The other, a metaphysical theory positing “sense data” which is in principle private, unaccessible, and with un-unverifiable claims. Lastly, as I have been arguing irrelevant to the meaning of the language used. — Richard B
But there is a difference between these two explanations, one metaphysical and one scientific. The scientific explanation has physical theory behind it. Verified countless times by a community of scientist. It has power to predict future occurrences and the power to construct our environment. All verifiable in the public realm. — Richard B
Why would you submit this as an example as a counter to direct realism if you don’t have idea what it is countering? — Richard B
If you want to argue that the feeling of being cold isn’t some essentially private mental phenomena but is reducible to brain activity then fine, but the same must also be said of seeing colours. Sight isn’t a uniquely special sense. They key point is that colour, like coldness and pain, aren’t properties of the external stimulus that trigger such experiences. — Michael
I know! Crazy isn't it!
That anyone might think a thing you can't personally understand could actually be the case! Implausible.... — Isaac
I just meant that there's no intermediate object, no 'representation' of an apple. — Isaac
I’m not saying that either. I’m saying that the reality of colour perception is like this: — Michael
The essential point is that the apple in between them isn’t coloured. It reflects a certain wavelength of light, but that’s all. Colour primitivism, which naive realists believe, is false. — Michael
when the man uses the term “grue” to describe the colour of the apple, he’s referring to what’s present in his experience and not present in the woman’s (in the particular example of that image), not to the fact that the apple reflects light with a wavelength of 450nm. — Michael
When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses, we're instead declaring and reconfirming our joint commitment to treating the post box a certain way. — Isaac
It could have been: "what's that red thing over there?" — frank
I've given an account of the need to reduce external surprise from both an evolutionary perspective and from a purely systems theory perspective. any self identifying system has to combat entropy gradients (in terms of information) and those gradients are Gaussian. so we minimise surprise, we treat things consistently, and (to the best of our ability) in ways which give predictable results based on their actual external-world states. — Isaac
can't think of a single reason why would just go about asking each other what our private thoughts are called? — Isaac
That's a representation. Those objects in the thought bubbles are representations of apples. — Isaac
When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses — Isaac
Then why have representations at all? Why have the word? — Isaac
In my preferred model of perception, we attempt to predict the external causes of our sensory inputs so that we might combat the entropy otherwise induced by external forces and maintain our integrity. You could put that in evolutionary terms as being a need to predict the environment so that we can survive what it's going to throw at us.
But this requires that what we're predicting is the external world, the actual thing outside of us which might impact our integrity. And when we live in groups, we do this socially. We co-operate to better predict external causes and make ourselves more predictable to others (in the hope they will return the favour). So the important thing about labelling something 'red' is the co-operation, the surprise reduction, entailed by doing so. It's important that we agree and it's important that what we agree about is an external cause.
If all we're labelling is our own private 'representations', then I really can't see the point. Why would you care? Why would I? What difference does it make to anyone what your private representation is called? — Isaac
As Wittgenstein pointed out, somewhere in PI, pointing at something only works if the other folk around you understand that they have to follow the direction of your finger - and that is already to be participants in a sign language. — Banno
As Wittgenstein's language game says that the statement "trees are green" does not point to something in a mind-independent world but rather points to something already existing in language, Wittgenstein's language game is incompatible with Semantic Direct Realism, which says that "trees are green" does point to something existing in a mind-independent world. — RussellA
None of which rules out the experience of redness. — frank
In fact, your view is more consistent with first person data than opposed to it. — frank
They are no more representations of apples than pain is a representation of fire or cold a representation of a temperature of 0°C. They are just an effect of stimulation. — Michael
When we say "the post box is red" we don't mean that there's some thing 'redness' which the post box possesses — Isaac
We do according to the (phenomenological) direct realist. They commit themselves to something like colour primitivism. Indirect realism is a response to such claims. — Michael
The pain I feel isn't a mind-independent property of fire. The cold I feel isn't a mind-independent property of the air. The sweetness I taste isn't a mind-independent property of sugar. The colour I see isn't a mind-independent property of the apple.
It makes no real difference if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing "mental representations" or if we describe this as feeling or tasting or seeing fire and air and sugar and apples. That semantic argument is, really, a non-issue. — Michael
None of which rules out the experience of redness.
— frank
No. The experience of 'redness' is ruled out by there being no evidence, nor need, for any such thing. — Isaac
Where is this 'pain' and what sensory nodes to you use to 'feel' it? — Isaac
It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.
So it is not the case that "feeling" is one thing, that "pain" is another thing, and that the former is "done" to the latter; it is just the case that "feeling pain" is a single (possibly private) thing. The same with feeling cold and seeing red. — Michael
Now you seem to be going back to semantics. — Isaac
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