're not making that up. But it is also in the shape of dozens of other things we've chosen to ignore. — Isaac
In the case of "You know that p", the audience and the subject are the same person. The truth condition is not redundant, but conveys the information that the speaker endorses the subject's belief that p. — Ludwig V
What they are calling "a contradictory unconscious real belief" I am calling "knowledge." — Dfpolis
I only claimed that acting on a belief was a sign of commitment — Dfpolis
I saw the picture of his crowd next to the picture of Obama's crowd. You could pettifog with various objections, but that is a rational basis for my conclusion on crowd size. — Dfpolis
It is paranoid behavior unless one has specific sound reasons for distrusting. — Dfpolis
You are creating a diversion instead of addressing my point that no rational follower of D.T. could fail to notice many of his lies. — Dfpolis
The point is that this type of behavior occurs, and it is useful to reflect upon it. — Dfpolis
"No ground"? In that case, you have a long way to go. It seems clear to me that many of our perceptions have specific, enduring sources, and that specificity grounds our property concepts. — Dfpolis
Do you mean that ants might not have evolved? Or that we might not have noticed that ants are organic unities, and so might not have formed the concept <ant>? — Dfpolis
We call it "an ant" because it has the objective capacity to elicit our concept <ant> — Dfpolis
The "grounds" that support what seems to you are the "grounds" that seem to you to be such. — Janus
So, you are saying that the truth criterion of the JTB definition is evaluated from the standpoint of the speaker, regardless of the subject of knowledge? That is, if I say that someone else than me knows something, then the truth criterion applies to the proposition that I am stating? — Ø implies everything
He knows p = He is justified in believing p and this proposition is true/known by me — Ø implies everything
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