What does it mean for you to be convinced that you saw a gold dress ? — plaque flag
The direct realist claims that talk about the tree is actually about that tree — plaque flag
Only that our perceptions tell us about the real. They are directly connected to the real, in some relation. Because they are directly connected to the real we can utilize them to come to understand the real better. — Moliere
Exactly! That's what it means! — Moliere
Which means what? What does it mean for a perception to be "directly connected" to the real? — Michael
"directly connected" I'd say means there is no more than one relationship between a perceiver and a percipient. — Moliere
we know that there is an apple, that the apple reflects light, that the light stimulates the rods and cones in our eyes, that the rods and cones in our eyes send electrical signals along the optic nerve to the thalamus, and that the thalamus sends electrical signals to the occipital cortex, generating a conscious visual experience. — Michael
The chains come later and depend upon us being able to access reality to be able to say — Moliere
Direct realists argued that we can trust that perception informs us about what the world is like because the world and its nature presents itself in experience. Indirect realists argued that we can't trust that perception informs us about what the world is like because experience is, at best, representative of the world and its nature. — Michael
Try starting with the problem of perception and epistemological problems of perception. — Michael
The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like for a subject to undergo it (Nagel (1974)). Our ordinary conception of perceptual experience emerges from first-personal reflection on its character, rather than from scientific investigation; it is a conception of experience from a “purely phenomenological point of view” (Broad 1952: 3–4).
I really don't understand why you keep talking about language. It just has nothing to do with it at all. — Michael
Direct realism is a position regarding the nature of perception, not conversation. — Michael
Intuition and concepts … constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. Thoughts without [intensional] content (Inhalt) are empty (leer), intuitions without concepts are blind (blind). It is, therefore, just as necessary to make the mind’s concepts sensible—that is, to add an object to them in intuition—as to make our intuitions understandable—that is, to bring them under concepts. These two powers, or capacities, cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only from their unification can cognition arise.
I just noticed you have a transformer symbol as your avatar. Electronic engineer? — frank
I want to float an idea -- What if both experiences of the dress are Directly real? The direct realist is willing to sacrifice the old pedagogical explanation of the law of non-contradiction "Nothing can be black and white all over". Here we have a reason to believe that the dress is black, blue, white, and gold. — Moliere
I can see things without saying anything. — Michael
To perceive a dog as such is already linguistic. — plaque flag
I've noticed that people on TPF sometimes say things like "perception can't be linguistic because I can see things without saying anything," or "language cannot be social because if I were stranded on a desert island I'd still be able to talk and read." In these cases I wonder if they're making a solid point that I'm just not getting, or if they simply don't understand what we mean. — Jamal
:up:In these cases I wonder if they're making a solid point that I'm just not getting, or if they simply don't understand what we mean. — Jamal
"perception can't be linguistic because I can see things without saying anything," — Jamal's example objection 1
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all... — Ari
"language cannot be social because if I were stranded on a desert island I'd still be able to talk and read." — Jamal's example objection 2
I've noticed that people on TPF sometimes say things like "perception can't be linguistic because I can see things without saying anything," or "language cannot be social because if I were stranded on a desert island I'd still be able to talk and read." In these cases I wonder if they're making a solid point that I'm just not getting, or if they simply don't understand what we mean. — Jamal
I guess I should have clarified. It's about human perception. The idea is that in perceiving, a human cannot help but be linguistic. Both we and dogs perceive, but our perception is inextricably linked to our concepts and thereby to language. — Jamal
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