Please believe that not all new users are here to spam your forum. I'm a long time reader and enjoy reading the posts here. I finally had something interesting to share because it reminded me of something that I had a personal connection with. — VanessaD

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A definition of a philosophical concept might be required at the beginning of a discussion only in the case that the term is equivocal. — Jamal

I fall back on my experience here on the forum as the basis for my response - many discussions quickly descend into confusion and lack of direction caused by lack of agreement on what words mean. Prime examples are "consciousness," "metaphysics," "truth," and "reality," but there are plenty more.

It’s possible that T Clark’s approach is more relevant than I thought, although it’s an approach to analyzing TPF discussions in terms of psychology rather than analyzing definition itself. What I mean is, I’ve noticed that people are disagreeing in what seems a temperamental or polarized way rather than substantively. It’s not clear that, for example, @Janus and @Isaac, or @T Clark and I, would really differ much given an actual discussion to look at, and what differences there would be might be to do with temperamental levels of tolerance for troublemaking. — Jamal

This isn't the place to take up the subject, but I don't understand your objection to "personalizing" philosophical issues. As I've noted before, one of the goals of philosophy is self-awareness. For me it is the primary goal. This is certainly true of eastern philosophies, but also western ones. After all, some guy supposedly said "The unexamined life is not worth living." The point, at least the only point, isn't to discuss ideas and reason, we're also here to examine our lives.

I fall back on my experience here on the forum as the basis for my response - many discussions quickly descend into confusion and lack of direction caused by lack of agreement on what words mean. Prime examples are "consciousness," "metaphysics," "truth," and "reality," but there are plenty more. — T Clark

Working out what these things mean is the stuff of philosophy. To restrict the use of a term at the beginning is to shut down the philosophy. I understand your position. My last post was a response to the post of yours in which you appeared to conflate definitions at the beginning of a discussion with definitions as an aim. This is the crucial point.

This isn't the place to take up the subject, but I don't understand your objection to "personalizing" philosophical issues. As I've noted before, one of the goals of philosophy is self-awareness. For me it is the primary goal. This is certainly true of eastern philosophies, but also western ones. After all, some guy supposedly said "The unexamined life is not worth living." The point, at least the only point, isn't to discuss ideas and reason, we're also here to examine our lives. — T Clark

I have explained as clearly as I can what I think is wrong with personalizing everything, so I don’t think I’ll say any more on it. Feel free to continue.

If we are defining something that is empirical (objects), we are determining what counts—not what it is or what is there (@frank), but what we are focusing on about it to include that thing as identified under the definition; we are explaining what distinguishes it for us—say, to pick out a bird as a goldfinch (and not a robin). But we stop once the difference is grasped; so a definition is not about the objects, but to make the distinction clear to the other. Thus we can continue to define what we are talking about until that goal is reach. This unbounded limit is why Kant says it is useless to define empirical concepts, because they are not definite (complete).

But we are in a different class of definition if we are discussing knowing, thinking, intending, etc. We can operate the different uses (senses) of a concept, say, knowing (Do you know his phone number? Do you know New York? I know you’re in pain, suck it up.), but do we simply describe the use? (“I mean ‘know’ in the sense: I know my way around”.) Wittgenstein would say we describe the measures by which we judge whether you do, or do not, as what counts or doesn’t as an apology is already determined, only just unexamined.

To restrict the use of a term at the beginning is to shut down the philosophy. I understand your position. My last post was a response to the post of yours in which you appeared to conflate definitions at the beginning of a discussion with definitions as an aim. This is the crucial point. — Jamal

I'll just repeat what I wrote previously - a lot of the discussions on the forum stink because people never get beyond disagreeing on definitions.

I have explained as clearly as I can what I think is wrong with personalizing everything, so I don’t think I’ll say any more on it. — Jamal

As far as I can tell, you haven't made any kind of case at all beyond that you don't like it, which is ironic. Yes, let's leave it there.

Nine.

a lot of the discussions on the forum stink because people never get beyond disagreeing on definitions. — T Clark

"truth," — T Clark

So let's take that head on. I have defended Davidson's take on Tarski's definition of truth; that the closes we can get to a definition of truth is the T-sentence

"P" is true IFF P

So there's a definition; are you saying that if I start a thread with that definition there ought thereafter be no disagreement on this definition? That no one ought be allowed to enter into the thread with an alternative? That no critique of that definition ought be allowed?

Here's my argument: The T-sentence sets out how truth functions. Therefore pragmatic accounts of truth are erroneous.

Now, how will you, or anyone, respond, given that they must accept my definition?

Now I do not think that you do hold to such a view; and so I am at a loss as to what it is you are supposing we are doing in philosophy.

While I agree, the Tortoise would presumably disagree, since he said something quite the contrary to Achilles. And I think there are plenty of Achilles hereabouts, who hold that we must find firm, certain ground for our assertions to have any value, and for whom the Tortoise presents an insurmountable difficulty.

Achilles and his friends - and I am not sure if @frank is amongst them - think that a good definition fixes the referent of the term involved, in such a way that doubt is not possible. So

"a very large herbivorous mammal of the family Elephantidae, the only extant family of proboscideans and comprising the genera Loxodonta (African elephants) and Elephas (Asian elephants): Elephants of all species are characterized by a long, prehensile trunk formed of the nose and upper lip, pillarlike legs, and prominent tusks, which are possessed by both sexes of Loxodonta and just the males of Elephas." — frank

The Tortoise points out that each of the terms here must also be defined, if we are to achieve certainty. And down the rabbit hole they fall.

And this of course is to be countered by the very argument which which my now surpassed thread began:

Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary.

Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition.

Iterate.

Given that there are a finite number of words in the dictionary, the process will eventually lead to repetition.

If one's goal were to understand a word, one might suppose that one must first understand the words in its definition. But this process is circular.

There must, therefore, be a way of understanding a word that is not given by providing its definition.

Now this seems quite obvious; and yet so many begin their discussion with "let's first define our terms". — Banno

Edit: It appears that @T Clark is a friend of Achilles.

"It can be done," said Achilles. "It has been done! Solvitur ambulando. — Lewis Carroll

But then again, "Solvitur ambulando" has to be the answer.

For what we thereby show is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “winning the race”...

am not sure if frank is amongst them - think that a good definition fixes the referent of the term involved, in such a way that doubt is not possible — Banno

Depends on the situation I guess. With extensional definitions, the reference is buttoned up as much as possible.

It really comes down to what you think about communication between minds. If we're each alone in little isolated bubbles between our ears, there's no way to tell if we really communicate or if we just believe we're doing that.

With a different metaphysics, like we're all connected to a universal mind of some kind, then communication would be easy to explain. We don't live in that era, though. We're blessed and cursed with a physicalist mindset. Communication is going to be a puzzle for us.

Cool.

...extensional definitions... — frank

Like G=df{Frank, the North Pole, electrotherapy}? A list of items?

That assumes that picking out an individual is transparent; that "frank" refers to this frank and not that one. But I don't see any reason to suppose that "frank" is any less problematic than "the author of the post to which this is a reply" - the definition I might give if asked what I mean by "frank".

That is, there is a tendency to think of individuals as somehow more "basic" than descriptions; but when push comes to shove, the one seems to depend on the other.

I've in mind the difference between Wittgenstein's and Russell's versions of logical atomism, the indirect topic of 's recent thread. Is the world all the things, or all the facts?

How do you get things without facts, or facts without things?

...communication between minds... — frank

I don't think this model of language as moving information between minds will work. Think I've mentioned this before. Language is constructed socially, and minds are as much a part of that construction as words.

f we're each alone in little isolated bubbles between our ears, there's no way to tell if we really communicate or if we just believe we're doing that. — frank

...and so that sort of perspective drops out of the discussion.

How do you get things without facts, or facts without things? — Banno

Wasn't that Sartre's point? That the world somehow exists before being broken into pieces? I guess the way we imagine it is that we are the breakers. We impose the ideas and then learn facts from a world we constructed.

As my recent thread points out, though, this narrative is self undermining.

Language is constructed socially, and minds are as much a part of that construction as words. — Banno

Ok. So definitions are also social practices.

f we're each alone in little isolated bubbles between our ears, there's no way to tell if we really communicate or if we just believe we're doing that.
— frank
...and so that sort of perspective drops out of the discussion. — Banno

Ok.

As my recent thread points out, though, this narrative is self undermining. — frank

The myth of the self?

I suspect that there are things such as money, mortgages, governments, schools, and selves. All of 'em, defined recursively by "This counts as..."

I am at a loss as to what it is you are supposing we are doing in philosophy. — Banno

Oh, Banno. You should be ashamed. You're just trying to provoke me.

The myth of the self? — Banno

No, the one about indirect realism.

I've in mind the difference between Wittgenstein's and Russell's versions of logical atomism, the indirect topic of ↪plaque flag's recent thread. Is the world all the things, or all the facts? — Banno

If I claim that the world is the totality of things, I'm trying (?) to get this claim promoted to a hassle-free premise for future inferences.

To me it's about digging into the basic normative structure of 'rational' conversation. What is the most minimal concept of the world ? If I correct so-and-so, I must think that some claims are better than others.

With a different metaphysics, like we're all connected to a universal mind of some kind, then communication would be easy to explain. — frank

I think that's been the traditional view (Aristotle quote below), that we have all private unmediated access to the same set of pure meanings.

Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images.

To me this is a tempting but wrong approach. Our mentalistic folk psychology, very useful in ordinary life, gets adopted without criticism in a more serious metaphysical context. So we get dualism and the container metaphor for communication.

If we forgive the appeal to sensation below, Peirce looks quite sophisticated in his investigation of the definition of reality. This connects to the deflationary approach to truth, I think. The world is the beliefs that an ideal community converges toward. I don't think this is perfect, but it gets the normativity right. We are temporal beings, and truthfinding is an infinite task.


https://courses.media.mit.edu/2004spring/mas966/Peirce%201878%20Make%20Ideas%20Clear.pdf
Let us now approach the subject of logic, and consider a conception which particularly concerns it, that of reality. Taking clearness in the sense of familiarity, no idea could be clearer than this.
Every child uses it with perfect confidence, never dreaming that he does not understand it. As for clearness in its second grade, however, it would probably puzzle most men, even among those of a reflective turn of mind, to give an abstract definition of the real.
...
The only effect which real things have is to cause belief, for all the sensations which they excite emerge into consciousness in the form of beliefs. The question therefore is, how is true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false belief (or belief in fiction). Now, as we have seen in the former paper, the ideas of truth and falsehood, in their full development, appertain exclusively to the experiential method of settling opinion. A person who arbitrarily chooses the propositions which he will adopt can use the word truth only to emphasize the expression of his determination to hold on to his choice.
...
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality.

To me this is a tempting but wrong approach. Our mentalistic folk psychology, very useful in ordinary life, gets adopted without criticism in a more serious metaphysical context. So we get dualism and the container metaphor for communication. — plaque flag

Right. Physicalism or materialism leaves us with that problem: how do meanings travel between heads? Physicalism is part of our present worldview, so that's why we're faced with the issue.

Many would like to point to social interaction as the basis for communication (meaning is use). But where behaviorism is rejected, this view doesn't really seem to do the job it's intended to do. From there, things get sketchy.

Another approach would be to start, tentatively, with what we can't do without. Let metaphysics be the tail instead of the dog.

Right. Physicalism or materialism leaves us with that problem: how do meanings travel between heads? Physicalism is part of our present worldview, so that's why we're faced with the issue. — frank

It's a tricky issue ! My approach is to reject the idea that meaning is a kind of immaterial stuff in the head. An idea is an equivalence class of [ material / physical ] expressions understood as tools. To translate a French sentence into an English sentence is to find a sentence in English that serves roughly the same purpose, does the same job. We focus on similarity of function. We think of ourselves as very clever primates with extremely complicated norms for using marks and noises. Note that 'demoting' ideas 'into' the physical also lifts up the physical. 'Geist' is a staggering complex 'dance' in/of material. But for me there's no final word on what materiality 'really' is. [ Mostly I just avoid supernatural pseudoexplanations and that's 'materialism' enough. ] Quarks and divorces and scientific norms are on the same plane inferentially --- we decide how to use such concepts.

Many would like to point to social interaction as the basis for communication (meaning is use). But where behaviorism is rejected, this view doesn't really seem to do the job it's intended to do. — frank

We don't have to be behaviorist though. Folk psychology (central to the manifest image mentioned by Sellars, which he tried to integrate with the scientific image) gives us all kinds of entities embedded in the reasons we give and ask for in relation to actions and claims. 'She gave him the divorce, even though she was jealous, because she really wanted him to be happy.' 'Please forgive me for bumping into you, [because] it wasn't intentional.'

Another approach would be to start, tentatively, with what we can't do without. — frank

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That's part of what I'm doing in Nothing Is Hidden. But something like public concepts seems to be necessary, because we can't start doing philosophy unless we understand one another to some degree --- and have a world together that we can be more or less right about.

That's part of what I'm doing in Nothing Is Hidden. But something like public concepts seems to be necessary, because we can't start doing philosophy unless we understand one another to some degree --- and have a world together that we can be more or less right about. — plaque flag

I agree

Returning to the definition theme, we might talk about how fluid and constantly renegotiated our concepts are. A definition pretends (?) to be a synchronic snapshot, but it changes what it portrays.
=========================================================================
"Frege followed Kant in emphasizing that logic (and semantics) is a normative discipline: talk about concepts is talk about how we should talk and think, not just about how we actually do. This insight is also very important for me. But Frege seems to have had a platonistic, ontological construal of these conceptual norms, whereas I follow a pragmatist line and see them as implicit in our practice.
...
Thus normativity is not a matter of validating our concepts against some unalterable—let us call them metaphysical—features of reality.
Following Wittgenstein Brandom argues (what I will label) a synchronic thesis, namely, that meaning is determined by use: “The practice of using language must be intelligible as not only the application of concepts by using linguistic expressions, but equally and at the same time as the institution of the conceptual norms that determine what would count as correct and incorrect uses of linguistic expressions. The actual use of the language settles—and is all that could settle—the meanings of the expressions used.
...
He explains: “Carnap and the other logical positivists affirmed their neo-Kantian roots by taking over Kant’s two-phase structure: first one stipulates meanings, then experience dictates which deployments for them yield true theories. The first activity is prior to and independent of experience, the second is constrained by and dependent on it.” The monistic position, by contrast, sees our semantic activities as a single layer, one which “involves settling at once both what we mean and what we believe.”
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/200759399.pdf

Now I do not think that you do hold to such a view; and so I am at a loss as to what it is you are supposing we are doing in philosophy. — Banno

A charitable interpretation of @T Clark’s position is that he is not saying, for example, that in a discussion entitled “What is truth?” we have to agree on what truth is at the start to make any progress—that obviously couldn’t work—but that in a discussion about something else, some other concept, one that depends on the concept of truth, a way of directing the debate is to decide on the definitions of those dependencies, otherwise the wrangling over definitions never ends.

I happen not to agree with this either, because we can usually set aside or ignore any concerns about the definition of these dependencies, relying on shared meaning.

Definitions may be a product of process philosophy. If you are engaged in philosophy why would you dwell in your project on a past byproduct?

A charitable interpretation of T Clark’s position is that he is not saying, for example, that in a discussion entitled “What is truth?” we have to agree on what truth is at the start to make any progress—that obviously couldn’t work—but that in a discussion about something else, some other concept, one that depends on the concept of truth, a way of directing the debate is to decide on the definitions of those dependencies, otherwise the wrangling over definitions never ends. — Jamal

Yes, it is a charitable interpretation. And in line with my thinking. Thank you.

...the wrangling over definitions never ends. — Jamal

That's the nature of philosophy.

Chapter 2.

In which it is discovered that not all words are nouns, and the discussion becomes 'heated'.

Some apocryphal...

In my opinion, it’s a task in life to train oneself to speak as clearly as possible. This isn’t achieved by paying special attention to words, but by clearly formulating theses, so formulated as to be criticizable. People who speak too much about words or concepts or definitions don’t actually bring anything forward that makes a claim to truth. So you can’t do anything against it. A definition is a pure conventional matter.

They only lead to a pretentious, false precision, to the impression that one is particularly precise. But it’s a sham precision, it isn’t genuine clarity. For that reason, I’m against the discussion of terms and definitions. I’m rather for plain, clear speaking. — Karl Popper