The unknowable itself is semantically empty, but the fact that there is an unknowable is what enables and enriches the infinite scope of the human imagination, so it could not be further from being semantically empty.

As your boy would have it:"What can be said at all can be said clearly and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence." This assumes that there is that which cannot be talked about, which cannot be dealt with by propositional utterances. This is not to say that it cannot be evoked by poetic language, or the visual arts or music and so on.

And then there is this:"The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists"

This is plainly asserting that value, the most important aspects of human life, cannot be part of the normatively derived collective representation that is the empirical world.

"It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists." Your boy recognized the importance of the unknowable, so at least that much can be said in his favour.

Well the Huge big grey elephant in the room is to have a "scientist" argue against an indefensible metaphysical worldview and promote another.
As a Scientist he is limited by Methodological Naturalism's principles to keep his work within a specific demonstrable realm, not because of a ideological bias but due to Pragmatic Necessity.(Its where our methodologies and evaluations function).
So by definition his interpretations and conclusions are pseudo scientific.
Now Donald main argument is his "mathematics" and his "mathematical models" but he always fails to demonstrat how those "models" do the work he claims they do.
His main approach sounds like "This can't be wacky because I keep on mentioning mathematics", as if Maths isn't a language of logic acceptable to the GIGO effect.
When you feed garbage in your premises you will receive garbage in your conclusions and this is what we get from Donald.
Hoffman ticks all the boxes of Pseudo Philosophy, he claims that those things he believes are true because of some mathematical models he came up with.
Its really said to see people waste time and resources in Magical ideas .

Anything we say is going to be framed in terms that derive from our shared experience and understanding of the empirical world as well as our intuitions and speculative imaginations. — Janus

How does "shared experience" even make sense to you? From all that I can glean from my own experience, it appears very obvious that my personal experience is radically different from anyone else whom I have relations with.

If this is difficult for you to grasp, try this little experiment. Sometime when you are with a group of people, randomly ask, 'what just happened?'. You'll see that the answers vary just as much as the people in the group.

How can you speak of a "shared experience" when this is so oxymoronic?

We can learn to navigate the empirical world more or less effectively, but if our perception and understanding of the empirical world were at odds with the underlying real nature of things it seems reasonable to think we would not do well. — Janus

Notice how you use 'perception and understanding". This is because we use the rational mind to resolve all the problems which sense perception presents us with. You speak as if the senses provide us with an accurate representation. In reality, the senses provide us with huge problems, problems which the rational mind has some success at resolving. So it's really not the senses which provide us the capacity to navigate, its the rational mind.

The reason I mention this, is because it provides a kind of conceptual background for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive. — Wayfarer

That's a very enlightening passage from the CPR. It demonstrates how "matter" is just a concept, and it is simply an assumption made by us, which is used to explain why our sense perceptions of the world or so radically inconsistent with what our rational minds tell us the world must really be like. We posit "matter" as the medium between rational understanding, and sense perception, as the reason for this inconsistency.

This is the true understanding of "matter", that it is simply a concept, and as Berkeley demonstrates, not a necessary concept, but one which has been chosen. Notice how Kant describes that when we apply this concept "matter" in its true form, all proposed spatial relations are internal rather than external. As objects having spatial relations with one another is simply how we represent the proposed external reality, and there is no necessity to this representation. It is just what is customary to us, as consistent with that assumption of "matter".

As a Scientist he is limited by Methodological Naturalism's principles to keep his work within a specific demonstrable realm, not because of a ideological bias but due to Pragmatic Necessity.(Its where our methodologies and evaluations function).
So by definition his interpretations and conclusions are pseudo scientific. — Nickolasgaspar

This, in no way is an accurate representation of how a scientist philosophizes. The method of philosophy is not the same as the method of science, so when a scientist philosophizes, that scientist may or may not have some training in philosophy. And if the scientist has some training in philosophy, the degree of training will vary from one scientist to another. This degree of training will be evident in the philosophy which the scientist produces.

"Pseudo science" on the other hand is the inversion of this, when someone without proper scientific training makes an attempt at science, without applying the appropriate scientific method. That you confuse these two is evident from the fact that you switch from pseudo science to pseudo philosophy in the course of your post. You don't seem to know what you're talking about.

…..for making sense of the claim that appearances are deceptive. — Wayfarer

If I may, in conjunction with your quote as it concerns the empirical side, I submit that the only need to make sense of appearances being deceptive, is if they are mistakenly treated as “looks like” as opposed to the intended notion of “present as”. That there is something present to sensibility cannot be deceptive, re:

“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance without something that appears, which would be absurd…”

…this from the B preface, which sets the stage for the rest of the changes in that edition.

In addition, deception with respect to empirical cognition resides in discursive judgement, for which sensibility in its role as representing external objects as phenomena has none, and by which the subsequent “looks like” appearance is determinable.

“…. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. (…) But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one….”
(A294/B350)

The final nail in that Hume-ian coffin, is the condition that if the so-called “Copernican Revolution” holds, in which the human intellect assigns properties to objects rather than objects come already imbued with them, then it is impossible to be deceived by an object’s appearance….presence…. to sensibility, insofar as at that point, no object has a property from which it obtains a “looks like”, or behaves like, hence nothing whatsoever by which to be deceptive, on the one hand, and the absolute impossibility of denying the effect of human physiological sensation caused by the presence of objects to sensibility, on the other.

You, and I honestly think , and perhaps may well agree, that all those pictures on this thread that show objects outside the human skull, depicted as actual named objects, is catastrophically wrong. Anything in those indicators, must be represented as mere matter, some as yet undetermined something, which is impossible to illustrate, so folks imbue the indicators with any ol’ thing that is already known, a blatant contradictory methodology with respect to the human intellect logically explainable by transcendental philosophy.

Which probably explains why it’s pretty much disrespected these days, and perhaps why you feel reiteration of its conditionals are worthwhile for critical thinkers, however lapsed they may be according to their arguments. People insist they see a tree, and they are correct, but only as a consequence, without knowing or caring about the antecedents necessary for how it is a tree, only a tree, and not any other thing.

(Descends soapbox, exists stage right….but still muttering to himself, accompanied by the snaps of assorted Greenwich Village pseudo-bohemian fingers)

What justifies that assumption ? How is he seeing around his own wall of perceptions ? — green flag

Around the wall of his own perceptions? I don't quite follow. You can think about your thoughts - as in, I can think about me typing these letter right now, but I don't get "out" of myself, in fact cannot do so.

He is interpreting beingthere in terms of perceptions given to a self. This is not starting without presuppositions. This is picking up a tradition uncritically. This is taken inherited frames as if they are the deepest and truest necessity. — green flag

Of course we have a given, and of course it is a construction. We cannot help doing so. But "dasein" is also an assumption - giving primacy to a certain kind of unreflexive action, but why is that mode of being more primordial than another mode of being?

It looks to me as if one chooses what aspect of our lives we want to take as a given, and give that primacy. It can be practical activity, it can be perceptions, it can be economic conditions or even word -use.

Why isn't it "We think, therefore we are" ? I am not saying that people are plural. I am saying that the 'virtuality' of the self (as a way of being a body and a social institution) is probably singular because it's easier to manage a single body in a social structure with a single set of statements to be responsible for. Imagine two souls in one body. — green flag

It can be. Several propositions can be taken to be primary or obvious, from "I am" to "We are" (taking into account that we are made of many organs that work is co-operation, or we can think about ourselves as particles) and even "thinking an idea". Thinking of a diamond is arguably as good as thinking of a self, in terms of such foundational experiments.

Do you want me to argue against that or to comment? I don't disagree with what you say.

People insist they see a tree, and they are correct, but only as a consequence, without knowing or caring about the antecedents necessary for how it is a tree, only a tree, and not any other thing. — Mww

One can - and should - speak about the necessary cognitive conditions that allow us to classify something as this particular tree as contrasted with some other tree, or indeed some completely different object.

And absolutely, the ground of phenomena as (re)presentation is very interesting and important. But it can be parsed out of the question of "do I directly see a tree", that is, for the sake of answering the question narrowly, it need not enter.

You could include it and argue, correctly in my view, that this unknown thing is the ground of my presentations, but since we (arguably) cannot cognize this is any positive manner, I don't see how this helps in answering the question.

Hoffman incidentally disagrees, he does think we can get to the grounds of things, by pursuing theories that suggest that spacetime is not fundamental. I think this is a mistake.

There is plenty more to say, but it would lead to issues that could take this conversation significantly outside of Hoffman's thinking, and this thread already is veering off the OP.

↪Gnomon
It seems to me that you have both a World and a Programmer who made it. What is the space that contains them both ? — green flag

The "space" that contains the program "world" is the mind of the "programmer". It's a dual-aspect Monism. No distinctions, no information, no meaning, no philosophy. A monism without defining distinctions would be a socked-in fog. :smile:

Do you want me to argue against that or to comment? — Manuel

Only if I’ve misinterpreted your comments in general. I don’t expect agreement as much as I appreciate correction.

I'd have to go back to my paperback copy of Hume's Treatise to confirm. I don't think he denies that the mind attributes properties to objects in a certain way. In other words his attribution of effects coming from objects as opposed to us attributing effects to objects is not entirely clear, it can be read in several ways.

But being a good empiricist, he calls effects brought forth by the mind "animal instinct", which is a definite downgrade from Kant's more sophisticated account. His focus suffers, in that he doesn't, and probably cannot, given his principles, elaborate on many functions of said instinct.

Other than this caveat, I have no issues with what you have said, which is well put, as usual.

Ahhhh….the Treatise. Ya know, and in no way to (not much) pat myself on the back, re: appearances, even ol’ Dave says, “… Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul.…”

If the two superior Enlightenment philosophers agree on a thing, while not immediate peers to each other, it is reasonable to suppose by the term appearance is meant mere presence, by them both.

Another thing, while we’re at it: Kant says concepts without intuitions are blind, thoughts without content are empty, or something like that. Hume says simple impressions have their own ideas and all simple ideas are accompanied by impressions, or something like that. Funny how very similar these two grounding conditions are, innit?

As to properties, I’ll trust your higher exposure. I myself don’t recall much being said about properties per se in either the ”Treatise…..” or E.C.H.U.. Lots more readily available in Kant, though, insofar as for his brand of metaphysics, empirical conceptions just are the properties objects are said to have.

Anyway…..ever onward.

it is reasonable to suppose by the term appearance is meant mere presence, by them both — Mww

One has some leeway in how these terms can be used, it's not something set in stone.

Why "mere" presence? As opposed to presence.

This, in no way is an accurate representation of how a scientist philosophizes. — Metaphysician Undercover

-Wll there is a way for accurately representing how someone should philosophize or reason whether he is a scientist or not. This is what it means to systematize a field of study by !

The method of philosophy is not the same as the method of science, so when a scientist philosophizes, that scientist may or may not have some training in philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

First of all there isn't such a thing as "A" scientific method. Science have many methods but that is a different topic.
Now if you noticed I identified the method of philosophy I was talking about (Aristotle).
The fundamental steps are the following.
1. Epistemology
2. Physika (Science)
3. Metaphysics
4. Ethics
5. Aesthetics
6. Politics
and back to epistemology for additional knowledge.
So if a scientist or anyone decides to skip those first two basic steps he is placing his inquiry on a really shaky ground.

so when a scientist philosophizes, that scientist may or may not have some training in philosophy. — Metaphysician Undercover

A Scientist can escape the first 3 steps of Philosophy. So its more probable for a philosopher to be bad in philosophy than a scientist. But still dudes like Hoffman show that when our auxiliary assumptions are polluted we are capable for really bad philosophy and interpretation of facts in general.

And if the scientist has some training in philosophy, the degree of training will vary from one scientist to another. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are confusing Chronicling with the ability of a scientist to contract metaphysical frameworks based on the available facts. The ONLY training one needs to do philosophy is to reason correctly, obey the steps of the philosophical method and challenge his preconceptions.
You do understand that Natural Philosophy (science) is Philosophy on Naturalistic principles and far better data. The common ingredient in all Philosophical categories is nothing more than Logic and a shared System of inquiry.

"Pseudo science" on the other hand is the inversion of this, when someone without proper scientific training makes an attempt at science, without applying the appropriate scientific method. — Metaphysician Undercover

-No this is not what pseudo science is. Theoretical frameworks that ignore the principles of Methodological Naturalism while using obscure language and questionable data. This is what pseudo science is and like in the case of Pseudo philosophy their advocates won't correct their claims even when they are exposed.

That you confuse these two is evident from the fact that you switch from pseudo science to pseudo philosophy in the course of your post. You don't seem to know what you're talking about. — Metaphysician Undercover

-Its obvious that I am not the confused one here. Hoffman promotes a Death denying ideology as "science" and the only argument he has is "I got a mathematical model".
Maths are complementary in any Scientific Theory. One needs hard evidence to back up his math.
i.e. Peter Higgs won the Nobel Prize ONLY after his math were verified by CERN....not the year he wrote down those equations....some 60years ago.
Unfortunately for Hoffman science doesn't accept unfalsifiable supernatural claims as Theories just because someone has some Math on a paper.

Why "mere" presence? — Manuel

Because the presence of something is pretty much insignificant. Means to an end is all.

“…. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in so far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it is thought. (…) But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists the formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no judgement—neither a true nor a false one….”
(A294/B350) — Mww

Intuition itself maybe be mistaken. Perhaps, faulty intuition ought not be called false judgement, if we should restrict the definition of "judgement''. But this is a different matter. However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition, and this "judgement" may be mistaken. Since there is already some form of judgement inherent within the intuited sense perception, and this judgement may be mistaken, it is very clear that sense perception may be deception. That is self-deception, which is often considered as a virtue because it is the basis of courage, confidence, and certitude. But taken beyond reasonable levels, following intuition becomes a vice, due to the propensity for mistake.

First of all there isn't such a thing as "A" scientific method. Science have many methods but that is a different topic. — Nickolasgaspar

The scientific method is very explicit, consisting of hypothesis, experimentation, observation, etc.. Why do you think that there is no such thing as the scientific method?

Now if you noticed I identified the method of philosophy I was talking about (Aristotle).
The fundamental steps are the following.
1. Epistemology
2. Physika (Science)
3. Metaphysics
4. Ethics
5. Aesthetics
6. Politics
and back to epistemology for additional knowledge.
So if a scientist or anyone decides to skip those first two basic steps he is placing his inquiry on a really shaky ground. — Nickolasgaspar

I do not see how this describes a method at all, you just name a bunch of subjects.

The ONLY training one needs to do philosophy is to reason correctly, obey the steps of the philosophical method and challenge his preconceptions. — Nickolasgaspar

Well, naming a bunch of subjects does not provide a "philosophical method". Perhaps if there was such a thing as "the steps of the philosophical method", it might be a simple matter for the person to get trained in the philosophical method. However, unlike the explicit scientific method, I really do not think that there is an explicit philosophical method which a person could follow.

The scientific method is very explicit, consisting of hypothesis, experimentation, observation, etc.. Why do you think that there is no such thing as the scientific method? — Metaphysician Undercover

I will suggest Paul Hoyningen's Lectures(philosophy of science) on the Nature of Science where he explains why there isn't a specific method (set of steps) followed by scientists.(like the 6 steps in philosophy).
Hakob Barseghyan lectures on Philosophy of science also starts his lectures with "popular science mythology" and he includes the scientific method. (all available on youtube and free).

Great example commonly used in favor of this argument is Albert Einstein's approach in developing the Theory of General Relativity. Something that is also important is that the Theory was "Verified" and accepted a over a night after a historic observation without having the chance of any falsification period! (so falsification is not always important too!).
Sure we have a general description of a popular progress but its far from becoming a Method that binds our scientific endeavors.
Here is an article on the subject ( If you are interested I can send you links for every reference).
https://www.discovermagazine.com/planet-earth/the-scientific-method-is-a-myth.

I do not see how this describes a method at all, you just name a bunch of subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover

-Well a method defines the steps we follow in order to preserve the quality of our inquiry. Obviously those are titles of the method but it seems like that haven't dig deeper on the subject of Systematicity in Philosophy.
Richard Carrier's lecture is a great way to start understanding our methods of demarcation.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Lvg4di3sAw
After all if I ask you to describe the scientific method...you will end up naming a bunch of actions.
The same is true for Philosophy.
1. epistemology (first learn what we know and how we know something -on a specific subject).
2. Physika (reevaluate or update your epistemology through empirical evaluation).
3. Metaphysics. reflect on that updated knowledge and use it to construct hypotheses reaching beyond our current knowledge
4.5.6. What are the implication of those hypotheses in Ethics , Aesthetics and Politics.
Restart...project your conclusions on our current body of knowledge ...etc.

Well, naming a bunch of subjects does not provide a "philosophical method". Perhaps if there was such a thing as "the steps of the philosophical method", it might be a simple matter for the person to get trained in the philosophical method. However, unlike the explicit scientific method, I really do not think that there is an explicit philosophical method which a person could follow. — Metaphysician Undercover

-Sorry , as I just explained you are wrong. Are you familiar with the Aristotle's work on the systematization of Logic and Philosophy? Have a go with the links I gave you and we can revisit your "objections"....if they are still there.
I know that most philosophers are shocked when they hear these things for the first time, but I find them to be far more important than any other aspect of Philosophy...if our goal is to become good Philosophers.

However there must be some form of "judgement", though not rational judgement which is inherent within intuition, and this "judgement" may be mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nice. Something not often brought about, but a metaphysically….logically….valid premise nonetheless, we generally being more concerned with knowledge.

There is a form of judgement regarding intuition, or, sensibility itself, which describes the condition of the subject, as such, in his perception of real objects. Best represented as how he feels about that which he has perceived, as opposed to what he may eventually know about it. That the sunset is beautiful is empirical, how the subject reacts to the mode or manner in which the sunset is beautiful, which are given from the sensation alone, is an aesthetic judgement by which the subject describes to himself the state of his condition.

Oooo and Ahhhh and HOLY SHIT!!! and the whole plethora of exclamatory representations, the spontaneity of which requires no conscious thought, hence are not proper cognitions, yet are judgements relating to a change in the subject’s condition all the same.

It is easy to see one cannot be deceived by how he feels, insofar as his feeling IS his condition at the time of it. It can change, obviously, but in its duration, it is as certain as any truth he can ascertain. Furthermore, his feeling regarding some perception may remain consistent even with a change in the knowledge of what caused it, which sustains the distinction in kinds of judgement, discursive or aesthetic.

The foremost exposition of the notion of aesthetic judgements resides…..where, do you think, assuming you accept it isn’t foremost in intuition?

How does "shared experience" even make sense to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Say you are with someone and she says, "See that dog over there; what kind do you think it is?". Say it's a very large dog, maybe a Great Dane. Do you think the other person is likely to say "Oh, it's so small, maybe a Chihuahua"?

Have you had many experiences something like say you are with some people in the city and you see a car speeding towards you and another person says "Oh, look the waves are breaking well, and there's a lovely dog running towards us; let's go for a swim"?

Wake up and smell the roses, dude...it's a shared world if it is anything.

If you don't think we can generally agree about what objects are where, what kinds of objects they are, how large or small, and so on, then I don't know what planet you are on.

You, and I honestly think ↪Manuel, and perhaps ↪Janus may well agree, that all those pictures on this thread that show objects outside the human skull, depicted as actual named objects, is catastrophically wrong. — Mww

I do agree if the pictures of those objects being outside the skull are intended to demonstrate that the objects, exactly as they are perceived, exist outside the skull. On the other hand they are perceived to exist outside the skull, obviously; but that is not the same thing. The skull does not exist, exactly as it is perceived, outside the skull; and this is a fact which might cause some confusion in some quarters. :rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

The core of realism, probably also to no avail, but for comparison, is simply that there are statements that are true, yet not known or even believed.

Things such as those we haven't found out yet, or are mistaken about.

That is, there is a world that is not dependent on our understanding of it. — Banno

Idealism is not a claim to omniscience.

I submit that the only need to make sense of appearances being deceptive, is if they are mistakenly treated as “looks like” as opposed to the intended notion of “present as”. — Mww

In Greek philosophy there is the notion that we can't say what any thing 'truly is', because it is not 'truly' any specific thing. This is suggested by the argument from equality in Phaedo 72e ff:

[1] We perceive sensible objects to be F.
[2] But every sensible object is, at best, imperfectly F. That is, it is both F and not F. It falls short of being truly F.
[3 ] We are aware of this imperfection in the objects of perception.
[4] So we perceive objects to be imperfectly F.
[5] To perceive something as imperfectly F, one must already have in mind something that is perfectly F, something that the imperfectly F things fall short of. (e.g, we have an idea of equality that all sticks, stones, etc., only imperfectly exemplify.)
[6] So we have in mind something that is perfectly F.
[7] Thus, there is something that is perfectly F (e.g. equality), that we have in mind in such cases.
[8] Therefore, there is such a thing as the F itself (e.g., the Equal itself), and it is distinct from any sensible object.

.

(I'm sure there are other examples of this point but my knowledge of Greek philosophy is not great.)

But one of the problems is, the discussion nearly always defaults back to whether coffee cups or trees or whatever kind of 'F' are real. We loose sight of the fact that the object chosen merely serves to symbolise objective knowledge, more broadly. So what I think is really at stake is 'seeing how things truly are' in an expansive sense. The philosophically discerning mind realises its own judgement is central to the generally taken-for-granted nature of the sensory domain (as in the example above). 'The sage' as a philosophical archetype, one who'sees things as they truly are' not in the narrow sense required by the precise sciences, but as a general grasp or insight into the imperfection of our sensory knowledge. So it is precisely the opposite to a claim of omniscience - it is an acknowledgement of the limitations of empiricism.

Idealism is not a claim to omniscience. — Wayfarer

Yeah, it is. Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability. Idealism implies that everything that can be known is known.

Again, stuff we have dealt with previously.

EDIT: Ignore this, I shouldn't come to a thread late without digesting the whole thing. — bert1

Actually, this is right on the point. Very often those who espouse idealism are defending a god of one sort or another. Further, something like this is needed by idealists to explain other minds, and avoid solipsism.

But this is where the argument goes, not where it begins.

'The sage' as a philosophical archetype, one who'sees things as they truly are' not in the narrow sense required by the precise sciences, but as a general grasp or insight into the imperfection of our sensory knowledge — Wayfarer

It would be good see more personal experiences recounted in these discussions to give meat to things said centuries, even millennia, ago. As a mathematician I had the handicap of only fully grasping abstract ideas when bringing them down to specific, more elementary examples.

In the present thread I am reminded of a drive I took several years ago into nearby mountains. As I drove over a hill and looked down on a small bridge I saw a bear leaning against a guardrail. This was no surprise as I had seen bears in this site before, but as as I approached the bridge the bear shifted into an old stump leaning propped the rail.

When I analyze this experience I think of the fact that seeing a bear there before had triggered a slight rise in emotions, which would make embedding in memory a tad stronger than usual. Then driving down the hill the subconscious would seek and find and present what had been enforced in memory stronger than normal. An "insight into the imperfection".

I would be surprised, however, if my suggestion were to take root. Philosophy is not a game to be played on a personal level. Profound statements are the ticket. Good luck with that. :cool:

The philosophically discerning mind realises its own judgement is central to the generally taken-for-granted nature of the sensory domain — Wayfarer

My sentiments exactly. The average Joe isn’t philosophically discerning, but he could be, given proper instruction.

….an acknowledgement of the limitations of empiricism. — Wayfarer

And the limits of empiricism is not tacit approval for some relative increase in idealism’s authority.

I do agree if the pictures of those objects being outside the skull are intended to demonstrate that the objects, exactly as they are perceived, exist outside the skull. — Janus

Agreed, but does to exist carry the same meaning as to be named? I maintain that the objects in pictures meant to demonstrate human perception shouldn’t have names. Objects don’t come pre-named, right?

Agreed, but does to exist carry the same meaning as to be named? I maintain that the objects in pictures meant to demonstrate human perception shouldn’t have names. Objects don’t come pre-named, right? — Mww

That's a tricky question. Some, like Heidegger, would say that we see things as things, like we don't see a shape which we subsequently call a bridge, we just see a bridge.

It seems there must be a pre-cognitive level of perception, the sense just being initially affected, which we do not have conscious access to, which would be prior to naming. Naming is not merely cognition, but re-cognition, or even post re-cognition, so it's gets complicated.

How do immaterialists invoke evolution? Doesn't evolution imply physicalism?

Yep. That's Tallis' criticism, which remains unanswered.

Not that I have made the effort to study his argument here, but I believe Bernardo Kasturp incorporates evolution as being the gradual change of universal mind as it splinters off into various forms during its path towards metacognition - of which humans are the present example. He would no doubt argue (and my wording is clumsy, I know) that the 'physical evidence' of evolution is like all other things in our apparent physical reality; just consciousness when seen from the dissociated boundary.


A brief blog on random mutations;

https://www.bernardokastrup.com/2019/08/evolution-is-true-but-are-mutations.html

You beat me to it...nicely put!

Thanks. It's complicated material and if you come at this with preconceptions you can miss the nuances. Which is something I've often done in the past. :wink:

just consciousness when seen from the dissociated boundary. — Tom Storm

That's the one aspect of Kastrup which I think goes way beyond any evidence or even intuition. To extrapolate from dissociative personality disorder and apply it to objects is a massive leap, which doesn't look tenable.

I think Kant suffices, or Cudworth - whom Chomsky specifically references.

Still, Kastrup is quite interesting on many topics.