Why isn't math also just brain activity ? 'Appearance,' image, etc.

Why isn't math also just brain activity ? — plaque flag

I suppose it is. I'm not a Platonist.

You said your hand is really something like strings from string theory. Is that correct ? — plaque flag

If superstring theory is correct.

I think the entities within the scientific image exist at the same time and in the same world as roses and promises and concepts.

If superstring theory is correct. — Michael

But string theory is just math. It's something in consciousness like redness.

I think the entities within the scientific image exist at the same time and in the same world as roses and promises and concepts. — plaque flag

That's fine. I'm just saying that colours, like pain, are a type of brain activity, not a property of apples. They're still real. They're just not what naive realists think they are.

I say 'in consciousness' as if from your point of view.

But string theory is just math. It's something in consciousness like redness. — plaque flag

I think you're being pedantic here. If string theory is correct then the entities that the theory describes – superstring – are the constituents of all material things. Just as if the theory of gravity is correct then the force that the theory describes – gravity – is the thing responsible for objects falling to the ground.

I'm just saying that colours, like pain, are a type of brain activity, not a property of apples. — Michael

I understand why you would say that. I'm just saying that it's artificial to call color unreal and yet keep shape or mass. Kant went the whole hog and said the Real was utterly unknowable, because he saw (in my opinion) that there was no good reason to keep just half the apple.

If all we ever have is Image, then all of our math scribbles and concepts are just image too. To say that your hand is 'really' strings is not far from painting the apple red.

So there's Kant : the Real is hidden. Everything else is Image.
You : the scientific image is Real, but Experience is Image.
Me : We see and talk about the Real, which doesn't mean we can't be mistaken.

My gripe is that string theory is part of Experience, hence just Image, so it's weird to say it's also the Real, because that's like half direct realism. Somehow our mathbrain is directly in touch with the Real but not our eyes...

I'm just saying that it's artificial to call color unreal — plaque flag

I'm not saying that.

I think you're being pedantic here. If string theory is correct then the entities that the theory describes – superstring – are the constituents of all material things. — Michael

Semantic not pedantic. The scientific image is just that, an image, a model. But you seem to say that the map is the territory. That atoms are really there but color is not --- as if our nervous systems weren't giving you the idea of atoms indirectly like everything else (according to your theory.)

I understand that.

Are there trees inside the blind person's head that they can see only after activating the biological machinery? If so, then all that is required for seeing trees is activating the biological machinery.

I'm not saying that. — Michael

You think color is just in our head, right ?

Semantic not pedantic. The scientific image is just that, an image, a model. But you seem to say that the map is the territory. That atoms are really there but color is not --- as if our nervous systems weren't giving you the idea of atoms indirectly like everything else (according to your theory.) — plaque flag

I'm a scientific realist, not a scientific instrumentalist, if that's what you're getting at.

You think color is just in our head, right ? — plaque flag

Colour is a type of brain activity. Brain activity is real. Therefore, colour is real.
Pain is a type of brain activity. Brain activity is real. Therefore, pain is real.

Apples don't have pain-properties. Trees don't have colour-properties. Fire doesn't have the property of being wet.

I'm a scientific realist, not a scientific instrumentalist, if that's what you're getting at. — Michael

I get that. But what can the scientific realist mean ? Indirect realism looks like dualism, so why does math get to poke through the veil of images ?

Math is a type of brain activity. Brain activity is real. Therefore, math is real.
Apples don't have math-properties.

But what can the scientific realist mean — plaque flag

That the entities described by our scientific models are real and discovered rather than just instrumentally useful fictions.

As I said before, if you argue for scientific instrumentalism over scientific realism then you might as well abandon direct realism and just be an idealist (or a transcendental idealist à la Kant).

Are apples real ?

Yes

That the entities described by our scientific models are real and discovered rather than just instrumentally useful fictions. — Michael

I know that. I mean the claim is indeterminate in the context of dualism. I've studied some physics. It's a bunch of math and abstract concepts.

The issue is that you call everything brain activity except math and physics concepts, not explaining why this stuff is truly real but color and smell isn't. I understand there are pragmatic reasons for caring about one aspect of an object rather than another. But I don't see the metaphysical justification for letting math off the hook here.

Personally I think your hand is made of atoms and has a color. But I'm not a dualist. Color is a normative concept, not a immaterial experience in my view. A blind person could infer that an apple is read or that it weighs 230 grams or that it's radioactive from sitting in a bucket of uranium.

The issue is that you call everything brain activity — plaque flag

No I don't. I claim that the sensations which constitute conscious experience are brain activity. We know this from the fact that we can stimulate the appropriate areas of the brain, such as the occipital lobe, and the subject will see shapes and colours in response to this stimulation.

No I don't. — Michael

Isn't indirect realism about a mediating image or consciousness which is not the Real itself ? Presumably created by the nervous system ?

So you agree that math is brain activity, but you say that your hand is strings (or some entity of that kind.) To me this is like saying your hand is math.

Isn't indirect realism about a mediating image or consciousness which is not the Real itself ? Presumably created by the nervous system ? — plaque flag

Sensation is the mediation. I am directly aware of feeling pain, which is a sensation, and in being directly aware of that pain I am indirectly aware of my hand being in the fire. I am directly aware of feeling cold, which is a sensation, and in being directly aware of that cold I am indirectly aware of the Arctic air surrounding me. I am directly aware of seeing red, which is a sensation, and in being directly aware of that red I am indirectly aware of the apple on the table.

Sensation is the mediation. — Michael

Yes. Which is basically dualism, it seems to me. You experience sensation which you refer to (which represents or mediates) some forever hidden real.

Which is basically dualism, it seems to me. — plaque flag

No, because I'm saying that sensation is a type of brain activity. In the case of visual sensation, that brain activity involves the primary visual cortex.

No, because I'm saying that sensation is a type of brain activity. In the case of visual sensation, that brain activity involves the primary visual cortex. — Michael

Indirect realism has (1) images and (2) reality itself, right ?

https://iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/
When I look at the coffee cup there is not a material candidate for the yellow object at which I am looking. Crudely: there is nothing in the brain that is yellow. Sense data, then, do not seem to be acceptable on a materialist account of the mind, and thus, the yellow object that I am now perceiving must be located not in the material world but in the immaterial mind. Indirect realism is committed to a dualist picture within which there is an ontology of non-physical objects alongside that of the physical.

Indirect realism has (1) images and (2) reality itself, right ? — plaque flag

Indirect realism is committed to a dualist picture within which there is an ontology of non-physical objects alongside that of the physical. — plaque flag

If there are non-physical objects then they are as much a part of reality as the physical is.

Indirect realism is committed to a dualist picture within which there is an ontology of non-physical objects alongside that of the physical. — plaque flag

I don't think it's committed to this. It's committed to a picture within which there are sensations, which are restricted to the brain, and things like apples and chairs. Many indirect realists may also be dualists and believe that sensations are non-physical, but that's not necessary. I'm explaining a non-dualistic indirect realism. I am simply arguing that colours are of the same kind of thing as pain; a type of brain activity, not a property of apples.

Do you believe in consciousness ?

Do you believe in consciousness ? — plaque flag

Of course.