Take this picture as an example:



Does anyone really want to argue that without a language with colour words such as "red", "green", and "blue", then we would just see a single (non-coloured?) circle, and not a coloured circle surrounded by a differently coloured ring surrounded by yet another differently coloured ring?

I think your point is reasonable, but you are ignoring that 'see' is part of a system of concepts. What does it mean to claim to see ? What do I commit myself to ?

I think your point is reasonable, but you are ignoring that 'see' is part of a system of concepts. — green flag

Seeing is a type of experience. Babies can see, non-linguistic animals can see, the illiterate deaf mute raised by wolves in the jungle can see.

I would argue that the word "grue" refers to their private experiences, which are different, despite the shared public use. — Michael

I agree, Indirect Realism is a workable theory.

The fact that we need language to talk about the colours we see is irrelevant to this discussion. — Michael

I'll drop it if you want, but the 'obsession with language' looks to me like a natural development in the dialogue. The presupposition that Reality is 'under' or 'apart' from language might be the problem. Is language in the object or subject ? Or is itself split ? Is the subject/object split fundamental ? And so on. Lots of trouble.

Objects may only make sense enough even to think about only a 'space of reasons.' This is not to deny (or affirm) some 'ineffable' something (raw feels, Consciousness, Being) but only to point out how tangled things becomes when people try to theorize about precisely that which eludes language. It's easy to end up with mystic tautologies. I myself have written quasilogicomystical manifestoes about the thereness of redness and the thereness of the there. There is color. There is space. Existence exists.

Seeing is a type of experience. Babies can see, non-linguistic animals can see, the illiterate deaf mute raised by wolves in the jungle can see. — Michael

Sure. But what does it mean to say so ? We who pretend to philosophy (who adopt a certain heroic role and hold ourselves to standards of rationality) are not thermostats switching on in response to stimuli. Claiming to that something sees something only makes sense in a context of time, in the context of what such a statement commits us to in the future (such as revision if we turn out to be wrong or the defense of the implications of our initial assertion.) Whiling seeing itself may be simple, the talk about seeing is extremely complex.

The philosopher is right to remove themselves in the sense of avoiding personal bias. But maybe the attempted (false, impossible) complete removal of the discursive context leads to trouble.

And so trying to say that language entails that we don't have private experiences — Michael

It is not that we don't have private experience but the language to articulate, like we do in the public sphere.

It is not that we don't have private experience but the language to articulate, like we do in the public sphere. — Richard B

Yet we can quite coherently talk about the well-observed fact that to some people the infamous photo of the dress appears white and gold, and to others black and blue. We can quite coherently talk about the colour blind. We can quite coherently talk about a situation such as that shown in this picture.



There is really no difficulty (for me at least) in understanding and talking about other people having a different private experience to the same external stimulus.

Now imagine that that photo represents the reality of two people living on Twin Earth. They speak a language much like English except with a different colour vocabulary. The apple reflects light with a wavelength of 450nm. They have learnt to refer to the colour of such objects as "foo".

I wouldn't say that "foo" refers to some public thing (such as light with a wavelength of 450nm, or a surface that reflects such light). I would say that "foo" refers to the quality of their private experience. If I were the man in this picture and able to learn of this picture, and of the fact that objects which reflect light with a wavelength of 450nm appear differently to the woman, I wouldn't think that the colour foo appears differently to the woman; I would think that objects which reflect light with a wavelength of 450nm don't appear to be the colour foo to this woman; they appear to be a different colour. The colour she calls "foo" isn't the colour that I call "foo".

But, again, this discussion on the meaning of colour terms is irrelevant to the actual disagreement between the direct and indirect realist. What matters is the relationship between the man and the woman's private experiences (which are different) and the mind-independent nature of the apple they are looking at. Would it be an accurate representation of reality to colour the apple in that picture, and if so should it be red or green (or other)? A direct realist (at least of the colour primitivist kind) would argue that it should be coloured, and that if it is coloured green then the woman is seeing it correctly and the man incorrectly, or if it is coloured red then the man is seeing it correctly and the woman incorrectly. This is a position that I believe is refuted by our scientific understanding of the world and perception. Colour is "in the head", not in apples (or light).

It may be that seeing some colour is causally covariant with certain wavelengths of light, but so too is the feeling of being cold or hot causally covariant with certain temperatures, and pain causally covariant with having one's nerves cut with a knife. But that there there is some regularity between cause and effect isn't that they are the same thing, and even if you want to adopt the same vocabulary to refer to both the cause and the effect it would be a fallacy of equivocation to then deny the distinction, and I think that this fallacy is all-too-common in discussions on colour.

I can see five different reds here. — Michael

No. You can see five different colours there. That they are all shades of 'red' is something you were taught by the culture you grew up in. different cultures have different groupings and distinctions.

I don't "reach" for five different words to describe what I see. — Michael

Of course you do. You'd say "a slightly darker shade of red than the one to it's left" or something like that. Those are words. But it needn't be words, it might be some other response. You might think of post boxes (if you're English), or buses. You might feel slightly on edge (red does that sometimes - again, cultural). There's no unifying thing that's 'the experience of red', it just is all these responses, nothing else on top of them.

At least, that's the way it is until we discover some 'red' neural cluster which can fire on it's own in response to red light.

That I see five different reds has nothing to do with language — Michael

Of course it does. 'Red' is what categorises them as all being in the same group and not five different colours entirely.

... everything to do with the raw subjective quality of my experience. — Michael

This is just completely unsupported conjecture. There's nothing to suggest we have an 'experience of red'.

We have sensory inputs, we have behavioural responses, we have post hoc self reports. That's it. Anything else is stuff you (or others) have just made up. A story.

We have sensory inputs, we have behavioural responses, we have post hoc self reports. — Isaac

We have consciousness. We're not just input-output machines. I have a first person experience when I'm sitting still, in silence, watching and hearing and feeling the things going on around me. I don't need to say, or think, "I'm in pain" to be in pain. I just feel it.

No. You can see five different colours there. That they are all shades of 'red' is something you were taught by the culture you grew up in. — Isaac

This is nonsense. You might as well say "you don't see five different colours; you see five different things. That they are all 'colours' is something you were taught in the culture you grew up in".

Or maybe "you don't see; you [something]. That it is 'seeing' is something you were taught in the culture you grew up in".

Or maybe "you don't get taught in a culture you grew up in; that it is 'being taught in the culture you grew up in' is ... [unintelligible rubbish]".

Again, you seem to fail to understand the use-mention distinction.

But this isn't the main point. The main point is that seeing colours has nothing to do with "reaching" for some word or other. Sight (and hearing and feeling and tasting) has nothing to do with language. And also that the colours you see when looking at a photo of a dress might not be the colours that I see when looking at that same photo of a dress.

This is nonsense. You might as well say "you don't see five different colours; you see five different things. That they are all 'colours' is something you were taught in the culture you grew up in".

Or maybe "you don't see; you [something]. That it is 'seeing' is something you were taught in the culture you grew up in".

Or maybe "you don't get taught in a culture you grew up in; that it is 'being taught in the culture you grew up in' is ... [unintelligible rubbish]". — Michael

Yes, that's right. Of course nothing would get said that way, but just like we can use language to talk about language, we can also use it to talk about its limits.

Again, you seem to fail to understand the use-mention distinction. — Michael

It's not failure to understand, it's a disagreement over its applicability. For something to exist it need not have a name, but it does need boundaries, it needs to be distinguished from it's surroundings. The edges need to be relevant. Our language (and our culture) define those edges. It's not the assignation of the token 'red', it's the definition of there being something there to warrant a token. That is (largely) a cultural decision, not a biological one.

But this isn't the main point. The main point is that seeing colours has nothing to do with "reaching" for some word or other. — Michael

I'm quite aware of your point, what I'm waiting for is any grounds for asserting it.

We have consciousness. We're not just input-output machines. I have a first person experience when I'm sitting still, in silence, watching and hearing and feeling the things going on around me. I don't need to say, or think, "I'm in pain" to be in pain. I just feel it. — Michael

On what grounds?

That you feel like you have? Have you never been wrong about what you 'feel like' is going on?

why should he believe the impressions that led him to consider indirectness in the first place? — frank

Oh this is interesting I like this question.

This is a bit similar to "Can a faulty coding machine accurately locate its faulty coding using the programmes run on it?"

Can a delusional person accurately define the distinction between delusion and reality whilst maintaining the status of deluded or can one ever sanely declare their insanity?

Can someone who makes mistakes identify their mistakes while still being considered a mistake-maker?

In my opinion, the reality we all exist in is observed differently for every subject. And that itself is our inherent subjectivity - the impossibility to perceive the same external environment from the same space and time as any other observer without being them. I can't occupy the space you're in right now and still be two separate individuals.

Thus the space-time dimension dictates the fundamental limits to standardising the perceptions and measurements of different observers.

In that case, there is no objective reality that can be perceived unanimously by all observers and the fault in such is not with the observers mind or paradigm for reality but rather the relationship between observed and observer itself.

Reality can only be appreciated indirectly. The bias is being an object.

I'm quite aware of your point, what I'm waiting for is any grounds for asserting it. — Isaac

On the grounds that babies and non-human animals and illiterate deaf mutes raised by wolves in the jungle can see colours.

On what grounds? — Isaac

First-person empirical evidence.

@Isaac

I refer you to this. Are you really trying to argue that without a language then we would just see a single non-coloured circle (or maybe nothing, because that there is a circle at all depends on it being coloured in contrast to the white background?), and not a coloured circle surrounded by a differently coloured ring surrounded by yet another differently coloured ring?

I think that that's an extraordinary claim, inconsistent with common sense, and that the burden is on you to prove it, not on me to disprove it.

Not having a language doesn't make the world appear black and white (or me outright blind).

Does anyone really want to argue that without a language with colour words such as "red", "green", and "blue", then we would just see a single (non-coloured?) circle, and not a coloured circle surrounded by a differently coloured ring surrounded by yet another differently coloured ring — Michael

Depends, are these people without the colour words in their language because they're colour blind? In which case they truly may only see one circle, or a circle with varying grades of grey.

Language is built on definitions - nouns or actions, and those are based on what we can perceive/detect - objects and motion.

If you cannot detected something, there are no words we have to meaningfully describe or simulate the undetected/unperceived object - for example one with a completely unique colour, texture, shape or substance unlike anything we have experienced previously. As the experience of the object is what ties any arbitrary word to its reference point.

If John and I went to see this object together, we could say how we enjoyed it's brilliant shades of Dumzinkgen (colour) and the rather flentbursh texture. It being made of jaffle-oxide ofc. And you woukd have no idea what it looked or felt like. But john and I can use the words like Dumzinkgen meaningfully in conversation because we both saw the colour.

The second point I want to make is, even if two differences are detectable between colours, for example 2 different shades of green, at what point do we determine when green is no longer a shade of green but a shade of blue.
Some argue turquoise is a tone of blue. Some argue it is a tone of green. Others say its its own unique colour.

There is a tribe in Africa, swahili I believe, where blue and green are but shades of the same colour. Are they any less correct in believing so verses our distinction?

In a spectrum of colour where changes are seamless, fluid and graduating, placing borders to define categories is more or less arbitrary to a point and you could place 100 borders or 20 or 8.

Tetrachromatic people see more shades of colour than trichromats can. A loving Tetrachromat couple may paint each wall of their house slightly different shades of yellow. We would come in and they would say don't you love the different tones, and we would say it's the same yellow what are you talking about. They would insist that it's not. And for them it truly isn't.

Summary: language reflects perception/what can be experienced.

The second point I want to make is, even if two differences are detectable between colours, for example 2 different shades of green, at what point do we determine when green is no longer a shade of green but a shade of blue.
Some argue turquoise is a tone of blue. Some argue it is a tone of green. Others say its its own unique colour.

There is a tribe in Africa, swahili I believe, where blue and green are but shades of the same colour. Are they any less correct in believing so verses our distinction?

In a spectrum of colour where changes are seamless, fluid and graduating, placing borders to define categories is more or less arbitrary to a point and you could place 100 borders or 20 or 8. — Benj96

I agree with this, but it has nothing to do with what I'm saying. I don't care what words one uses to refer to the colours one sees. It doesn't matter. What matters is that we do see colours, and that seeing colours and talking about colours are two completely different things. I do the former even without the latter.

It's not the case that if John has a single word "grue" that refers to the colours that the rest of us call "blue" and "green" that if shown something green and something blue then they will appear to be identical, just as I don't need individual words for each shade of red to see that one shade of red isn't identical to a different shade of red. I might use the same word "red" to describe both colours, but I can see that they're different.

What matters is that we do see colours, and that seeing colours and talking about colours are two completely different things. I do the former even without the latter. — Michael

Of course they are. I agree with you fully. Seeing and talking are two separate verbs. So they can't be referring to the same thing.

When we talk about yellow generally we aren't seeing yellow externally but referring to our memory of seeing yellow externally.

Unless of course we are seeing something yellow and pointing at it saying look its yellow. In that case we are referring to immediate experience.

On the grounds that babies and non-human animals and illiterate deaf mutes raised by wolves in the jungle can see colours. — Michael

You know this how?

First-person empirical evidence. — Michael

Why would your personal conclusions about the function of your brain (or mind, even) be treated with any more authority that your first person feelings about gravity, or electromagnetism, or evolution?

I think that that's an extraordinary claim, inconsistent with common sense, and that the burden is on you to prove it, not on me to disprove it. — Michael

That's not the claim I'm making. That we can distinguish is not in question. What the distinction consists in is.

You want to say that distinction consists in different 'experiences'.

I'm claiming there's no evidence for that. All there's evidence for is that the distinction consists in a different response, of which 'reaching for the word 'red'' is an example specific to 'red'.

You know this how? — Isaac

Evolution of colour vision in mammals

You want to say that distinction consists in different 'experiences'.

I'm claiming there's no evidence for that. — Isaac

Experience is evidence of itself. My different experiences are self-evident.

I don't care what words one uses to refer to the colours one sees. — Michael

When Hume suggested a human with otherwise correct vision can install a missing shade of blue, he has already granted that the name of the color doesn’t reflect the capacity. Could have been any gap in the spectrum, which makes the name of it irrelevant.

When Hume suggested a human with otherwise correct vision can install a missing shade of blue, he has already granted that the name of the color doesn’t reflect the capacity. Could have been any gap in the spectrum, which makes the name of it irrelevant. — Mww

I agree. If some future scientist were able to modify my eye and give me tetrachromacy, I would see more colours than I see now, even though I wouldn't have words to refer to these new colours.

You know this how? — Isaac


Evolution of colour vision in mammals — Michael

Exactly. By their responses. Not their private experiences.

My different experiences are self-evident. — Michael

You haven't answered...

Why would your personal conclusions about the function of your brain (or mind, even) be treated with any more authority that your first person feelings about gravity, or electromagnetism, or evolution? — Isaac

Exactly. By their responses. Not their private experiences. — Isaac

Yes, it's entirely possible that only adult humans have private experiences. Or it's entirely possible that only I have private experiences, and that the rest of you are p-zombies. But I think it more likely that I'm nothing particularly special and that the rest of you have private experiences, and that non-human animals have private experiences too.

Why would your personal conclusions about the function of your brain (or mind, even) be treated with any more authority that your first person feelings about gravity, or electromagnetism, or evolution? — Isaac

First person conclusions are what science is built on. As in every theory and hypothesis was someone's original individual first person conclusion or suspicion about reality that then was proven consistent for others too.

So I wouldnt discredit someone solely on their belief or intuition being personal. Einsteins belief in special relativity was at one stage personal/ known/ though about only by him.

You want to say that distinction consists in different 'experiences'.

I'm claiming there's no evidence for that. All there's evidence for is that the distinction consists in a different response, of which 'reaching for the word 'red'' is an example specific to 'red'. — Isaac

They're both correct. Distinction can be at any stage from input, through processing or perception, to output or response.

The input (wavelengths) can be the same and the output can be different (reaching for colours words like green, red, brown or grey)
Or the input can be different and the response can be the same. Two people looking at two separate shades of yellow and saying yellow.

Why would your personal conclusions about the function of your brain (or mind, even) be treated with any more authority that your first person feelings about gravity, or electromagnetism, or evolution? — Isaac

My experiences aren't self-evidence of gravity, but they are self-evidence of my experiences. That's common sense.

Again, you seem to fail to understand the use-mention distinction.

But this isn't the main point. — Michael

Perhaps yes it is, and no we don't fail. We, the people disputing the reality of private experience, understand that seeing colours is using (hence reaching for) words and pictures in order to mention (refer to, and thereby identify, classify, compare and order) visual stimuli.

This symbolic skill does tend to thrive on casual confusion of symbol and object, such as the kind usefully diagnosed as use-mention, but also (by the way, just saying...) the kind that confuses either symbol or object with brain shiver.

Without language, your target image might illicit responses that deserved classifying as a nascent form of recognition or comparison or classification of colours. Perhaps an animal would be reminded (as it were) of a face, in response to the whole set of local contrasts. But to imagine that all of the concentric rings would be identified as instances of separate classes of stimuli... That implies language, proper.

I will have to come up with five more pictures that excludes at least a third of the picture of the "ngoe" being green and excludes "ngoe" being an odd number. — RussellA

And as Wittgenstein pointed out in the first few pages of PI, you would thereby, already be participating in a language game, and so trying to explain meaning by making use of meaning.

Then he cut to the chase: Stop looking for meaning, and instead look at use.

Then he cut to the chase: Stop looking for meaning, and instead look at use. — Banno

I thought he meant you find meaning by looking at use.