This is obfuscating. What do you mean we don't "know" this? — schopenhauer1

Like I said, semantic problem. You can check out my 'the being of meaning' thread for more, if you are curious.

I can talk the usual sloppy talk in ordinary life, but I think Hegel and Heideggar are right. There's a blurry average intelligibility that mostly doesn't notice its lack of grip. One emits the usual platitudes, appeals to the obvious, without hearing that one's thinking is being done for one, by one [ das Man ].

Philosophy makes darkness visible, drags ignorance into the light, wakes up the marching zombie.

We say it does because it matters that our babies get milk and are kept warm. We also love puppies and squirrels. — plaque flag

Yes animals with a first person perspective, but of anything else? Photosynthesis?

Like I said, semantic problem. You can check out my 'the being of meaning' thread for more, if you are curious.

I can talk the usual sloppy talk in ordinary life, but I think Hegel and Heideggar are right. There's a blurry average intelligibility that mostly doesn't notice its lack of grip. One emits the usual platitudes, appeals to the obvious, without hearing that one's thinking is being done for one, by one [ das Man ].

Philosophy makes darkness visible, drags ignorance into the light, wakes up the marching zombie. — plaque flag

Not sure why this is a bigger deal. We usually say that some things can sense and be aware of things and some things can't. You disagree? On a sort of panpsychist ground? Or if not, how?

Yes animals with a first person perspective, but of anything else? Photosynthesis? — schopenhauer1

This is an empirical question. Some humans nurture plants and beetles. Few if any nurture rocks.

We usually say that some things can sense and be aware of things and some things can't. You disagree? — schopenhauer1

No. I don't disagree. I just don't think we know very well what we mean.

This is an empirical question. Some humans nurture plants and beetles. Few if any nurture rocks. — plaque flag

Humans do, because the feel something towards those plants. The plants don't feel something though. Or are you saying they do besides the events of reproduction and homeostasis, which isn't feeling.

The plants don't feel something though. — schopenhauer1

I don't know what it means to say so. Yes, I can talk the usual fuzzy talk. That's why I say look to deeds. We incinerate the dead, anesthetize the living for root canals.

No. I don't disagree. I just don't think we know very well what we mean. — plaque flag

You'd have to explain how we don't know very well what we mean. Examples or something of the sort.

I don't know what it means to say so. Yes, I can talk the usual fuzzy talk. That's why I say look to deeds. We incinerate the dead, anesthetize the living for root canals. — plaque flag

But we don't incinerate the living (or we shouldn't) and anesthetize the dead :smile:.

But we don't incinerate the living (or we shouldn't) and anesthetize the dead — schopenhauer1

Sure !
But the use of 'but' doesn't make sense here, because you are merely expanding my point.

Sure !
But the use of 'but' doesn't make sense here, because you are merely expanding my point. — plaque flag

And thus simply reproducing and homeostasis can't be the dividing line of what matters as that is misapplying. Rather, feeling or awareness, etc. And here, I can agree that we have fuzzy words. Sensation, "what-it's-like-ness". This would be misapplied perhaps to non-animals, even living things, as much as our heart goes out to the little buggers (because it matters to us). It may even be misapplied to uni-cellular and very primitive animals. At that point, what is simply events eventing (behaviors all the way down), and what is "feels-likeness"?

what is simply events eventing (behaviors all the way down), and what is "feels-likeness"? — schopenhauer1

The boundary is rough, uncertain, controversial.

I grant you that it's only things that give a damn that can have problems (and tentatively project giving a damn with all its problems on other things.)

The nexus between an object being bombarded by effects of the universe and and an object being bombarded by effects that matters is consciousness. — schopenhauer1

I've been attending a couple of online Q&A's by Evan Thompson, who's a philosopher and phenomenologist, one of the co-authors of the influential book The Embodied Mind. He is exploring 'biopsychism' - the question of whether all life is sentient. One of his other books is Mind in Life.

He has a paper suggesting that qualia - broadly speaking, knowledge of good and bad - comes into existence with any form of living organism. There's nothing good or bad in chemistry or physics - stuff just happens. But as soon as there's a living organism, even the most rudimentary, then that organism has to navigate away from what harms and towards what helps. So the emergence of sentient life-forms is the emergence of a dimension of being that is not possible in the inorganic domain.

The video is here. The paper is linked in the description. (Yet another hour-long youtube video, of which there are now millions :yikes: )

He has a paper suggesting that qualia - broadly speaking, knowledge of good and bad - comes into existence with any form of living organism. There's nothing good or bad in chemistry or physics - stuff just happens. But as soon as there's a living organism, even the most rudimentary, then that organism has to navigate away from what harms and towards what helps. So the emergence of sentient life-forms is the emergence of a dimension of being that is not possible in the inorganic domain. — Wayfarer

Very good, this is why I was arguing in some other thread, that 'judgement' is fundamental to living systems. This perspective gives us a different way of looking at the reality of free will.

It totally makes sense that life responds differentially and can (must ? ) be interpreted as seeking and avoiding.

But qualia are slippery eels.

But qualia are slippery eels. — plaque flag

I've noticed that the term is only ever used in discussions connected to a particular clique of American academic philosophers - the usual suspects of Dennett/Churchlands/Rosenberg - who, I think, introduced it to be able to argue the case on their own terms in terms of an obscure piece of specialised jargon. (You would never encounter it in daily speech, or general literature.)

But the way to simplify it, is to think of it simply as 'quality' - being or consciousness has a qualitative dimension (Chalmer's awkward phrase 'what-it-is-like-ness'). This brings to mind the book Zen and the Art of Motorcyle Maintenance, by Robert M Pirsig, which has a lot to say about 'the metaphysics of quality'. I asked our friendly bot to summarize that for us:

In Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, Pirsig distinguishes between two modes of understanding the world: the classic and the romantic. The classic mode of understanding is based on the rational and analytical approach of traditional philosophy, while the romantic mode is based on intuition and direct experience. According to Pirsig, these two modes of understanding are not mutually exclusive, but rather complementary, and he believes that they can be integrated through a metaphysics of quality.

Pirsig sees quality as a kind of objective reality that is independent of subjective perceptions or preferences, and that is inherent in all things. He believes that the pursuit of quality is what gives meaning and purpose to human existence, and that it is the key to a fulfilling and satisfying life. The metaphysics of quality that Pirsig proposes is an attempt to reconcile the classical and romantic modes of understanding by recognizing the importance of both reason and intuition in the pursuit of quality. — ChatGPT

Now, notice how this stands against David Hume's original formulation of the 'is/ought problem' which articulates the problem of how to derive the qualitative 'ought' from the quantitative 'is'. And around that, revolves one of the principle problems of modern ethics. This is the tip of a large iceberg so I won't elaborate it here.

It totally makes sense that life responds differentially and can (must ? ) be interpreted as seeking and avoiding.

But qualia are slippery eels. — plaque flag

To distinguish between what is to be sought, and what is to be avoided, is to make a distinction of kind, which is to categorize, and this is a qualia based judgement.

:up:

while the romantic mode is based on intuition and direct experience. — ChatGPT

In careful, technical conversation, it's hard to make sense of qualia. It's hard to even point out the logical difficultly to people, because our ordinary way of talking obscures the issue. This is the Motte and Bailey confusion as explored by Ryle. So people don't 'get' Wittgenstein's point. There is 'obviously' something like 'direct experience.' One says so and one agrees. Of course. But not of course. The problem of the meaning of such signs is overlooked. One has bills to pay, places to be, more visceral myths to elaborate, something juicier to chew on.

To distinguish between what is to be sought, and what is to be avoided, is to make a distinction of kind, which is to categorize, and this is a qualia based judgement. — Metaphysician Undercover

I say : so you assume. So you happen to interpret, projecting expired metaphysics on our fellow mammals. <smile>

Even thermostats respond differentially, categorize. Check Sellars maybe on what it might mean to really apply a concept and not just react to the presence of X.

So it's hard to call the universe an organism, because it has no environment. Life climbs a ladder. It 'shits' more disorder than it creates. — plaque flag

Things tend to fall apart, but here we are, strange primates, increasing in complexity, godlike cyborgs, now creating synthetic brains better than our own. Even from the outside, we are not [just] drifting spacerock. — plaque flag

We can take an external view and look at patterns that stubbornly resist being erased. The pattern doesn't 'want' to die. — plaque flag

Philosophy makes darkness visible, drags ignorance into the light, wakes up the marching zombie. — plaque flag

qualia are slippery eels. — plaque flag

:fire: :100: I'm jazzed by the way you dance!

As I discern things, there is no "hard problem" for scientists, just another hard confusion that semantically bewitches philosophers.

@schopenhauer1

Thank you for the kind words ! Especially from you they are valued.

As I discern things, there is no "hard problem" for scientists, just another hard confusion that semantically bewitches philosophers. — 180 Proof

I agree. But what do you make of 'wondering at a tautology' ? Do you see/feel why this confusion is tempting ? I love music. Feeling is first in some sense, but feeling is also senseless or aconceptual, but that too is nonsense. See what I mean ? Have you wrestled with this eel ?

I like the addition of [ just ] to 'drifting spacerock.' Well played.

But what do you make of 'wondering at a tautology'? — plaque flag

More context plesse.

Do you see/feel why this confusion is tempting?

I suspect you agree with Freddy ...

But there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything. — On the Genealogy of Morals

Philosophers, more than most, are 'bewitched by language', no?

Thank you for the kind words ! Especially from you they are valued.

Well played.

:cool:

More context plesse. — 180 Proof

Sure. A bouquet of W quotes:

It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists.
...
The experience that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not experience.

To say 'I wonder at such and such being the case' has only sense if I can imagine it not to be the case. In this sense one can wonder at the existence of, say, a house when one sees it and has not visited it for a long time and has imagined that it had been pulled down in the meantime. But it is nonsense to say that I wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot imagine it not existing. I could of course wonder at the world round me being as it is. If for instance I had this experience while looking into the blue sky, I could wonder at the sky being blue as opposed to the case when it's clouded. But that's not what I mean. I am wondering at the sky being whatever it is. One might be tempted to say that what I am wondering at is a tautology, namely at the sky being blue or not blue. But then it's just nonsense to say that one is wondering at a tautology.

I suspect you agree with Freddy ...

But there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer" is merely a fiction added to the deed – the deed is everything.
— On the Genealogy of Morals — 180 Proof

Yes. The doer is a fiction, so even 'deed' is no longer the right word. But taking phrases as tools, as flags being waved, screwdrivers being twisted, I answer yes.

Doers are fictional / conventional (essentially social) foci of responsibility.

Philosophers, more than most, are 'bewitched by language', no? — 180 Proof

Oh that's a tough one.

Yes, if we focus on how useless these philosophers are, how much fun they have splashing around in their confusion. Regular folks (almost by definition) just use the usual word tools in the usual ways.
No, if we acknowledge how much better a strong philosopher is at 'hearing' the hollowness of ordinary usage.

A good philosopher might be defined in terms of an extreme sensitivity to semantic and inferential norms. But we got to make room for Nietzsche: strong philosophers are possessed. They think because they feel the world differently. I love John Coltrane. I can think of a chain of words from a beloved philosopher as another kind of music that moves through time. (Hobbes' chapter 'Of Man' is like this for me.)

What do I make of "wondering at a tautology" in this thread? Well, for a start, that p-zombies are tautologies and subjective beings are contradictions ...

Doers are fictional / conventional (essentially social) foci of responsibility. — plaque flag

:up:

p-zombies are tautologies and subjective beings are contradictions ... — 180 Proof

Could you elaborate on the bold part ? I think I grasp the underlined part.

Like tautologies, 'p-zombiies' are devoid of content. They are merely there (à la Chinese Rooms).

Like tautologies, 'p-zombiies' are devoid of content. They are merely there (à la Chinese Rooms). — 180 Proof

Correct me if I'm wrong. Folks can't say what p-zombies are supposed to lack. The consciousness we can talk about is 'material' in the sense that we have public criteria for its application.

Imagine a native English speaker who knows no Chinese locked in a room full of boxes of Chinese symbols (a data base) together with a book of instructions for manipulating the symbols (the program). Imagine that people outside the room send in other Chinese symbols which, unknown to the person in the room, are questions in Chinese (the input). And imagine that by following the instructions in the program the man in the room is able to pass out Chinese symbols which are correct answers to the questions (the output). The program enables the person in the room to pass the Turing Test for understanding Chinese but he does not understand a word of Chinese.

Searle / Sarl
...if the man in the room does not understand Chinese on the basis of implementing the appropriate program for understanding Chinese then neither does any other digital computer solely on that basis because no computer, qua computer, has anything the man does not have...

Clearly the human in this case is the relatively stupid meatbot while instruction book hosts / performs most of the intelligence. It's weird that Sarl thought this proved that computers don't 'really' think. This is maybe the problem of the meaning(lessness) of being again in the more typical first-person register (which dilutes it by taking too much for granted.) 'Thrusting against the limits of language. '

You might like this:

folly -
folly for to -
for to -
what is the word -
folly from this -
all this -
folly from all this -
given -
folly given all this -
seeing -
folly seeing all this -
this -
what is the word -
this this -
this this here -
all this this here -
folly given all this -
seeing -
folly seeing all this this here -
for to -
what is the word -
see -
glimpse -
seem to glimpse -
need to seem to glimpse -
folly for to need to seem to glimpse -
what -
what is the word -
and where -
folly for to need to seem to glimpse what where -
where -
what is the word -
there -
over there -
away over there -
afar -
afar away over there -
afaint -
afaint afar away over there what -
what -
what is the word -
seeing all this -
all this this -
all this this here -
folly for to see what -
glimpse -
seem to glimpse -
need to seem to glimpse -
afaint afar away over there what -
folly for to need to seem to glimpse afaint afar away over there what -
what -
what is the word -
what is the word

http://www.samuel-beckett.net/whatistheword.html