Doesn't evolution imply physicalism? — RogueAI

Neo-darwinian materialism surely does. But it has many critics, not least Raymond Talllis:

Broadly speaking, Aping Mankind is about sloppy science. That is, it’s an attack on scientism, the mistaken belief that all important questions are best tackled with the use of natural science techniques. It’s about how hubris can cause as prestigious a subject as science to overestimate and overextend itself. More specifically, Aping Mankind is about the impact of this tendency on biological theories of human mental development, with all the philosophical mind/body issues which that involves. Raymond Tallis delivers a heartfelt polemic against what he sees as a great many errors and unproven assumptions, which are wide-ranging and yet interlinked. What holds these assumptions together is a blind adherence to what seems to be the most scientifically-convenient – though not necessarily correct – philosophy, a form of what is called ‘materialism’. In the process Tallis trains his guns on an array of notables, such as John Gray, Daniel Dennett and Susan Blackmore. As ammunition he has coined some new words, for example, those used in the book’s subtitle, ‘neuromania’ and ‘darwinitis’.

I have that book, later I’ll see if Hoffman is mentioned, although I don’t recall.

https://philosophynow.org/issues/88/Aping_Mankind_Neuromania_Darwinitis_and_the_Misrepresentation_of_Humanity_by_Raymond_Tallis

Who are we discussing here, Hoffman or Kasturp?

They’re brothers in arms, Hoffman is on the advisory board of Kastrup’s Essentia Foindation.

I brought up Kastrup as an example of evolution in idealsim - I know Hoffman agrees with (in his words) 90% of Kastrup's positon. But yes, strictly speaking I brought in a new guy. Sorry. :wink:

Sure, scientists cooperating to do philosophy badly. All the more reason to keep close track of their arguments.

It's worth noting the connection, and one could probably trace a history as well, perhaps back to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

Where or what is Tallis’ criticism of Hoffman that you keep alluding to?

one could probably trace a history as well, perhaps back to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. — Banno

Indeed.

Sorry - https://philosophynow.org/issues/154/An_Encounter_with_Radical_Darwinitis

thought it had been shared earlier.

And then Spinoza? It has the same temptations. I've a great deal of sympathy for such ideas, but...

Thanks! I do see his point, it’s more or less the same objection I raised at the very beginning. It’s like when David Stove would compare positivism to the Uroboros, the snake that eats itself - ‘the hardest part’, he would say with a mischievous grin, ‘is the last bite.’

That said, I’m still not dismissing Hoffman out of hand. I’ll try and finish more of the book.

I have no knowledge of Spinoza but my mother was 'into' him. I should have listened more closely to her...

In these arguments I general factor out (or bracket) the question of whether or not the ideas correspond to reality. Partly because I lack the expertise to discern if this is the case and partly out of wanting to steel man arguments I don't fully understand. You probably did the same thing when you were studying philosophy. As someone outside of philosophy, who is an atheist, I find these accounts of idealism fascinating.

What is the nature of your sympathy with these ideas?

Sorry - https://philosophynow.org/issues/154/An_Encounter_with_Radical_Darwinitis — Banno

That's great - thanks.

That said, I’m still not dismissing Hoffman out of hand. I’ll try and finish more of the book. — Wayfarer

There may well be useful nuances and details in his position which have been overlooked in our commentary. Would you mind highlighting these if you find them?

Great example commonly used in favor of this argument is Albert Einstein's approach in developing the Theory of General Relativity. Something that is also important is that the Theory was "Verified" and accepted a over a night after a historic observation without having the chance of any falsification period! (so falsification is not always important too!). — Nickolasgaspar

Instead of using Einstein's relativity as an example of how science is tainted, you ought to simply realize that this theory is unscientific. The principle of relativity, upon which Einstein's theory is based, is unverifiable, therefore not science, it's ontology.

After all if I ask you to describe the scientific method...you will end up naming a bunch of actions.
The same is true for Philosophy.
1. epistemology (first learn what we know and how we know something -on a specific subject).
2. Physika (reevaluate or update your epistemology through empirical evaluation).
3. Metaphysics. reflect on that updated knowledge and use it to construct hypotheses reaching beyond our current knowledge
4.5.6. What are the implication of those hypotheses in Ethics , Aesthetics and Politics.
Restart...project your conclusions on our current body of knowledge ...etc. — Nickolasgaspar

That's strange, I have a degree in philosophy and I was never taught any of this. it's very fictional, and not at all representative of how philosophy is actually taught, in my experience.

I know that most philosophers are shocked when they hear these things for the first time, but I find them to be far more important than any other aspect of Philosophy...if our goal is to become good Philosophers. — Nickolasgaspar

Right, most philosophers are shocked when they hear of your "philosophical method", because it's absolutely foreign to them. Why do you call them "philosophers", when the philosophical method is foreign to them?

There is a form of judgement regarding intuition, or, sensibility itself, which describes the condition of the subject, as such, in his perception of real objects. Best represented as how he feels about that which he has perceived, as opposed to what he may eventually know about it. That the sunset is beautiful is empirical, how the subject reacts to the mode or manner in which the sunset is beautiful, which are given from the sensation alone, is an aesthetic judgement by which the subject describes to himself the state of his condition. — Mww

This is close to what I was suggesting, but let me take a slightly different aesthetic example, to make things clearer. Suppose it's a nice summer day and I walk past a garden of flowers, and notice a vast array of different shades of colour, and I think about how beautiful all those different colours are, in that particular array. Within my sensibility I have distinguished all sorts of different shades of colour, so that I perceive, or see, the landscape as completely varied in colour, and beautiful in this way.

What I am saying is that inherent within my sensibility, there is some sort of "judgement", which "decided" to present this display to me in a way which is beautiful, or pleasant. And if we move here to "pleasure" instead of "beauty", the nature of this sort of "judgement" becomes more emphasized. We cannot describe the pleasure we get from sensations in terms of a simple physical reaction to external stimuli because something inherent within the sensibility must judge whether the sensation ought to be experienced as pleasurable or as painful. This is the type of "judgement" which I think we must consider as inherent within sensibility. It is not my conscious mind which upon receiving the sensation decides that the sensation ought to be classed as pleasurable, the sensation is already judged as pleasurable before I have time to think about it. And of course this is even more emphasized with pain.

It is easy to see one cannot be deceived by how he feels, insofar as his feeling IS his condition at the time of it. — Mww

I don't buy this at all. I think what you propose here is sophistic trickery. I think that "judgement" which inheres within sensibility could very often be wrong. What happens if I eat something, and I think that it tastes good, but it ends up making me sick? Clearly that inherent "judgement", which judged it as good was mistaken. You might argue that the inherent judgement was "pleasurable", and this is different from "good", but this doesn't suffice, because being sick is not pleasurable either.

Therefore there is a problem with your qualification, "at the time of it". You'd say that at the time of eating the substance, it was pleasurable, and I was not mistaken in that sensation. But clearly there was a mistake involved here, the mistake which made the harmful substance appear at that moment to be pleasurable. I think that this condition, "at the time of", is really a deceptive phrase. Nothing is ever judged in relation to "the present moment", it is always judged in relation to the past and future.

So perhaps it might be true as you say that a person is never wrong in a judgement of "at the time of", but this is not a real judgement which is ever really made, so it must be disregarded as irrelevant. Our judgements are directed toward what just happened, or what is about to happen. For simplicity sake, I might say "I am doing...right now", but if I have to truthfully describe my actions, I must make a division between what I just did, and what I am about to do. Then "at the time of" becomes an illusion.

Say you are with someone and she says, "See that dog over there; what kind do you think it is?". Say it's a very large dog, maybe a Great Dane. Do you think the other person is likely to say "Oh, it's so small, maybe a Chihuahua"?

Have you had many experiences something like say you are with some people in the city and you see a car speeding towards you and another person says "Oh, look the waves are breaking well, and there's a lovely dog running towards us; let's go for a swim"? — Janus

I do not see the relationship you are trying to propose. Words are meaning based, therefore based in intention. There is no logical relation between a person's experience and a person's use of words. Similar acts of word usage do not imply the same experience. The similar acts may be used to justify a claim of similar experience, but two distinct yet similar experiences does not make one "shared experience".

If you don't think we can generally agree about what objects are where, what kinds of objects they are, how large or small, and so on, then I don't know what planet you are on. — Janus

You seem to be missing the point. What I objected to, is your use of "shared experience". All that is required for agreement is similarity, and two similar things (experiences) does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

Sure. But I just did a search on the Kindle sample and notice the term ‘idealism’ does not appear. All the examples in that sample are taken from biology. It’s possible those like myself with a previous interest in philosophical idealism are reading things into it that aren’t there.

Food for thought. A rose by any other name?

If we both see the same kinds of things in front of us that qualifies as a shared experience.

If you saw a beach and I saw a city that would not be a shared experience.

If we both see the same kinds of things in front of us that qualifies as a shared experience. — Janus

No, it means that we are each having the same kind of experience. Two distinct experiences which are both of the same kind does not justify the claim of one "shared experience".

Two experiences of the same thing at the same time qualifies as a shared experience in my lexicon.

If we shared a plate of food that would not entail that we ate exactly the same items on the plate: that would be impossible.

Instead of using Einstein's relativity as an example of how science is tainted, you ought to simply realize that this theory is unscientific. The principle of relativity, upon which Einstein's theory is based, is unverifiable, therefore not science, it's ontology. — Metaphysician Undercover

- No it isn't. Its a scientific theory that ticks all boxes. It provides a sufficient narrative, hasdescriptive power non extreme conditions and it offers accurate predictions allowing us to producetechnical applications. The three criteria (description, prediction, application) are all met.
Sure in extreme scenario the theory breaks down, but that can easily be due to Emergence of phenomena.
So its 100% scientific. Remember scientific doesn't mean 100% correct. Scientific frameworks can only provide tentative positions due to the nature of our ever evolving observations.

. The principle of relativity, upon which Einstein's theory is based, is unverifiable, therefore not science, it's ontology — Metaphysician Undercover

-Again that's is wrong. General relativity could easily have been falsified if Dyson and Eddington hadn't observed what Einstein's theory predicted. ALL THEORIES are falsifiable when make PREDICTIONS.
Is it a theory on the ontology of the universe. Sure and it became our epistemology when it was verified. Of course.
IS it wrong. Probably since it break down in extreme scenarios plus it doesn't fit with the rest of our theories on smaller scales. Can that be due to Emergence? Probably.
Either way the Quasi Dogmatic Principle in science (Paul Hoyningen) uses all theories as Black Boxes allowing us to study them until they are crashed and burned. This is how science advances by studying our mistakes.

That's strange, I have a degree in philosophy and I was never taught any of this. it's very fictional, and not at all representative of how philosophy is actually taught, in my experience. — Metaphysician Undercover

-I know, Philosophical studies are mainly based on chronicling than how it should be practiced.
This is the main reason behind Academic Philosophy's failure to remain relevant to our Epistemology (except most philosophical practices within Natural Philosophy of course).
In Greece, the birth place of Western Philosophy , we tend to focus on Aristotle's (non philosophical) work on Logic and systematization of Philosophy. Sure, its all out of irrational national pride, but at the end it did benefit our thought process.

Right, most philosophers are shocked when they hear of your "philosophical method", because it's absolutely foreign to them. Why do you call them "philosophers", when the philosophical method is foreign to them? — Metaphysician Undercover

-They can always learn about it...plus its a social convention for people with a diploma from the academy. Even Scientists are acknowledge as Doctors of Philosophy when they get their PhD's. This is what PhD means.
In reality ONLY scientists follow the true Philosophical method...with the addition of the empirical tool

Two experiences of the same thing at the same time qualifies as a shared experience in my lexicon. — Janus

That your "lexicon" describes two distinct, but similar experiences as one shared experience indicates that it is not logically rigorous.

f we shared a plate of food that would not entail that we ate exactly the same items on the plate: that would be impossible. — Janus

If you do not understand the difference between two people sharing one plate of food, and the two distinct experiences that these two people are undergoing while sharing that one plate of food, and you conclude that because it is one plate of food being shared, the two experiences must be one shared experience, then I'm afraid that I am at a loss to dispel your misunderstanding of this matter. I'll give it a try anyway.

Let's start with this. Do you understand the difference between an event, and the participants in the event? Do you agree that the fact that the participants share in the event, does not imply that what is the property of any of the participants, is shared by the event, as property of the event? That would be a composition fallacy.

So here's an example of this fallacious way of thinking. Suppose someone gets raped, and one of the two participants in that event has a very enjoyable experience. And you conclude that since this person who has the enjoyable experience, is a participant in a shared experience, the other participant also has a very enjoyable experience as well, being a participant in that shared experience. Do you see the problem with your fallacious "shared experience"?

No it isn't. Its a scientific theory that ticks all boxes. It provides a sufficient narrative, hasdescriptive power non extreme conditions and it offers accurate predictions allowing us to producetechnical applications. — Nickolasgaspar

It's incredible the way you just make things up. Are you a professional fiction writer?

What I am saying is that inherent within my sensibility, there is some sort of "judgement", which "decided" to present this display to me in a way which is beautiful, or pleasant. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is tantamount to proposing that sensibility thinks, from which follows that given that understanding is the faculty of thought, there are now two thinking faculties in the same system. What a mess that would turn out to be.

What happens if I eat something, and I think that it tastes good, but it ends up making me sick? Clearly that inherent "judgement", which judged it as good was mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

You tell me. Something tastes good, turns out to make you sick, so……what, it really didn’t taste good?

Have it your way.

How do immaterialists invoke evolution? Doesn't evolution imply physicalism? — RogueAI

Here's one way.

There is a deeper non-material reality which we perceive as physical matter in spacetime. (Hoffman's headset metaphor). The deeper reality is not static; it changes. From within our headset, we perceive those changes as evolution.

There is a deeper non-material reality which we perceived as physical matter in spacetime. — Art48

But under idealism, that deeper reality is some mind(s) that are creating this reality we're experiencing.

It's incredible the way you just make things up. Are you a professional fiction writer? — Metaphysician Undercover

Seriously you are the one who ignores science and you accuse me for being a professional fiction writer?????
You do understand that General relativity predicted many phenomena years before they were observed, including black holes, gravitational waves, gravitational lensing, the expansion of the universe and the different rates clocks run in a gravitational field.
That means that your freaking GPS on your phone works because GR formulation allows us to adjust our satellite clocks every single day. (now every time you use your car navigation you will feel embarrassed! lol)
That means that Gravitational lensing(bending light) is what allowed Eddington to verify Einstein's theory

The same is true for CRT screens and laser beams. (You can google this freaking things mate!)

Why are you posting opinions on scientific knowledge you know nothing about[/b]...and to make it worse you do that with an attitude?
Can you now see that basic scientific epistemology fuels your pseudo philosophy????

let me help you, don't take my word for it...just google "General relativity , everyday applications"

The Downtown ReviewThe Downtown Review
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 3
December 2018
The Theory of Relativity and Applications: A Simple IntroductionThe Theory of Relativity and Applications: A Simple Introduction
Ellen ReaCleveland State University
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context=tdr

I'm not wasting further time on your distortions.

Here is a good detailed review of Case Against Reality with some useful comparisons. Some snippets:

Hoffman spends considerable time describing various philosophical positions and positioning his perspective among them. He acknowledges predecessors with similar views, such as Immanuel Kant. Philosophers have various objections to Interface Theory of Perception (ITP), and he counters all that he discusses. Here I won’t try to adjudicate these disputes but instead to outline Hoffman’s view.

Followed by a very succinct statement of 'conscious realism':

Hoffman supports a monist philosophical position that he calls “conscious realism.” In it, the world is populated by conscious agents that influence each other and perceive each other. He distinguishes conscious realism with panpsychism, in which physical objects can be conscious. In conscious realism, there is no requirement that the physical reality behind our interface is itself conscious. The point is that what we usually call reality, including objects and spacetime, is generated by each conscious agent through a perceptual interface arising from consciousness. Conscious entities only perceive icons, not reality, and do not directly perceive other conscious entities, only their icons.

To me, it has always seemed strongly reminiscent of Leibniz' monadology. 'According to Leibniz, monads are the fundamental units of reality, which are simple, indivisible, and unextended substances subjects.

For Leibniz, monads are the basic building blocks of the universe, and all things, including physical bodies and even human souls, are made up of monads. Each monad has its unique qualities, which determine its specific nature and behavior. Monads do not interact with each other directly, but rather each one reflects the entire universe within itself, creating a harmonious pre-established harmony.'

In other words, 'conscious agents all the way down'. Whitehead's 'actual occasions of experience' also come to mind, although I've never really been able to get my head around that.

Another point worth making:

Hoffman says the FBT ('fitness beats truth') theorem applies only to perceptions of the world (90-91). Cognitive capacities need to be studied separately to see how they are shaped by evolution. Not all evolutionarily derived capacities are necessarily unreliable. Indeed, there can be selection pressures for ability with logic. For example, the value of reciprocity for humans can contribute to selection for logical ability. Hoffman says skills in mathematics and logic can exist compatibly with the FBT theorem and with Interface Theory of Perception (ITP), but whether concepts in mathematics and logic enable understanding of objective reality remains to be seen.

This partially addresses the question of why science itself ought not to be considered also a perceptual illusion. However further down, we read:

Hoffman says science has evolved in a way that draws on features of human nature: people argue best for what they believe or against contrary ideas that others believe (196). Reasoning evolved for the purposes of persuasion, and science arose from these inadequate foundations via groups and individuals mustering logic and evidence against opponents. This perspective on science is contrary to the common view, at least among scientists, that scientists should be objective. Hoffman’s evolutionary picture is more compatible with the analysis of Ian Mitroff (1974), who found that elite scientists fiercely stuck by their preferred views and attempted to undermine contrary views (and denigrated scientists holding those contrary views). According to Mitroff, scientific norms such as organised scepticism exist alongside “counternorms” such as organised dogmatism, and the counternorms can be functional for scientific progress. Mitroff’s picture might be a starting point for an evolutionary model of science.

I am always dubious about attempts to explain the capacity of reason with reference to evolution, as it always seems reductionist to me. After all, reason ought to be the source, not the subject, of whatever explanations we are able to discern. This is why I make frequent references to Thomas Nagel's essay Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, which elaborates the point: if reason is only the product of adaptive necessity, then why trust it? Classical philosophical theology has an answer for that: the mind contains a faculty, however corrupted, which is able to discern the truth by reason. (It's also worth noting The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science, Peter Harrison, which argues that one of the primary impulses for early modern science was as a corrective for the corrosive effects of original sin on the intellect.)

I think from what I've read so far, Hoffman's book raises many interesting questions based on evolutionary science, but it also makes the mistake of seeing evolution as a kind of all-powerful agency, which perhaps is the lingering cultural legacy of the mythology it has displaced. 'The jealous God dies hard', something you certainly see in the polemics of the 'ultra darwinists' such as Dennett and Dawkins. While Hoffman's view seems worlds away from their lumpen materialism, his estimation of evolution as the sole creative agency in the development of life remains quite close to it, in some fundamental ways.

And overall, it leaves open the question that if, as he says, all of the objects of experience are simply icons, then what is the reality? I think he says this is not something we can know, but that is deeply problematical in my view. Still, it's a developing field of enquiry, and some grander truth behind the illusion of desktops and icons might yet come into focus.

For Leibniz, monads are the basic building blocks of the universe, and all things, including physical bodies and even human souls, are made up of monads. Each monad has its unique qualities, which determine its specific nature and behavior. Monads do not interact with each other directly, but rather each one reflects the entire universe within itself, creating a harmonious pre-established harmony.' — Wayfarer

A point of difference from monads is that Hoffman's conscious agents do interact to form a compound agents.

And overall, it leaves open the question that if, as he says, all of the objects of experience are simply icons, then what is the reality? — Wayfarer

Conscious agents are his model of reality, but, he admits, probably not the last word. To paraphrase: He expects his theory is wrong but it's mathematically precise and in science we make mathematically precise models so we can tell precisely where we are wrong, and then try to devise a better theory.

Hoffman's conscious agents do interact to form a compound agents. — Art48

He might he say that elsewhere, but that thumbnail sketch I provided doesn't say it. It says that

The point is that what we usually call reality, including objects and spacetime, is generated by each conscious agent through a perceptual interface arising from consciousness.

There's nothing about 'compound agents' implied by that.

...try to devise a better theory.... — Art48

From which perspective? Outside consciousness? A theory of empiricism is not necessarily an empirical theory.