There is another, much older, trope of a dead god. That one was put into service and gained critical historical significance. — Fooloso4
To what end do you think this idea of a defunct god serves? — Fooloso4
How do you see it as an alternative to teleological/intelligent design arguments? — Fooloso4
It could be argued that an acorn dies or is transformed in order to become an oak. The same teleological argument can be made about a god who dies or is transformed to become something else. — Fooloso4
C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.
C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.
D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe. — spirit-salamander
B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.
If God is One, and was active prior to His creation, what prevents Him from being active currently? — Metaphysician Undercover
If all that exists at a given time, is one substance, then all is one. — Metaphysician Undercover
unless there is something which is other than the one, which serves as a boundary, or divisor, within the one, to make two, or the proposed multiplicity. — Metaphysician Undercover
The nature of "a principle" is such that it always consists of parts. There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle. — Metaphysician Undercover
There cannot be a principle which does not have constituent parts which comprise the principle. — Metaphysician Undercover
“There’s an objection—I’ll call it the ‘Injury Problem’—that I think poses a larger problem for the claim that God creates out of His proper parts. The objection is this: if the x’s are proper parts of God and God creates the universe out of the x’s, then God loses whatever functions or features the x’s conferred on God. And this would make God worse off or lessened. For instance, if Michelangelo created the statue of David not out of a block of marble but out of the flesh and bone in his right foot, Michelangelo would no longer be able to walk as he once did. It would seem that something just as injurious to God would take place if He were to create out of Himself. Perhaps we could reply that God creates out of parts that don’t really contribute to God’s properties or functions. But this response seems unappealing and ad hoc, for why did God have those parts in the first place and in what sense are they really parts of Him if they don’t really serve any function? A different response is to say that God could heal Himself—replace those parts from which He created the universe with new parts. But the problem (and the injury) would just be pushed back to where those parts were taken from.” (Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - A Theory of Creation Ex Deo) — spirit-salamander
If God was active, then those three required parts of the principle "active" are necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover
I conclude that your argument is misdirected in a number of ways. — Metaphysician Undercover
The ground of all being would thus be completely rounded, so to speak. This ground would be absolutely homogeneous as if flawlessly and seamlessly made from one piece. Why should the spawning of space-time parts not diminish it? “Diminish” would actually be an understatement in this case. It would have to be “destroy”, considering that to create would be to use God's “material”, as quoted in the original post. If you take a little of this “material”, you ultimately take all of it. — spirit-salamander
Christ dying on the cross? — spirit-salamander
Probably not a practical end, rather only a theoretical one. — spirit-salamander
And what end is served by the idea of a presently existing God. — spirit-salamander
If I think about it carefully, the idea of a defunct God can yield the same values as theism or atheism. — spirit-salamander
Interesting approach, the world or its emergence would thus have something necessary, inevitable. — spirit-salamander
Why should God, as One, not be His own divisor or boundary-puller, directed towards Himself? — spirit-salamander
Even if a principle must always have parts, I refer to the Injury Problem: — spirit-salamander
Okay, then I say God was totally inactive before creation. — spirit-salamander
Would you agree thatcreatio ex nihilo in the strict sense can only mean creatio ex deo?
The scholars or experts in the philosophy of religion: Daniel Soars, Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker, Bill Vallacella (Maverick Philosopher) whom I quote in the OP see it that way. They all advocate panentheism instead of theism in order to avoid the logical problem. The same applies to the mystic Jakob Boehme.
If in theism stuff of God is the "material" for creation, and considering the following: — spirit-salamander
Doesn't it follow that God must use himself up completely in creation? — spirit-salamander
I appreciate the clarification. It allows for philosophical dialog, without getting into political posturing. I too have constructed an alternative god-model for my own worldview, and I enjoy sharing views without getting into condemnations. However, some materialist posters see no need for a god-posit at all. As Feynman advised, in order to avoid feckless hypothetical speculations, "just shut-up and calculate". They accept reality as it appears on the surface, and don't try to look for underlying principles that are not empirically verifiable. But this is a philosophical forum, so we don't calculate, we speculate.[Title of the OP was changed because it was misleading. It suggested that I was making a positive argument for a God who no longer exists.]
I present a challenge to theism (It is only for dialectical reasons that the challenging argument clings to some basic assumptions of theism): — spirit-salamander
Okay, maybe I just need to lower the standard of my argument a bit.
Since my argument from simplicity would only be a possibility and not a necessity (assuming you are correct in your critique), and since the classical cosmological proofs of God strictly speaking do not prove a present existence of God (see last quotes in the OP; and provided that they otherwise work), the rational theist (hitherto always believing in the provability of a presently existing God), as I have called him/her, cannot be sure of a present God, and must therefore now believe fideistically (irrationally?) in it. — spirit-salamander
If God is necessarily one, then He cannot divide Himself. If He is capable of dividing Himself, you cannot describe Him as necessarily one. — Metaphysician Undercover
God is whatever God is. I don't think It is constrained by human interpretations of what it can or should be, can or should do. — T Clark
My argument assumes total alteration. — spirit-salamander
To take away, or subtract from the infinite leaves it no less infinite. — Metaphysician Undercover
This is what Socrates argued of "the idea". It doesn't matter how many things partake of the same idea, the idea remains the same regardless. — Metaphysician Undercover
They accept reality as it appears on the surface, and don't try to look for underlying principles that are not empirically verifiable. But this is a philosophical forum, so we don't calculate, we speculate. — Gnomon
my Deistic god-model is a non-intervening abstract philosophical principle. — Gnomon
and culminates for me with https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/791947The Dao that can be told is not the eternal Dao. The names that can be named are not eternal names. — Laozi
This is definitely true for the quantitative infinite, but I'm not so sure about the qualitative. — spirit-salamander
Certainly, what you say has never been uncontroversial:
"In VI. 4. 2 Plotinus connects the problem of soul's presence in body with a larger issue, that of the presence of intelligible reality in the sensible world. He is aware that in doing this he is confronting one of the most difficult problems facing any Platonist. Among the difficulties presented by Plato in his Parmenides concerning the theory of Forms is that of the presence of a single Form in a multitude of particular sensible objects (131ac): how could one Form (for example, the Form of beauty) be present in many (beautiful) things without being divided up among them?
The presence of the Form in a multitude seems to mean destruction of the Form as a whole, as a unity. This cannot be right. But to save the Form's unity, one must abandon its presence in many things. This too is unacceptable. Plato himself gives no clear indication as to how one is to resolve this dilemma. Aristotle considered it as yet another decisive reason for rejecting Plato's theory of Forms (Metaphysics, 1. 6). The problem remained unresolved, lying deep, as a possibly fatal flaw, in the heart of Platonic philosophy. The Middle Platonists were aware of it, but they contented themselves with references to the ‘mysterious’ relation between intelligible and sensible reality. Plotinus' Ennead VI. 4–5 is the first Platonist text we have which faces the issue squarely." (Dominic J. O'Meara - Plotinus - An Introduction to the Enneads)
Plotinus' own solution is also considered controversial by some. — spirit-salamander
"Infinity" defined as a quantitative measure is a common stumbling block for philosophical forays into transcendent topics. If the context is a space-time bounded world, then an objective quantitative definition is appropriate. But if the context is unbounded open-ended Eternity-Infinity, a subjective qualitative interpretation is necessary*1."Finite and infinite are concepts that have significance only in relation to space and time, in that both are infinite, i.e., endless, as well as infinitely divisible. — spirit-salamander
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