Okay, maybe I just need to lower the standard of my argument a bit.

Since my argument from simplicity would only be a possibility and not a necessity (assuming you are correct in your critique), and since the classical cosmological proofs of God strictly speaking do not prove a present existence of God (see last quotes in the OP; and provided that they otherwise work), the rational theist (hitherto always believing in the provability of a presently existing God), as I have called him/her, cannot be sure of a present God, and must therefore now believe fideistically (irrationally?) in it.

What is it you hope to gain from making these arguments?

In the specific case here, simply defending the (new) title of my post. I am also looking for counter-arguments, which you have thankfully given me. These can then lead me to approach the matter somewhat differently. And, of course, I hope to gain the impression that the reader is enriched with something new, something she has not heard countless times before.

And in general, I hope that the idea of a defunct God will be further explored and elaborated within the philosophy of religion (what I have found in textbooks and treatises so far is rather meager). So, expanding the conceptual landscape in the service of truth. This can possibly be accelerated if a general public is interested. It's a bit odd that the great David Hume has already taken up this idea in his popular dialogues on religion without it getting much attention. Perhaps it is because he mentioned it in an amusing way.
But he actually saw it as a genuine alternative to the result of the usual teleological/intelligent design proof of God, that is my interpretation.

There is another, much older, trope of a dead god. That one was put into service and gained critical historical significance.

To what end do you think this idea of a defunct god serves? How do you see it as an alternative to teleological/intelligent design arguments? It could be argued that an acorn dies or is transformed in order to become an oak. The same teleological argument can be made about a god who dies or is transformed to become something else.

There is another, much older, trope of a dead god. That one was put into service and gained critical historical significance. — Fooloso4

You seem to be alluding to something obviously familiar, yet I can't figure it out. Christ dying on the cross? Or Indian mythology? Or from indigenous cultures?

To what end do you think this idea of a defunct god serves? — Fooloso4

Probably not a practical end, rather only a theoretical one. But I would have to think about that further.

I would have to proceed systematically and ask what end is served by the idea of a world without God, who was not before, is not beside, nor will be after.

And what end is served by the idea of a presently existing God.

If I think about it carefully, the idea of a defunct God can yield the same values as theism or atheism. It would therefore simply cause more confusion.

How do you see it as an alternative to teleological/intelligent design arguments? — Fooloso4

I was thinking more of Hume's specific argument, if I recall it correctly. It's been a long time since I read it. Hume (or the character in the Dialogues with whom Hume can most readily be equated) admits that there is order in the natural world. Order seems to refer to an ordering principle. Theism says this principle is a perfect being co-existing with the world. Hume now brings alternatives. There could be a plurality of fundamental ordering principles (atomism?) Or the principle that orders the world is of inferior nature. And finally, that principle perished in creating order, which is now independent through conservation principles.

It could be argued that an acorn dies or is transformed in order to become an oak. The same teleological argument can be made about a god who dies or is transformed to become something else. — Fooloso4

Interesting approach, the world or its emergence would thus have something necessary, inevitable.

C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.

C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.

D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you derive what you call "D" here. If God is One, and was active prior to His creation, what prevents Him from being active currently?

What I see first is contradiction within B 2:

B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.

If all that exists at a given time, is one substance, then all is one. Accordingly, it is impossible that one becomes two. or any other multiplicity, unless there is something which is other than the one, which serves as a boundary, or divisor, within the one, to make two, or the proposed multiplicity. Therefore it is contradictory to say that One can transform itself into Many. This proposition implies that the One is not really one, or the Many is not really many.

Because of this, we need to look more closely at your principle that God is simple. You say that God must be simple, as the "most original principle". But this as well is contradictory. The nature of "a principle" is such that it always consists of parts. There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle.

So, allow me to return to my original objection. To "be active" is a principle which implies the necessity of parts. There is a number of things implied within this concept "active". There is a substance which is active, there is space to be active in, and there is time. If God was active, then those three required parts of the principle "active" are necessary.

I conclude that your argument is misdirected in a number of ways.

If God is One, and was active prior to His creation, what prevents Him from being active currently? — Metaphysician Undercover

I leave open whether God was active in every way appropriate to him prior to his creation. At least as far as creation is concerned, he was inactive prior to it. Sounds logical to me anyway, and that's how I understand my construction.

If all that exists at a given time, is one substance, then all is one. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps the following quote will be helpful:

"According to stuff monism there is only one kind of stuff (e.g. material stuff ), although there may be
many things. According to thing monism there is strictly speaking only one thing. Spinoza is an exemplary thing monist." (Galen Strawson - Nietzsche’s Metaphysics?)

You mean thing-monism, whereas I mean stuff-monism.

unless there is something which is other than the one, which serves as a boundary, or divisor, within the one, to make two, or the proposed multiplicity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why should God, as One, not be His own divisor or boundary-puller, directed towards Himself?

The nature of "a principle" is such that it always consists of parts. There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, I wanted to avoid evoking too many technicalities with the term "principle". If it causes too many problems, I shall simply say "most original source" instead.

There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if a principle must always have parts, I refer to the Injury Problem:

“There’s an objection—I’ll call it the ‘Injury Problem’—that I think poses a larger problem for the claim that God creates out of His proper parts. The objection is this: if the x’s are proper parts of God and God creates the universe out of the x’s, then God loses whatever functions or features the x’s conferred on God. And this would make God worse off or lessened. For instance, if Michelangelo created the statue of David not out of a block of marble but out of the flesh and bone in his right foot, Michelangelo would no longer be able to walk as he once did. It would seem that something just as injurious to God would take place if He were to create out of Himself. Perhaps we could reply that God creates out of parts that don’t really contribute to God’s properties or functions. But this response seems unappealing and ad hoc, for why did God have those parts in the first place and in what sense are they really parts of Him if they don’t really serve any function? A different response is to say that God could heal Himself—replace those parts from which He created the universe with new parts. But the problem (and the injury) would just be pushed back to where those parts were taken from.” (Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - A Theory of Creation Ex Deo) — spirit-salamander

If God was active, then those three required parts of the principle "active" are necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, then I say God was totally inactive before creation.

I conclude that your argument is misdirected in a number of ways. — Metaphysician Undercover

Would you agree thatcreatio ex nihilo in the strict sense can only mean creatio ex deo?

The scholars or experts in the philosophy of religion: Daniel Soars, Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker, Bill Vallacella (Maverick Philosopher) whom I quote in the OP see it that way. They all advocate panentheism instead of theism in order to avoid the logical problem. The same applies to the mystic Jakob Boehme.

If in theism stuff of God is the "material" for creation, and considering the following:

The ground of all being would thus be completely rounded, so to speak. This ground would be absolutely homogeneous as if flawlessly and seamlessly made from one piece. Why should the spawning of space-time parts not diminish it? “Diminish” would actually be an understatement in this case. It would have to be “destroy”, considering that to create would be to use God's “material”, as quoted in the original post. If you take a little of this “material”, you ultimately take all of it. — spirit-salamander

Doesn't it follow that God must use himself up completely in creation?

The alternative is panentheism: for in panentheism, creatures are not absolutely distinct from God, as in theism. Rather, there is a kind of continuum of the world to God.

Christ dying on the cross? — spirit-salamander

Yes.

You might find this interesting. In Kabbalah, Jewish mysticism, the problem of creation is dealt with differently. Ein Sof (without end) withdraws itself in order for there to be room to create the world.

Probably not a practical end, rather only a theoretical one. — spirit-salamander

I was thinking along the lines of a theological one.

And what end is served by the idea of a presently existing God. — spirit-salamander

I think this is the background against which the former question can be asked. Everything from an absentee landlord to protector and provider.

If I think about it carefully, the idea of a defunct God can yield the same values as theism or atheism. — spirit-salamander

Right. That was one of the things I was getting at with the question.

Interesting approach, the world or its emergence would thus have something necessary, inevitable. — spirit-salamander

I think this overstates the case. The point is that the idea of a defunct god does not do away with teleology. Theology made use of teleology but it was with Aristotle a natural rather than theological principle. It is of the nature of an acorn to become an oak. But not every acorn becomes an oak and there is nothing necessary about there being acorns and oaks.

Why should God, as One, not be His own divisor or boundary-puller, directed towards Himself? — spirit-salamander

If God is necessarily one, then He cannot divide Himself. If He is capable of dividing Himself, you cannot describe Him as necessarily one.

Even if a principle must always have parts, I refer to the Injury Problem: — spirit-salamander

This is an expression of the same problem. It assumes that God is one, and many at the same time. But until the proper principle is applied, which could allow the same thing to be one and many at the same time, the problem described is just fictional, a derivative of the base contradiction of being one and many at the same time.

Okay, then I say God was totally inactive before creation. — spirit-salamander

This doesn't resolve anything, because now you need a cause to make God become active.

Would you agree thatcreatio ex nihilo in the strict sense can only mean creatio ex deo?

The scholars or experts in the philosophy of religion: Daniel Soars, Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker, Bill Vallacella (Maverick Philosopher) whom I quote in the OP see it that way. They all advocate panentheism instead of theism in order to avoid the logical problem. The same applies to the mystic Jakob Boehme.

If in theism stuff of God is the "material" for creation, and considering the following: — spirit-salamander

You'd have to explain to me these proposals before I could assess them properly.

Doesn't it follow that God must use himself up completely in creation? — spirit-salamander

No, because we haven't properly accounted for how "parts" as distinct individuals could exist as a united "whole". Until we establish the proper relationship between parts and whole, such speculation is useless.

The point is that we describe these relations in spatial terms, then we want to transpose spatial relations to establish a temporal priority. But you have provided no principles of commensurability to relate spatial terms to temporal terms.

So for example, you describe God as one whole. This would imply no space within God, as separating one part from another, because this would indicate that god is a multitude. Then (implying temporal posteriority), God divides into parts. But where does the space within God come from? Now we say, that this space is due to the fact that God is active. But space within God implies that God is a multitude, rather than one. So we go around in a vicious circle which is unresolvable, until we remove the idea that God is one. Then God is necessarily a multitude. But how do we call this multitude by one name, "God"? This can be resolved by looking at the possibility of a relationship which is other than spatial.

[Title of the OP was changed because it was misleading. It suggested that I was making a positive argument for a God who no longer exists.]
I present a challenge to theism (It is only for dialectical reasons that the challenging argument clings to some basic assumptions of theism): — spirit-salamander

I appreciate the clarification. It allows for philosophical dialog, without getting into political posturing. I too have constructed an alternative god-model for my own worldview, and I enjoy sharing views without getting into condemnations. However, some materialist posters see no need for a god-posit at all. As Feynman advised, in order to avoid feckless hypothetical speculations, "just shut-up and calculate". They accept reality as it appears on the surface, and don't try to look for underlying principles that are not empirically verifiable. But this is a philosophical forum, so we don't calculate, we speculate.

I agree that traditional Theism is inappropriate for our modern world. Therefore, it is indeed due for a philosophical & scientific update. For example, my god-model terminology derives mostly from 21st century Quantum and Information Theories. Moreover, as an alternative to traditional religious Theism, my Deistic god-model is a non-intervening abstract philosophical principle. That's not a concept to inspire hope in the down-trodden masses. Just a way to make sense of some paradoxes & contradictions of our amazing, but imperfect world. Here, I take your list of postulates as an outline for presenting some of my own ideas. As you will see, my theory departs from yours mainly in the last item.


A 1. The universe began to exist a finite time ago.
*** Since the physical world is limited by Entropy, its time to exist must also be limited.

A 2. Only an act originating from God could have caused the universe to begin.
*** The Act of Creation is confirmed by BB theory. Only the nature of the Actor remains to be updated. The Genesis myth was based on experience with ruling tyrants in ancient Mesopotamia. Surely, we can come up with a more modern notion of creation and causation.

B 1. Creation from nothing is impossible.
*** Yes, but creation from infinite Potential is not only possible but scientifically credible, since materialistic classical Physics was undermined by statistical Quantum Physics. Mathematics is no-thing, yet it includes all possible values. And the basic elements of physical reality (particles) seem to exist in a never-land state of suspended existence, until realized by an observation. Quantum Fields, Virtual Particles, and Superposition are about as close to nothingness as you can get within Space-time. But they are full of possibilities.

B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.
*** Yes, transformation is what energy does. And Energy could be construed as "transcendent substance" prior to its transformation into mundane Matter. In its Potential states of position, charge, "zero point", etc. Energy is invisible & intangible. For example, a Virtual particle has no charge, but after transformation into a Real particle, it may possess the causal property of charge. We only know that ghostly Energy has passed through, like a tornado in the night, by observing the after-effects.

C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.
*** Simple = unified or integrated as in a holistic Singularity. I interpret the Big Bang evidence as implying that the Energy Source of Creation was/is a complete infinite Whole, within which at least one Holon (our world) exists. In that case the Source is also the Origin, and being transcendent, a universal Principle instead of a space-time Thing. Note, if necessary, I'll address the definitions of Potential & Holons in another post.

C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.
*** This supposes a physically limited God. If the whole from which our world emerged was physical/material, it would have a limited supply of substance from which to construct a world. But, if the Whole consists of infinite metaphysical Potential, it would not be diminished by the transformation of infinite Possibility into finite Actualities. That's what happens when a quantum system in statistical superposition transforms into the specific state we know as a Particle. But the infinite Potential (Energy) remains at 100% (second law of thermodynamics).

D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe.
*** I prefer to think of the Creator as a non-physical Principle, similar to abstract Logos. and an infinite Potential, like Chaos (infinite being without finite order).
The math of Statistics assumes a range from 0% to 100%. But, since the math is Ideal, it is not subject to physical laws. You can subtract 10% from 100% over & over without making the whole any less complete.
Quantum Physics uses the concept of an Infinite Potential Well to describe the unlimited mathematical range within physical particles could possibly exist.


PS__I suspect that your demoted deity theory is similar in motivation to my own Whole/Holon theory : to fill the god-gap in Big Bang theory. However, I label my god-model as PanEnDeism, instead of Pantheism or Pandeism.

Non-supernatural Theism :
The belief that God became the Universe is a theological doctrine that has been developed several times historically, and holds that the creator of the universe actually became the universe. Historically, for versions of this theory where God has ceased to exist or to act as a separate and conscious entity, some have used the term pandeism, which combines aspects of pantheism and deism, to refer to such a theology. A similar concept is panentheism, which has the creator become the universe only in part, but remain in some other part transcendent to it, as well.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/God_becomes_the_Universe

By the way, I have already lowered the ambition of my argument. So that no one thinks I want to defend it by hook or by crook, as it is written in the OP.

Okay, maybe I just need to lower the standard of my argument a bit.

Since my argument from simplicity would only be a possibility and not a necessity (assuming you are correct in your critique), and since the classical cosmological proofs of God strictly speaking do not prove a present existence of God (see last quotes in the OP; and provided that they otherwise work), the rational theist (hitherto always believing in the provability of a presently existing God), as I have called him/her, cannot be sure of a present God, and must therefore now believe fideistically (irrationally?) in it. — spirit-salamander

I am now thinking of a different approach: You write:

If God is necessarily one, then He cannot divide Himself. If He is capable of dividing Himself, you cannot describe Him as necessarily one. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps the act of dividing should be viewed merely metaphorically.

And on the other hand, perhaps what is traditionally said about God (in relation to his creation) metaphorically could be understood literally.

For this, I refer to passages by David Bentley Hart from his book THE EXPERIENCE OF GOD BEING, CONSCIOUSNESS, BLISS. The bold highlights were added by me.

"Another, very traditional way of putting the matter is to say that created things exist by subtraction: that is, they are finite and somewhat diffuse expressions of an infinite and indivisible reality, and their individual essences are simply special limits graciously set to the boundless power of being that flows from God, special definite modes in which God condescends to share his infinitely expressive plenitude. Or—one more very venerable metaphor—God is the infinite “ocean of being” while creatures are finite vessels containing existence only in limited measure." (David Bentley Hart - THE EXPERIENCE OF GOD BEING, CONSCIOUSNESS, BLISS)

subtraction comes from the Latin subtrahere and means as much as:

carry off
subtract
take away

To carry off or take away from God, I guess. There is no other way to make sense.

"their individual essences are simply special limits graciously set to the boundless power of being that flows from God"

The boundless power of being and God should be identical, shouldn't they?

God "condescends to share his infinitely expressive plenitude".

What does the dictionary say:

"condescend

1: to assume an air of superiority
The writer treats her readers as equals and never condescends to them.
2
a: to descend to a less formal or dignified level: UNBEND
would not condescend to respond to such a crass remark
b: to waive the privileges of rank"

God gives of his simplicity (which is his being) in sharing "to waive the privileges of rank".

"God is the infinite “ocean of being” while creatures are finite vessels containing existence only in limited measure."

The vessels contain water from the ocean, which in itself is spaceless.

If we take what I quoted literally, we come closer to my argument.

"In the end, the crucial question is whether any of the relations that finite contingencies have to God’s infinite absolute being require alterations in God himself; and the traditional assumption is that God is not like some finite bounded substance that undergoes change as a result of external forces but is the transcendent source of the actuality of all substances and forces, and so he does not receive anything from “outside” himself, for everything is always in him and already realized in his own essence in an immeasurably more eminent way."

My argument assumes total alteration.

"What I want to emphasize here is that, whatever elaborations the different traditions have worked upon the idea of divine simplicity—however ingenious or convoluted, clear or obscure—the elementary metaphysical premise remains constant: that God is not like a physical object, composed of parts and defined by limits, and so is dependent upon nothing and subject to neither substantial change nor dissolution. There is an old Aristotelian principle, which seems to me quite obviously true, that in any causal relation change occurs in the effect, not in the cause itself. If, when two finite substances are involved in a causal relation, each undergoes some change, this is because each is limited and lacking in some property the other can supply, and so each functions as both a cause and an effect in that relation. Ice melts upon a burning coal but also cools the coal; and neither can affect the other without being affected in turn. God, however, is not a limited physical substance, standing outside other such substances, and his particular spiritual intentions (acts of will and knowledge, that is) toward finite things involve no physical processes and no modifications of his substance from without. And if those intentions somehow “determine” anything about who God is, it certainly could not be a passive determination in any sense, but an eternal act of self-determination or self-expression. More important, they would certainly add nothing new in the order of real being to God, since the “subtracted” reality of finite things is always already embraced within the infinitely fuller reality of divine being."

"... [W]e can observe the divine simplicity’s plural expressions and effects in contingent things, and from those abstract toward the reality of their unconditioned source.But, in the end, how that simplicity might be “modulated” within itself is strictly unimaginable for us. At that uncrossable intellectual threshold, religions fall back upon inscrutable doctrines, philosophers upon inadequate concepts, and mystics upon silence. “Si comprehendis, non est deus,” as Augustine says: If you comprehend it, it is not God."

Hart does not seem totally averse to a "modulation" of God. That's my impression.

"modulation

1
: an inflection of the tone or pitch of the voice
specifically : the use of stress or pitch to convey meaning
2
: a regulating according to measure or proportion : TEMPERING
3
: a change from one musical key to another by modulating
4
: the process of modulating a carrier or signal (as in radio)
also : the result of this process"

"modulate

verb
Definition of modulate
as in to regulate
to make changes to (something) in order to keep a desirable balance, proportion, etc.
He takes insulin to modulate his blood sugar levels.
She kept talking during the performance, making no effort to modulate her voice.

Synonyms & Similar Words

regulate
adjust
improve
correct
change
adapt
modify
tune
alter"

"I will add only that philosophers often tend to overburden the notion of the simplicity and immutability of God’s metaphysical substance with questions regarding whether God might have had a somewhat different “personal identity” had he chosen not to create as he did, and whether then his decisions “change” him from what he might otherwise be. After all, the choices we make seem subtly to determine who we are in relation to a world of things outside ourselves; whether our choices actually change us as spiritual substances is a rather difficult question, but they do at least shape our personal histories. Whatever the case, however, and as interesting as that question may be, even after one has stripped away all the anthropomorphic imagery—the imagery, that is, of God deliberating over what to do in the future, in accord with various internal and external limitations, until he vanquishes his uncertainty—it is not very germane at this point.

I would say it is very germane at this point.

Hart would say that I operate on "stubborn anthropomorphism". Then I say, So what.

If I omit anthropomorphism, it does not follow that God cannot become defunct. This is evident from the quotation from Augustine alone: If you comprehend it, it is not God. My argument may thus not be necessary, but possible.

Here is another fitting quote:

God is whatever God is. I don't think It is constrained by human interpretations of what it can or should be, can or should do. — T Clark

My argument assumes total alteration. — spirit-salamander

I don't see how you come to the conclusion that God must be altered. To take away, or subtract from the infinite leaves it no less infinite. So if the defining feature of God is "infinite", subtracting from Him would leave Him still infinite, therefore unaltered. This is what Socrates argued of "the idea". It doesn't matter how many things partake of the same idea, the idea remains the same regardless.

But I had the impression that Hart left the question of an alteration in God somehow ambivalent. He has, of course, the clear tendency or conviction towards unchangeability, but he is apparently aware of the more or less justified theoretical problems of the critics.

To take away, or subtract from the infinite leaves it no less infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is definitely true for the quantitative infinite, but I'm not so sure about the qualitative.

I am personally not sure whether Schopenhauer is right or wrong with the following quotations:

"Finite and infinite are concepts that have significance only in relation to space and time, in that both are infinite, i.e., endless, as well as infinitely divisible. If one still were to apply these two concepts to other objects, then the latter must be such as fill space and time and partake of their qualities. From this we are able to measure how great is the abuse perpetrated with these concepts by philosophasters and windbags in this century."

(Parerga and Paralipomena, Volume 2
Chapter 13
On philosophy and its method
§20 Annotations)

"Sometimes it is said to be the absolute, which we have recognized in § 20 above as the cosmological proof, compelled to travel incognito; and sometimes, however, it is said to be the infinite, in contrast to the finite, since the German reader, as a rule, is quite content with this verbiage and does not notice that in the end nothing can be clearly understood by this, except ‘that which has an end’ and ‘that which has no end’."

(On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason
§ 34 Reason)

The infinite God could perhaps only have the trivial and negative sense of "He is not a finite being". Nothing more.

This is what Socrates argued of "the idea". It doesn't matter how many things partake of the same idea, the idea remains the same regardless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Certainly, what you say has never been uncontroversial:

"In VI. 4. 2 Plotinus connects the problem of soul's presence in body with a larger issue, that of the presence of intelligible reality in the sensible world. He is aware that in doing this he is confronting one of the most difficult problems facing any Platonist. Among the difficulties presented by Plato in his Parmenides concerning the theory of Forms is that of the presence of a single Form in a multitude of particular sensible objects (131ac): how could one Form (for example, the Form of beauty) be present in many (beautiful) things without being divided up among them?
The presence of the Form in a multitude seems to mean destruction of the Form as a whole, as a unity. This cannot be right. But to save the Form's unity, one must abandon its presence in many things. This too is unacceptable. Plato himself gives no clear indication as to how one is to resolve this dilemma. Aristotle considered it as yet another decisive reason for rejecting Plato's theory of Forms (Metaphysics, 1. 6). The problem remained unresolved, lying deep, as a possibly fatal flaw, in the heart of Platonic philosophy. The Middle Platonists were aware of it, but they contented themselves with references to the ‘mysterious’ relation between intelligible and sensible reality. Plotinus' Ennead VI. 4–5 is the first Platonist text we have which faces the issue squarely." (Dominic J. O'Meara - Plotinus - An Introduction to the Enneads)

Plotinus' own solution is also considered controversial by some.

They accept reality as it appears on the surface, and don't try to look for underlying principles that are not empirically verifiable. But this is a philosophical forum, so we don't calculate, we speculate. — Gnomon

I see it the same way. The latest example of an unphilosophical attitude to theology comes from a philosopher:

Massimo Pigliucci
@mpigliucci
I’m sorry but I can’t any longer take seriously any essay or paper that itself takes talk of god seriously. It’s simply a non starter. And a trite and (very) old one.

https://twitter.com/mpigliucci/status/1640908332327223296?s=20

The tweet has definitely caused irritation among one or the other.

Anyone who practices philosophy must also take God talk seriously. Philosophy, in my opinion, includes all philosophical fields, without exception.

my Deistic god-model is a non-intervening abstract philosophical principle. — Gnomon

The model I present is called by the philosopher of religion Paul Draper demergent deism.

(the opposite of emergent theism/deism, according to which the world evolves until it eventually becomes or produces God)

I am definitely sympathetic to your construction. It seems to me a plausible possibility of candidates for world explanation.

The "defunct god" concept began with ...

The Dao that can be told is not the eternal Dao. The names that can be named are not eternal names. — Laozi

and culminates for me with https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/791947

This is definitely true for the quantitative infinite, but I'm not so sure about the qualitative. — spirit-salamander

I do not see how "infinite" could be anything other than quantitative. I don't see how to conceive of an infinite quality. What would that even mean? Notice that the "omni" prefix sometimes used to describe God's qualities, does not mean "infinite". In fact it's more like the inverse of infinite, as the limit to the quality, whereas "infinite" means unlimited.

Certainly, what you say has never been uncontroversial:

"In VI. 4. 2 Plotinus connects the problem of soul's presence in body with a larger issue, that of the presence of intelligible reality in the sensible world. He is aware that in doing this he is confronting one of the most difficult problems facing any Platonist. Among the difficulties presented by Plato in his Parmenides concerning the theory of Forms is that of the presence of a single Form in a multitude of particular sensible objects (131ac): how could one Form (for example, the Form of beauty) be present in many (beautiful) things without being divided up among them?
The presence of the Form in a multitude seems to mean destruction of the Form as a whole, as a unity. This cannot be right. But to save the Form's unity, one must abandon its presence in many things. This too is unacceptable. Plato himself gives no clear indication as to how one is to resolve this dilemma. Aristotle considered it as yet another decisive reason for rejecting Plato's theory of Forms (Metaphysics, 1. 6). The problem remained unresolved, lying deep, as a possibly fatal flaw, in the heart of Platonic philosophy. The Middle Platonists were aware of it, but they contented themselves with references to the ‘mysterious’ relation between intelligible and sensible reality. Plotinus' Ennead VI. 4–5 is the first Platonist text we have which faces the issue squarely." (Dominic J. O'Meara - Plotinus - An Introduction to the Enneads)

Plotinus' own solution is also considered controversial by some. — spirit-salamander

The theory of participation is flawed, and Plato exposed this. I believe that Aristotle did provide a workable resolution by placing actuality as necessarily prior to potentiality, his so-called cosmological argument.

The concept of individual parts partaking of the whole, makes the whole passive, as being partaken of, without changing. But the active parts must receive their actuality, or activity from somewhere, as cause, and the somewhere cannot be the passive whole. This is why Aristotle proposes a further actuality, which is properly an immaterial actuality, like the soul, which therefore cannot be described in spatial terms, like the activity of parts.

Plotinus does not provide a solution, because the One which is proposed as the source of all, is said to be an infinite potentiality. But this meets the problem which Aristotle expressed, an infinite potentiality could not actualize itself. So there is no means (cause) whereby everything could proceed from the One.

"Finite and infinite are concepts that have significance only in relation to space and time, in that both are infinite, i.e., endless, as well as infinitely divisible. — spirit-salamander

"Infinity" defined as a quantitative measure is a common stumbling block for philosophical forays into transcendent topics. If the context is a space-time bounded world, then an objective quantitative definition is appropriate. But if the context is unbounded open-ended Eternity-Infinity, a subjective qualitative interpretation is necessary*1.

When we are talking about a "demoted deity" in the form of the real world, it's OK to speak of parts relative to the whole. But, if that Creative Power existed prior to the Big-Bang --- before the emergence of finite space-time from a hypothetical undefined realm of statistical possibility/probability --- then the physical limits of space & time do not apply, and the whole is likewise undefinable and indivisible.

Besides, space & time are abstractions that exist only in minds, not in matter*2. Space & Time are imaginary measuring sticks that we overlay on the material world in order to provide chunks of meaning for the mind. Even the beginning-of-time is a human milepost that we use to mark the distinction between Time & Eternity.

As you said, a Space-time deity would be finite in scope, and almost infinitely divisible. Such is the mystery of math, with its never-ending numberline. In that case, Infinity-plus-One is still Infinity. That makes sense only because "infinity" is an ideal definition, not a real physical thing. Likewise, the gap-filling deity we imagine as a defining context for the open-ended Big Bang theory, is an ideal concept, that we may never know in reality. If that hypothetical gap-filler is also the Cause & Creator of reality, then all of its defining properties are abstract qualities. :smile:


*1. Is infinity a quantity? :
Good question. No. Infinity is a limit, which can't be a quantity, and a bound, which can be a quantity.
https://www.quora.com/Is-infinity-a-quantity

*2, How is space time an illusion? :
Locations in space and time, hence, have no identity and can be said to exist only as mathematical conveniences. Quantum theory suggests that locality is an illusion, a byproduct of the decoherence that occurs between quantum waves so that nonlocal effects are damped while local effects are reinforced.
https://medium.com/the-infinite-universe/space-and-time-may-be-illusions-1aa71e8de03e