Okay. Then seeing red does require things outside the head.

Okay. Then seeing red does require things outside the head. — creativesoul

It doesn't require it. It's just how it usually works. It only requires the activation of the appropriate parts of the occipital lobe.

The evolution of seeing red...

You used "activation". I think it's better put as a "reactivation". The difference is one of evolutionary explanation of seeing red. There's no way to check, but I think it's much safer to claim that we could not induce seeing red for the first time with someone who was in the complete dark, had never seen red before, using only the means you're suggesting are required.

I think it's much safer to claim that we could not induce seeing red for the first time with someone who was in the complete dark, had never seen red before, using only the means you're suggesting are required. — creativesoul

Why not? If electromagnetic radiation stimulating the rods and cones in someone's eyes can cause them to see red for the first time then why can't we (with a sufficiently advanced technology) do this artificially? Is there something unique about the electrical signals sent by the photoreceptors such that we cannot in principle replicate them?

In fact we're trying to do exactly that to enable the blind to see.

"Electromagnetic radiation stimulating the photoreceptors can cause someone to see red for the first time" is a gross oversimplification.

Philosophy is often a serious kind of poetry. Yes, we like inferences. But metaphors do much of the lifting. — plaque flag

It is true that "The world is all that is the case", but is this the world of Indirect or Direct Realism.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein studiously avoids addressing this question.

In fact we're trying to do exactly that to enable the blind to see. — Michael

Good luck in the absence of red things outside the head to play a role.

Epicurus' ontology is difficult to puzzle through. The relevant excerpt, I believe:

Further, the whole of being consists of bodies and space. For the existence of bodies is everywhere attested by sense itself, and it is upon sensation that reason must rely when it attempts to infer the unknown from the known. And if there were no space (which we call also void and place and intangible nature), bodies would have nothing in which to be and through which to move, as they are plainly seen to move. Beyond bodies and space there is nothing which by mental apprehension or on its analogy we can conceive to exist. When we speak of bodies and space, both are regarded as wholes or separate things, not as the properties or accidents of separate things.

Again, of bodies some are composite, others the elements of which these composite bodies are made. These elements are indivisible and unchangeable, and necessarily so, if things are not all to be destroyed and pass into non-existence, but are to be strong enough to endure when the composite bodies are broken up, because they possess, a solid nature and are incapable of being anywhere or anyhow dissolved. It follows that the first beginnings must be indivisible, corporeal entities.

Mostly noting the similarity between bodies and space, and everything is some small one-dimensional entity traveling through a multitude of dimensions (as the pop accounts would have it --I don't claim to understand such stuff)

For Epicurus he thought there were very fine atoms which made the mind -- so the mind was a composite of atoms, which isn't too far off from the mind being a composite of neurons.

Later:

We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we see their shapes and think of them. For external things would not stamp on us their own nature of color and form through the medium of the air which is between them and use or by means of rays of light or currents of any sort going from us to them, so well as by the entrance into our eyes or minds, to whichever their size is suitable, of certain films coming from the things themselves, these films or outlines being of the same color and shape as the external things themselves. They move with rapid motion; and this again explains why they present the appearance of the single continuous object, and retain the mutual interconnection which they had in the object, when they impinge upon the sense, such impact being due to the oscillation of the atoms in the interior of the solid object from which they come. And whatever presentation we derive by direct contact, whether it be with the mind or with the sense-organs, be it shape that is presented or other properties, this shape as presented is the shape of the solid thing, and it is due either to a close coherence of the image as a whole or to a mere remnant of its parts. Falsehood and error always depend upon the intrusion of opinion when a fact awaits confirmation or the absence of contradiction, which fact is afterwards frequently not confirmed or even contradicted following a certain movement in ourselves connected with, but distinct from, the mental picture presented—which is the cause of error.

For the presentations which, for example, are received in a picture or arise in dreams, or from any other form of apprehension by the mind or by the other criteria of truth, would never have resembled what we call the real and true things, had it not been for certain actual things of the kind with which we come in contact. Error would not have occurred, if we had not experienced some other movement in ourselves, conjoined with, but distinct from, the perception of what is presented. And from this movement, if it be not confirmed or be contradicted, falsehood results; while, if it be confirmed or not contradicted, truth results.

And to this view we must closely adhere, if we are not to repudiate the criteria founded on the clear evidence of sense, nor again to throw all these things into confusion by maintaining falsehood as if it were truth.

A fair interpretation of this translation is that Epicurus is a direct realist, in the sense that our perceptions and senses are directly connected to or apprehend real objects outside of the activity of the brain.

Nothing quite like bundles of properties, though, as I understand that. So different than your distinction where there are different properties, or maybe kinds of properties? Like a property-dualism?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Particle_in_a_box

That's the highest I went in terms of classes in physics. Very fascinating stuff.

What I found in reflection is that none of the sentences in QM meant something like what I might mean when I'm talking about anything in my life, such as "I went to physical chemistry class today".

Further, QM equations of systems more complicated than hydrogen using this model are not analytically solvable. So there'd be no necessary relation, at least, between these absurdly complicated systems (when we consider them expressed in scientific physical terms) and, say, me walking to physical chemistry class, or my memory of walking to physical chemistry class.

And lastly, absolutely no one really understood all this stuff in their day to day life. So while it's fascinating and reveals unexpected things about reality, it surely can't be the case that it is all there is to reality because we have to grasp reality well enough to have survived this far.

Not so much a refutation as sharing why I am doubtful of scientific realism.

It is true that "The world is all that is the case", but is this the world of Indirect or Direct Realism.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein studiously avoids addressing this question. — RussellA

The world is whatever we as philosophers are talking about.

'Deeper' than this or that contingent metaphysical thesis is the necessary or 'primordial' structure of philosophers articulating how it is whatever is the case.

The philosopher's intention to articulate the truth is intrinsically social and worldly in a strategically indeterminate sense. The details are what we philosopher's debate, and we can expect claims to be abandoned, revised, synthesized. Wittgenstein is trying to dig deeper, say something about 'eternal' logical-linguistic structure.

Consciousness looks like reification of the world existing for an organism. The world is seen with the help of ('through') particular pair of eyes. But it's the world that's seen and not an image of the world.

What's strange and yet familiar is that this same world is seen with the help of ('through') so many different pairs of eyes.

We have thinkers like Democritus brilliantly postulating that all the stuff of the world is made of indestructible pieces too tiny for us to see. So Democritus himself is made of such pieces. But this does not make the person or his reasons an illusion under which atoms hide. A tree is 'made of' leaves and branches, but the tree is no less real because we can consider it as a unity.

The redness of an apple is a property of that apple within an unshattered lifeworld that includes norms for the application of concepts. Some people mistakenly (or imprudently) insist that 'atoms and void' are on some separate and deeper and realer plane of existence like a substrate. But this forces us into a confused dualism and a reification of consciousness. Our concept of atoms-and-void in the normative realm is somehow supposed to also be radically other than concept.



Also, even 'private experience' happens within the world, as if in a room that only a particular room can access. This is because we include it in our inferences (folk psychology i the manifest image.) We explain a divorce in terms of a headache.

If one looks for meaning in terms not only of use but more specifically in inferential use (normatively governed), then all entities are 'obviously' in one and the same world.

The world is that which is the case. This ineluctably minimal concept of world is that which philosophers can be right or wrong about. It's the apriori target of claims. To deny this is to tell me I am wrong about something -- about what is the case ---which is only to support my point.

I suggest that we look at what the philosophical situation always already accepts (without noticing it) and work outward from that.

But it's the world that's seen and not an image of the world. — plaque flag

I think the focus on sight is a detriment to the discussion. So forget sight for the moment and consider the other senses. It's fine to say that we taste apples, but it's also correct to say that the tastes we taste are not properties of the apple. Tastes are a neurological response to stimulation of the gustatory cells by the chemicals in the apple. We might want to talk about apples having a taste even when not being tasted, but that is properly interpreted in the counterfactual sense of what it would taste like were we to taste it, not in the sense that it has in its own right some material property which is a property of taste. And the claim that there is a right or wrong way for an apple to taste is false. It's not right that sugar tastes sweet. It's just the case that, given the way the human body is, sugar tastes sweet to most humans in most situations. To a different organism (or a human with an uncommon body) sugar might not taste sweet, and that is no more or less correct.

The same with how an apple smells, and how an apples a feels, and how an apple sounds (were it to make a noise).

And the same with how an apple looks. Sight isn't special. The visual characteristics of an apple (such as colour) are a neurological response to stimulation of the photoreceptor cells by light, not properties of the apple. It's not right that apples look red (or green, depending on the apple). It's just the case that, given the way the human body is, apples look red to most humans in most situations. To a different organism (or a human with an uncommon body) apples might not look red, and that is no more or less correct.

(When interpreted with empathy, do Flat-Earther's really exist?)
— sime

Yes. They make claims about our world in our language. Their claims have inferential purchase. If I believe them, I will also believe implications of their claims --- which may be why I can't believe them, for their claims imply others that are not consistent with other of my beliefs. — plaque flag

But do people really share the same belief objects whether agreeing or disagreeing about the truth of a proposition? For how can linguistic conventions decide what the object of a proposition is?

If you accept that the Earth isn't flat, then you presumably accept that a flat Earth cannot be the physical cause of a Flat-Earther's beliefs. In which case, how and in what sense can he be said to be referring to the Earth?

When you interpret a flat earther to be speaking about 'our earth', are you claiming to have knowledge about the speaker's beliefs, intentions, mental state, circumstances and so on? or are you merely referring to what convention says about the speaker's verbal behaviour?

The norms of linguistic convention are certainly correlated to facts about the world, for otherwise nobody would ever trust each other's remarks. But can this justify elevating the status of convention to the ground or justification of meaning? For don't our conventions often mislead and betray us about the facts of truth and meaning?

But can this justify elevating the status of convention to the ground or justification of meaning? For don't our conventions often mislead and betray us about the facts of truth and meaning? — sime

Our conventions continually evolve, precisely because they continually fail us in some ways. I think it's important to call them norms to emphasize their use. I appeal to norms in order to challenge them. I play some norms against other norms. Think of Kinsey offending sex norms by appealing to scientific norms. Think of an atheist when it was riskier to be one offending community religious norms while protected by the norms of individual freedom and rationality.

It'll be hard to understand me if you stick to a representationalist semantics. I like inferentialism, which I connect to something like neorationalism, (resource linked earlier in the thread if you are interested.)

I think what you say makes sense --- within your framework which I don't share.

It's just the case that, given the way the human body is, apples look red to most humans in most situations. — Michael

To me red is a concept that's applied according to certain norms. Saying the apples look red sounds to me like dualism, as if one peels off the redness and leaves the real apple behind.

I've tried to summarize my metaphysics in a new discussion ( I invite you to join.) Our conversation has been great for me, by the way.

I embrace a flat ontology, no dualism. I lean toward understanding consciousness as just the world for a 'discursive' self. So consciousness is not its own thing. It's just the being of the world, which an organism is aware of with the help of eyes and noses, etc. But even dreams of organisms are in the world. We can talk of anger or any entity X as long as it's inferentially linked to all other entities.

To a different organism (or a human with an uncommon body) sugar might not taste sweet, and that is no more or less correct. — Michael

In case it helps, I don't think of words like 'sweet' getting their meaning from this or that quale. Instead concepts are norms, even if in some sense they are aimed at quale (inferentially linked to 'quale.')

If you accept that the Earth isn't flat, then you presumably accept that a flat Earth cannot be the physical cause of a Flat-Earther's beliefs. In which case, how and in what sense can he be said to be referring to the Earth? — sime

Here's an alternative view of meaning.

The master-idea of semantic inferentialism is to look instead to inference, rather than representation, as the basic concept of semantics. What makes something meaningful or contentful in the sense that matters for sapience (rather than the mere sentience we share with many nonlinguistic animals) is the role that it plays in reasoning. The primary vehicle of meaning in this sense is declarative sentences. Those are symbols that can be used to assert, state, or claim that things are thus-and-so. The kind of content they express, “propositional” content, in the philosopher’s jargon, is what can both serve as and stand in need of reasons—that is what can play the role both of premise and of conclusion in inferences.
...
Pragmatism in general is the claim that pragmatics is methodologically, conceptually, and explanatorily prior to semantics—that one should understand the meaning or content expressed by linguistic locutions in terms of their use. The later Wittgenstein, who counseled “Don’t look to the meaning, look to the use,” is a pragmatist in this sense (though he didn’t use that term). Normative pragmatism is the idea that discursive practice is implicitly, but essentially, and not just accidentally, a kind of normative practice. Discursive creatures live, and move, and have their being in a normative space. What one is doing in making a claim, performing the most fundamental kind of speech act, is committing oneself, exercising one’s authority to make oneself responsible.

Understanding someone’s utterance is knowing what they have committed themselves to by producing that performance, by saying what they said—as well as knowing what would entitle them to that commitment, and what is incompatible with it. Those commitments, entitlements, and incompatibilities are inferentially connected to one another. The space discursive creatures move about in by talking is a space of reasons, articulating what would be a reason for or against what. That is what connects normative pragmatism to semantic inferentialism.

Saying the apples look red sounds to me like dualism, as if one peels off the redness and leaves the real apple behind. — plaque flag

It's no different to saying that apples taste sweet.

I don't think of words like 'sweet' getting their meaning from this or that quale. Instead concepts are norms — plaque flag

Then how are we able to disagree on how an apple tastes?

And how does the person with synesthesia come to describe numbers as having colours, given that nobody else in his language community uses colour vocabulary that way?

A flat-earther would be committed to the implications of their view. So one could ask them what happens if one keeps going West forever.

We can look at what statements are accepted as premises and also at what inferences are tolerated. Concepts get their meanings from the claims they are used in in this approach.

It's no different to saying that apples taste sweet. — Michael

I agree that everyday language is very squishy. I probably shouldn't emphasize the anti-dualism too much, because I can assimilate a folk-psychology of what the apple tastes like to Suzy. But the meaning of the-apple's-taste-for-Suzy does not get its meaning from a quale. I say instead that it gets its meaning inferentially. 'Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting, so she threw it out of the car.'

I say instead that it gets its meaning inferentially. 'Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting, so she threw it out of the car.' — plaque flag

What does the word "disgusting" mean in the sentence "Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting, so she threw it out of the car"?

Then how are we able to disagree on how an apple tastes? — Michael

Fair point. Hopefully addressed above.

What does the word "disgusting" mean in the sentence "Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting, so she threw it out of the car"? — Michael

In my view, concepts are not semantic atoms. They get their meanings from the claims that include them.

Which inferences are allowed ?
To me that's central.

[ Also which premises are allowed ? ]

To make a claim is to assume a responsibility.

Ethics is first philosophy.

It'll be hard to understand me if you stick to a representationalist semantics. I like inferentialism, which I connect to something like neorationalism, (resource linked earlier in the thread if you are interested.) — plaque flag

That's odd, because my attacks on conventionalism are precisely an attack on representationalism, including the idea that conventions tell us about what speakers mean.

If meaning is inferential, then the references of a speakers utterances are strongly identified with the local and proximal causes of the speakers utterances, and only weakly identified with distal causes that perfuse the convention the speaker is using in an optional capacity.

How do you reconcile your commitment to inferential semantics with your apparent claim to know the propositional content of speakers utterances?

OK, but I think that these two mean different things:

1. Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting
2. Suzy threw the apple out of the car

We should be able to make sense of the meaning of 1) without reference to 2). Especially as there are any number of reasons that can explain 2):

3. Suzy thought the apple smelled disgusting so she threw it out of the car
4. Suzy thought the apple felt disgusting so she threw it out of the car
5. Suzy thought the apple looked disgusting so she threw it out of the car
6. Suzy is sexually aroused by littering so she threw the apple out of the car

Or even:

7. Suzy thought the apple tasted disgusting but she doesn't like to litter so she didn't throw it out of the car

How an apple tastes (or smells or looks) to Suzy is one thing, and her throwing it out of the car is a different thing entirely.

And I would say that how an apple tastes (or smells or looks) to Suzy concerns what's going on in her head (specifically, with her brain).

That's odd, because my attacks on conventionalism are precisely an attack on representationalism, including the idea that conventions tell us about what speakers mean. — sime

I claim that meaning is public. Claims don't represent claimant's meaning-as-hidden-stuff.

How do you reconcile your commitment to inferential semantics with your apparent claim to know the propositional content of speaker's utterances? — sime

'Content' sounds representational again. The point is to look at which inferences tend to be accepted. Let me emphasize that these norms are 'liquid', unfinished, an infinite task.

Especially as there are any number of reasons that can explain 2): — Michael

:up:

Yes !

So it's no single inference that gives 'disgusting' its meaning. It's all possible inferences involving claims involving 'disgusting.'

Yes !

So it's no single inference that gives 'disgusting' its meaning. It's all possible inferences involving claims involving 'disgusting.' — plaque flag

I think you missed the point. There's no inference that gives "disgusting" it's meaning. The meaning of "the apple tastes disgusting" has nothing to do with whether or not Suzy throws the apple out of the car.