So what are we doing when we translate the word "hello"? What does it refer to? The meaning of the word "hello" is its use as a greeting, and we translate it with this in mind; we look to see what word(s) are used in the same way in other languages. — Michael

Yeah, but not all words are greetings. All that shows is that the meaning of a greeting is it's use.

But this is just the conclusion you're trying to establish. You can't use it as a premise without begging the question. This is the very thing im looking for an argument to underwrite. — StreetlightX

Right. I would have to think about how to do that. It's always been my reaction that "meaning is use" can't be right.

But back to the OP, I could reformulate the argument as such.

2. Animals have their own language games were the meaning of signals is determined by use.

3. Animal language games lack abstract language features.

4. Therefore, there must be something about human language beyond use.

That was what I was originally arguing for.

Yeah, but not all words are greetings. All that shows is that the meaning of a greeting is it's use. — Marchesk

The meaning of the word "hello" is its use. The same can be said of other words like "yes", "no", "please", etc. So the principle of meaning-as-use is sound. And, contrary to Harry Hindu's claim, this use is what we consider when translating these words into other languages.

So it seems to me that you (and Harry) can't reasonably reject the principle behind the claim that the meaning of a word is its use. You just reject the claim that this is the case for all (or most) words.

But then I ask; what's the difference between me saying "hello" when I meet you and me saying "it is raining" when water is falling from the clouds?

So it seems to me that you (and Harry) can't reasonable reject the principle behind the claim that the meaning of a word is its use. You just reject the claim that this is the case for all (or most) words. — Michael

Notice that I never said meaning can't be use, just that meaning isn't exclusively use (and cannot possibly be as I see it), which is what Witty seemed to be arguing, or at least the people who have tended to agree with him.

Also, I would argue that there is something more to "hello" than just noticing that it's a greeting. There is some additional meaning. Arguably, when I greet someone, I do so acknowledging them as an individual deserving of some respect, unless it's done sarcastically.

I don't greet a rock or a tree (usually unless I'm being silly or just using it to talk to myself). But people (and pets) are greeted, because there is the meaning of a self that can respond or understand the greeting.

"hello" means "I greet you". Could you use it to mean anything else?

If meaning is use then we aren't referring to anything when we talk. We wouldn't be talking about anything.

When listening to someone else's words we aren't deciphering their use we are deciphering the intent or what it is they are referring to, or thinking about, in their mind when they are talking. Using language is translating the shapes, colors, sounds, tastes and smells in your mind into other sounds and colored scribbles for others to hear or see for them to translate them back to the things that are in the speaker or writers head. This is why seeing or hearing words trigger their meanings inside our own heads. When describing your visit to Rome, you create images and sounds and smells and tastes in the listener's mind which is your intent no?

Notice that a severely autistic person does not greet others, because others don't exist as selves to that person. They can't use "hello", because they're mind blind, or something like that.

That should demonstrate that even with a greeting there needs to be a cognitive ability underpinning it.

When describing your visit to Rome, you create images and sounds and smells and tastes in the listener's mind which is your intent no? — Harry Hindu

It would seem that Wittgenstein's argument tends to be understood in purely behavioral terms. Notice what unlightened said about how Witty wanted to get away from the Cartesian Theater, thinking that it would be impossible to communicate your beetle in the box.

So I'm guessing the language-is-use crowd might try to deny that. But that's where the argument becomes absurd.

"hello" means "I greet you". Could you use it to mean anything else? — Harry Hindu

That doesn't contradict what I said. It would just then mean that the meaning of "I greet you" is its use as a greeting, much like a handshake or a hug.

When listening to someone else's words we aren't deciphering their use we are deciphering the intent or what it is they are referring to, or thinking about, in their mind when they are talking. Using language is translating the shapes, colors, sounds, tastes and smells in your mind into other sounds and colored scribbles for others to hear or see for them to translate them back to the things that are in the speaker or writers head. This is why seeing or hearing words trigger their meanings inside our own heads. When describing your visit to Rome, you create images and sounds and smells and tastes in the listener's mind which is your intent no?

That the words are used to achieve some end is not that the meaning of a word isn't its use.

That doesn't contradict what I said. It would just then mean that the meaning of "I greet you" is its use as a greeting, much like a handshake or a hug. — Michael

"I greet you" includes you as a meaning. If you didn't understand "you", then there would be no such greeting. The other needs to be part of one's cognitive capacity.

"I greet you" includes you as a meaning. If you didn't understand "you", then there would be no such greeting. The other needs to be part of one's cognitive capacity. — Marchesk

And to understand the meaning of the word "you" is to understand the use that the word "you" plays in the language.

2. Animals have their own language games were the meaning of signals is determined by use.

3. Animal language games lack abstract language features.

4. Therefore, there must be something about human language beyond use. — Marchesk

That doesn't follow. All this shows is that animals don't use expressions in the same way that we do.

And to understand the meaning of the word "you" is to understand the use that the word "you" plays in the language. — Michael

Yes and no. If you're just talking about he English word "you", then yes. If you're talking about the meaning assigned to it, then no.

You entails understanding that other people exist with their own thoughts, feelings, desires, rights, etc. It is fundamental to human interaction.

That doesn't contradict what I said. It would just then mean that the meaning of "I greet you" is its use as a greeting, much like a handshake or a hug. — Michael

Yes, you can use words as a tool, but what is it that you hope to accomplish by using words as a tool? Isn't it to trigger the concepts (that aren't words) in other people's minds? When you describe your trip to Rome, what is it that you want the listener to think about - just your words and how they are used - or do you want them to have visuals of the sights you experienced and are thinking about when you use those words? In order to say anything, you have to have in mind what it is you are referring to when you say it, or else what are you actually saying and what is it you hope to accomplish by speaking or writing?

Wittgenstein was aiming for a radical redefinition of meaning, not merely pointing out that words acquire meaning by how they're used. Everyone knows that already. Wittgenstein's approach is behavioral, not cognitive, and I take issue with that.

You must have the cognitive (thought) prior to behavior, or there are no language games. Language games can't get off the ground without cognition. — Marchesk

But Wittgenstein's argument is that 'cognition' by itself can't do anything magical that is over and above what behavior can, as far as language or meaning are concerned. If you are puzzled about the possibility of meaning, postulating some magical inner mechanisms in the mind is not going to solve the problem. This is because the philosophical questions about symbolism (i.e. representation of reality through language or though) is going to arise about inner mental states as much as it arises for written signs on paper, or behaviors. You are not going to get meaning out of something just by assuming that it is something 'cognitive', 'mental', 'inner' or whatever. And this is because you can't understand a symbolic system (whether it is language or thinking) just by inspecting the physical or mental properties of the symbols themselves (i.e., the words on the page or inner mental states).

So for example take sections 139 -142 in Philosophical Investigations, where Wittgenstein illustrates this point by showing that a mere existence of some mental state like a mental picture (in his example it is a picture of a cube) cannot by itself determine a unique meaning or use for the word (or concept) 'cube', because the picture can be interpreted in countless different ways as standing for completely different things. And the mere fact that the picture is 'mental' can't force on you just one unique interpretation which will somehow make you understand the picture as a 3d picture of a cube, and not say as a bunch of 2d rectangles (and similar considerations apply to 'interpretations' as mental entities which accompany the picture). (see also sections 73-4 where he makes a parallel point about a sample of a leaf - for something to be a sample for something else - and this is connected to your question about universals - it is not enough to consider the sample by itself, rather you must look at its use; you must consider the technique of comparing the sample with the things which it is a sample of, e.g, what circumstances are we going to count as something that 'fits' the sample (or doesn't), and what practical purpose it serves)

And so when Wittgenstein talks about 'use', what he means by that (among other things) is that you have to look at the use of symbols within a system or a praxis to understand their meaning, and this means that you have to consider how the symbols (to put it in a Tractarian way) are compared with reality: e.g., under what circumstances do we say that such and such is the case, what kinds of other propositions can we logically infer from it, and what sorts of language techniques ('language games') we need in order to make the talk about this or that subject matter intelligible (and there is a host of many pother questions that need to be answered).

And so when Wittgenstein talks about 'use', what he means by that (among other things) is that you have to look at the use of symbols within a system or a praxis to understand their meaning, and this means that you have to consider how the symbols (to put it in a Tractarian way) are compared with reality: e.g., under what circumstances do we say that such and such is the case, what kinds of other propositions can we logically infer from it, and what sorts of language techniques ('language games') we need in order to make the talk about this or that subject matter intelligible (and there is a host of many pother questions). — Fafner

Sort of, but I think at this point one would invoke Kant, because this seems rather Humean and empirical. And Kant argued persuasively that you need categories of thought to get the empirical endeavor off the ground, otherwise you just have a meaningless jumble of sensory impressions.

Similarly, you need cognition to make language work, otherwise, you just have a bunch of meaningless behavior.

I was trying to find a quote from some behaviorist in the past (Watson maybe) that I saw a long time ago. It may have been taken out of context, but it went something like this:

"I could teach an earthworm English with the right stimui."

Which is impossible because the earthworm has no such cognitive capacity to learn English, let alone lacking any sort of body that could communicate words.

I mention that because it ties back to how animals generally lack certain linguistic features that human languages possess, and this is biologically based. Behavior can't bootstrap an ant colony to English, unfortunately, because that would be fascinating. (Did read a scifi story were wasp colonies were intelligent and figured out how to go online and tell us about it. They may have been genetically enhanced, though).

Sort of, but I think at this point one would invoke Kant, because this seems rather Humean and empirical. And Kant argued persuasively that you need categories of thought to get the empirical endeavor off the ground, otherwise you just have a meaningless jumble of sensory impressions.

Similarly, you need cognition to make language work, otherwise, you just have a bunch of meaningless behavior. — Marchesk

Yes you can say that there is a Kantian ring to Wittgenstein's philosophy, but it has nothing to do with 'cognition' (whatever it means) as you say. Again, the point here is not that we have to look into the realm of psychology (as opposed to behavior) to understand language, rather I think that both Kant and Wittgenstein argued that you have to look at logic or norms, that is how we use the logical/normative system of language in our dealing with the world (or experience in Kant's case).

Better syllogism:

1. Meaning-as-use is language game behavior in the world.

2. The empirical world is particular.

3. But, language employs universals.

4. Therefore, language can't just be use.

it works for metaphor, math, and other forms of language that aren't merely particular. Arguably, animal language games are solely particular (with maybe a few exceptions).

Another thing I thought about is how books are made into movies. Books are in a written language, sometimes with pictures. A movie is all moving pictures with audio. If meaning were use, then how is it that we can translate written words to sounds and visual action on a screen?

How is it that anyone that read the book first will automatically know the written parts when they see the action on the screen? And didn't they already have a visual of what the book describes before seeing the movie, and wouldn't that visual be similar which is why they recognize the parts in the movie as the parts in the book?

Giving a description is giving an account of some state-of-affairs in words, or using words as a tool to relay the visual of some state-of-affairs. When we say anything meaningful we are usually, if not all the time, relaying information about some state-of-affairs that isn't the use of language.

gain, the point here is not that we have to look into the realm of psychology (as opposed to behavior) to understand language, rather I think that both Kant and Wittgenstein argued that you have to look at logic or norms, that is how we use the logical/normative system of language in our dealing with the world (or experience in Kant's case). — Fafner

But how does this explain the difference between animal communication and human?

I was trying to find a quote from some behaviorist in the past (Watson maybe) that I saw a long time ago. It may have been taken out of context, but it went something like this:

"I could teach an earthworm English with the right stimui."

Which is impossible because the earthworm has no such cognitive capacity to learn English, let alone lacking any sort of body that could communicate words.

I mention that because it ties back to how animals generally lack certain linguistic features that human languages possess, and this is biologically based. Behavior can't bootstrap an ant colony to English, unfortunately, because that would be fascinating. (Did read a scifi story were wasp colonies were intelligent and figured out how to go online and tell us about it. They may have been genetically enhanced, though). — Marchesk

Well but that's not a philosophical question but a scientific one (about the psychological conditions under which some organism is capable of learning a human-like language). This was not the kind of question which interested Wittgenstein, and therefore it wasn't the question that he tried to answer when he talked about meaning and use (therefore the topic of this whole tread simply misses its target). What interested Wittgenstein were the logical features of language that make it function as a language, not the psychological conditions which allow some creature but not another to learn language - that has nothing to do with philosophy according to W'.

But how does this explain the difference between animal communication and human? — Marchesk

As I said, it's not a philosophical question and therefore completely irrelevant to philosophical problems about language and meaning. It is not something that you can answer by armchair speculations.

Well but that's not a philosophical question but a scientific one (about the psychological conditions under which some organism is capable of learning a human-like language). This was not the kind of question which interested Wittgenstein, and therefore it wasn't the question that he tried to answer when he talked about meaning and use (therefore the topic of this whole tread simply misses its target). What interested Wittgenstein were the logical features of language that make it function as a language, not the psychological conditions which allow some creature but not another to learn language - that has nothing to do with philosophy according to W'. — Fafner

Philosophy is a science. The conclusions of one branch of the investigation of reality shouldn't contradict those of another. All knowledge must be integrated into a consistent whole.

hat interested Wittgenstein were the logical features of language that make it function as a language, not the psychological conditions which allow some creature but not another to learn language - that has nothing to do with philosophy according to W'. — Fafner

Wittgenstein said that if a lion could talk, we would not understand it, because we don't participate in the lion language games. As such, there's no meaning that we could translate from our human games to the lion games in order to arrive at a common understanding.

I think that's mistaken. The real meaning is based on how a lion understands the world by virtue of being a lion. To the extent that's similar to being a human, we should be able to arrive at some common meaning, and therefore be able to translate between human and lion language.

I'm only using animal communication as a means to critique the notion that meaning is only exclusively it's use. I don't see the difference between a bird using song to woo a mate, and human using words to seduce a mate, if use is all there is to meaning.

And yet, we do acknowledge some pretty important differences between bird song (far as we understand birds), and human language. Some of those involve the use of abstract concepts, which are pretty important. A human male seducing a female might employ the concept of earning potential to interest her. Earning potential is not something animals communicate, because money isn't a concept they form.

That doesn't contradict what I said. It would just then mean that the meaning of "I greet you" is its use as a greeting, much like a handshake or a hug. — Michael

In other words, "hello" is just a sound we make (a social behavior) when we greet each other. We could then say that the sounds other animals make when they greet each other means "hello".

Animals use noises, scents and body language to communicate, but the general consensus is that only human beings possess language. — Marchesk

I'm calling foul there already. I don't think it's at all a consensus any longer that other animals do not have languages.

They would do so by showing that dolphin sounds convey concepts. — Marchesk

Human language doesn't literally transport concepts. It catalyzes concepts in the persons hearing it.

In other words, "hello" is just a sound we make (a social behavior) when we greet each other. — Harry Hindu

And other words are just sounds we make in particular social situations, mostly to elicit certain responses from others.

2. Animals have their own language games were the meaning of signals is determined by use.

3. Animal language games lack abstract language features.

4. Therefore, there must be something about human language beyond use. — Marchesk

But this doesn't work either. All you've done is identify a distinction, and then assert without argument that meaning-as-use is not compatible with abstract language features. But this is another instance of begging the question. Why is meaning-as-use not compatible with abstract language features? What even do you mean by abstract language features as you understand them? What is it about (1) meaning-as-use on the one hand, and (2) abstract language features on the other, that makes the two incompatible? This is what I'm trying to get you to articulate.

I'm only using animal communication as a means to critique the notion that meaning is only exclusively it's use. — Marchesk

It seems to me that you don't really understand what W' meant by 'use', since your critique has nothing to do with his actual views (and he certainly wasn't a 'behaviorist' in the usual sense).

Your concern is that, under a certain doctrine, all there is to using language is emitting appropriate sounds at appropriate times, mechanically, as if there were no difference between human language and the sort of signaling other animals do, and that meaning here is not so much explained as explained away. The popular alternative, around here at least, seems to be that meaning is what's going on in the minds of speaker and hearer. I guess people call this "externalism vs. internalism."

Because I find this sort of debate intensely boring, I propose instead we try together to analyse an example, leaving our pet theories aside, and see if we can discover something about meaning.

Suppose I go hiking with a friend in an area he knows but I don't. We come to a fork in the trail, and I start to go right, but he says, "This way," starting left, "That way's kinda dangerous." Also consider a version of this story where my companion is Lassie, who sits and whimpers when I start to go the wrong way. Or a Neanderthal who grunts and shakes his head, and gestures to the left.

What does it mean to understand each of these? What do we expect if something is to be called "understanding"?

I think it could be useful to quote Wittgenstein's himself, and sections 73-74 from the Investigations summarize particularly well what he essentially meant by 'use' - that if we consider 'meaning' as something which could be described in isolation from our actual practices of language use, we simply look in the wrong place.

73. When someone defines the names of colours for me by pointing to samples and saying "This color is called 'blue', this 'green'....." this case can be compared in many respects to putting a table in my hands, with the words written under the colour-samples.--Though this comparison may mislead in many ways.--One is now inclined to extend the comparison: to have understood the definition means to have in one's mind an idea of the thing defined, and that is a sample or picture. So if I am shown various different leaves and told "This is called a 'leaf'", I get an idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind.--But what does the picture of a leaf look like when it does not show us any particular shape, but 'what is common to all shapes of leaf'? Which shade is the 'sample in my mind' of the color green--the sample of what is common to all shades of green? "But might there not be such 'general' samples? Say a schematic leaf, or a sample of pure green?"--Certainly there might. But for such a schema to be understood as a schema, and not as the shape of a particular leaf, and for a slip of pure green to be understood as a sample of all that is greenish and not as a sample of pure green--this in turn resides in the way the samples are used. Ask yourself: what shape must the sample of the color green be? Should it be rectangular? Or would it then be the sample of a green rectangle?--So should it be 'irregular' in shape? And what is to prevent us then from regarding it--that is, from using it--only as a sample of irregularity of shape?

74. Here also belongs the idea that if you see this leaf as a sample of 'leaf shape in general' you see it differently from someone who regards it as, say, a sample of this particular shape. Now this might well be so--though it is not so--for it would only be to say that, as a matter of experience, if you see the leaf in a particular way, you use it in such-and-such a way or according to such-and-such rules. Of course, there is such a thing as seeing in this way or that; and there are also cases where whoever sees a sample like this will in general use it in this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way. For example, if you see the schematic drawing of a cube as a plane figure consisting of a square and two rhombi you will, perhaps, carry out the order "Bring me something like this" differently from someone who sees the picture three-dimensionally.