Is it any more complicated that for every effect there is a cause. — RussellA

Well, yes.

One thing that cause and effect naturally invokes is time -- and the way scientists, philosophers, and historians treat time varies greatly.

Then you have to have a theory of cause and effect which is usually to say they are events, and effects are those which come after causes. But what is an event? Well, that depends on the area of study -- an event in history won't be the same as an event in an ELISA experiment won't be the same thing as an event in phenomenology.

Then you have to have some kind of theory of the relationship between events. It can't just be any old event that happens to follow another one -- otherwise the rooster crowing in the morning would cause the sun to rise, to use a more Humean example of causation.


Given the complexity of cause I think the summation that every event must have a cause, or for every effect there is a cause is something of a simplification of a very difficult concept or feature of reality to untangle. In fact, I don't think it can be untangled -- I think it's more correct to view it as a multifarious entity.

But, let's put this to the side. It's a bit off the beaten path, though it looked at first like it might be promising with respect to in/direct realism since causation is a little different from color and shape and what have you. In TPF discussions I'll stick with anti-realist Direct Realist -- it seems to fit, given what's been said.

And that's why I've said before that there's an element of equivocation in the direct realist's argument. That we might use the same word to refer to both cause and effect isn't that they are the same thing. Colour experience is one thing, and apples reflecting light is a different thing entirely. — Michael

This seems a completely unreasonable strawman of the direct realist position. It is that we are detecting a property of the external object, not that we actually possess a copy of that same property in our own brain.

Direct realism is simply saying that we observe properties of the external world. That 'red' is a label given to a property in the external world and when we correctly see red, it is that we are detecting that property.

That 'red' is a label given to a property in the external world and when we correctly see red, it is that we are detecting that property. — Isaac

What does it mean to correctly see that property? I don't think it correct that 500nm light looks the way it does to us. I don't think it correct that 500.5nm light looks exactly the same. I don't think it correct that 400nm light looks different. I don't think it correct that 1nm light doesn't look like anything. It just happens to be that, given our physiology, things look the way they do (or don't look like anything).

And it’s not incorrect that things look different to something with a different physiology, e.g. the colour blind or the human tetrachromat or animals.

It is that we are detecting a property of the external object, not that we actually possess a copy of that same property in our own brain. — Isaac

What does “detect” mean? If it just means “responds to” then it isn’t inconsistent with indirect realism.

And phenomenological direct (naive) realism says something exactly like this. They don’t just say that we respond to external world objects. They say that external world objects are as they are seen, e.g. that the colour property in the experience is the colour property of the apple. And they don’t just say that a copy of the property is in the experience, but that the exact token instance of the property is in the experience. That’s what they mean by experience being direct. If it were a copy then it would be representative realism, i.e. indirect realism.

In TPF discussions I'll stick with anti-realist Direct Realist -- it seems to fit, given what's been said. — Moliere

That's like saying you are an Atheist Christian, or a vegan carnivore.

One thing that cause and effect naturally invokes is time.............Then you have to have a theory of cause and effect which is usually to say they are events, and effects are those which come after causes. But what is an event? — Moliere

The Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that perception is a direct awareness of properties existing in the mind, such as the direct perception of the colour red.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that it is only through our senses that we know the external world.

Science tells us that the object in the external world causing our perception of the colour red has a wavelength of 700nm.

The Indirect Realist argues that the properties existing in our mind, the colour red, are different to the properties of the object in the external world that caused them, a wavelength of 700nm

The Direct Realist argues that the properties existing in our mind, the colour red, are the same as the properties of the object in the external world that caused them, the colour red.

In effect, the Direct Realist is arguing that the properties of an effect at a later time are the same as the properties of its cause at an earlier time.

The Direct Realist is arguing that the properties of an effect are the same as the properties of its cause

But we know this is not the case, When getting a headache from looking at a bright light, we know that bright lights are not in themselves headaches. When glass breaks from being hit by a stone, we know that stones in themselves are not breaking glass. When enjoying reading a book, we know that books in themselves are not enjoyment.

The Direct Realist's position that the properties of an effect are the same as the properties of its cause cannot be justified.

That's like saying you are an Atheist Christian, or a vegan carnivore. — RussellA

Well -- maybe we need new terms then. Perhaps the way these have been distinguished isn't true of what people believe. What I've been calling a set-up. Not that set-ups are bad -- they help us to make distinctions and try to understand ourselves and others in relation to one another. Just that they can be made so clear that they no longer represent anything that people believe.

When it comes to direct vs indirect realism, sometimes discussions focus on direct/indirect (I tend to be more interested in that), and other times on realism/anti-realism (@Banno seems to focus on that). This is why I tend to talk about direct perception rather than, or more often than, direct realism. It means I can talk about embodiment, affordances, and so on, without worrying too much about ultimate reality or mind-independence, which are bothersome topics.

Well -- maybe we need new terms then. — Moliere

Perhaps the term "Direct Realism" should be thought of as a name rather than a description, in the same way that "Transcendental Idealism" is neither transcendental nor idealism.

Other names that incorrectly appear to be descriptions are: Red Panda, white chocolate, titmouse, gravy train, buffalo wing, cat burglar, butterfly, coat of arms, lady bug, Asian flu, Chinese checkers, Arabic numerals, the Fibonacci sequence, the Pythagorean theorem , koala bears, king crabs, glow-worms, fireflies, horned toad, slow worms, starfish, jellyfish, velvet ants, strawberries, peanuts, Panama hats, English horns, Jerusalem artichokes, Bombay duck, The Isle of Dogs, catgut and funny bone.

I could then say that yesterday I was thinking about the meaning of Direct Realism whilst eating several spicy buffalo wings.

Mind-independence and indirectness, as concepts, have so far been my target as bothersome notions -- the former because we don't know enough about minds to know either way, and the latter because it seems to posit some kind of ultimate reality that we are approximating towards which is similar to the problem of mind-independence in that since it cannot be known we cannot know we are approximating towards that reality, and therefore we have no reason to claim our knowledge has any relation at all to that notion. It functions like a thing-in-itself.

without worrying too much about ultimate reality or mind-independence — Jamal

That makes sense. I'm thinking in terms of "What is real?" throughout, and trying to see if I could pick up a position in this endless debate. It's not one I commonly jump into anymore, because my notions of metaphysics and reality, as I've demonstrated so far, aren't really congruent to the discussion most of the time but I thought I'd give it a try anyways.

Hrm, it's not the name though it's what you set out for the name -- in relation to causation no direct realist would say "we can see causal chains all the way back" because we are situated in time. Like I said before, cause-and-effect relies upon a notion of time. Even more, cause-and-effect cannot be determined in the abstract -- the billiard balls can have two or more possible prior states within the game of billiards. We already know the objects and how they behave: that is, events have entities in them, and entities behave in different ways. I'm not so sure about properties and all the rest. Why would there be properties? Aren't these just predicates?

Rather than saying a direct realist would hold that we see reality as it is, that the substrate is real and we directly perceive it, I'd say that the direct realist states that there's nothing indirect. That doesn't mean that upon looking at billiard balls a direct realist believes they'll see the causal chain all the way back. We are still situated in time, after all -- which is why cause-and-effect necessarily requires a notion of time, and events require entities -- there's a lot already assumed in the discussion that's not really demonstrable as much as needed to even talk

If you note in the image above, the indirect scenario has a guy seeing a faulty representation of the object. If this is his only access to the world, can he be an indirect realist without contradiction? In other words, if his view of the world is faulty (or at least possibly unreliable), why should he believe the impressions that led him to consider indirectness in the first place? — frank

I don't think that we can talk about a "faulty" representation. To do that we must know what the "correct" representation --in fact, absolute reality-- is, which we can't. Moreover, that would consist a self-contradition, since if we could see the world "as it is" then we wouldn't talk about a "faulty" representation. :smile:
Therfore, if the person on the left in the image believes that he sees the world directly "as it is", he deludes himself. If we could do that, then we would all have the same perceptions, cognitions and reality. Which evidently is not the case.
So, "faulty" or not, an indirect perception of the world is all the reality we can have. A subjective one. But this does not mean that the external world is mind-dependent. Only idealists believe that.

From the 3 main systems/theories of perception --direct realism, indirect realism and idealism-- I believe indirect realism is the one that has more advantages, or, if you prefer, the less disadvantages or "problems". In fact, it is said that it has a single problem: skepticism, i.e. denying that knowledge (through perception) and even rational belief is possible. But this is much better than the problem of illusion that is involved in the other two theories. Because claiming that we perceive the world directly as it is (in the first case) or that the worls is mind-dependendent (in the second case) are nothing else than illusions.

and the latter because it seems to posit some kind of ultimate reality that we are approximating towards which is similar to the problem of mind-independence in that since it cannot be known we cannot know we are approximating towards that reality, and therefore we have no reason to claim our knowledge has any relation at all to that notion. — Moliere

Is it a problem that we only know about black holes by observing the effect they have on light and matter?

The way I've been saying we know cause-and-effect is that we learn it from our culture. We know of black holes because they fit within a wide body of knowledge used by several people. Observation is important to science, but it's a social process which produces knowledge rather than a methodology. The methods get developed along with the knowledge, and vary depending upon what we're interested in.

Mind-independence and indirectness, as concepts, have so far been my target as bothersome notions -- the former because we don't know enough about minds to know either way, and the latter because it seems to posit some kind of ultimate reality that we are approximating towards which is similar to the problem of mind-independence in that since it cannot be known we cannot know we are approximating towards that reality, and therefore we have no reason to claim our knowledge has any relation at all to that notion. It functions like a thing-in-itself. — Moliere

I admire the way you’ve combined topics that I primitively tend to compartmentalize.

:) Thanks. That's nice to hear.

:up:

What does it mean to correctly see that property? — Michael

To eat the red berry and not get sick because it's ripe.

it’s not incorrect that things look different to something with a different physiology, e.g. the colour blind or the human tetrachromat or animals. — Michael

It is. That's why those two conditions are...conditions. We try to help colour-blind people see properly, we don't try to help the rest of the world lose that ability.

In tetrachromat animals, they have a form of life in which errors will accrue from failures to see what they see. We don't.

What does “detect” mean? If it just means “responds to” then it isn’t inconsistent with indirect realism. — Michael

Yes it is, because indirect realism posits this 'representation' of the object (which we have no cause to consider even exists) to which we respond. Direct realism is about eliminating that representation. Both involve responding to the object. Indirect realism seems to want to build this 'representation' out of it first and yet doesn't seem to have cause to.

they don’t just say that a copy of the property is in the experience, but that the exact token instance of the property is in the experience. That’s what they mean by experience being direct. If it were a copy then it would be representative realism, i.e. indirect realism. — Michael

You'll have to quote a direct realist saying such a ludicrous thing for me to believe this isn't just a straw man.

So, "faulty" or not, an indirect perception of the world is all the reality we can have. A subjective one. But this does not mean the external world is mind-dependent. Only idealists believe that. — Alkis Piskas

:up: :100:

To eat the red berry and not get sick because it's ripe. — Isaac

So someone who doesn't eat the red berry can't see the red berry (correctly)?

I disagree with this. I don't need to eat something to see it. I'm asking you to explain what it means to see something's colour correctly. That has nothing to do with any subsequent activity.

All you seem to be saying is that if someone sees something correctly then they will do this. I'm asking you to make sense of the antecedent.

Yes it is, because indirect realism posits this 'representation' of the object (which we have no cause to consider even exists) to which we respond. — Isaac

You appeared to accept this in the case of pain. Putting my hand in the fire causes pain. That pain is not a property of the fire, but an inner, physiological state. It is because of that pain that I am made aware of the fire and respond accordingly, pulling my hand away. The person with something like congenital insensitivity to pain doesn't feel pain when putting their hand in the fire and so is less likely to, or at least slower to, react.

Why are you unwilling to extend this principle to other sense modalities such as smell, taste, or sight? Do you think that there's some fundamental difference between nociception and photoreception (beyond the trivial case of it being a different sense receptor responding to a different stimulus)?

You'll have to quote a direct realist saying such a ludicrous thing for me to believe this isn't just a straw man. — Isaac

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#NaiRea

Consider the veridical experiences involved in cases where you genuinely perceive objects as they actually are. At Level 1, naive realists hold that such experiences are, at least in part, direct presentations of ordinary objects. At Level 2, the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in experience.

This is the position that indirect realists argue against. Instances of external world properties do not "manifest" in experience. It is just the case that external world properties are causally responsible for experience, and the qualities and properties of this experience are qualities and properties of the experience, not of the external world stimulus.

Our modern scientific understanding of the world, along with the arguments from hallucination and illusion, have shown that the naive realist conception of colour (and other) experience as described above is untenable.

The subsequent argument over whether or not we should describe perception as "seeing representations" or "seeing the external world stimulus" is an irrelevant issue of semantics. It's like arguing over whether we feel pain or feel the fire. These are just different, equally valid, ways of speaking that mean slightly different things with an emphasis on one aspect of perception or another.

Why would there be properties? Aren't these just predicates? — Moliere

Predicates are distinct from properties. Predicates are linguistic whilst properties are extralinguistic. Predicates are tied to particular languages, in that schwarz is tied to German as black is tied to English, but the property black is tied to neither. There is a real world out there and the things in it have properties whether or not there are any languages or language-users.

To my understanding, there are two types of Direct Realism, Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) and Semantic Direct Realism (SDR). PDR is an direct perception and direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world. SDR is an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world. As PDR is extralinguistic and SDR is linguistic, properties exist in PDR whilst predicates exist in SDR.

I can perceive that an apple has the property of greenness even if I don't know the name of that particular shade of green, but I need the predicates within language in order to say that "the apple is green".

in relation to causation no direct realist would say "we can see causal chains all the way back" because we are situated in time — Moliere

But that is exactly what the Direct Realists is saying. The Direct Realist is saying that they directly know the apple, not just how the apple seems, even though there is a causal chain through time from the apple to our perception of the apple.

The Direct Realist holds a contradictory position. First, that they cannot see through causal chains backwards through time and second that they can directly see the prior cause of a perception.

Rather than saying a direct realist would hold that we see reality as it is, that the substrate is real and we directly perceive it, I'd say that the direct realist states that there's nothing indirect. — Moliere

In the absence of a Direct Realist arguing their case, I would have thought that your representation is the opposite of what a Direct Realist believes, in that it is surely the case that the Direct Realist believes that "we see reality as it is, that the substrate is real and we directly perceive it".

So someone who doesn't eat the red berry can't see the red berry (correctly)? — Michael

No.

I don't need to eat something to see it. I'm asking you to explain what it means to see something's colour correctly. That has nothing to do with any subsequent activity. — Michael

Simply declaring it doesn't have anything to do with subsequent activity is begging the question. I'm claiming it does. I'm saying that, since we don't have any locus for a 'representation' of red (and yet 'red is meaningful, as in the ripe berry), our best theory is that it is our response that constitutes 'red' (our reaching for the word, our eating the ripe berry, our categorising according to our culture's rules...), and that absent of any of these responses, there's no 'seeing red' going on at all.

You counter that you think you see red without any response at all, and that because you think it, it must be true.

I counter that we don't have an apparent mechanism, nor locus for such a thing and looking at the way the brain works doesn't seem to allow that (it seems to go straight from modelling aspects (likes shade and edge) to responses (like speech and endocrine system reactions).

... and so we go round in circles.

You appeared to accept this in the case of pain. Putting my hand in the fire causes pain. That pain is not a property of the fire, but an inner, physiological state. — Michael

Yes. Pain, is a property of a body. Our bodies are in a state of pain (or not, if we have incorrectly identified it). It's not a property of a fire under any system.

Red is a property of a berry. Berries are red. Fires aren't in pain so there's no issue there to contend with, you're not comparing like with like.

In each case we're predicting the state of some external node and responding either to refine that prediction or alter the state of that node.

This is the position that indirect realists argue against. — Michael

None of which says that our brains are literally coloured - that the property in the object must be manifest in the brain.

Our modern scientific understanding of the world, along with the arguments from hallucination and illusion, have shown that the naive realist conception of colour (and other) experience as described above is untenable. — Michael

They really haven't, but my attempts to show that have come to naught if you're just back here again.

The brain does not always predict the stet of external nodes correctly. That doesn't mean it does not attempt to do so, nor does it mean we can't ascribe the properties we predict to those external nodes. We are just sometimes wrong.

whether or not we should describe perception as "seeing representations" or "seeing the external world stimulus" is an irrelevant issue of semantics. It's like arguing over whether we feel pain or feel the fire. — Michael

So it's a crucial issue of semantics. Should the psychology admit internal representations, as well as external representations and internal brain shivers?

So it's a crucial issue of semantics. Should the psychology admit internal representations, as well as external representations and internal brain shivers? — bongo fury

I think it’s a non-issue. I feel pain. I feel the fire. Both are correct ways of talking. The painting is made of paint. The painting is of a woman. Both are correct ways of talking. I speak into my phone’s microphone. I talk to my parents over the phone. Both are correct ways of talking.

And I've mentioned before that I don't really like the word "representation". Pain isn't a representation of fire, it's just a consequence of that kind of stimulation. The same with smells and tastes and images.

The Direct Realist agrees that pain doesn't exist external to the senses of any perceiver, but argues that the colour red does.

How does the Direct Realist explain, given that all their knowledge of the world external to their senses comes through their senses, how the perceiver knows that one perception is not direct, eg, pain, but another perception is direct, eg, the colour red ?

Simply declaring it doesn't have anything to do with subsequent activity is begging the question. I'm claiming it does. I'm saying that, since we don't have any locus for a 'representation' of red (and yet 'red is meaningful, as in the ripe berry), our best theory is that it is our response that constitutes 'red' (our reaching for the word, our eating the ripe berry, our categorising according to our culture's rules...), and that absent of any of these responses, there's no 'seeing red' going on at all.

You counter that you think you see red without any response at all, and that because you think it, it must be true. — Isaac

I can see without any overt response recognisable by other people who might be around. I am quite capable of sitting still, saying nothing, and seeing the objects in front of me. It just isn’t the case that I’m blind, or that nothing I see is coloured, unless I do or say something.

If you can't accept this then our fundamental viewpoints are so diametrically opposed that we're never going to agree.

I counter that we don't have an apparent mechanism, nor locus for such a thing and looking at the way the brain works doesn't seem to allow that (it seems to go straight from modelling aspects (likes shade and edge) to responses (like speech and endocrine system reactions).

Then what’s this and this?

I can see without any overt response recognisable by other people who might be around. — Michael

I didn't limit the description to overt responses.

Then what’s this and this? — Michael

They are both parts of the brain typically responding to external stimuli and outputting responses related to colour. I can absolutely assure you 100% that none of those regions merely sit in some 'state' that equates to an 'experience of red'. Every single region, every neuron, is just firing or not, each passing a signal on or not. No where is there a state of affairs which some other part of the brain can detect as being 'an experience of red'.

Observation is important to science, but it's a social process which produces knowledge rather than a methodology. The methods get developed along with the knowledge — Moliere

:up:

I didn't limit the description to overt responses. — Isaac

Then what covert response counts as seeing red? Perhaps the firing of certain neurons?

No where is there a state of affairs which some other part of the brain can detect as being 'an experience of red'. — Isaac

I’m not suggesting that. I’m suggesting that seeing red just is the firing of certain neurons as a response to external stimulation, comparable to feeling pain just being the firing of certain neurons as a response to external stimulation.

The Direct Realist agrees that pain doesn't exist external to the senses of any perceiver, but argues that the colour red does. — RussellA

I might be more in the direct realist camp, so I'll try to answer this. We need not assume in the first place that we are trapped behind a wall of sensations. This methodological solipsism is unjustified, in my view. Concepts are public. They exists within a system of norms for their application. This is why bots can talk sensibly about pain and color. How long, if not already, will it be impossible to sort flesh from silicon in a text conversation ? They have internalized the norms of concept application by reading more than any human has ever been able too. There is structure in the record of what we've said.

Just because we need our eyes to see doesn't mean that we are trapped behind them, looking at a screen. We are also not down in a submarine, peeking through a periscope. The 'I' that makes claims is not some tiny man in the pineal gland but rather a 'virtual', normative entity in a social space.

Here is perhaps Kant’s deepest and most original idea, the axis around which I see all of his thought as revolving. What distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. Judging and acting involve commitments. They are endorsements, exercises of authority. Responsibility, commitment, endorsement, authority—these are all normative notions. Judgments and actions make knowers and agents liable to characteristic kinds of normative assessment. Kant’s most basic idea is that minded creatures are to be distinguished from un-minded ones not by a matter-of-fact ontological distinction (the presence of mind-stuff), but by a normative deontological one. This is his normative characterization of the mental.

...

This master idea has some of Kant’s most characteristic innovations as relatively immediate consequences. The logical tradition that understood judging as predicating did so as part of an order of semantic explanation that starts with concepts or terms, particular and general, advances on that basis to an understanding of judgements (judgeables) as applications of general to particular terms, and builds on that basis an account of inferences or consequences, construed syllogistically in terms of the sort of predication or classification exhibited by the judgments that appear as premises and conclusions. In a radical break with this tradition, Kant takes the whole judgment to be the conceptually and explanatorily basic unit at once of meaning, cognition, awareness, and experience. Concepts and their contents are to be understood only in terms of the contribution they make to judgments: concepts are functions of judgment. Kant adopts this semantic order of explanation because judgments are the minimal units of responsibility—the smallest semantic items that can express commitments. The semantic primacy of the propositional is a consequence of the central role he accords to the normative significance of our conceptually articulated doings. In Frege this thought shows up as the claim that judgeable contents are the smallest units to which pragmatic force can attach: paradigmatically, assertional force. In the later Wittgenstein, it shows up as the claim that sentences are the smallest linguistic units with which one can make a move in the language game. — Brandom

So we should think of 'red' and 'pain' as not meaningful in themselves but only as part of claims made by selves conceived as responsible agents with a community that keeps score.

.

So, "faulty" or not, an indirect perception of the world is all the reality we can have. A subjective one. — Alkis Piskas

Respectfully, if you are trapped in a subjective perception of the world, how can you so boldly assert that others are in the same position ? How can you see their means of perception ? Is it safe to assume that your logic is valid for others ? Is there just one logic ? Is there even just one world ? How could one check ? Am I possibly just a figment of your imagination ?

My point is that subjectivist assumptions, laudably cautious in their intentions, still end up assuming the world without realizing it. Moreover there is the assumption of similar nervous systems, a universally authoritative logic, a shared space that one can still somehow comment on: "All the reality we can have is a subjective one." How can you use we here ? Why not the more careful and modest "I can only have a subjective perception of the world." But that's just grammar ?

Then what covert response counts as seeing red? — Michael

As I said, it's not one single response. It is one of a number which accurately respond to the state of the external node. Anything which doesn't is either wrong or irrelevant.

I’m suggesting that seeing red just is the firing of certain neurons as a response to external stimulation, comparable to feeling pain just being the firing of certain neurons as a response to external stimulation. — Michael

Great. That's a really good, clear point to have as a point of agreement.

Now. When neurons within the nociceptive system fire and produce responses we call 'pain' those responses have effects on, for example, the endocrine system which prepare the body for a response to the trauma that nociceptive system has estimated exists. If it makes a mistake, then the pain response was an error, it will attempt to correct that error. This model fits with the general evolutionary model of how the features of the brain evolved - response to environmental stimuli to reduce surprise, to better ensure self-sustainment of the information system.

'Pain' is a term we use for the interocepted detection of one of four main types of response to stimuli, it's detected post hoc (things like heart rate, cytokine release, even external visual and auditory stimuli). It's purpose is obvious to avoid the noxious element at the nociceptor dendrite.

To suggest that colour is like this would require;

a) the V4 and V01 regions release endocrine responses which prime other cells to propagate state changes (they don't)
b) there to be a separate system of interoceptive neurons which detect the state of the V4 and V01 regions other than the ventral and dorsal streams of neural network connections which constitute the response to colour (there isn't)
c) there to be some 'preparatory state' response to a ripe berry (as opposed to an unripe one) other than the stimulation of the regions involved in the response to the estimated ripeness of the berry (again, there isn't)
d) there to be some evolutionary advantage to having such a state other than the actual ventral stream response to identifying the ripe berry (feel free to suggest one - evolutionary theory is just storytelling)

Colour detection is not like pain. The output of the V4 and V01 regions goes directly into systems which model the environment and determine a response to it. The response of those regions to their respective stimuli is absolutely no different in character to the response of earlier regions detecting edge, or light intensity. Nor later regions assigning object definitions and associations. They are all trying to estimate the state of some external node. To exactly the same extent that we can say that external node is 'square' we can say it is 'green'. Both are just ways of describing our estimating its state in ways which dictate appropriate responses.

They are all trying to estimate the state of some external node. To exactly the same extent that we can say that external node is 'square' we can say it is 'green'. Both are just ways of describing our estimating its state in ways which dictate appropriate responses. — Isaac

What’s the actual physics of this? What mechanical process counts as “estimating external states”? Obviously you don’t believe in anything like an immaterial mind, so I assume that you believe that everything is a physical event?

I would say that “estimating external states” is itself just the firing of certain neurons.

So what all perception reduces to is an external stimulus influencing sense receptors which in turn trigger the firing of certain neurons and then sometimes a bodily response. That is perception at its most fundamental.

But given the mostly deterministic nature of such physical processes (I say mostly because at the quantum scale it is stochastic) it doesn’t make much sense to describe the firing of certain neurons or its response as being correct or incorrect. One can only say that it’s adaptive or maladaptive. But with this it really makes no sense to talk about seeing the world “as it is”. There’s just neurons firing in a useful way, and it’s not a given that there’s just one useful way for neurons to fire in any given situation.