The onus is on direct realists to explain, if only broadly and superficially, how direct realism is supposed to work. Thoughts? — frank

Pierre Le Morvan wrote an article Arguments against Direct Realism and how to counter them

A major problem with Direct Realism is the belief that because one knows an effect, such as the image of a tree, the cause of that effect can be directly and unambiguously known.

Interesting!

I may be absolutely certain of what I am seeing, whether a tree or snooker balls on a snooker table, but knowing the present effect doesn't allow me to know the preceding cause.

As I cannot know from the position of the snooker balls in the image the preceding state of affairs, I cannot know from seeing an image of a tree the preceding cause of that image.

A Direct Realist would need to explain how the cause of an effect may be unambiguously known just from knowing the effect.

The onus is on direct realists to explain, if only broadly and superficially, how direct realism is supposed to work. Thoughts? — frank

But you already know how it works, I see with my eyes and touch with my skin and hear with my ears. The onus is on the indirect realist to explain what this interface could possibly be that is neither me nor the world. The only candidate so far is 'image', and that is obviously nonsense. when I touch a tree, what is between me and the tree? Nothing, I say, what do you say?

In my view, there's a confusing tendency around this issue to put objects beneath and not within the space of reasons, which is almost tautologically implausible, for claims must have meaning and philosophical claims must be justified.

Ah, so here we go.

I'm glad you folks have the same thought process, because now I could lay down the argument on the idea that what we see is indirect reality. It's reality, no doubt, but a representation. And it's a representation not because of the reasons you say.

If we directly perceive objects without any nervous interface, how exactly do with do that? Your eyes don't see things. Your ears don't hear things, and your fingers don't feel things. Your central nervous system sees, hears and feels. There clearly is an interface between the CNS and the world. Thus, indirectness appears to be the way it works. — frank

If the view is of a valley with a fine village with an old pub in it, and you can walk down the hill to the pub and enter and order a beer and drink the beer, then the view was not a representation, whereas if you just get a squashed nose and the taste of paint, it was a representation. I hope this helps. — unenlightened

Our five senses work just fine. It's not in the touching, or seeing, or hearing that we miss out on the thing-in-itself. It's our concept formation, our language, our comprehension, and all other things human that get in the way of looking at an object and not be able to undo the idea of a "tree", "moon", "triangle", "people". You can't look at a tree and see a "thing". You can only see a tree. A wood table, for example, cannot be unseen as a table. You can't look at it and see a "thing".

Our mind is enveloped in this cloud of a lifetime learning. No, I take that back. Our mind naturally forms concepts/ideas from day one. This (!) is what we can't undo. We can't get outside of our mind and see the world stripped off of names, reference, and qualities.

But you already know how it works, I see with my eyes and touch with my skin and hear with my ears. The onus is on the indirect realist to explain what this interface could possibly be that is neither me nor the world. — unenlightened

I think the usual answer is nerves.

what do you say? — unenlightened

Ha! As if anyone cares what I think. :grin:

Ah, so here we go. — L'éléphant

I'm not going to read the rest of your post. Thanks.

I'm not going to read the rest of your post. Thanks. — frank

That's fine. No harm done.

I have never been able to fanthom the "direct realism" argument.
Our senses (body and mind) filter, organize and present information (data) from the external enviroment in a way that is advantageous (usually) for our survival. Do our senses give us an entirely complete picture of the external environment, it would seem quite clearly not; we don't see UV or Infrared, we do not hear frequencies above or below certain limits. So our picture of the world including the way we color it is a representation of reality, not a complete picture of all or nature.
So for me, it is the direct realism argument which is undermined by the science of perception.

Do our senses give us an entirely complete picture of the external environment, it would seem quite clearly not; we don't see UV or Infrared, we do not hear frequencies above or below certain limits. — prothero

We have devices that can show us those. So, it's not the issue.

We have devices that can show us those. So, it's not the issue. — L'éléphant

Quite the contrary IMV, direct and indirect realism are questions about perception not about scientific instrumentation. Furthermore what makes you think scientific instrumentation reveals all?

We can't get outside of our mind and see the world stripped off of names, reference, and qualities. — L'éléphant

True, but the idea of such a naked world is itself a object within our system of references. It's within our space of reasons, even as it helplessly and hopelessly tries to gesture beyond that space. This is not to say that the world is in the mind. The brain and the tree and the dream are all in the same world, in the same space of reasons. Else we could not make sense of their relationships to one another.

Our senses (body and mind) filter, organize and present information (data) from the external enviroment in a way that is advantageous (usually) for our survival. Do our senses give us an entirely complete picture of the external environment, it would seem quite clearly not; we don't see UV or Infrared, we do not hear frequencies above or below certain limits. So our picture of the world including the way we color it is a representation of reality, not a complete picture of all or nature. — prothero

Your conclusion doesn’t follow. Another possibility which is consistent with the premises is this: we see things in certain human ways, but it’s the things we are seeing, not representations thereof. That’s direct perception.

I have never been able to fanthom the "direct realism" argument. — prothero

What indirect realism gets right is that an individual human's beliefs are a function not only of the world apart from that individual but also of that individual's spatial and cultural position within that world. But all of our beliefs must refer to the same (life-)world in order to be intelligible and subject to epistemological and semantic norms. The naked world ( imagined paradoxically as a substrate 'beneath' language) is like an impossible point at infinity, an idea in the Kantian sense.

it’s the things we are seeing, not representations thereof. — Jamal

:up:

There's no reason to imagine seeing as radically simple.

Who said that there's such a thing as "direct realism"?

Our senses (body and mind) filter, organize and present information (data) from the external enviroment in a way that is advantageous (usually) for our survival. Do our senses give us an entirely complete picture of the external environment, it would seem quite clearly not; we don't see UV or Infrared, we do not hear frequencies above or below certain limits. So our picture of the world including the way we color it is a representation of reality, not a complete picture of all or nature. — prothero

Is this your argument? I can't see everything, so I can't see anything. If you have a picture of the world, how do you see it? Indirectly?

Is there a point to this? Is there not elementary neuroscience and psychology first in modern philosophy?

Is there a point to this? Is there not elementary neuroscience and psychology first in modern philosophy? — Alexander Hine

I think the question reduces to one of identity. Those who Identify as mind will be indirect realists, whereas those who identify as body will be direct realists. Direct realists are joined to the world by their skin and all their senses, and indirect realists are separated from the world by their skull and all their senses. Neuroscience will never find the person in the neurones or the 'correct' identification.

Your conclusion doesn’t follow. Another possibility which is consistent with the premises is this: we see things in certain human ways, but it’s the things we are seeing, not representations thereof. That’s direct perception. — Jamal

What would be the justification for that view?

Your conclusion doesn’t follow. Another possibility which is consistent with the premises is this: we see things in certain human ways, but it’s the things we are seeing, not representations thereof. That’s direct perception. — Jamal

If that's your definition of direct realism then the distinction between direct and indirect disappears but I do not think that definition is the one universally applied in the argument.

Is this your argument? I can't see everything, so I can't see anything. If you have a picture of the world, how do you see it? Indirectly? — unenlightened

I do not think that was the argument; It was more we don't see everything not we do not see anything. Yes sense perception has a direct causal link to the external world but the senses are selective and perception is a process that occurs in the brain not in the external world. Again how are you defining direct realism vs indirect realism ?

perception is a process that occurs in the brain not in the external world. — prothero

The phrase "external world" implies a separate "internal world" in which presumably "perception" happens, as distinct from "seeing" which happens in the external world when for example, the dog sees the rabbit. Indirect realists are happiest talking about seeing and most unhappy talking about touching, for reasons that are probably fairly obvious.

But the problem with this dual world that indirect realism seems to require is that bodies, sense-organs and' most of all, brains, are part of the external world that they have no direct contact with.

…..because as Mww noted, direct realism doesn't make any sense on its face. — frank

Doesn’t make any sense with respect to the central nervous + peripherals system from a physical point of view, nor with respect to some theoretical cognitive system from a metaphysical point of view.

Direct realism is a necessary condition for the proper functionality of sensory apparatus as such, nonetheless, and should be taken as granted from either point of view.

To finesse the noted…..

The phrase "external world" implies a separate "internal world" in which presumably "perception" happens, as distinct from "seeing" which happens in the external world when for example, the dog sees the rabbit. Indirect realists are happiest talking about seeing and most unhappy talking about touching, for reasons that are probably fairly obvious.

But the problem with this dual world that indirect realism seems to require is that bodies, sense-organs and' most of all, brains, are part of the external world that they have no direct contact with. — unenlightened

I think the distinction between self and other is pretty fundamental to human cognition and psychology.
Although I would agree we are embedded in and part of the larger world and that our perception of the tree is as "real" as the tree itself, it would seem a semantic distinction between the tree as it is separate from us and our perception of the tree as formed in the mind and through the senses is warranted.
Yes there is a direct path of causal efficacy from the eternal world to the perception and so in that sense it is "direct" but that slanders my understanding of the direct realism or Naive realism argument.

So far an AI would be none the wiser (with respect to direct / indirect perception). All these clouds floating around, trees in heads or not in heads--it gives one a headache. The AI overheats and shuts down.

Maybe human intellect is getting in the way of self-observation (is that tree in my head?).

Would it help to examine a different animal that is not busy philosophizing about how it gets a tree into its head (or not)? Our sensory / perceptual facilities evolved similarly to other animals, but they can not get tangled up in reflection about perception,

A scout honey bee flies away from the hive. On its flight it passes over a patch of black-eyed susan (Rudbeckia hirta). It turns back to the hive and once there communicates to gatherer bees a few facts -- what direction, how far, how good. The scout 'speaks' through movement--in the dark, pretty much. Gatherer bees take the facts and go directly to the rudbeckia patch and collect lots of pollen.

Bees have been doing this for a long time, and have not been philosophizing about it (as far as we know).

Are bees perceiving the world directly or indirectly?

If a male dog smells a female dog in heat, is it perceiving the pheromones directly or indirectly?

↪frank So far an AI would be none the wiser (with respect to direct / indirect perception). All these clouds floating around, trees in heads or not in heads--it gives one a headache. The AI overheats and shuts down. — BC

Well, yes, what is important is understanding the process of perception not engaging in a semantic argument about the meaning of "direct" or "indirect". Perception is a process with its limitations and bees have their own perceptual process which in some respects is superior to our own.

Doesn’t make any sense with respect to the central nervous + peripherals system from a physical point of view, nor with respect to some theoretical cognitive system from a metaphysical point of view.

Direct realism is a necessary condition for the proper functionality of sensory apparatus as such, nonetheless, and should be taken as granted from either point of view. — Mww

So you have a contradiction on your hands. What do you do about that?

So you have a contradiction on your hands. — frank

Yikes!! Can’t have that. Point it out for me?