How can one reconcile the scientific view, say that the the universe is billions of years old or that natural selection functions on individuals, with the idealist view that nothing exists without a mind to believe it exists? — Banno

By concluding that there must have been a mind at the beginning of the universe, obviously.

EDIT: Ignore this, I shouldn't come to a thread late without digesting the whole thing.

I have heard of him, but have been warned by a very good philosopher - Susan Haack - to steer clear of him.

I suspect that too much emphasis on certain late-Wittgenstein ideas might not be to my taste. But, there are other to keep in mind too, some, like C.I. Lewis, who introduced the concept of "qualia" in analytic philosophy, did say very interesting things about describing "what we mostly taken from granted explicit", as does Raymond Tallis.

But perhaps you can say the main point. I say that we have internal mental lives. So does Hoffman - and perhaps most people, which is no indication of its correctness of course. Hoffman calls his view "conscious realism" - I take it to be "common sense", which again, does not imply it is correct.

You say that it is misleading or confused somehow to believe in these things? Why?

bout how to navigate the world fairly smoothly. But does it follow our perceptions give us accurate information about the world? Don't optical illusions, criticisms of naive realism, etc. show it does not? — Art48

We know there is a world that gives rise to our perceptions and understanding of an empirical world of objects. Anything we say is going to be framed in terms that derive from our shared experience and understanding of the empirical world as well as our intuitions and speculative imaginations.

We can learn to navigate the empirical world more or less effectively, but if our perception and understanding of the empirical world were at odds with the underlying real nature of things it seems reasonable to think we would not do well.

So it seems reasonable to conclude that there is some kind of isomorphism between the world we perceive and whatever world production, beyond and independent of human experience, that is really going on.

We can learn to navigate the empirical world more or less effectively, but if our perception and understanding of the empirical world were at odds with the underlying real nature of things it seems reasonable to think we would not do well.

So it seems reasonable to conclude that there is some kind of isomorphism between the world we perceive and whatever world production, beyond and independent of human experience, that is really going on. — Janus

Hoffman's icon and headset metaphors seem to contract the idea of an isomorphism. For example, moving the icon from top left to top right does nothing to the file.And the correspondence between dragging icon to the trash can and the zeroing of bits seems nebulous.

Yes, but I'm not talking about desktop icons and computer files. I don't think it's a good analogy.

if our perception and understanding of the empirical world were at odds with the underlying real nature of things it seems reasonable to think we would not do well. — Janus

Respectfully, why ? Are you not reasoning from analogy from the fake world to the hidden real world ?

In our fake world, you bump your shins when you walk with your eyes closed.

The human Brain is made of matter, which is organized (by natural logical processes) into a Meaning-Seeking machine. So it processes incoming information (data) into abstract concepts that are meaningful to the observer. But, in order to establish a relationship between the observer and its environment, the brain constructs a concept (the Self image) to represent its own subjective perspective*3 on the objective world. No spooky spirits required. — Gnomon
I don't think you've presented a monism. Problematic quotes above. — green flag

Enformationism may not be a formal Monism*1 as you are used to it. It's primarily based on scientific concepts, instead of academic philosophy. So it does not deny the practical (functional) distinction that humans make between Brains & Mind. It merely traces the physical (material) & metaphysical (mental) elements of the Real world back to a single Source. Depending on your personal preferences, you can label that source as mathematical "Singularity" or as metaphysical "G*D". A common metaphorical explanation for a non-intervening Deistic Creator is to imagine that the Big Bang Singularity represents a conception in the Mind of God, and that the evolving material world represents the Body of God. In effect, it's all G*D, all the time.

I can accept a variety of metaphors to make sense of a physical world with Minds that question their own origins. But, my thesis is an extrapolation from 20th century Quantum theory and Information theory, not from any historical philosophical conjectures. However, my notion of Information as the Single Substance of reality is similar to Spinoza's equation of God with Nature (Pantheism)*2. Yet, I diverge from that 17th century speculation, which assumed that Nature was Eternal. Since we now have reasons to believe that the material world of Space-Time had a dramatic Birthday, it seems necessary to make a distinction between what-now-is and what-existed-before the Creation Event of the universe (PanEnDeism). Multiverse theories assume, without evidence, that Physics (matter & energy) is eternally cycling, so the emergence of inquiring minds is routine. Possible : but I prefer the simpler (Ockham's Razor) version of the creation story.

The essential distinction in my non-religious thesis is derived from the radical notion that all-is-Information. Quantum physicist John A Wheeler proposed his "It from Bit"*3 concept, (IT = matter ; BIT = mind) to illustrate his belief that both Matter & Mind are essentially forms of Generic Information (some may call the Enformer : "G*D"). I merely expanded on that notion, of the world as an Information Processor, to conclude that the process was initiated by an intentional Programmer. Processing & Programming are functionally different, but the substance in both cases is the Power to Enform (energy + logic). For example E = MC^2 equates causal Energy with massive Matter. So, I conclude that the Programmer's (Creator's) ideas are also the substance of the Program (creation). Technically, that's a Monistic concept, but it's not a traditional philosophical Ontology. :smile:

PS__I have no formal training in Philosophy, so most of my knowledge of such abstruse concepts comes from professional Scientists. These esoteric ideas are expounded in greater detail in the Thesis & Blog.


*1. Monism :
a theory or doctrine that denies the existence of a distinction or duality in some sphere, such as that between matter and mind, or God and the world.
___Oxford

*2. Substance Monism :
Substance monism posits that only one kind of substance exists, although many things may be made up of this substance, e.g., matter or mind. Dual-aspect monism ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monism

*3. It from Bit symbolizes the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — at a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that what we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe.
https://www.themarginalian.org/2016/09/02/it-from-bit-wheeler/

You say that it is misleading or confused somehow to believe in these things? Why? — Manuel

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motte-and-bailey_fallacy

The motte in this case is the practical use of 'consciousness' and 'inner lives.' It'd be absurd to deny this kind of consciousness. We have and use blurry and imperfect but goodenoughsofar criteria for its presence and absence.

The bailey is the Metaphysical version that gets smuggled in. It's a parasite on the everyday concept. Instead of something like an informal continuum between unreachable negative and positive infinities, as suggested in the motte version, we a Dualism with the bailey version -- which tends to collapse into a confused false monism.

I have heard of him, but have been warned by a very good philosopher - Susan Haack - to steer clear of him. — Manuel

To me that's a reason to read him. I like what I know of Haack, but even smart people develop intellectual allergies.

Besides, what's a thinker but a bag of memes that we can do with as we see fit ? Just as they did to put that bag together in the first place ?

I haven't said it is a fake world. The real world independent of human experience produces the real world of human experience is how I would characterize it.

Ah, you are a follower or fan of Wittgenstein. Then we will probably disagree. Words get meanings in several ways- it’s context dependent. I don’t see any problem with the idea of a private mental state. — Manuel

Of course I like Wittgenstein. But that's like liking Shakespeare. To me it doesn't make sense as a polemical thing. One disagrees with this or that, but denying the quality altogether ? That'd be bold. Sort of like denying Cantor.

I haven't said it is a fake world. The real world independent of human experience produces the real world of human experience is how I would characterize it. — Janus

Please forgive the rhetorical mischief.

Still, all these layers are confusing.

Just curious: what dataset were you trained on ? [joking, I will respond more seriously after a walk in the sun]

I think the basic issue comes down to whether objects of experience possess intrinsic reality. This kind of critical analysis is characteristic of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, arising from their principle of sunyata and dependent origination. It grants that objects of experience are real, but that their reality is dependent on causes and conditions, and not inherent or intrinsic to them; they are not real 'from their own side' is one way that it is put.

However, Buddhists also make use of the so-called 'two truths' doctrine. This is says that there are two levels of reality, the conventional/empirical (samvritti) and the ultimate (paramatha). On the conventional level, empiricism is the arbiter, even if from the level of ultimate truth the objects of experience are devoid of intrinsic reality (although there is often considerable scholastic analysis involved in the details.)

Murti's book Central Philosophy of Buddhism compared the 'two truths' doctrine with Kant's acknowledgment that one can be at once an empirical realist, and a transcendental idealist, as expressed in these two often-quoted paragraphs.

I understand by thetranscendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensiblity). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding.

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance– which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing –matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are call external, not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another, but that space itself is in us. — (CPR, A369, 379)

The reason I mention this, is because it provides a kind of conceptual background for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive.

It grants that objects of experience are real, but that their reality is dependent on causes and conditions, and not inherent or intrinsic to them; they are not real 'from their own side' is one way that it is put. — Wayfarer

All I can say is that this is not a wild or strange idea. It's even a mainstream idea. I myself argue that only a unified lifeworld makes sense.

What conditions are required to make philosophy possible ? I ask because the denial of any of these conditions, when presented by a philosopher, is absurd. Suggested answers : a shared world we can be right or wrong about (or at least less wrong about), a language in which we can successfully if not perfectly communicate, and norms for the making and integration of claims into a set of beliefs. Roughly these norms are a second order tradition...a critical, synthetic practice with respect to first-order mythic-metaphysical creativity. The subject is not some radically simple synonym of being. The subject is a locus of responsibility which is kept track of by other such subjects, all of them holding one another to standards.

It seems to me that you have both a World and a Programmer who made it. What is the space that contains them both ?

As far as I'm aware - in this thread - I don't believe I have made a metaphysical distinction, one between "body" and another of "mind" nor one of "internal consciousness" as opposed to "external consciousness".

I did mention that Hoffman's reasons for defending a kind of idealism, were not very convincing, but I doubt he would call himself a dualist either.

You've talked about the problems with the metaphysical notion of an inner mind, and you seem to say it is a confusion. If you can say why it is a confusion, maybe I can follow.

As far as "monism" goes, yeah, I think it's a sound idea. I personally like Galen Strawson's "Real Materialism", but not his panpsychism. Some people call that view "dualist" because he accepts what most of the great figures in the past have taken for granted, that we start with experience.

Maybe all of them are wrong in this respect. I'd be very dubious, but I cannot rule it out.



As with many philosophers, there are different perspectives on who is or is not important or should be. I think Wittgenstein's ending in the Tractatus, the last few pages, are his best work.

A lot of the Investigations are also great. But some have taken him to be the solution for all (of most) of the problems in philosophy. It often boils down to, one is using a word incorrectly, hence this word causes your thinking to be wrong.

That can solve problems. But it's also a way of avoiding them. But as with everything in philosophy, this too is debatable.

Just to remind you:

As I quoted Hume before:

"Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions, which have appeared in that narrow compass."

The fact that we can attribute independent existence to the entities postulated by science is a (reasonable) postulate, subject to further refinement. — Manuel

Hume says we are trapped in a narrow compass, but somehow he can see outside of his narrow compass and determine that I too am trapped in my own narrow compass. Perceptions are seeming understood to be personal (?), but the royal we is used recklessly. He does not even notice the framework of self-transcending rational norms that govern his claims. He assumes the transubjective intelligibly of his language. He assumes the unity of his own voice as a joint unity, a social ego. He speaks about that compass as if from the outside to announce its nature --- that it traps not just him but me and you (who only exist by the grace of conjecture) in a bubble of perceptions.

This might be an ungenerous reading of Hume, but hopefully you see what I'm getting at.

But some have taken him to be the solution for all (of most) of the problems in philosophy. It often boils down to, one is using a word incorrectly, hence this word causes your thinking to be wrong. — Manuel

I assure you, FWIW, that I don't truck with solutions so much as being endlessly less wrong, less semantically challenged, less trapped in dead metaphors, ...

I don't deny that there are shallow readings of Wittgenstein.

I can tell that you are well read, and I respect you. So I think we both have seen (maybe in our younger selves even ) the way newish philosophy types ape their heroes or sages. Stealing from psychoanalysis, I call it (positive) transference. It's annoying, but it's probably not skippable. For me (us?) , it's about the ideas, the memes, and not the bins they come in, however handy such bins are in conversation and for the considering how memes can be systematically integrated in ego and therefore (potentially) into the dominant software of the tribe.

That can solve problems. But it's also a way of avoiding them — Manuel

:up:

I know what you mean. There are indeed avoidance gimmicks.

Well - he is consistent though, in his discussion of the self he famously said:

"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception."

You may reply that he is using "I" here in a misleading way, because by using that word, he is assuming what he is denying. No quite. In all these topics, he has in mind something like an empirical criteria: that which we can check with the restraint of empirical evidence. And while I agree that there is no such independently existing entity "I", we cannot, not use it - in fact, it's part of world law.

We enter into serious problems here, because a tree, is just as much a construction as an "I" or almost anything else. If you want to be radical about it (as some are), you can say that there only are fields of energy, or strings.

but somehow he can see outside of his narrow compass and determine that I too am trapped in my own narrow compass — green flag

He's assuming you are a creature similar to him - a fellow human being. And since it is true that both are human beings, he feels confident in saying that his "narrow compass" will also apply to others.

If something along these lines is not true, empirical psychology and ordinary communication would be much easier, as everything can be put forth in a transparent manner. If there is no "inner consciousness" (and I don't know of an alternative), then we should be open to inspection in a manner that should be less difficult than it currently is.



I respect having arguments in which we can disagree, without getting mad or angry, it's useful. :cool:

And you obviously have a good formation as well.

Very true about copying our elders. I agree about the ideas mattering, more than belonging to a tribe, no doubt. It's also hard to not sympathize with some of these people.

Still, all these layers are confusing. — green flag

All what layers? There is an imaginable logical distinction between the world as experienced and the world in itself is all. Would you want to claim that there is nothing beyond what can possibly be experienced and articulated by us?

Of course I like Wittgenstein. But that's like liking Shakespeare. To me it doesn't make sense as a polemical thing. One disagrees with this or that, but denying the quality altogether ? That'd be bold. Sort of like denying Cantor. — green flag

This reads like an appeal to authority. I don't think Wittgenstein's contributions to philosophy can be compared to Shakespeare's contributions to poetry and theatre or Cantor's contributions to mathematics.

I don't think it can be said that he was an artful writer, contributions to mathematics are much more clearly important, and if his philosophical ideas don't gel for you, then you have no reason to acknowledge anything but his influence, an influence which can legitimately be seen as largely unfortunate in my view.

[quote="Manuel a tree, is just as much a construction as an "I" or almost anything else. If you want to be radical about it (as some are), you can say that there only are fields of energy, or strings.[/quote]

Actually I couldn't say that, because (if there are only fields/strings), then I am not here to say it.

I oppose the constructive approach. I claim that it makes much more sense to start with the unity of the lifeworld, including selves and language and norms of rational discussion all together in the one real world (as parts of that world). This unity can be broken up by various abstractions. But perceptions make no sense as a building block.

This reads like an appeal to authority. I don't think Wittgenstein's contributions to philosophy can be compared to Shakespeare's contributions to poetry and theatre or Cantor's contributions to mathematics. — Janus

I think I got you on this one. Who ever said Shakespeare or Cantor were great? That sounds like an appeal to authority to me. Obviously I'm being playful here. And just as obviously I was implying that I find Wittgenstein to be great in his field. That you don't so value him is no surprise, given your metaphysical position, as far as I can make it out. I don't expect Christians to like Dawkins and I don't expect Cartesians / Humeans/ Kantians /etc to like Wittgenstein.

an influence which can legitimately be seen as largely unfortunate in my view. — Janus

To me that's hilarious. But Wittgenstein's work doesn't need me to keep it in circulation. So go to it. Take the old fraud down a notch.

All what layers? There is an imaginable logical distinction between the world as experienced and the world in itself is all. Would you want to claim that there is nothing beyond what can possibly be experienced and articulated by us? — Janus

The way I'd try to solve that kind of problem is to say that the world seems to offer such richness and complexity that we'll never run out of novelty. I find it implausible (unimaginable?) that humans will ever be a loss for further inquiry. So the world is infinite, one might say.

I think I got you on this one. Who ever said Shakespeare or Cantor were great? That sounds like an appeal to authority to me. — green flag

The thing is that the importance of mathematical and literary contributions are easier to assess than philosophical contributions. As you note there are probably many philosophers who don't think Wittgenstein is all that great; all that is needed is the existence of radically different starting assumptions than his, and his relevance will be as nothing.

Can you say the same about mathematicians who don't think much of Cantor or lovers of literature who don't think much of Shakespeare? The other point about Shakespeare and Cantor is that the former's importance has not diminished over around five centuries and the latter;s over nearly two. It is too early to know how Wittgenstein's philosophy will be assessed in the centuries to come.

Take the old fraud down a notch. — green flag

I haven't said he was a fraud, and I don't have the influence to "take him down a notch".

The way I'd try to solve that kind of problem is to say that the world seems to offer such richness and complexity that we'll never run out of novelty. I find it implausible (unimaginable?) that humans will ever be a loss for further inquiry. So the world is infinite, one might say, with no bound on the depth of its detail and so on. — green flag

I agree that the potential scope for knowledge within the bounds of human experience and judgement is infinite, but it doesn't follow that there is not also an infinity that will forever remain closed to us.

He's assuming you are a creature similar to him - a fellow human being. And since it is true that both are human beings, he feels confident in saying that his "narrow compass" will also apply to others. — Manuel

What justifies that assumption ? How is he seeing around his own wall of perceptions ?

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. — Manuel

He is interpreting beingthere in terms of perceptions given to a self. This is not starting without presuppositions. This is picking up a tradition uncritically. This is taken inherited frames as if they are the deepest and truest necessity.

If there is no "inner consciousness" (and I don't know of an alternative), — Manuel

That's why I recommend Brandom. The self is (among other things) a locus of responsibility, a normative entity.

Is it obvious that there is only one self in each body ? Why isn't it "We think, therefore we are" ? I am not saying that people are plural. I am saying that the 'virtuality' of the self (as a way of being a body and a social institution) is probably singular because it's easier to manage a single body in a social structure with a single set of statements to be responsible for. Imagine two souls in one body. The weekend soul only remembers what happens on the weekends and is wildly different than the other. Even here we'd track the weekend soul and only put him in jail on the weekends if he was bad. Responsibility / 'scorekeeping' is maybe the essence.

I agree that the potential scope for knowledge within the bounds of human experience and judgement is infinite, but it doesn't follow that there is not also an infinity that will forever remain closed to us. — Janus

It's fine. A harmless idea. But to me it's semantically empty. It's a pile of negations. As a work of art, as an image of God, it is at least interesting enough to have kept people talking about it for centuries.